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The Establishment of the Vietnam-Canada Strategic Partnership and Shifts in ASEAN's Multilateral Diplomatic Landscape

Category
Current Watch
Published
September 26, 2026

Executive Summary

On the occasion of Vietnamese General Secretary To Lam's state visit to Canada, the two countries upgraded their Comprehensive Partnership to a Strategic Partnership. This represents an expansion of Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy" to a Western middle power and serves as a key pillar of Canada's comprehensive engagement strategy in ASEAN, which includes Indonesia, the Philippines, and Singapore. The upgrade also carries clear trade and economic security implications, as both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the swift conclusion of the ASEAN-Canada FTA based on the CPTPP. However, given the potential for structural delays in ASEAN's multilateral negotiations and Vietnam's priority on managing its relations with the United States and China, substantive implementation is highly likely to remain gradual. South Korea needs to proactively respond to the competition initiated by Canada by upgrading the Korea-ASEAN FTA and readjusting its industrial upgrading cooperation with Vietnam.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

Establishment of the Vietnam-Canada Strategic Partnership: Analysis of the Current Situation

Background and Progress

To Lam, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and State President, paid a state visit to Canada. This marks the first official visit by a General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam to Canada since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1973 [7]. During the summit in Ottawa, General Secretary To Lam and Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney agreed to upgrade the Comprehensive Partnership established in 2017 to a Strategic Partnership [1]. Vietnamese state media assessed that the bilateral relationship is now poised to enter a new stage of development characterized by "a higher level of political trust, broader and more substantive cooperation, and more closely intertwined interests" [1].

Pham Vinh Quang, the Vietnamese Ambassador to Canada, stated that the visit took place at the invitation of Governor General Nguyen Thong Duc. During the visit, General Secretary To Lam paid a courtesy call on the Governor General, held a summit with Prime Minister Carney, and met with Canadian parliamentary leaders [8]. The ambassador explained the significance of the visit in the context of "diversifying economic relations, restructuring supply chains, and expanding cooperation in strategic sectors" [8]. This aligns with Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy" stance, which seeks to reduce dependence on any single major power amid US-China competition.

Current Status

The joint statement released on September 24 defined trade as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship. The CPTPP serves as the institutional foundation for expanding these trade ties [4]. Vietnam is Canada's largest trading partner among ASEAN member states [4]. The joint statement highlighted the potential for expanding trade, investment, strategic business partnerships, and development cooperation [4]. The two leaders reaffirmed their support for the swift conclusion and implementation of the ASEAN-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which was described as the foundation for deepening economic cooperation between Canada and ASEAN [4].

Immediately following the visit, concrete follow-up measures emerged in the aviation sector. Air Canada decided to proceed with the approval process with the goal of launching regular flights to Ho Chi Minh City in 2027 [9]. This is part of the expansion of the air transport agreement following the establishment of the Strategic Partnership [9]. In addition to Vietnam, Canada is concurrently expanding its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region. In a speech at the Atlantic Council, the Canadian government mentioned signing a security treaty with Indonesia, upgrading partnerships with the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei, and establishing a new partnership with Timor-Leste [2]. This demonstrates that the upgrade of Vietnam-Canada relations is not an isolated event but a key pillar of Canada's comprehensive engagement strategy in ASEAN.

Key Actor Analysis

Vietnamis approaching this upgrade as an extension of its policy of diversifying multilateral diplomacy. During the same period, General Secretary To Lam attended the High-Level Week of the UN General Assembly, where he emphasized multilateralism and UN centrality. Do Hung Viet, Vietnam's Ambassador to the UN, defined this as "an expression of our consistent policy of independence, self-reliance, self-strength, peace, friendship, cooperation, development, and the diversification and multi-lateralization of external relations" [12]. During the same period, Vietnam announced that it was close to concluding a bilateral trade agreement with the United States [10]. In a meeting with US Senator Steve Daines, Vietnam described the United States as "one of its top strategic partners" and expressed its commitment to deepening their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership [11]. The upgrade of relations with Canada should thus be interpreted as one branch of its bamboo diplomacy, pursued concurrently with the United States, Australia, and others. Earlier in August, during General Secretary To Lam's state visit to Australia, the two sides agreed to expand military cooperation within the framework of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership [3]. However, as that case also demonstrates, Vietnam maintains a pattern of preferring gradual and incremental deepening over rapid alignment with any specific bloc [3].

Canadahas been positioning Vietnam as a key economic partner within ASEAN amid its expanding Indo-Pacific engagement since Prime Minister Carney took office. Around the same time, Canada pursued a diversified foreign strategy, announcing plans to strengthen cooperation with France in energy, defense, and space [13]. This aligns with Canada's own need to move away from its unilateral dependence on the United States and expand its network of relations to ASEAN, Europe, and beyond.

The United Statesis not a direct party to this matter, but it serves as a structural backdrop given that Vietnam's relations with the US are deepening in parallel. The overlap between reports of the imminent conclusion of the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement [10] and the establishment of the Vietnam-Canada Strategic Partnership demonstrates Vietnam's intention to diversify its leverage over specific major powers by expanding its multilateral diplomacy.

Key Issues

The first issue is where this upgrade stands within the regional trend of ASEAN countries expanding their multilateral diplomacy. In addition to Vietnam, Canada has been consecutively upgrading or establishing relations with Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore, Brunei, and Timor-Leste [2]. The establishment of the Vietnam-Canada relationship is part of this broader trend rather than an isolated event.

The second issue is the progress of the ASEAN-Canada FTA. Although the leaders of both countries reaffirmed their commitment to a swift conclusion in the joint statement [4], no specific timeline was provided. The progress of this agreement will serve as a barometer for whether Canada-ASEAN economic cooperation is substantively deepening.

The third issue is the sustainability of Vietnam's bamboo diplomacy. While upgrading relations with Canada, Australia, and the United States concurrently, Vietnam avoids forming official alliances with any specific bloc [3]. Whether this multi-faceted balancing strategy can be sustained in the future, or whether its equilibrium will be shaken if US-China strategic competition intensifies, remains to be seen.

II. In-Depth Analysis

Establishment of the Vietnam-Canada Strategic Partnership: In-Depth Analysis

1. Root Cause Analysis

The primary driver of this upgrade is Vietnam's "bamboo diplomacy" line. This approach avoids subordinating security or the economy to any specific major power, while simultaneously deepening high-level relations with multiple major and middle powers. The phrase "independence, self-reliance, self-strength, peace, friendship, cooperation, development, and the diversification and multi-lateralization of external relations" mentioned by UN Ambassador Do Hung Viet codifies this principle into official diplomatic language [12]. The upgrade with Canada is an illustrative case of this policy expanding to Western middle powers.

Economic drivers are also distinct. Ambassador Pham Vinh Quang explained the significance of the visit as "diversifying economic relations, restructuring supply chains, and expanding cooperation in strategic sectors" [8]. Vietnam is currently exposed to allegations of circumvention exporting from China amid the US-China tariff war, while simultaneously being on the verge of concluding a bilateral trade agreement with the United States [10]. Upgrading relations at this juncture with Canada—a CPTPP member and a Western market with a clear stance of countering China—aligns with Vietnam's calculation to hedge its export risks to the US. For Canada, there was already a pragmatic incentive, as Vietnam is its largest trading partner in ASEAN [4].

Canada's driver is the operationalization of its own Indo-Pacific Strategy. The Mark Carney administration has concurrently pursued a security treaty with Indonesia, partnership upgrades with the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei, and a new partnership with Timor-Leste [2]. The upgrade with Vietnam should be viewed as a piece of this comprehensive ASEAN engagement strategy. When viewed alongside the Carney administration's moves to expand energy, defense, and space cooperation with France and its consideration of participating in the European-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) [13], Canada is in the process of diversifying its partnerships in both Europe and Asia to move away from US-centric security dependence. The upgrade of relations with Vietnam represents the Asian pillar of this diversification strategy.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The first visit by a General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam to Canada took place half a century after the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1973 [7]. This delay itself carries structural implications. Vietnam has traditionally prioritized its top leader's visits to the United States, China, Russia, neighboring ASEAN countries, and more recently, middle powers adjacent to AUKUS, such as Australia and India. With Australia, Vietnam has already expanded cooperation to include military collaboration within the framework of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership [3]. The fact that Canada was relatively low on this priority list suggests that this upgrade is not a realignment of Vietnam's diplomatic priorities, but rather a complementary effort to broaden the scope of its multilateral diplomacy.

Economic Structure: The CPTPP was already functioning as the institutional infrastructure of the bilateral trade relationship [4]. The establishment of the Strategic Partnership is a way of layering political trust onto this existing institutional framework. Rather than creating a new free trade agreement, it signaled the institutional expansion of economic cooperation by reaffirming the swift conclusion of the ASEAN-Canada FTA negotiations [4]. This also aligns with Vietnam's industrial upgrading, such as the expansion of its finished vehicle exports. Moves by VinFast and Hyundai Thanh Cong to expand exports outside of ASEAN [14] are in line with Vietnam's industrial policy to move beyond being a simple assembly base, and increased access to the Canadian market serves as a practical incentive for these diversification efforts.

Security Structure: The joint statement did not put security cooperation at the forefront. Specifying trade as the "cornerstone" of the relationship [4] highlights the difference from the approach taken with Australia. While military cooperation was already discussed with Australia [3], the initial outcomes with Canada emerged in soft areas such as the expansion of the air transport agreement [9]. This demonstrates Vietnam's approach to managing multilateral diplomacy by differentiating the pace and scope of relations with each Western partner.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The closest precedent is General Secretary To Lam's state visit to Australia in August of the same year. At the time, the two countries agreed to expand military cooperation within the existing framework of their Comprehensive Strategic Partnership [3]. Pham Hung Tam, the Vietnamese Ambassador to Australia, defined this as "opening a new stage of development" [3], which is nearly identical to the phrasing of "a new stage" in the joint statement with Canada. Comparing the two cases reveals that the diplomatic language and procedures Vietnam employs when upgrading relations with Western middle powers are highly standardized. However, while the Australian case involved expanding cooperation with a country integrated into the existing security architecture of AUKUS, Canada is not a party to such regional security frameworks. This difference explains why soft areas such as trade, education, and migration are more prominent in the relationship with Canada than security elements.

Another point of reference is Vietnam's parallel pursuit of multilateral diplomacy with the United States and the United Nations. General Secretary To Lam's attendance at the UN General Assembly High-Level Week [12] and the announcement of progress toward concluding a bilateral trade agreement during his meeting with US Senators [10][11] took place almost concurrently with his visit to Canada. Rather than a coincidence, the concentration of these three diplomatic tracks in the same month should be seen as the result of Vietnam's recurring pattern of simultaneously adjusting its relations with multiple major powers and multilateral organizations at specific junctures. This trend was also evident in the establishment of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the United States in 2023, followed by subsequent upgrades with Japan and Australia.

Within Canada, this upgrade of relations with Vietnam was introduced alongside the strengthening of relations with France [13] and the security treaty with Indonesia [2] as part of the Carney administration's diversified diplomacy package. This supports the interpretation that Canada, recognizing the risks of relying on the United States following the inauguration of the Trump administration, is engaged in a broader restructuring to reshape its security and economic partners in both Europe and Asia.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the actual timing of the conclusion of the ASEAN-Canada FTA negotiations. The joint statement only expressed support for a "swift" conclusion and implementation without providing a specific deadline [4]. If negotiations are delayed, this upgrade may remain a political declaration, and the substantive deepening of economic cooperation could be limited.

The second variable is the outcome of tariff and trade negotiations with the United States. Depending on the terms under which Vietnam concludes its bilateral trade agreement with the US [10], the practical weight of its relationship with Canada as a hedging tool against US-related risks will vary. If negotiations with the US are concluded in Vietnam's favor, cooperation with Canada is highly likely to remain complementary; conversely, if relations with the US sour, the strategic importance of the Canada-CPTPP route could increase.

The third variable is whether Canada's comprehensive ASEAN engagement strategy can secure budgetary and political sustainability. The extent to which concurrent expansions—such as the security treaty with Indonesia and partnership upgrades with the Philippines, Singapore, and Brunei [2]—can be sustained within the Carney administration's term and fiscal constraints will dictate the pace of deepening relations with Vietnam.

The fourth variable is whether similar moves spread among other ASEAN member states. As this case is cited as a representative example of ASEAN countries upgrading their multilateral diplomacy with Western middle powers, whether other member states like the Philippines and Singapore continue with similar upgrades will define the regional character of this trend.

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*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.

This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.

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