Civil Society Projects Through Assemblies and Protests (II) The Politics of Protest After Democratization: Characteristics and Directions for Improvement

1. How Have Assemblies and Protests Changed After Democratization? Changes in Protest Patterns Over 20 Years of Democratization

(1) Number of Cases and Proportion of Street Protests: While the number of assemblies has decreased, the proportion of street protests has increased.

• Increased during the 1997-8 IMF crisis, then decreased again under the Roh Moo-hyun administration. Started increasing again in 2007.

• The proportion of street protests among all assemblies and protests has grown; candlelit vigils have become commonplace.

Since democratization in 1987, the number of reported protests in the media has decreased, but the proportion of street protests has been increasing. Protest-related reports were concentrated in the late 1980s. This finding comes from an analysis of 7,431 protest reports published in the JoongAng Ilbo, Hankyoreh, Weekly Chosun, and Sisa Journal from 1988 to 2007 by the East Asia Institute (Director Lee Sook-jong, Professor at Sungkyunkwan University).

While protest reports were concentrated in the late 1980s, they sharply decreased in the early years of the civilian government. However, they showed a slight increasing trend from 1996 through the late 1990s, coinciding with the IMF crisis. The general strike by labor unions protesting the amendment of the Labor Law and the mass layoffs during the IMF crisis appear to have influenced the increase in protests. After President Kim Dae-jung took office, the number of protests gradually decreased, but then began to rise again. Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, protests subsided again, marked by the impeachment crisis. [Figure 1]

During the early democratization periods of the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam administrations, the proportion of street protests among all assemblies and protests fluctuated depending on the issue. However, during the Kim Dae-jung administration, the proportion of street protests steadily declined. This trend reversed in 2002. Triggered by the incident involving the death of a middle school student, various protests and the candlelit vigils in December led to street marches and assemblies accounting for 72.8% of reported protests in 2002. During the Roh Moo-hyun administration, street assemblies and marches constituted an average of 75.2% of protests. After a subsequent decline, in 2007, this proportion was still fluctuating in the 50% range, even during the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam administrations of the early democratization period in the late 1980s and early 1990s when diverse interests were expressed. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the proportion of street protests was around 32.6% and 33.2% in 1998 and 1999, respectively, and only 12.9% and 16.2% in 2000 and 2001. [Figure 2]

The significant increase in the proportion of street assemblies during the Roh Moo-hyun administration appears to be a result of large-scale candlelit vigils and street assemblies becoming commonplace following the first large-scale candlelit vigil commemorating the middle school student who died in 2002. Major issues such as the protest against the dispatch of troops to Iraq in 2003, the protest against the presidential impeachment in 2004, and the protest against the relocation of the US military base in Pyeongtaek in 2006, all saw the emergence of large-scale street assemblies and candlelit vigils. Even a protest by conservative groups in 2005 urging action on North Korean human rights featured candlelit vigils.

[Figure 1] Number of Protest Reports and Proportion of Street Protests (1988-2007) (case=7431/5529)

Note 1: 1988 is a period before the founding of the Hankyoreh; the analysis is based on reports from the JoongAng Ilbo and Monthly Chosun.

[Figure 2] Changes in Protest Location Distribution by Administration (%, 1988-2007, case=5529)

(2) Changes in Protest Participants and Objectives

• Protests led by white-collar workers constitute the largest proportion.

• The proportion of protests by socially vulnerable groups or those in declining industries (agriculture, livestock, fisheries) has decreased, leading to their marginalization in the politics of protest.

• The proportion of political protests led by youth and students, the main force of the 1980s movement, has sharply declined.

1) Changes in Protest Leadership (1988-2007)

Assemblies and protests since democratization have been led by "tie-wearing" professionals and production workers.

An analysis of 655 assemblies and protests from 1988 to 2007 revealed that office and administrative workers, often referred to as white-collar workers, accounted for the largest proportion of protests at 25.1%. Production workers followed at 22.9%, indicating that laborers have been leading assemblies and protests since democratization. Youth and students (20.4%) and local residents and consumers (12.8%) followed. [Figure 3]

When examining by period, protests led by white-collar workers consistently accounted for the largest proportion, ranging from 22% to 28%. Protests by production workers, excluding a sharp increase to 37.8% during the Kim Dae-jung administration, remained between 16% and 21% under other administrations. This surge appears to be a result of increased protests by these groups following mass layoffs and the rise of non-regular employment in the aftermath of the IMF crisis. While the youth and student groups, who led democratization, still rank high overall at 20.4%, their influence has sharply declined recently. Their participation in protests accounted for 31.5% and 21.4% during the Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam administrations, respectively, but dropped to 9.6% and 9.3% during the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations.

Conversely, protests representing public sector employees (civil servants, military, public enterprise workers) and minorities such as the disabled, women, and foreign workers have steadily increased. While public sector assemblies and minority assemblies accounted for only 3.2% and 2.6%, respectively, during the Roh Tae-woo administration, both rose to 8.2% during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. On average, public sector employee assemblies accounted for only 5.6%, and those for the rights of the disabled, women, and foreign workers accounted for 5.1%. Protests led by workers in declining sectors such as agriculture, livestock, and fisheries in Korea accounted for only 4.8%, decreasing to 3.3% during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. [Figure 4]

The Dilemma of Political Participation in Advanced Democracies: Unequal Voices

Highly educated individuals with political capacity lead protests, while the marginalized are also excluded from protests.

This pattern is not unique to Korea but is also commonly observed in Western advanced democracies. As the "crisis of representation" spreads, where the interests of various social strata are not adequately represented in government or parliament, protests and other non-traditional forms of political participation not only persist but are often led by the middle class and intellectuals who are highly educated and politically aware.

The dilemma lies in the fact that even in non-institutional politics such as assemblies and protests, when led by the middle class or intellectuals, the interests of socially vulnerable groups and minorities are underrepresented (APSA Task Force Report 2004; Russel J. Dalton 1996). While the middle and intellectual classes possess the capacity and resources to protect and realize their interests within the institutional political sphere (parties, interest groups, elections), this is not the case for lower-income or marginalized groups with lower educational attainment.

Democracy guarantees freedom of assembly and protest as a means to protect individual interests and rights. However, when even assemblies and protests have unequal voices, it can lead to the marginalization of those who genuinely need protection. It is time to pay attention to this issue. Korea is not exempt from this dilemma.

[Figure 3] Distribution of Occupations of Major Participants in Assemblies and Protests (1988-2007, %) (response=6553)

Note 1: Professional civic activists surveyed from 2004 onwards.

Note 2: Multiple response analysis, based on response.

Note 3: Cases with missing data excluded.

[Figure 4] Changes in the Composition of Protest Leaders by Administration (%) (1988-2007, response=6533)

Office/management protests steady, production worker protests declining

Leaders of 1980s protests fading

Public sector and minority movements stirring

Note 1: Multiple response analysis, response-based criteria

Note 2: Percentage of protest cases excluding cases with no data

(2) For what purpose and against whom did they fight?

• Labor Unions: Increased focus on interest group nature for material compensation; protests for economic issues (material compensation, economic accountability) highest at 42%

• Professional Associations & Students: 80-90% of protests related to political issues (opposing policies, demanding political accountability)

• Local Movement Organizations: 71.4% of protests related to political issues, 23% to economic issues

Political protests 58.5%, economic protests 41.5%

From 1988 to 2007, the nature of protests remained strongly political. Of the 2,467 cases analyzed, 58.5% were related to political issues, such as opposing specific policies or demanding accountability from specific politicians. The remaining 41.5% were related to economic issues, including demands for material compensation, general economic grievances, requests for changes in economic policy, and demands for accountability (resignation) for failures in economic policy. [Table 1, Figure 5]

White-collar professional associations lead political struggles

White-collar professional associations, which constitute the largest proportion of protesters, are leading rallies and protests primarily on political issues rather than economic ones. Protests demanding political accountability, such as the resignation of specific politicians, accounted for 47.6%, followed by protests against policies (42.4%). Protests demanding material compensation, changes in specific economic policies, or addressing general economic issues collectively accounted for less than 10%. Youth and student groups, as well as local movement organizations, exhibit a similar pattern to professional associations, with a high prevalence of protests related to political issues and little engagement with economic issues. For youth and student groups, protests related to economic issues constituted 19.0%, and for local movement organizations, this figure was only 28.6%. These groups raise concerns about political bias and highlight the need for efforts to realize the members' livelihood and economic interests.

Strengthening of labor unions as interest groups; 54.5% of protests for economic purposes, but a significant proportion are political protests

Meanwhile, labor unions, which led political struggles in the 1980s and 1990s, have largely become stronger as interest groups. Analyzing the demands of protests led by these unions, demands for material compensation were the highest at 29.5%, followed by demands for changes in economic policy or accountability in economic policy decision-making at 12.2%, and general economic demands at 12.8%, totaling 54.5% for economic issues. However, political protests, such as opposing specific political policies (23.3%) or demanding political accountability (22.3%), still constitute a significant proportion at 45.6%.

Government and political circles are primary targets, followed by protests against corporations

With the continued dominance of political struggles, protests are primarily targeted at the government and political circles (National Assembly)/local governments. In 2007 alone, protests targeting the government accounted for 30.1%, and those targeting the National Assembly or political parties were 17.4%. In contrast, the proportion of protests targeting corporations, which significantly increased after the IMF crisis, has decreased in the 2000s. However, it has been on the rise again since 2005. In 2007, protests targeting corporations accounted for 13.1% of the total 6,207 cases, following those targeting the government and political circles. [Figure 6]

[Table 1] Characteristics of Protest Demands by Major Participating Groups (Frequency/%)

[Figure 5] Demands of Major Leading/Participating Groups in Rallies and Protests from 1989 to 2007 (Case=2467)

Note 1: Multiple response analysis, response-based criteria

Note 2: Excluding cases with no data

Note 3: Each figure represents the percentage below

[Figure 6] Trend of Rally and Protest Targets from 1989 to 2007 (%, Case=6207)

2. Twenty Years of Democratization: Proposals for a Mature Culture of Rallies and Protests

• [Three Common Misconceptions about Protests] Demand Acceptance = Protest Scale × Protest Duration × Protest Intensity (Illegal Protest)

• The more people gather, the longer the protest lasts, and the more illegal the protest, the higher the acceptance rate, increasing the social cost of conflict

The misconception that demands can only be met through loud, prolonged, and forceful protests

Analyzing protest reports over the past 20 years reveals that three common misconceptions regarding protests are consistently applied. The idea that demands are more likely to be met if a large number of people protest loudly and for a long duration. [Figure 7], [Figure 8]

First, regarding the scale of protests, small-scale gatherings with fewer than 200 participants accounted for 52.6% of the surveyed cases, medium-scale protests with 200-2,000 participants accounted for 32.0%, and large-scale protests with over 2,000 participants constituted only 15.4%. This indicates that mobilizing large numbers of people is not easy. However, the effect is greater than expected. The rate of demand realization for protests with fewer than 200 participants over the past 20 years was 27.6%, and for medium-scale protests (200-2,000 participants), it was 37.6%. For large-scale protests with over 2,000 participants, this rate increased to 41.3%.

The longer the protest period, the higher the rate of demand acceptance. Regarding the duration of protests, demonstrations lasting less than one day account for 74.9%. Protests lasting from two days to a week constitute only 10.9% of the total 4,018 protests. Long-term protests exceeding one week accounted for 14.3%. It is also difficult to maintain public attention for extended periods. However, protest organizers are tempted by long-term protests because they increase the likelihood of their demands being met. While only 20% of short-term protests (less than one day) reportedly had their demands met, this figure more than doubles to 44.1% when protests last a week. For long-term protests exceeding one week, 68.5% achieved their intended goals.

Indeed, the proportion of long-term and large-scale protests has been increasing recently. For long-term protests exceeding one week, the proportion rose from 14.1% during the Roh Tae-woo administration to 25.6% during the Kim Young-sam administration, the first civilian government. However, due to increased scrutiny of long-term protests after the IMF crisis, the proportion of such protests fell to only 4.7% during the Kim Dae-jung administration, but it began to rise again to 15.9% during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. The same trend is observed for large-scale protests involving over 2,000 participants. While the proportion was 11.9% during the Roh Tae-woo administration and 15.5% during the Kim Young-sam administration, it increased to 21.5% during the Kim Dae-jung administration and 20.6% during the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

[Figure 7] Scale and Duration (1988-2007, %)

(1) Scale (case=4270) (2) Duration (case=4018)

[Figure 8] Difference in Demand Acceptance Rate by Scale and Duration (1988-2007)

(%, scale = 1196, duration case= 1439)

[Figure 9] Change in the Proportion of Protests with Over 2,000 Participants and Exceeding One Week

(%, Scale case=4018, Duration case=4270)

• The myth that illegal protests are more effective

• It is important to raise awareness about the incentives for legal protests

Illegal protests are viewed unfavorably because they disrupt public order and inconvenience other citizens. Due to this social pressure, the proportion of illegal protests, which recorded 43.5% during the Roh Tae-woo administration, decreased to 21.2% during the Kim Young-sam administration and 14.9% during the Kim Dae-jung administration. However, it began to rise again during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, reaching 22.7%. [Figure 10]

The Kim Dae-jung administration was the most stringent towards illegal protests, while the Roh Moo-hyun administration was the most lenient.

Illegal protests are highly correlated with forceful crackdowns. Consequently, since democratization, each administration has exercised greater caution in employing forceful crackdowns. During the Roh Tae-woo administration, the rate of forceful crackdowns, regardless of legality, was 24.1%. This figure was 13.1% during the Kim Young-sam administration, and the Kim Dae-jung (10.6%) and Roh Moo-hyun (10.3%) administrations had the lowest rates of forceful crackdowns. [Figure 11]

However, the approach to illegal protests differed. Immediately after democratization, the Roh Tae-woo administration forcefully cracked down on illegal assemblies at a rate of 55.8%. This rate increased to 67.4% and then to 71.1% during the civilian and the People's government administrations, respectively. These two administrations took a firm stance against illegal protests. In contrast, during the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the rate of forceful intervention in illegal protests significantly decreased to 35.6%. This result lends weight to the criticism that illegal protests were tolerated during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. However, before demanding a firm response to illegal protests, it is necessary to focus on more fundamental issues.

The belief that illegal protests are more effective is the problem.

One of the factors hindering the establishment of a culture of legal protests is the belief that demands can only be met by making loud voices through illegal means. In fact, an analysis of 1,425 protest reports over the past 20 years shows that the probability of demands being met in legal protests is only 28.2%, while it is significantly higher at 42.4% for illegal protests. [Figure 12] [Table 2]

Looking at it by administration, the Roh Tae-woo administration, which had the highest number of illegal protests, also had the highest rate of demand fulfillment for illegal protests at 62.8%. With the rate of demand fulfillment for legal protests at only 33.5%, it seemed as though a rule emerged during this period that demands were only met through illegal protests. During the Kim Young-sam administration, the incentive for illegal protests significantly decreased, with a demand realization rate of 35.0% for illegal protests and 33.5% for legal protests. During the Kim Dae-jung administration, the demand fulfillment rate for illegal protests was 24.6%, which was lower than that for legal protests (29.3%), making legal protests more attractive. Under the Roh Moo-hyun administration, the demand fulfillment rate for illegal protests was relatively low at 28.8% compared to other administrations, but it was still higher than that for legal protests (21.9%). As long as the incentive for illegal protests persists, merely increasing the intensity of the response is not a panacea. While it may contribute to temporarily reducing the number of illegal protests, it will not be a fundamental solution. Instead of increasing the intensity of the response, efforts should be made to ensure consistency in the response and strengthen the incentives for legal protests to encourage voluntary participation from citizens.

[Figure 10] Change in the Proportion of Illegal Protests by Administration (1988-2007, case=5161)

[Figure 11] Comparison of Overall Forceful Crackdown Rate and Forceful Crackdown Rate for Illegal Protests by Administration (%)

Note 1: Forceful crackdown rate case=5018, Forceful crackdown rate for illegal protests case=3954

[Figure 12] Difference in Demand Acceptance Rate by Protest Type (%) (1988-2007, case=1425)

Note 1: Legal protest (legal + was illegal but became legal), Illegal protest (illegal + was legal but became illegal)

Note 2: Looking only at data from 1989-2007, the demand acceptance rate for legal protests is 26.2%, and for illegal protests it is 31.2%, showing a narrowing gap.

[Table 2] Comparison of Demand Acceptance by Protest Type by Administration (%) (1988-2007, case=1425)

• A culture of compromise and conflict resolution is urgently needed.

• Negotiation and mediation achieve 80-90% demand fulfillment; the wisdom of choosing the second-best option over the best is needed.

To address the disruption of public order and social costs caused by illegal protests, it is necessary not only to increase the intensity of the response but also to proactively prevent social conflicts and clashes of interest from escalating into extreme street politics.

Equally important as providing incentives for legal protests is the urgent establishment of institutions and a culture that mediate and reconcile social conflicts and clashes of interest. South Korean society, both during and after democratization, has experienced deepening ideological and political polarization, leading to the neglect of the importance of compromise and mediation. It is even sometimes dismissed as opportunism. Now that South Korean society has passed the threshold of democratization, it is time to cultivate the ability to resolve issues maturely through negotiation and conflict resolution.

Survey results indicate that although attempts at direct negotiation or third-party mediation during protests over the past 20 years have been very low, their effectiveness has exceeded expectations. Among the 2,375 reported protests, direct negotiation occurred in only 17% of cases, while 83% involved no negotiation. Cases where mediation was not attempted amounted to a staggering 89.7%, with only 10.3% involving mediation attempts. Regarding negotiation, except for a peak of 30.5% during the Roh Tae-woo administration, it remained between 10.7% and 14.0% in subsequent administrations. For mediation, it was 14.9% during the Roh Tae-woo administration, but fell below 10% during the Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung administrations, before rising again to 14.0% during the Roh Moo-hyun administration. In absolute terms, the practice of negotiation and mediation for collective action can be assessed as having hardly taken root.

However, when direct negotiations between parties involved in a protest took place, the proportion of demands that were fully or partially met was a remarkable 92.7% (35.5% fully met, 52.3% partially met, 5.0% minor concessions), with only 7.3% of demands not met at all. Conversely, when negotiations did not occur, the proportion of demands met (4.6% fully met, 8.5% partially met, 0.6% minor concessions) was a mere 13.8%. Meanwhile, when third-party arbitration or mediation occurred, the proportion of demands reflected was 34.9% fully met, 47.7% partially met, and 2.7% received promises of acceptance, totaling 85.2%. In the absence of mediation or arbitration efforts, the proportion of protester demands reflected in policy was only 15% (5.0% fully met, 9.4% partially met, 0.5% promises of acceptance).

Of course, partial fulfillment or promises of acceptance may fall short of the participants' initial expectations. However, considering that the proportion of demands completely unmet exceeds 85% when no mediation or negotiation is attempted, it is deemed realistic and desirable to resolve issues through mediation or negotiation.

Despite the visible effectiveness of negotiation and mediation, the primary reason they have been rejected in Korean society is the severe political and social confrontation and conflict, which has eroded social trust. In conditions of eroded trust, a zero-sum mentality, where the other's gain is one's own loss, becomes prevalent. Consequently, the past approach has been to exchange irreconcilable claims and resort to demonstrations of power.

The repeated choice of the worst outcome due to mutual distrust and betrayal is an unfortunate reality for Korean democracy, which has now reached its 20th year since democratization. It is a critical time to choose the second-best option over the worst.

[Figure 13] Proportion of Mediation and Negotiation Attempts (%) (1988-2007)

Note: Negotiation status (case=2375), Mediation status (case=2224)

[Figure 14] Negotiation and Mediation Attempts by Administration (%) (1988-2007)

(1) Proportion of Negotiations During Protests by Administration (case=2375) (2) Proportion of Mediation During Protests by Administration (case=2224)

[Table 3] Difference in Demand Acceptance Rate by Mediation and Negotiation (1988-2007, %)

[Figure 15] Difference in Demand Acceptance by Negotiation and Mediation (%) (1988-2007)

(1) Acceptance Rate by Negotiation Status (case=1539) (2) Acceptance Rate by Mediation Status (case=1442)