NSPR10 US Strategy in East Asia and the Pacific: Changes and Continuities

Overview

With the so-called "Global War on Terror" (GWOT) emerging as the paramount issue in U.S. foreign and security policy after 9/11, American foreign policy toward specific regions like Europe and East Asia gradually receded from public attention. While the U.S. devoted over four years to the war on terror, China accelerated its bilateral and multilateral diplomacy in the East Asia-Pacific region, challenging the diplomatic dominance of the U.S. and Japan. Ultimately, the U.S. found itself compelled to confront both the 21st-century security threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation, and the 19th-century security threat posed by the emergence of China as a potential hegemonic challenger. Future U.S. strategy in East Asia and the Pacific will encompass measures to address these 'dual challenges'.

The foreign policy of the second Bush administration will maintain an offensive posture, adding the promotion of freedom to its existing agenda of counter-terrorism and non-proliferation. However, its execution will exhibit a stylistic shift, emphasizing consultation with allies and seeking international support. Since the end of the Cold War, successive U.S. administrations have demonstrated continuity and change in their policies regarding alliances, China, regional presence and cooperation, and Korean Peninsula policy. The East Asia-Pacific strategy of the second Bush administration will include the establishment of a counter-terrorism alliance system, a dual approach of cooperation and competition with China, the complementary use of regional and multilateral frameworks, and the readjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance and a 'transformational diplomacy' toward North Korea.

In terms of alliance policy, the Bush administration will prioritize the consolidation of a 'new alliance system' that facilitates rapid response to North Korean nuclear issues, terrorism, and humanitarian crises. This system will be based on cooperative frameworks involving multiple allies and smaller base structures, rather than the traditional alliance system that pursues integrated strategies centered on large-scale military bases. The Bush administration, referring to Japan as a 'global partner,' will pursue explicit or implicit strategic common goals to materialize the 'globalization' of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Notably, as the two countries account for 40% of global development aid, they will redouble efforts to systematize development aid strategically, in accordance with the 'strategic development alliance' proposed by Secretary of State Rice in March 2005.

One of the core elements of the U.S.'s new East Asia-Pacific strategy is the 'strategic flexibility' of U.S. forces in the region. Therefore, the ROK and the U.S. will seek to resolve this issue through the principle of "acknowledging the strategic flexibility of U.S. Forces Korea, predicated on prior consultations." The U.S. is also pursuing trilateral strategic dialogues among the U.S., Australia, and Japan to strategically link the U.S.-Australia alliance and the U.S.-Japan alliance. Specifically, the U.S. will seek to 'constrain' the expansion of China's influence by fostering strategic partnerships between India and Japan, thereby working with Japan, Australia, and India.

The U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005" stated that "China's military power is a threat not only to the Taiwan Strait but also to East Asia and, by extension, to the United States." This marked the first time since the launch of the Bush administration that China's threat was emphasized as regional in scope within East Asia and the Pacific, rather than being confined to cross-Strait relations. While continuing economic and counter-terrorism cooperation with China, the Bush administration appears poised to contain China from the left (expanding U.S. military presence in Central Asia), right (strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, readjusting the ROK-U.S. alliance), and below (strengthening cooperation with Vietnam and India, establishing a counter-terrorism regime in Southeast Asia), keeping in mind the potential for conflict in long-term strategic interests.

The U.S. will adopt a cautious approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. The Bush administration, needing to guard against the potential 'escalation' of the Iranian nuclear issue, will adhere to the Six-Party Talks framework until a consensus emerges within the international community that "North Korea's demands are excessive," in order to prevent a 'simultaneous escalation' of the North Korean nuclear issue. In seeking a resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue, the Bush administration will postpone discussions on establishing a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula as much as possible to prevent North Korea from attempting to broaden the scope of the issue beyond nuclear matters to areas such as establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, thereby diluting the focus on the nuclear issue and impacting the status of U.S. Forces Korea. Concurrently, the U.S. will highlight the issue of North Korean human rights.

The U.S. will also increase its interest in regional multilateralism and regional diplomacy as mechanisms to complement the new alliance system. As regional security issues become more comprehensive in scope, and given the complex obstacles to addressing them alone or solely through alliances, the U.S. is expected to adopt a more proactive stance toward regional multilateral cooperation organizations. This aims to counter China's assertive multilateral and regional diplomacy and to maintain and expand U.S. regional leadership. However, it will emphasize 'Asia Pacific regionalism' rather than 'East Asian regionalism,' encompassing cooperation not only with East Asian countries but also with Pacific nations such as Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

This U.S. strategy for East Asia and the Pacific presents several strategic challenges for South Korea and simultaneously demands efforts to bridge strategic gaps. First, South Korea must emphasize that while centering its strategic axis on the ROK-U.S. alliance, it is strategically advantageous for the U.S. to play a role in maintaining strategic balance between China and Japan rather than containing China, thereby satisfying the positions of regional countries, including the U.S.

Second, by taking the lead in sub-regional cooperation among Northeast Asian countries, South Korea should participate in and contribute to 'Asia Pacific regionalism,' which includes Pacific nations like Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, rather than exclusively 'East Asian regionalism.' This approach would satisfy both China and the U.S. without damaging ROK-China cooperative relations.

Third, both countries must agree on and flesh out the vision of the ROK-U.S. alliance continuing as a 'comprehensive and dynamic alliance' even after the North Korean threat has disappeared. A comprehensive ROK-U.S. alliance refers to an alliance that can contribute to the revitalization of regional multilateral security cooperation by comprehensively addressing new security threats such as terrorism, drugs, environmental pollution, illegal human trafficking, and piracy. Meanwhile, a dynamic alliance relationship signifies playing the role of a 'dynamic balancer' that actively responds not only to the North Korean threat but also to 'new' threats arising from strategic competition between China and Japan.

Fourth, South Korea should maintain its alliance with the United States while expanding strategic dialogue and exchanges with China, Japan, and Russia, under the overarching principle of not targeting any specific country as an adversary. This entails consolidating the ROK-Japan partnership in the 21st century and establishing strategic relationships with China and Russia. In particular, given the necessity of cooperation with China in crucial areas such as the North Korean nuclear issue and missile development, ROK-China cooperative relations must be continuously deepened.

Finally, South Korea should lead in establishing minilateralism within Northeast Asia. Prior to establishing a Northeast Asian multilateral cooperation body that comprehensively encompasses the Korean Peninsula and the four major powers, the activation of trilateral minilateral consultative bodies can serve as a catalyst for the establishment of a Northeast Asian security cooperation framework. South Korea should promote trilateral official and unofficial dialogues among the ROK, U.S., and Japan, and among the ROK, China, and Japan, to foster the stabilization of U.S.-China relations and China-Japan relations concerning the Korean Peninsula issue.

Author

Kim Sung-han, Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security