Civil Society Project (II) Through Assemblies and Protests: The 2008 Candlelight Protests and Korean Democracy

1. The Candlelight Protests of 2002, 2004, and 2008

[See Table 7. Comparison Table of Candlelight Protests]

Keywords of the Candlelight Protests: "Large-scale Festival," "Netizens," "Web 2.0 Interactive Communication," "Everyday Politics"

Web 2.0

The candlelight protests, which began on May 2nd demanding renegotiation of the import of U.S. beef, have continued for over two months. The large-scale, long-term protests have garnered attention not only from domestic media but also from international media. In the early stages of the candlelight rallies, middle and high school female students emerged as the main force of the protests, and it is assessed that the activation of one-person media utilizing information devices such as mobile phones, wireless internet, and webcams has drawn participation and interest from all walks of life. The fact that some media outlets and social groups competitively broadcasted live TV streams, dramatically increasing interactive communication involving netizens and the general public, is also seen as an achievement. These changes can largely be traced back to the candlelight protests commemorating middle school students in 2002 and the candlelight protests against impeachment in 2004.

Longest and Largest Candlelight Protests in History

Over two months from May 2nd (until July 12th), an estimated 550,000 person-days (organizers estimate 3 million), with overnight protests becoming routine.

Similar to past candlelight protests, this protest was not conducted in the solemn manner led by past activist groups, but rather in a festive format that allowed for long-term participation by a large crowd. This protest is particularly noteworthy for having the largest crowd and the longest duration of candlelight protests. From May 2nd to July 12th, an estimated 2,994,400 people (police estimate 556,600) participated. Notably, in 2008, marathon-style protests lasting extended periods, such as 72-hour and 48-hour relay protests, emerged, and overnight dawn protests, which began as candlelight cultural events and continued until the early morning of the next day confronting the police, became routine.

The candlelight protests commemorating the middle school students Hyosun and Miyun, which began in November 2002 and continued into 2003, saw a total participation of 5 million person-days over approximately 300 occasions. However, this figure includes other issues such as opposition to the dispatch of troops to Iraq after 2003. Based on the initial demands of 'punishment of U.S. soldiers, apology from President Bush, and revision of the SOFA,' approximately 300,000 people participated over 32 days until December 31st. In 2004, following the National Assembly's passage of the impeachment resolution led by the Grand National Party and the Democratic Party, candlelight protests for 'nullification of impeachment and eradication of corruption' took place for 16 days from March 12th to 29th, with 1.5 million person-days of participation.

The organizing committee announced that, starting with the candlelight protest on July 5th, which saw an estimated 500,000 participants (police estimate 50,000), weekday protests would be suspended in favor of weekend-focused demonstrations. Subsequently, on July 12th, the first weekend rally attracted only 20,000 participants (police estimate 3,700). While online and some civic groups are continuing daily candlelight protests to maintain momentum, participation has been limited to around 200-300 people since July 12th.

Netizens Initiate Candlelight Protests, Civic/Activist Groups Follow

Online rumors about mad cow disease and the petition to impeach Lee Myung-bak (exceeding 1 million signatures by May 4th) matured the social atmosphere for the candlelight protests.

The 2008 candlelight protests were initiated by proposals and preparations from online organizations such as Anti-Lee Myung-bak Cafe and MadCow.net. Anti-Lee Myung-bak Cafe organized the first candlelight rally on May 2nd, and MadCow.net proposed a rally on May 3rd. With over 10,000 citizens participating in each (police estimates 5,000 and 7,000 respectively), the protests began to expand in earnest.

The pattern of online proposals initiating candlelight protests, followed by the participation of progressive civic groups like the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy and the People's Solidarity for Progress, is consistent with the experiences of 2002 and 2004. In the 2002 candlelight protests, Kim Ki-bo (ID: Angma), an OhmyNews citizen reporter, proposed the candlelight rally on the joint committee's bulletin board. In 2004, during the impeachment period, candlelight protests initiated by pro-Roh Moo-hyun online groups like "Power of the People" and "Nohsa-mo" gained momentum with the broad participation of citizens.

Begins as a Festival with Diverse Participants; The Emergence of "Candlelight Girls" in 2008

The 2004 candlelight protests already highlighted the participation of the "tie-wearing crowd," "stroller crowd," and families and couples. This was replicated in the 2008 candlelight protests. In past protests led by activist groups, unilateral organization by the hosts and aggressive slogans were common. In the candlelight protests, based on prior online discussions and preparations, participants voluntarily prepared various protest tools (e.g., stickers, uniforms), and free discussions among participants replaced the political speeches of prepared speakers.

The participation of popular entertainers also appears to have contributed to the popularization of the candlelight protests. In 2002, Shin Hae-chul, Yoon Do-hyun, and Kim Jang-hoon participated; in 2004, Kwon Hae-hyo and Moon So-ri joined. In 2008, in addition to familiar faces, individuals like Kim Min-sun, who sparked the "hamburger controversy," and Harisu attracted attention by criticizing U.S. beef imports online. The participation of top singers like Lee Seung-hwan and Kim Jang-hoon led to an estimated 60,000 participants (police estimate over 10,000) at the candlelight rally on May 17th, playing a role in the expansion of the candlelight protests.

The most noticeable group among the participants in the 2008 candlelight protests was the middle and high school female students, symbolized by the "Candlelight Girls." For teenagers, dissatisfaction with the government's policies to intensify educational competition (e.g., English immersion, expansion of specialized high schools, allowance of "zeroth period" classes) since the Presidential Transition Committee period combined with their participation. Not only was the initial proposer of the impeachment petition for Lee Myung-bak a high school sophomore with the ID "Andante," but teenage online communities such as "10s United to Drive Out Mad Cows" and "National Youth Union," with over 570,000 members, played a leading role in the early candlelight protests.

Expansion of participation issues based on lifestyle politics (based on post-materialist values)

The expansion of participating strata is also confirmed by the number of organizations that joined the emergency response committee. In 2002, the National Emergency Response Committee for the Middle School Girl Incident included approximately 130 civic organizations with anti-American tendencies such as the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD), the Korean Federation for Environmental Movement (KFEM), and the People's Alliance. In 2004, the National Action Against the Impeachment included about 550 organizations, including the PSPD and KFEM. By May 2, 2008, 1,513 organizations had joined the Emergency Response Committee for Mad Cow Disease, and this number had expanded to 1,837 organizations as of July 6.

The candlelight vigils of 2002 and 2004, which were held over political issues such as President Bush's apology, the revision of the SOFA, and the nullification of the impeachment, tended to be divided along ideological lines. However, the candlelight vigils in 2008 initially focused on lifestyle political issues, such as the safety of imported U.S. beef, which led to the large-scale participation of non-political organizations like the 'icoop Consumer Cooperative'. Housewives participating through the 'U-mom' community and users of the cooking community site '82cook' took active measures, leading the stroller brigades in organized participation in the rallies.

2. Candlelight Vigils by Phase: The Development Process of the 2008 Candlelight Vigils

[Figure 1] Candlelight Vigil Development Chart [Table 8] Characteristics of Candlelight Vigils by Phase

Although the 2008 candlelight vigils have not yet completely concluded, the period from the first vigil on May 2 to July 12 can be broadly categorized into four phases.

[Ignition Phase] May 2 – May 23 (Candlelight Cultural Events)

In May, the candlelight vigils officially began with two consecutive candlelight cultural events organized by internet-based groups. The first event on May 2 was organized by the National Movement Headquarters for the Impeachment of Lee Myung-bak, and the second on May 3 by the internet café 'Mitchinso.net'. Both events attracted over 10,000 participants, drawing significant attention. Prior to the vigils, critical public opinion regarding the beef import negotiations and the government's hasty handling of the matter had already been forming online. Following the conclusion of the beef negotiations on April 18, concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, widely referred to as the 'mad cow disease scare,' spread, gaining momentum for the impeachment petition against Lee Myung-bak that began online in early April. After surpassing 100,000 signatures on April 29, the number exceeded 500,000 by May 2 and surpassed 1 million by May 4. The broadcast of PD Notebook on April 29 had a significant impact. The parliamentary hearings that began on May 7 revealed the government's hasty negotiations and inadequate response, which appeared to heighten public criticism and increase interest in the candlelight vigils. Around that time (May 6), the Emergency Response Committee for Mad Cow Disease was formed to organize continuous candlelight vigils and ensure efficient preparation. Subsequently, the committee began to take the lead in organizing the vigils, demanding renegotiation of the entire agreement.

The initial candlelight vigils were held in the format of cultural events to circumvent regulations against nighttime protests. They gained attention due to the large participation of high school students in uniform (the so-called 'candlelight girls'), accounting for 50-60% of attendees. With the addition of stroller brigades, the '30s tie brigade,' and participants in their 40s and 50s, along with popular entertainers like Lee Seung-hwan and Kim Jang-hoon attending the cultural events, the number of participants swelled to an estimated 60,000 by May 17 (according to organizers, 11,000 according to police).

Table 1. Presidential Approval Rating Trends (March-May)

On May 2, President Lee Myung-bak stated that "the controversy over the beef negotiations is undesirable." Subsequently, the police announced that "candlelight protests are illegal and will be subject to legal action," focusing solely on preventing the spread of the protests. However, as the number of candlelight vigil participants increased and President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating dropped to 22.6%, the President softened his stance, stating "lack of communication" (May 13), "will serve the people with a humble attitude" (May 15), and "apologetic to the people" (May 22). The scheduled announcement of the 'Sanitary Conditions for U.S. Beef Imports' for May 15 was postponed.

[Climax Phase] May 24 – June 10: First Physical Clashes and the June 10th Rally with 700,000 Participants (80,000 by Police)

With the government and the U.S. clearly stating their refusal to renegotiate, street marches began after the candlelight cultural events starting May 24. When the government announced its intention to re-notify on June 3, the protests gradually intensified. From June 30, chants of "Let's go to the Blue House!" emerged after the cultural events. Clashes between protesters and police occurred during the process of damaging and towing police buses that were set up to block the street marches. Physical confrontations escalated after the first use of water cannons on May 31 and the deployment of special police forces to disperse protesters who had climbed onto police buses.

Table 2. Public Opinion on Candlelight Vigils (Early June)

Amidst widespread distrust in the government, public opinion shifted to blame the government rather than the protesters when the government adopted a hardline stance. Early June opinion polls showed that around 60% of the public believed the candlelight vigils should continue. In particular, the scene of a female university student being assaulted by riot police, which spread online, fueled criticism of the government's hardline response. During this period, President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating plummeted into the 10% range.

Table 3. Presidential Approval Rating (Early June)

The Grand National Party, facing the June 4 by-elections, began to question the government's response at this time. On June 2, the notification scheduled for June 3 was postponed again, and the police shifted from suppression to a more moderate response towards the protesters. This temporarily eased the physical confrontations between the government and the protesters. Following 72-hour relay rallies from June 5 to 8, the candlelight vigils reached their peak on June 10, with an estimated 700,000 participants (80,000 according to police).

[Transformation Phase] June 11 – June 29: Shift to Five Major Political Issues and Second Clash After Official Gazette Publication

The government launched a full-scale effort to de-escalate the beef negotiation crisis. With the strategy of stabilizing public sentiment through additional negotiations akin to renegotiations, additional talks were held with the U.S. from June 13 to 19. These resulted in agreements such as: △ Import of beef from cattle under 30 months of age only, △ Prohibition of imports of four parts deemed high-risk for mad cow disease, and △ Strengthening of the Korean government's quarantine sovereignty. President Lee Myung-bak announced in a special press conference that he "deeply reflects on the beef import crisis" and, on June 20, replaced seven out of eight presidential secretaries and senior secretaries. On June 25, based on the results of the additional negotiations, the government officially published the sanitary conditions for U.S. beef imports in the official gazette.

Table 4. Public Opinion on Candlelight Vigils (Late June)

In the ten days following June 10, public opinion regarding the candlelight vigils underwent a reversal. While President Lee Myung-bak's approval rating remained in the low 20% range, public opinion favoring the cessation (or restraint) of candlelight vigils rose to around 60%. The scale of the candlelight vigils also significantly decreased to between 500 and 1,000 participants after June 14, leading to observations that the candlelight political situation was entering its final phase.

The outcome of additional negotiations was better than expected, and fatigue from the prolonged candlelight vigils also appears to have played a role. Attempts by the Mad Cow Disease Countermeasures Committee and hardline online groups to expand the issue of renegotiating beef imports to five major socio-political agendas (△ opposition to the attempted takeover of public broadcasting △ opposition to the Grand Canal project △ opposition to the privatization of medical services △ opposition to the liberalization of education △ opposition to the privatization of public enterprises) also seem to have contributed to the decrease in candlelight rally participants. As the candlelight vigils, which began with issues of everyday politics, became politicized, the participation of ordinary citizens began to noticeably decline. Under conditions where the momentum of the candlelight vigils was weakening, the hardline faction, centered on participants from online and existing civic movement groups, emerged as the mainstream when the promulgation of the revised trade agreement was pushed through on June 25th. In response, the government also reintroduced water cannons, which had disappeared after June 1st, after a 25-day absence. As physical clashes intensified, the voices of citizens advocating for the candlelight vigils' original non-violent stance were drowned out by the loud calls to "go home if you are not willing to be non-violent." The evaluation began to emerge that the so-called 'flags' had replaced the 'candlelights'.

[Decline Phase] June 30 – July 12: Crisis of Legitimacy for Candlelight Vigils and Restoration of Honor... Possibility of Subsequent War of Attrition

President Lee Myung-bak, who had spoken of deep reflection, stated on June 24, "We will sternly deal with forces that threaten national identity" ahead of the official gazette publication on June 25. On June 29, the prosecution also asserted, "We will thoroughly investigate those involved in violent protests," consistently denying the legitimacy of the candlelight vigils and taking initial suppression measures. This change in attitude, however, harbored the potential for backlash, as it fueled public suspicion about the government's sincerity, given the ongoing resentment towards the Lee Myung-bak administration.

Unlike the situation in late May, when the government's hardline response led to hundreds of thousands of participants in candlelight vigils and resulted in the President's apology, the candlelight vigils lost their self-regulating capacity and initiative in controlling the political situation. Instead, public opinion favoring the cessation of candlelight vigils intensified, and it became difficult to return to the original non-violent path of the vigils through internal discussions. The revelation that there were distortions in the information during the PD Notebook's investigation, which had triggered the beef crisis, further accelerated the crisis of legitimacy for the candlelight vigils themselves.

From June 30 to July 2, the Catholic Priests' Association for Justice held a situation mass, and on July 3 and 4, Protestant and Buddhist communities joined the candlelight vigils, successfully mobilizing the largest crowd since June 10 (500,000 according to organizers, 50,000 according to police) on July 5. However, this can be considered a form of honor restoration aimed at regaining the legitimacy of the candlelight vigils. The symbolic act of six executives of the emergency response committee, who were wanted by the authorities, taking refuge and staging a sit-in at Jogyesa Temple after the July 5 rally indicated that the candlelight vigils, which had lasted for over two months, could no longer be maintained in their existing form. The emergency response committee announced its policy to suspend weekday candlelight vigils. Subsequently, only an estimated 20,000 participants (3,700 according to police on July 12, 3,000 on July 17) attended the candlelight vigils on July 12 and 17, respectively.

Given that U.S. beef has already resumed domestic sales and public opinion favors the cessation of candlelight vigils, it is unlikely that the vigils will be able to attract the same level of crowd participation as before. This period can be considered a decline. However, as distrust in the government persists, the government's current unilateral hardline approach is also drawing backlash. Consequently, rather than a rapid fizzling out or resurgence, the candlelight vigils are likely to become a war of attrition between the government and protesters.

3. Lessons Learned from the Candlelight Vigils

Was early suppression by the government impossible, and did a broad range of the public participate for over two months?

The government cannot overcome the situation solely through the 'rumor theory' and 'behind-the-scenes conspiracy theory'; restoring government trust is key.

Rumors thrive on distrust.

It is true that the "PD Notebook" broadcast that triggered the recent candlelight vigils and the widespread rumors online (initial mad cow disease rumors: transmission through water and air; later rumors related to government's violent suppression: sexual assault of female protesters, suffocation deaths) contributed to the spread of the initial candlelight protests. However, as President Lee Myung-bak himself acknowledged in his apology statement, the government must reflect on its own role in fostering public and protester distrust through communication failures, hasty negotiations, and mismanagement of the subsequent resolution process.

The government itself fostered distrust.

Current public distrust in the government stems from several factors: (1) the transition committee's activities and personnel controversies, (2) politics of exclusion before and after the general election, (3) disregard for public life and sovereignty, (4) the perception of an incompetent government, and (5) inconsistent policies and concerns about sincerity. The stubborn personnel appointments style, starting from the transition committee, deepened the gap between the middle class and the working class, and the nomination process around the general election led to a large number of party defectors. This is also when the once high approval ratings of 70-80% began to plummet. As a result, the ruling party's majority in the National Assembly was threatened shortly before the general election.

The initial response was particularly problematic.

In reality, the full expression of public dissatisfaction through the candlelight vigils occurred when the government rushed the beef import negotiations in haste before the ROK-U.S. summit, facing criticism for 'trading' the inviolable lives and sovereignty of the people for the ROK-U.S. alliance. Furthermore, government officials who appeared at hearings and TV debates were unable to respond adequately, and even faced a controversy over misinterpreting the 'terms of the negotiated agreement,' which amplified doubts about the national administration capabilities and competence emphasized by President Lee Myung-bak.

There was no consistency in policy responses to the public.

While it is natural to implement policies flexibly in response to public opinion, inconsistent enforcement of legal principles, with some ministers expressing different views or a sudden shift to aggressive suppression tactics immediately after the President's "deep reflection" press conference, failed to maintain law and order or quell the protesters' anger. This led to distrust in sincerity and further intensified the emotional responses of the protesters.

Restoring government trust is the fundamental solution to extinguishing the candlelight.

Despite public opinion polls from June 20 (JoongAng Sunday) indicating that the majority favors the cessation or restraint of candlelight vigils, concerns about U.S. beef have not subsided. Furthermore, this has not led to an increase in President Lee Myung-bak's approval ratings for state administration. While it may be difficult to regain the initiative in political affairs as before, as long as distrust in the government serves as the driving force behind the candlelight vigils, restoring government trust appears to be the only fundamental solution to the candlelight issue. It is time to incorporate criticism from various sectors into state administration and strive to build a new foundation of trust.

• Crisis of Representative Democracy and Escalation of Government-Public Conflict

• Crisis of Representative Democracy, Crisis of Trust

• The National Assembly and Political Parties Unable to Act as Mediators for Adjustment and Compromise

A crisis of representative democracy is emerging. Over the past two months, civil society and the government have been in direct confrontation during the candlelight vigils. The National Assembly and political parties, which should serve as intermediaries and buffers between civil society and the state, were nowhere to be seen. This means that the National Assembly and the political establishment lost their function of institutionally mediating and resolving conflicts by representing the diverse demands of civil society, leading civil society to confront the President and the government directly.

According to institutional trust surveys conducted by EAI in 2004 and 2008, and a survey by Seoul National University in 2001, the National Assembly consistently ranked last among 11 surveyed institutions. The same applies to the public's trust in major Korean political parties. The results of the Power Institutions Trust and Influence Survey, which EAI has conducted annually with the JoongAng Ilbo, show that from 2006 to 2008, the Uri Party, the Democratic Party, and the Democratic Labor Party, excluding the Grand National Party, remained at the bottom among the surveyed institutions. The Grand National Party, which was included in the top 10 in 2006 and 2007, fell to 21st place in 2008. [Table 5], [Table 6]

Given the extremely low public trust in the National Assembly and political parties, it is difficult to expect them to mediate or reconcile conflicts between the state and civil society, or within civil society. This is why they were unable to intervene to alleviate or institutionally resolve the conflict between the government and the public, even as the 2008 candlelight protests continued for over two months. In the absence of trusted mediators and buffers, conflicts between the two groups tend to become sharp and prolonged.

[Table 5] Ranking of Institutional Trust Scores (2001-2007)

EAI Social Trust Survey (2004, 2008), Seoul National University Institute for Social Development (2002)

[Table 6] Ranking of Major Political Party Trust (2006-2008)

EAI ∙ JoongAng Ilbo Power Institutions Trust and Influence Survey (2006-2008)

Candlelight Protests and Democracy

The Limits of Collective Intelligence Shown by the Candlelight Protests: The Vacuum of Leadership

Why Insist on Marching to Cheong Wa Dae? Provoked Unnecessary Hardline Response

While distrust in the government and its inept response were the fundamental reasons for the spread of the candlelight protests, the limitations and problems of the candlelight protesters themselves began to intensify as the protests progressed. Most notably, after the initial postponement of the official gazette publication (14th), the protests evolved from cultural events in Cheonggyecheon starting May 24th into street marches, and from the 30th onwards, attempts to advance to Cheong Wa Dae became routine, leading to daily physical clashes with the police.

The preparatory committee argued that their intention was to send a stronger warning message to the government, which remained indifferent to the demand for renegotiation of the beef import agreement, and that the government's hardline response was the root cause of the violence. However, Cheong Wa Dae is the symbol of government authority and the highest governing body. It is difficult for the government to permit a protest by a large crowd in front of Cheong Wa Dae late at night. Even during the 1980s and 1990s, when street protests were common and movements to oust the government were active, attempts to protest at Cheong Wa Dae were considered only twice: during the Gwangju Uprising in 1980 and the democratization protests in 1987. Even then, protesters exercised self-restraint.

The government's interpretation is that the preparatory committee's leadership attempted to politically exploit the beef import issue by exacerbating the situation through clashes between protesters and the government's hardline response. The preparatory committee, in turn, views the government's intention as an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of the candlelight protests by provoking violence through its hardline stance. While the truth of these claims may become clearer through subsequent trials, both the leadership and the netizen groups should have fully considered that a hardline response from the government would be unavoidable if they insisted on marching to Cheong Wa Dae.

Why Ignore Public Opinion? The Spread of Calls for Restraint, Yet Protests Became More Radical

Following the government's decision to proceed with the official gazette publication instead of renegotiating the beef import agreement, a move made with confidence after the additional negotiations on June 20th, protesters who had been losing momentum after the large-scale candlelight rally on June 10th were rapidly drawn into violent protest methods. Although some participants advocated for non-violence during this period, the mainstream sentiment among protesters leaned towards violent protest. Many protesters who did not agree with this shift departed, and the number of participants sharply declined until the religious sector intervened with a special mass.

Despite public opinion polls showing 57-58% in favor of suspending the candlelight protests after June 20th, the protesters disregarded this sentiment, leading to a significant loss of momentum. Faced with the difficulty of abandoning the violent approach themselves, the religious sector emerged as a savior, facilitating a return to non-violent methods. As citizen participation dwindled and the government's hardline response intensified, the situation reached a point where they had to request the participation of established political parties, such as the Democratic Party, which had previously kept their distance.

The Limits of Self-Determination: Leadership Vacuum and Exclusivity

Among netizens, there was resistance to the idea of protest organizations or political forces dominating the candlelight rallies. Simultaneously, the practice of determining protest methods on the fly through online or on-site discussions was glorified as an example of direct democracy. However, its limitations gradually became apparent.

First, there was a leadership vacuum. Initially, the citizens and netizens participating in the candlelight protests demonstrated self-regulatory capabilities by adhering to principles of political purity, non-violence, and voluntary participation. When the government insisted on its principle of no renegotiation, and after June 10th, when the government engaged in additional negotiations and achieved some results, the protesters repeated their demand for renegotiation. Of course, the preparatory committee led an effort to expand the scope of issues on June 16th to include △ defense of public broadcasting △ opposition to health insurance privatization △ opposition to the Four Major Rivers Project △ opposition to educational liberalization △ opposition to public enterprise privatization. As political and social issues, beyond everyday life issues, began to emerge prominently, and physical clashes with the police and conservative groups increased, the departure of voluntary participants became noticeable. In terms of protest methods and tactics, they demonstrated intellectual prowess in devising innovative ideas such as 'crossing the crosswalk' and 'one-person march to Cheong Wa Dae.' However, as time passed and circumstances changed, they failed to produce any alternative strategies for how the candlelight protests could adapt and change while upholding the principles of political purity, non-violence, and voluntary participation.

Second, they limited the values of democracy through their exclusivity and intolerance towards groups that did not participate in or agree with the candlelight protests. In particular, the obstruction of former minister Jeong Un-cheon's speech at the June 10th event was a symbolic incident demonstrating that the protesters themselves had no intention of communicating with the government. While internal discussions and bidirectional communication may have occurred within groups that sympathized with the candlelight protests, they exhibited strong exclusivity in both online and offline spaces towards other groups (the observing group and the opposing group). The collective intelligence displayed by the participants in this candlelight protest demonstrated a limitation of operating only within homogeneous groups, which is another manifestation of groupthink.