NSPR9 Military Empire in the Information Age

Overview

The ROK and the U.S. currently face various challenges. The tasks that the ROK-U.S. alliance must overcome are numerous, including the gap in threat perception regarding North Korea, the increasing nationalistic sentiment among the Korean people, and changes in alliance perceptions due to the U.S.'s revision of its global strategy. The reason these challenging factors are emerging is that the fundamental situation of the ROK-U.S. alliance is changing. Controversies surrounding strategic flexibility and Operation Plan 5029 are issues that clearly reveal the differences in perspective between the two countries. To discuss these issues, the ROK and the U.S. launched the ROK-U.S. Security Policy Consultation (SPI) to study the future of the alliance, replacing FOTA, late last year, but the blueprint that will determine the alliance's future remains largely incomplete.

The U.S. Forces Korea (USFK), the backbone of the ROK-U.S. alliance, is currently undergoing a full-scale adjustment process. The core of the USFK reduction plan, which the ROK and the U.S. have finally agreed upon, is to reduce 12,500 USFK personnel, including the 2nd Infantry Division's Stryker Brigade Combat Team deployed to support the Iraq War, in three phases from 2004 to 2008. In addition, the two countries have agreed to relocate the Yongsan Garrison and move the 2nd Infantry Division to Osan/Pyeongtaek. With this, the reduction of USFK and the readjustment of the ROK-U.S. alliance have entered full swing.

The security environment on the Korean Peninsula is currently very unstable due to the second North Korean nuclear crisis. At a time when U.S. security contributions, which have played a role in Korean security for the past half-century, are more desperately needed than ever before, why is the U.S. pursuing such significant changes as USFK reduction and alliance readjustment?

The recent changes in the ROK-U.S. alliance are not an issue that emerged suddenly. In fact, the U.S. Department of Defense began re-examining U.S. alliance policy and overseas basing policy globally immediately after the end of the Cold War, and this process has accelerated further after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The core of the change in the international security environment after 9/11 is that the types and kinds of security threats are expanding beyond traditional state-to-state relations, and accordingly, the actors of security threats are expanding to include various non-state actors, requiring a different approach to establishing and managing international relations than in the past. In particular, various asymmetric threats, such as weapons of mass destruction and large-scale terrorism, have become core issues of 21st-century security.

To cope with these changes in the security environment, the U.S. is fundamentally re-examining its military strategy. The core of the change is a new military strategy to counter new threats, and the global readjustment of U.S. overseas bases and the re-establishment of alliance networks are important parts of this new military strategy. Throughout the Cold War, U.S. military strategy placed primary importance on large-scale forces deployed on the front lines of the Cold War. However, post-Cold War military strategy places greater significance on the network connecting bases rather than a base-centric approach. These changes have significant implications for South Korea, which is in an alliance relationship with the U.S.

The most emphasized area in the U.S.'s new military security strategy is the construction of advanced military capabilities using cutting-edge technology. Various studies and discussions are underway in this regard.

First is the study of military innovation and military transformation. Military innovation means fundamentally changing the way of warfare by applying advanced information technology to military power, thereby changing organizations and doctrines. Military transformation is the process of actually applying military innovation to change the military's constitution, the core of which is to convert industrial-era military power into information-age military power by applying advanced information science and technology and to transition from a Cold War military posture to a post-Cold War military posture.

Second is the concept of network-centric warfare. Network-centric warfare, like network-centric computing, is a concept that builds a global communication network to allow any platform—from warships, aircraft, and ground combat vehicles to even individual infantrymen—to log in to the network at any time and freely upload and download data. As long as weapon systems are present on the network, regardless of their location on the battlefield, they can not only participate in rapid, effects-based concentrated attacks but also significantly reduce transportation requirements, and the common knowledge held by combat personnel increases. In this case, how platforms can operate jointly becomes much more important than what the platforms are.

Third, recent U.S. military doctrine tends to emphasize the importance of Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO). RDO emphasizes three-dimensionality, integration, precision, and agility, demonstrating that future warfare will be conducted as simultaneous and parallel air-ground joint operations rather than sequential ones. According to U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff data, RDO is a joint operational concept for future warfare. RDO combines knowledge, command and control, and effect-based operations to achieve desired political and military outcomes. Through RDO, the U.S. and its allies, connected by networks, will launch asymmetric offensives across directions and dimensions that the enemy cannot resist, thereby dominating the operational conditions and tempo.

The concepts of network-centric warfare and RDO have already proven their effectiveness through the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, on the other hand, there are strong counterarguments that advanced technology warfare is not the only variable that will dominate future battlefields. Future wars are likely to be a mix of advanced and conventional warfare, and while air and naval power and precision weapons will lead the overall trend of the war, the involvement of rifle-wielding infantry will still be necessary for its conclusion.

As such, the U.S. is establishing and increasingly refining a new concept of alliance based on the changed security environment and military doctrine. The core of the new alliance concept is not a fixed regional alliance based on mutual defense treaties as in the past, but a flexible coalition based on missions and a multidimensional network connecting allied nations. In line with the new alliance concept, the U.S. Department of Defense is changing its military security strategy from a point-to-line approach to a network-oriented approach. The changes pursued by the U.S. military security strategy are manifested in military innovation and transformation based on advanced IT technology in terms of hardware, and in the networking of alliance and basing policies in terms of software.

The transformation of U.S. military power to cope with the new security environment is proceeding on three levels: alliance networks, military capabilities, and global defense posture. The reorganization of the global defense posture is known as GPR. From our perspective, the aspects that deserve particular attention are the adjustment of the global defense posture and the subsequent reorganization of the alliance network.

First, the adjustment of the global defense posture involves adjusting the deployment of U.S. forces overseas to accurately reflect the realities of the new security environment. During the Cold War, the U.S. maintained a strategy of stationing large forces in fortified positions on the front lines confronting the enemy to deter the enemy, demonstrate its commitment to defending allies, and respond immediately in the event of hostile actions. However, with the end of the Cold War, the U.S. military must be able to respond rapidly to changing situations, so it will follow a rotational deployment pattern of smaller facilities rather than relying on large overseas permanent bases.

Second, the core of the new global defense posture is to respond more efficiently and flexibly to the war on terror and future threats. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen existing alliance networks, create new alliances, and be flexible enough to extend a hand to past adversaries.

Third, continuous military transformation must accompany the adjustment of the global defense posture. In the past, the U.S. military was organized to fight large armies, but now it requires agile movements, such as fighting small terrorist networks. Therefore, in the future, small, modular brigades will be preferred over large, cumbersome divisions, along with advanced communications, jointness and integration between echelons, and rapid and efficient coordination. Network-centric warfare and joint and combined operations are essential in the wars of the new era.

What can be understood from these discussions is that the importance of networks in the 21st-century military security environment will continue to increase, and that U.S. military strategy is changing in response. The nature of military security in the 21st century will shift from state-to-state warfare to state-vs-network warfare, and while the dominant mode of warfare will still occur at the state level, the proportion of networks in warfare is expected to become increasingly important.

South Korea is linked to the U.S. by a military alliance. Therefore, changes in U.S. military strategy have important implications for South Korea's security. For this reason, a comprehensive understanding of U.S. military security strategy is very important, and it is necessary to understand the network strategy of the 21st-century empire by intensively analyzing the aspects of the new military strategy that reveal network characteristics. The U.S. is also seeking to network its military security strategy as an alternative to overcome the limitations that cannot be resolved even with the overwhelming power of a superpower, such as changes in overseas basing policy, changes in alliance policy, and the establishment of a counter-terrorism and non-proliferation coalition. In this regard, there are several questions we should ask ourselves.

First, a sober review is needed on why we require cooperation with the U.S. and why the U.S. requires an alliance with South Korea. At least until the peaceful unification of the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. alliance is the most viable means of supplementing South Korea's military security capabilities in case of emergency. From the U.S. perspective, given the gradually visible moves by China and Russia to expand their influence in the U.S., the ROK-U.S. alliance serves to complement U.S.-Japan security cooperation. Therefore, from the U.S. perspective, the ROK-U.S. alliance is judged to have strategic value. Considering these circumstances, it is desirable for the ROK-U.S. alliance to be maintained closely at least at the current level, but how to overcome the exclusivity of the ROK-U.S. alliance, especially the concern that it may be perceived as encircling China, remains an important task for the future of the alliance.

Second, what are the tasks for the ROK-U.S. alliance, considering the global transformation of U.S. military security strategy? During the transition period of alliance adjustment, what we should keep in mind is, first and foremost, the consideration of interoperability of the ROK-U.S. alliance. In the future, the ROK and the U.S. must carefully consider how to maintain the alliance network. Although the tripwire role of USFK has been eliminated with the relocation of the 2nd Infantry Division south of the Han River, the 'tripwire of trust' must be maintained, and for the alliance to function properly in the 21st century, the military forces of both countries must strengthen their networks under the concept of interoperability.

Third, the relocation of USFK, a concrete expression of U.S. military innovation in the 21st century, is not merely a matter of self-reliant defense, but must be remembered as a problem directly linked to South Korea's military innovation in the 21st century. The relocation of USFK is not something to worry about but a message that we must make the most of the time we have left. It is now time for us to seriously consider Korean-style military transformation. It is neither possible nor desirable for South Korea to pursue military transformation focused on advanced technology like the U.S. Therefore, if South Korea is to pursue military transformation suited to its own situation, an urgent review of priorities is needed regarding what should be considered.

Fourth, in an increasingly networked international security environment, what kind of network should we lead? Within the large network of the ROK-U.S. alliance, we need to seriously consider and research what kind of network we should establish to secure our survival and achieve peace and prosperity in the future security environment. While it is true that there are concerns about entering the U.S.-led network, it is necessary to recognize that the benefits of strengthening the alliance are relatively greater than the risks of alliance relaxation.

In conclusion, the future world will be an era where it is crucial how powerful actors in international politics utilize the multi-layered spiderwebs they have spun. The environment in which we must live will continue to be a U.S.-centric network for a considerable period. However, this does not mean neglecting networks with countries other than the U.S. The future environment in which South Korea will exist is an era of complex, intertwined networks at the domestic, Korean Peninsula, Northeast Asian, and global levels. First, we must effectively utilize the network spun by the U.S., and strive to create our own independent networks to the best of our ability around the Korean Peninsula. In Northeast Asia, the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely counter the strengthening military-security cooperation between China and Russia, which is becoming increasingly visible, but in an era of complex networks, there is no need to define this as a binary choice and limit our own room for maneuver. If we do not have the ability to spin webs that ensnare others, then effectively utilizing the webs spun by others will be the wisdom for the survival of a nation like South Korea, surrounded by great powers.

Author

Lee Sang-hyun, Sejong Institute