NSPR11 [2nd Revision] North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Six-Party Talks

Overview

Since the outbreak of the second North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002, the Korean Peninsula in the 21st century remains entangled in the North Korean nuclear issue at a critical juncture in history. Despite the agreement on a joint statement at the Fourth Six-Party Talks on September 19, 2005, the principle of denuclearization by the United States and the principle of freeze and compensation by North Korea make it difficult to reach a substantive implementation agreement, casting doubt on the possibility of success in final negotiations. In this situation, if the nuclear issue is not resolved quickly and if there is no active response to the history of new civilizational standards, the future of the Korean Peninsula's history in the 21st century is bleak.

As a party to the Six-Party Talks during the North Korean nuclear crisis, South Korea has strived to act as a facilitator for negotiations between North Korea and the United States. However, from the perspective of desiring a resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, there is a tendency to be captivated by idealistic thinking rather than realistic calculation of the interests of each party, leading to a failure to accurately perceive the essence of the problem. This stems from a self-centered mindset that is not thorough in comprehensively considering the interests of the involved parties. For South Korea to play a role in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, it must accurately grasp the interests of each party while clearly understanding the scope and limitations of its own role and demonstrating a realistic approach.

North Korea proposes a phased, simultaneous implementation of "action for action" to resolve the "Korean Peninsula nuclear issue," which includes the United States shifting its policy of hostility towards North Korea to one of peaceful coexistence, North Korea abandoning its nuclear program, the United States eliminating its nuclear threat, normalizing relations, and compensating for economic losses due to denuclearization, and establishing a peace regime. If the issue of implementing the joint statement is not resolved at the Six-Party Talks, North Korea will likely seek ways to leverage its nuclear deterrence again. The two current demands of North Korea—the abandonment of the U.S. policy of hostility and the continued pursuit of nuclear deterrence—are both difficult to achieve at present and carry a high risk of bringing crisis to the Korean Peninsula.

The United States has identified the fight against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) terrorism as a core element of its national security strategy for the 21st century, and is pursuing non-proliferation of WMD and the establishment of an anti-terrorism alliance system. In this context, the United States classifies North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism, addresses the North Korean nuclear issue from the perspective of combating WMD terrorism, and maintains a hardline policy of negotiating only with a North Korea that has transformed into a normal state, not just a nuclear-free one. Against this backdrop, the United States insists on complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization as a prerequisite for the Six-Party Talks. The U.S. strategy involves pursuing the Six-Party Talks while simultaneously preparing to advance alternatives such as the propagation of freedom for regime change, economic sanctions based on the Proliferation Security Initiative, and military sanctions.

Meanwhile, South Korea's three principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue—non-possession of nuclear weapons, peaceful resolution, and a leading role—are contradictory and lack realism. South Korea exhibits an ambiguous stance, differing from the positions of the United States and Japan, which are based on a multi-pronged approach involving the Six-Party Talks, the propagation of freedom, and the Proliferation Security Initiative, particularly in its approach to alternatives for pressuring North Korea. The proposals made by South Korea in the five rounds of Six-Party Talks have limitations in bridging the gap between the U.S. principle of denuclearization and North Korea's principle of freeze and compensation. In this situation, South Korea appears to be focusing on process management, emphasizing the progress of the Six-Party Talks rather than the outcome of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue.

Considering long-term, medium-term, and short-term alternatives for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, South Korea must, in the long term, devise a solution at a higher level—the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue through international cooperation among ethnic groups. This is because a perspective that simultaneously considers the sovereignty and right to survival of both others and our ethnic group is necessary. Resolving the North Korean nuclear issue requires new leadership from the North Korean leadership that pursues 21st-century methods.

Based on new leadership, North Korea should seek ways to implement the reaffirmation of the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and compliance with the norms of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Meanwhile, the United States and other parties should agree to provide legal, economic, and political assurances to North Korea, enabling it to pursue 21st-century solutions.

In the medium term, the South Korean government must accurately assess the consequences should the Six-Party Talks fail and the strategies of North Korea and the United States lead to military conflict, and ensure this is recognized by the parties to the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, to implement the basic agreement for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, a framework that more comprehensively develops the current Six-Party Talks will be necessary.

In the short term, the South Korean government must manage the negotiation process to ensure the continuation of the Six-Party Talks, while accurately assessing strategic changes between North Korea and the United States to formulate realistic countermeasures. Currently, the South Korean government is pursuing a superficial alternative of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through large-scale economic assistance to North Korea and improved relations with relevant parties since the Fourth Six-Party Talks. However, it is difficult to simultaneously satisfy North Korea's fundamental position that the "Korean Peninsula nuclear issue" cannot be resolved without firm political and military guarantees for the Suryong system, and the U.S. fundamental position that the "North Korean nuclear issue" requires prior verifiable and complete denuclearization by North Korea. If the Six-Party Talks fail to yield results, structural instability will deepen. The South Korean government is considering a South-North summit for a breakthrough, but it is unlikely to achieve results at the current stage. The United States will view such efforts as negatively impacting the establishment of an anti-terrorism alliance, and North Korea will use them as a temporary means to defer the issue rather than resolve it.

Author

Ha Young-sun, Professor at Seoul National University

Chun Jae-sung, Professor at Seoul National University