France's National Rally (RN) Crosses the Senate Threshold, But Its De-demonization Narrative Falters
Executive Summary
In the French Senate elections, the National Rally (RN), alongside its ally the Union of the Right for the Republic (UDR), secured at least 14 seats, forming a parliamentary group for the first time in its history. Rather than a reversal of power, this is evaluated as an entry into the political establishment by breaching the fortress of the indirect local election system—a result of its cumulative local organizing strategy. However, immediately following the election, revelations of anti-Semitic messages from 2013 targeting Jordan Bardella emerged, shaking the very foundation of the RN's "de-demonization" narrative, which is central to its strategy for taking power. As its structural asset (its Senate status) and its narrative asset (its image strategy) move at different speeds, the 2027 presidential election landscape and Marine Le Pen's succession plan could be reshaped depending on judicial proceedings and public opinion trends. Given that France is a core EU member state and a participant in NATO's integrated military command, the rise of the RN could impact policies toward Russia and the European strategic autonomy line, requiring close monitoring of EU trends and the European security landscape.
I. Analysis of the Current Issue
Le Pen Crosses the Senate, But Bardella's Ground Shakes
A Threshold Created by 14 Seats, But No Tectonic Shift
In the French Senate elections held on September 27, the National Rally (RN) and its allies secured at least 14 out of 348 seats[1]. While the number itself is not large, the significance changes considering that the threshold for forming a parliamentary group in the Senate is 10 seats. The RN has crossed this threshold for the first time since its founding[1]. Party President Jordan Bardella announced that the party formed a parliamentary group in partnership with the Union of the Right for the Republic (UDR), led by Éric Ciotti. Edwige Diaz was designated as the leader of the parliamentary group.
Marine Le Pen evaluated the result as "more than we could have hoped for"[4]. She called it a "historic victory" and a "breakthrough" that accelerates the far-right's entry into the political mainstream[4]. However, looking at the overall composition of the Senate, The Republicans (LR) remain the largest force, followed by the Socialist group and the centrist coalition. The RN has merely risen to become one of the major forces in the Senate alongside Macron's centrist coalition and the Socialists[4]. The common tone of local media coverage is that this represents entry into the political establishment rather than a reversal of power.
To understand this election result, one must examine the unique nature of the Senate as an institution. French senators are not elected by direct popular vote but through an indirect election by an electoral college of local officials. Traditionally, because of the high proportion of representatives from rural areas and small-to-medium communes, the Senate has been considered a structure difficult for emerging forces like the RN to penetrate. The fact that the RN has formed a parliamentary group in such a chamber is read as a signal that the party is no longer confined to major cities and younger demographics, but has begun to take root in local political networks.
Anti-Semitic Message Controversy: Cracks in the De-demonization Strategy
A report published three days after the election shook the RN's strategic foundation. On September 28, the investigative outlet Mediapart disclosed instant messaging conversations from 2013 allegedly belonging to Bardella, who was then a youth member of the National Front (FN)[11]. Bardella immediately denied the allegations, calling them a "crude fabrication"[11]. He characterized the situation as an "all-out effort to destabilize" Le Pen's 2027 presidential campaign[15].
Mediapart did not back down. On October 1, it released additional excerpts of the 2013 conversations, which it claimed were authenticated through Meta and a bailiff[13]. In response, the RN had initially countered that it was an "unfounded defamatory campaign," but the outlet essentially provided the very "evidence" in question[13]. Bardella's camp maintains that they will file a counter-lawsuit for forgery and defamation. Le Pen has characterized the incident as a "dirty trick (barbouzerie)," maintaining a conspiracy-theory frame.
President Emmanuel Macron also took a direct stance. On September 30, he described the allegations of anti-Semitic remarks against Bardella as "extremely serious and unacceptable"[15]. It is unusual for the president to publicly comment on a personal scandal involving an opposition leader. This reflects a consensus within political circles that the issue is not mere gossip but could impact the entire landscape of the 2027 presidential election.
There is another reason why this controversy is fatal. Bardella had been redefining the RN's image, notably at an international conference on combating anti-Semitism held in Jerusalem in March 2025, where he blamed Islamic fundamentalism and the radical left for the resurgence of anti-Semitism. Al-Monitor pointed out that the report emerged just as the RN was "seeking to shed its racist image and build close ties with Israel"[11]. The symbolic face of the de-demonization strategy is now shaken by allegations that contradict this very effort.
The 2027 Presidential Election: Two Coexisting Scenarios
Polling numbers point to Le Pen's lead. In a Toluna Harris Interactive poll conducted on September 22–24 commissioned by M6 and RTL, Le Pen was projected to win 35–36% of the vote in the first round, an increase from the 33% recorded in a September 14 poll[7]. Jean-Luc Mélenchon of the far-left La France Insoumise (LFI) was projected at 17–18% as her likely opponent in the second round[7]. Former Prime Minister Édouard Philippe, the frontrunner of the centrist camp, stood at only 13–16%, making his advancement to the runoff uncertain[7].
Within this framework, the issue of Le Pen's eligibility to run for office remains a variable. In July, the Paris Court of Appeal reduced Le Pen's period of ineligibility to 45 months (including a 30-month suspended sentence). While running in the 2027 presidential election itself became possible, she would have to campaign while wearing an electronic monitoring ankle bracelet. If Le Pen is ultimately unable to run, there was a strong expectation both inside and outside the party that her "successor," Bardella, would take over the candidacy. The current anti-Semitism controversy directly shakes the credibility of this "Plan B" option, carrying implications that go far beyond a simple personal scandal.
Competition within the conservative camp is also a variable. Bruno Retailleau of The Republicans (LR) emerged as a presidential candidate after securing official support from the European conservative bloc at the European People's Party (EPP) assembly held in Toulouse on September 28[16]. In an interview with Le Monde, he stated, "The problem with Europe is that it has given people the feeling that democracy is being bypassed," causing controversy even within the EPP with pledges that challenge the primacy of EU law[16]. This indicates that a trend of challenging the functioning of the European Union is growing simultaneously not only within the RN but also among hardline conservatives within the LR.
Interests of Key Actors
National Rally (RN): Le Pen seeks to use the formation of the Senate parliamentary group as momentum for her presidential run[4][1]. Bardella is in a position where he must simultaneously defend against the anti-Semitism allegations and build relations with Israel[11]. Internally, the party's immediate task is managing the credibility of the "succession plan" prepared for Le Pen's eligibility risk.
President Macron and the Centrist Camp: Macron directly intervened in the allegations against Bardella, defining them as "extremely serious" in an apparent bid to drive a wedge into the RN's de-demonization strategy[15]. In a special feature on the "dismantling of Macronism," Le Monde described the August 2026 funeral of Senator François Patriat, a close ally of Macron, as a symbolic scene of the decline of Macronism[14]. This reflects the view that the weakening of the centrist camp's organizational foundation is occurring in tandem with the RN's entry into the political establishment.
The Republicans (LR) and Bruno Retailleau: While maintaining its status as the largest force in the Senate, Retailleau is solidifying his position as the conservative presidential candidate by securing official EPP support[16]. His challenging stance on the primacy of EU law reflects a Eurosceptic sentiment that, while distinct from the RN, partially overlaps with it.
Mediapart: Taking on the role of vetting the past remarks of the RN leadership through investigative reporting, the outlet sought to enhance the credibility of its reporting by disclosing authentication procedures involving Meta and a bailiff[13].
Mélenchon (LFI): As the only candidate from the far-left camp projected as a potential contender for the second round, the prospect of a Le Pen-Mélenchon runoff itself symbolizes the weakening of France's traditional two-party system (The Republicans and the Socialist Party)[7].
Core Issues: Simultaneous Entry into the Establishment and Credibility Crisis
The core issue lies in the intersection of these two trends at the same time. On one hand, the RN has achieved a structural milestone by forming a Senate parliamentary group. On the other hand, the personal credibility of the key figure who drove this achievement is being shaken by anti-Semitism allegations. If these two trends diverge, the possibility of a wholesale readjustment of the RN's entire presidential strategy cannot be ruled out.
This shift in French domestic politics carries implications at the EU level. France, along with Germany, is a core member state considered one of the two main pillars of EU operations. If the RN expands its institutional foothold in the Senate and solidifies its status as a leading candidate in the 2027 presidential election, France's stance on the primacy of EU law or discussions on strategic autonomy could shift[16]. As Retailleau's questioning of the primacy of EU law and the RN's traditional Euroscepticism align, variables are multiplying in the very way policies are coordinated within the EU.
This shift also has the potential to indirectly influence European policy lines regarding the Russia-Ukraine war. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has noted that far-right forces are rising simultaneously across Europe—including France's RN, Spain's Vox, and Vannacci's new party in Italy—and is closely watching whether this trend will bring changes to Europe's policy toward Russia[5]. Given that the RN has traditionally taken a friendly stance toward Russia, this issue is also indirectly linked to the domestic political landscape within Russia. A single institutional event like forming a Senate parliamentary group will not immediately resolve these three areas. However, because this event reveals a facet of the larger structural shift that will unfold leading up to 2027, it remains an indispensable indicator for monitoring EU trends.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
The Deep Currents Beneath the Senate: Three Structures Explaining the RN's Surge
Why the Fortress of the Indirect Election System Was Breached
The French Senate was originally an institution designed to disadvantage the far-right. Senators are not directly elected by the public. Instead, an electoral college composed of members of the National Assembly, regional and departmental councilors, and, above all, delegates from municipal communes elects them. This structure, which allocates representation by commune rather than in proportion to population, overrepresents votes from small rural towns. This is why the RN has long complained about this Senate electoral college, calling it a "fortress of the Republic."
The background behind the cracks in this fortress is multifaceted. The most direct driver is the local election strategy that the RN has pursued since the late 2010s. Under Bardella's leadership, the RN differs from the past FN, which focused solely on national-level elections like presidential and legislative elections. It chose a strategy of steadily increasing its seats in municipal and regional councils to alter the composition of the electoral college itself. The 14 seats secured this time should be viewed as the cumulative result of this local organizing. This indicates that it is an extension of local root-taking rather than a temporary political trend.
The second driver is the erosion of the traditional right. The Republicans (LR) maintained their status as the largest force in the Senate[4]. However, there is a clear trend within the LR of blurring boundaries with the RN. LR presidential hopeful Bruno Retailleau stated at the EPP assembly that "Europe has given people the feeling that democracy is being bypassed"[16]. The fact that his proposal challenging the primacy of EU law caused controversy within the EPP demonstrates that the discursive distance between the traditional right and the far-right is narrowing[16]. This opens up space for the RN to encroach upon LR votes.
The Process of De-demonization and Its Vulnerabilities
The RN's strategy for entering the political mainstream can be summarized in a single term: "de-demonization (dédiabolisation)." This refers to the image-rebranding effort pursued by Marine Le Pen and the Bardella generation to break away from the overt racism of Jean-Marie Le Pen. One of the key targets of this effort was the Jewish community. Bardella attended the international conference on combating anti-Semitism in Jerusalem in March 2025, where he attributed the resurgence of anti-Semitism to Islamic fundamentalism and the radical left. Building relations with Israel was a core mechanism for the RN to package itself as a "normal party."
However, this mechanism is structurally vulnerable. This is because de-demonization is closer to covering up a party's past rather than erasing it. The 2013 instant messaging conversations disclosed by Mediapart are records of that very concealed past—specifically, from Bardella's teenage years as a youth member of the FN[11][13]. Despite the RN's outright denial, calling it a "crude fabrication"[11], the credibility of their rebuttal was shaken when the outlet released additional excerpts authenticated through Meta and a bailiff[13]. President Macron's unusual direct commentary on an opposition leader's personal scandal, defining it as "extremely serious and unacceptable"[15], also reflects a consensus that this issue is not mere gossip but targets the RN's entire narrative of entering the political establishment.
Structurally, this is not a problem unique to the RN. Many European far-right parties face a similar dilemma: the tension between the racist legacy of past generations and the "normalization" project of the current generation. This pattern is evident in the debates over the fascist lineage of the Brothers of Italy (Fratelli d'Italia) and the suspected neo-Nazi links of Germany's AfD. The analysis by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace groups Spain's Vox and Vannacci's new party in Italy to identify the rightward shift in Europe as a single trend[5]. What makes the RN case unique is that the crack was revealed through the teenage records of the party president himself. Because it is an attack on an individual rather than the organization, it is more difficult to defend.
Between 2017 and 2027: Repeating Structures and Altered Variables
In the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen reached the runoff but was held to around 34% of the vote[3][6]. At the time, the centrist Macron won overwhelmingly, and even in South Korea, this election drew attention as a "pacemaker for global democracy"[6]. In her 2022 bid, Le Pen's runoff vote share rose to 42%[3]. Looking solely at the upward trajectory of its vote share, the RN's long-term growth is clear.
The 2027 landscape is qualitatively different from the past. The biggest difference is Le Pen's legal risk. While the Paris Court of Appeal's reduction of her period of ineligibility to 45 months—with 30 months suspended—opened the path for Le Pen to run for president, she must campaign while wearing an electronic monitoring ankle bracelet. Recent polls show Le Pen maintaining her lead with 35–36% in the first round, with a runoff against the far-left Mélenchon appearing highly likely[7]. Looking at these figures alone, the RN's position is stronger than ever.
It is precisely at this juncture that the Bardella variable becomes decisive. In past far-right parties, leadership risk was usually "replaceable." However, in the case of the RN, Bardella has served as the de facto "Plan B" due to Le Pen's legal situation. In the 2017 and 2022 elections, this dual-risk structure did not exist. A situation where the party president and the presidential candidate are separated, and the president's credibility is shaken, is unprecedented in the RN's history. To find historical analogies, one might look to instances where populist factions within the US Republican Party experienced internal strife over succession, but this is merely a similar phenomenon and difficult to compare directly.
Three Key Areas to Watch Moving Forward
First is the judicial variable. Whether Mediapart's additional revelations continue and how Bardella's counter-lawsuit concludes will determine his viability to continue in the "Plan B" role[11][13]. Second is the relationship with the LR. Depending on whether Retailleau's remarks challenging the primacy of EU law are accepted or rejected within the EPP[16], the boundary line between the RN and the traditional right will shift. This will dictate how the right-wing vote is split in the first round of the 2027 election.
Third is the impact at the EU level. If the RN comes to power, there is potential for shifts in France's stance on discussions regarding European strategic autonomy, policies toward Russia, and its participation in NATO's integrated military command. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace suggests that the rise of the far-right across Europe could shake the very foundation of Europe's policy toward Russia[5]. Given that the RN has traditionally taken a friendly stance toward Russia, this issue is also indirectly linked to the domestic political landscape within Russia. A single institutional event like forming a Senate parliamentary group will not immediately resolve these three areas. However, because this event reveals a facet of the larger structural shift that will unfold leading up to 2027, it remains an indispensable indicator for monitoring EU trends.
III. Recommended Policy Responses
The Chessboard Beyond the Senate Parliamentary Group: What to Watch Until 2027
Overall Assessment: A Phase of Overlapping Institutional Progress and Narrative Risk
The RN's formation of a Senate parliamentary group is not a reversible event[1]. This is because it is a status secured through formal institutional procedures. This status will be maintained until the 2027 presidential election. Conversely, the controversy surrounding the anti-Semitic messages attributed to Bardella remains fluid[11][13]. Its trajectory could vary significantly depending on the outcome of lawsuits, potential further revelations, and public reaction.
The core assessment of this issue is that these two trends must be viewed separately. The Senate parliamentary group is the RN's "structural asset." This means it has secured substantial influence in local organization, legislative initiative, and committee assignments. The messaging controversy is a variable that shakes its "narrative asset," the de-demonization strategy. The two move at different speeds. While structural assets do not easily disappear, narrative assets can be severely shaken within a matter of weeks.
This is also why Le Pen is adhering to a conspiracy-theory frame, calling it a "dirty trick." It can be interpreted as an attempt to redefine the damage to their narrative asset as a structural attack, thereby converting it into material to rally their support base. Whether this strategy succeeds depends on the judicial proceedings and polling trends leading up to early 2027.
Short-Term Action Plan (October–December 2026)
The key task during this period is to precisely track the "fact-finding phase." A major watershed will be how Mediapart's authentication process involving Meta and the bailiff is evaluated in court[13]. It is necessary to monitor whether the forgery and defamation lawsuits announced by Bardella's camp are actually filed, and if so, in which court and at what pace they proceed.
Simultaneously, there is a need to examine the initial legislative actions of the Senate parliamentary group. Which bills parliamentary group leader Edwige Diaz signs and which standing committees she is assigned to will serve as indicators of the pace at which the RN is transitioning from a "protest party" to a "legislative actor." Whether the RN parliamentary group plays a kingmaker role during the deliberations on the 2027 budget should also be monitored.
On the LR side, it is necessary to monitor how Retailleau's remarks challenging the primacy of EU law are handled within the EPP[16]. This issue serves as a leading indicator of whether the discursive boundary between the LR and the RN is narrowing further.
Medium-Term Action Plan (Q1 2027, Before Entering the Official Presidential Election Phase)
The key to the medium-term phase is the finalization of the candidate lineup. Le Pen's eligibility to run for office was reduced to 45 months (with 30 months suspended) by an appellate court ruling, but it comes with the condition that she must campaign while wearing an electronic monitoring anklet. It is necessary to separately evaluate what political effects this condition will produce during the actual campaign—whether it will trigger a backlash or generate public sympathy.
If the Bardella controversy is not resolved by this point, the credibility of the "successor plan" itself will be shaken. If Bardella, who has been considered an alternative candidate should Le Pen fail to complete the race for any reason, sees his standing weakened by reputational damage, the possibility of alternative candidates emerging within the RN cannot be ruled out. This point represents a critical juncture that could lead to shifts in the internal power dynamics of the RN.
Polling trends must also be continuously tracked. Current polls consistently project a scenario where Le Pen wins 35–36% of the vote in the first round and advances to the runoff alongside Mélenchon [7]. The key is whether this dynamic persists after the Bardella controversy, or whether votes shift toward the centrist candidate, Édouard Philippe [7].
Long-Term Action Plan (Preparing for Post-2027 Presidential Election Scenarios)
In the long term, sector-specific preparations for a potential RN government are necessary. In the areas of foreign policy and security, it is crucial to assess potential shifts in France's stance regarding its level of participation in NATO's Allied Command Operations, its policy on sanctions against Russia, and discussions on European strategic autonomy [5]. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace has analyzed that the broader rise of the European right could influence policy stances toward Russia [5]. It is also necessary to consider that similar trends are occurring simultaneously, such as Spain's Vox and Italy's new Vannacci party, alongside developments in France [5].
In the areas of economy and trade, there is a need to examine potential shifts in the RN's stance on Eurozone policies, EU budget contributions, and regional trade regulations. This is a point that is indirectly linked to the business environment for South Korean companies in Europe.
Regarding Asia-Pacific engagement, a long-term task must be to determine how France's Indo-Pacific strategy, the strength of its stance on the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait, and its defense and nuclear energy cooperation with South Korea might be adjusted under a regime change scenario.
Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
On the judicial and narrative axis, the trigger points include the first-instance ruling in Bardella's defamation and forgery lawsuit, whether Mediapart releases additional materials, and the official reactions of the Israeli government and Jewish organizations. If Israel withdraws or suspends its previously favorable stance, the RN's "de-demonization" narrative will suffer a substantial blow.
On the institutional and legislative axis, key indicators include the number of bills introduced by the RN Senate group and their passage rate, the voting patterns of the RN group on the 2027 budget bill, and the frequency of joint voting between Les Républicains (LR) and the RN. An increase in de facto joint voting with LR should be read as a signal of a realignment of the right-wing landscape within the Senate.
On the electoral and public opinion axis, it is necessary to track the first-round voting projections from polling agencies, including Toluna Harris Interactive, the fluctuations in the three-way race among Le Pen, Mélenchon, and Philippe, and whether the RN's approval ratings drop or hold steady following the Bardella controversy [7]. The schedule and outcome of the Supreme Court appeal regarding Le Pen's eligibility to run for office are also indispensable triggers.
On the foreign policy axis, it is necessary to monitor statements by RN lawmakers regarding NATO and the EU, the voting behavior of the RN group on aid budgets for Ukraine, and coordination efforts among RN-aligned parties within the European Parliament.
Summary and Conclusion
The Senate elections on September 27 marked an irreversible institutional milestone for the RN [1][4]. While this does not represent a reversal of power, given that Les Républicains remain the largest force in the Senate [4], the very fact that the RN is participating in the legislative process as a party with its own parliamentary group for the first time is a structural shift. The controversy over Bardella's antisemitic messages, which emerged around the same time, operates on a different level from this structural progress [11][13][15]. This is because the issue directly targets the RN's core strategic asset: its "de-demonization" strategy.
How these two trends interact leading up to the 2027 presidential election is the central axis of observation. The structural asset of having a Senate parliamentary group will not be easily shaken. Conversely, the narrative asset of Bardella's personal credibility could shift rapidly depending on judicial proceedings and potential further revelations. For the South Korean government and businesses, it is crucial to track these two axes separately. Changes in structural assets should be evaluated as medium- to long-term variables in the EU policy landscape, while changes in narrative assets should be assessed as short-term variables in the 2027 presidential election dynamic, each on a different timeline.
References
[1] [Kyiv Independent] French far right gains ground in Senate months before presidential election
[4] [Foreign Policy] The U.S. and China Agree to Slash Tariffs
[5] [Carnegie Endowment] Will the Far Right Change Europe’s Russia Policy?
[8] [Third Way - Clean Energy] Third Way rolls out “new economic bargain” platform for Dems
[9] [TelQuel] Élections 2026 : le PAM veut tourner la page RNI
[11] [Al-Monitor] French far-right leader Bardella denies media claim he made antisemitic remarks
[13] [Le Monde] Bardella's denial of antisemitic remarks challenged as website publishes evidence
[14] [Le Monde] From Macron's original promise to the unraveling of an ideal
[15] [Le Monde] Macron calls antisemitic allegations against Bardella 'extremely serious'
[18] [France 24] France to unveil 2027 budget as debt hits record high
[19] [TelQuel] Le RNI se dit disposé à participer au prochain gouvernement
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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