Assessing the Possibility of Ending the Russia-Ukraine War Within the Year: Lavrov's UN Remarks and Implications for South Korea

Executive Summary

On the occasion of the UN General Assembly in September, the United States, Ukraine, and Russia all mentioned ending the war, but their conditions and timetables do not align. In his UN address and Security Council remarks, Lavrov made it clear that Russia would achieve its military objectives regardless of the negotiation format, reaffirming that for Russia, ending the war is not a product of negotiations but a byproduct of battlefield superiority. On the other hand, Trump and Zelensky put forward a deadline of "before winter," but this is closer to conditional optimism based on the cessation of attacks on energy infrastructure. Despite the first meeting between German Foreign Minister Badephul and Lavrov since 2022, Lavrov's immediate dismissal of the meeting's contents repeated the Kremlin's established pattern of maintaining dialogue channels while refusing substantive concessions. Given the precedent where the suspension of airstrikes during the Witkoff-Kushner visit was a procedural measure rather than a negotiation outcome, a dual track of negotiation and pressure is highly likely to persist through the end of the year. Therefore, it is rational for the South Korean government and businesses to adopt a phased approach, deploying response resources only after verifying physical indicators such as the convening of a trilateral summit or the implementation of an energy truce.

I. Issue Analysis

The Russia-Ukraine War, the Possibility of an End to the War Within the Year, and Lavrov's UN Remarks

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

Ahead of the UN General Assembly High-Level Week in September, Russia-Ukraine negotiations had already gone through one cycle. The Trump administration's special envoys, Witkoff and Kushner, visited Moscow and Kyiv in succession on September 5–6. During these visits, Putin described the negotiation situation as "not simple" [2]. In line with the envoys' visit, the Russian military suspended its airstrikes on Kyiv for three days, but resumed them immediately after the suspension ended on September 8 [6]. This reaffirmed the Kremlin's pattern of separately operating negotiation channels and military pressure channels.

Amid this trend, US Secretary of State Rubio and Lavrov met in New York on September 23. Both sides stated that they discussed the possibility of a "limited truce" targeting grain and energy facilities [9]. On the same day, at a UN Security Council meeting on Ukraine, Lavrov made it clear that Russia would not halt its special military operation regardless of the format of any negotiations [16]. A structure in which flexible rhetoric at the negotiating table coexisted with unyielding principles on the battlefield was already firmly established at this point.

2. Current Situation

On September 26, Lavrov escalated his offensive during his address at the General Debate of the 81st session of the UN General Assembly. He claimed that "Europe is using all means to derail the peace negotiations desired by the Trump administration" [5][3][13]. At the same time, he declared that "the goals of the special military operation will be achieved, and threats to Russia's security will be eliminated" [5]. Russian state-run news agency TASS reported that the speech covered not only the Ukraine issue but also the West's "Russophobic and destructive policies," Middle East issues, and UN reform [11]. In a separate press conference, Lavrov claimed that Europe was preparing for war with Russia, while emphasizing that Putin had repeatedly stated he had no intention of going to war with Europe [7][8]. He thus employed a dual message, labeling Europe as an "obstructor of peace" while portraying Russia as maintaining a defensive posture.

On the same day, Italian news agency ANSA reported that while Lavrov attacked Europe from the podium, he met with German Foreign Minister Badephul off-camera [1]. This meeting, the first bilateral talk between the foreign ministers of the two countries since the outbreak of the war in 2022, lasted about 20 minutes in the Russian meeting room inside the UN building and concluded with a handshake [19]. German media outlet Die Presse evaluated this as "the first bilateral meeting in years" [19]. However, in a press conference immediately following the meeting, Lavrov dismissed it, stating that "there was absolutely nothing new in Badephul's remarks" and that she "merely repeated Berlin's existing position" [18][14]. He downplayed the significance of the meeting, saying it only showed that Russia is ready to listen to all counterparts without exception [14].

Upon arriving at the UN on September 22, President Trump delivered a brief message to Putin in response to reporters' questions: "End the war" [20]. Italian newspaper La Repubblica reported that Trump remarked, "Maybe there could be an agreement before winter" [10]. On the same page, citing The Washington Post, it was also reported that the United States and Russia jointly blocked the introduction of international restrictions on the use of AI in weapons systems [10]. This indicates that behind the superficial topic of peace negotiations, the two countries share common interests regarding military technology norms.

3. Key Actors and Positions

Russiais adhering to rhetoric that prioritizes achieving its goals over setting a timetable. At the Security Council, Lavrov stated, "We will not stop the special military operation regardless of the format of negotiations" [16]. From the UN podium, he employed a dual tactic: driving a wedge between the United States and Europe by labeling Europe as an obstructor of negotiations [5], while simultaneously agreeing to meet with Badephul to maintain the dialogue channel itself [1][14]. This is an extension of the existing pattern of keeping negotiation channels open while refusing to make substantive concessions [6].

The United Statescontinues to present an optimistic timetable, with President Trump suggesting the possibility of an "agreement before winter" [10]. However, the fact that the Witkoff-Kushner special envoy line has operated through CIA and personal envoy channels rather than regular State Department channels [4] suggests that the pace of negotiations may be driven by the US domestic political calendar rather than the maturity of the negotiations' substance. Secretary of State Rubio stated that he discussed a limited truce regarding grain and energy with Lavrov [9], showing a focus on partial confidence-building measures rather than a comprehensive end to the war.

Germanyresumed bilateral contact with Russia for the first time since 2022 through Foreign Minister Badephul [19][1]. This is interpreted as an attempt to deter escalation targeting Germany, Europe, and NATO, such as hybrid attacks. However, Lavrov's virtual downgrading of the meeting by defining it as having "no new content" [18] shows that Russia is utilizing dialogue with Europe not as an opportunity to advance negotiations, but as a means to expose the rift between the United States and Europe.

Ukraineis not represented in the direct quotation sources, but according to previous EAI reports, Zelensky has already mentioned the possibility of the war continuing into winter [2]. Thus, optimism and caution coexist in Ukraine's mentions of "ending the war before winter."

4. Key Issues

While all three parties agree on the necessity of ending the war, they diverge sharply on the conditions and sequence. Russia insists on achieving its goals as a prerequisite and maintains that it will not suspend military operations even during negotiations [16]. In contrast, the United States tends to emphasize ending the war as a political achievement, prioritizing a timetable [10][20]. Europe prioritizes deterring hybrid threats and ensuring security, but Russia labels these efforts as obstruction of negotiations, repeatedly using rhetoric that highlights the rift between the United States and Europe [5][3]. The ongoing discussions on a limited truce restricted to grain and energy facilities [9] suggest that partial and phased measures are more likely to be put on the table before a comprehensive peace agreement. However, whether this diplomacy-stage rhetoric translates into an actual easing of military pressure on the front lines remains to be verified separately.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Russia-Ukraine War, the Possibility of an End to the War Within the Year, and Lavrov's UN Remarks: In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue

Reading Lavrov's UN remarks as mere rhetorical posturing misses the core point. The very structure of his statements reveals the fundamental logic of Russia's negotiation strategy. Lavrov stated that "the goals of the special military operation will be achieved, and threats to Russia's security will be eliminated" [5]. This phrasing assumes the achievement of goals independent of negotiations, rather than as a result of them. For Russia, ending the war is not a product of negotiations, but a byproduct of achieving its military objectives. Indeed, at the Security Council meeting on September 23, he made it clear that "Russia will not halt its special military operation regardless of the format of any negotiations" [16]. This approach of separating the negotiating table from the battlefield follows the same pattern as the three-day suspension of airstrikes during the Witkoff-Kushner visit, which was a procedural measure aligned with the envoys' schedule rather than a negotiation outcome [6].

This fundamental stance is rooted in Russia's assessment of its superiority on the front lines. If the Kremlin had judged itself to be at a disadvantage on the battlefield, it would have had an incentive to accelerate the negotiation timeline. However, Lavrov's remarks assume a calculation that time is on Russia's side. His dual messaging—labeling Europe as an "obstructor of peace" while portraying Russia as maintaining a defensive posture [7][8]—also aligns with a strategy of shifting the blame for delayed negotiations onto Europe while actually buying time.

The fundamental drivers for the United States and Ukraine are different. The background behind Zelensky's mention of ending the war "before winter" and Trump's response to it is the seasonal pressure of attacks on energy infrastructure. Ukraine desires a truce that halts attacks on energy facilities before the winter heating season. This is not a timeline for military victory, but a humanitarian and political deadline. In effect, the clocks of the three parties regarding the timing of the war's end operate on entirely different principles.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: Transatlantic Asymmetry

Lavrov's targeting of Europe is structural. A dialogue channel, albeit limited, operates between the United States and Russia. During the meeting between Rubio and Lavrov on September 23, the two sides discussed the possibility of a "limited truce" targeting grain and energy facilities [9]. In contrast, the perception that Europe is excluded from this channel lies at the root of Lavrov's remarks. His claim that "Europe is using all means to derail the peace negotiations desired by the Trump administration" [5][3][13] is a framing that contrasts the Washington-Moscow bilateral channel with Europe's marginalization.

However, this framing diverges somewhat from the actual structure of negotiations. During Witkoff and Kushner's visit to Kyiv on September 5–6, national security advisors from the United Kingdom, France, and Germany were also present [2]. This suggests that discussions on security guarantees and reconstruction are likely to be decided not through a Washington-Moscow bilateral channel, but within a multilateral framework involving Europe. There is a gap between Lavrov's rhetoric labeling Europe as an obstructor and the reality that Europe is not excluded from actual negotiation processes. This gap itself is highly likely an intentional framing designed to drive a wedge between the two sides of the Atlantic.

The meeting with Badephul is another case illustrating this structure. The very fact that the first bilateral meeting between the German and Russian foreign ministers since the outbreak of the war in 2022 took place could be read within Europe as a signal of resuming dialogue [19]. However, immediately after the meeting, Lavrov downplayed its significance, stating that "there was absolutely nothing new" and that she "merely repeated Berlin's existing position" [18][14]. This means that while the format of the meeting was dialogue, the substance was limited to confirming existing positions. This reveals a dual tactic of keeping channels with Europe open while ensuring they do not lead to signals of substantive concessions.

Security Structure: Dual Track of Negotiation and Pressure

The structural characteristic running through Russia's negotiation behavior is the separate operation of negotiation channels and military pressure channels. The three-day suspension of airstrikes on Kyiv, timed with the Witkoff-Kushner visit, resumed immediately after its conclusion on September 8, resulting in at least two deaths [6]. This pattern shows that the localized truce was not a comprehensive peace agreement, but merely a device to manage the negotiation period. Lavrov's Security Council remarks also reaffirm this structure. He explicitly stated that military operations would continue regardless of the format of negotiations [16]. The principle of conducting negotiations while maintaining military pressure has been consistently upheld from summer through autumn.

Ukraine's structural vulnerability lies in the occupied territories. According to a Council of Europe report, approximately 3.5 million Ukrainians reside in the occupied territories, where the occupation is becoming entrenched through new Russian decrees and policies. Ukraine's foreign minister criticized Russia for intentionally creating a humanitarian disaster in the occupied areas on the left bank of Kherson. As the duration of the occupation lengthens, local administration, civil registration, and currency systems are integrated into the Russian system, exponentially increasing the legal and administrative costs of restoration in future territorial negotiations. The fact that civilian casualties in the first eight months of this year exceeded those of the entire previous year, according to UN statistics, and that this trend continued into September, proves that battlefield damage has not decreased even during a period rife with rhetoric about ending the war.

Economic Structure: Sanctions and the Seasonality of Energy

Discussions surrounding attacks on energy infrastructure are not merely a humanitarian issue but reflect a structure of seasonal pressure. Concerned about the harm to civilians resulting from the destruction of power and heating facilities during the winter, Ukraine and its allies have demanded a moratorium on attacks on energy infrastructure and guarantees for navigation in the Black Sea. This explains why the “limited ceasefire” discussed during the Rubio-Lavrov meeting was confined to grain and energy [9]. Rather than a comprehensive ceasefire, this should be viewed as an attempt to reach a minimal agreement to manage winter risks. From Russia’s perspective, because striking energy infrastructure serves as both negotiating leverage and a military tool, it has little incentive to abandon these attacks entirely.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The pattern of Lavrov's UN speeches is not new. Since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russian diplomacy has utilized the UN stage as a venue for propaganda aimed at dividing the West. The fact that his speech comprehensively addressed not only the Ukraine issue but also the West's "Russophobic and destructive policies," Middle East issues, and UN reform [11] is an extension of the existing strategy to position the war in Ukraine within the larger framework of the West versus Russia. This method of expanding the frame—raising issues with the Western system as a whole rather than merely responding to individual matters—resembles the Soviet Union's diplomatic utilization of the UN during the Cold War.

The pattern of combining negotiation channels with military pressure is similar to the negotiation phase of the Minsk Agreements in 2014–2015. Even then, localized offensives continued on the Donbas front while negotiations were underway, and ceasefire agreements repeatedly collapsed. One of the reasons the Minsk Agreements ultimately lacked efficacy was that agreements at the negotiating table failed to constrain the military calculations on the battlefield. Lavrov's recent remark that "operations will not be suspended regardless of the negotiation format" [16] suggests that this learning effect remains deeply ingrained in Russia's negotiation strategy.

While the meeting between the German and Russian foreign ministers is symbolic as the first such instance since 2022, in terms of substantive content, it recalls the precedent of the contact between Lavrov and Baerbock in early 2022, which had already failed just prior to the outbreak of the war. At that time, Germany attempted dialogue but failed to bring about a change in Russia's fundamental stance. Lavrov's characterization of the meeting's content as "nothing new" [18][14] once again reaffirms the repetitive pattern where the formal resumption of dialogue does not translate into substantive shifts in position.

Trump's suggestion of an "agreement before winter" [10] is an extension of the optimism emanating from the US administration that has been repeated since early 2025. Even during the Witkoff-Kushner visit, the US side presented the restoration of negotiation channels itself as an achievement, but it did not lead to a substantive breakthrough [4]. The fact that CIA and personal envoy lines operated in place of regular State Department channels indicates that the timing of negotiations is driven by the US domestic political calendar rather than the maturity of the negotiations [4]. It cannot be ruled out that the optimism displayed on the UN stage this time is also rhetoric repeatedly reproduced for political necessity, independent of actual progress in negotiations.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

First, whether attacks on energy facilities actually cease. Whether the energy truce demanded by Zelensky remains mere rhetoric or leads to a real reduction in the frequency of strikes serves as a physical indicator to gauge the sincerity of negotiations. The implementation of the "limited truce" discussed by Rubio and Lavrov [9] will be the first test.

Second, whether a trilateral summit is convened. Whether the trilateral summit with Putin requested by Zelensky is actually scheduled serves as a benchmark for assessing whether negotiations are being elevated. Contacts so far have remained at the foreign minister and special envoy level, and an elevation to the summit level has not yet occurred.

Third, the format of Europe's participation in negotiations. Contrary to Lavrov's "exclusion of Europe" framing, national security advisors from three European countries are present in actual negotiation working groups [2]. Whether decision-making power over future security guarantees and reconstruction remains solely with Washington and Moscow, or expands into a multilateral framework where Europe holds a substantive veto, will shape the nature of the peace conditions.

Fourth, the pace at which the occupation becomes entrenched. How deeply Russian decrees and administrative systems take root in the occupied territories, where approximately 3.5 million people reside, will determine the difficulty of future negotiations on territorial issues. As entrenchment accelerates, the range of negotiation proposals acceptable to Ukraine narrows.

Fifth, the US domestic political calendar. The pattern of CIA and personal envoy lines replacing regular State Department channels [4] suggests that the timing of negotiations is linked to the political needs of the Trump administration. If the deadline of "before winter" stems from the need to showcase political achievements rather than the actual maturity of negotiations, the deadline itself could produce the counterproductive effect of pressuring the substance of the negotiations.