North Korea’s Threat Statements against South Korea and Escalating Border Risks: Analyzing the Impact on a U.S.-North Korea Summit
Executive Summary
The statement by Kang Chol-su, director of North Korea’s Enemy Confrontation Research Institute, targets the logic of integrating South Korea into the U.S. Indo-Pacific collective defense system rather than the remarks of USFK Commander Xavier Brunson themselves. This message directly clashes with North Korea’s "two hostile states" theory. Coinciding with short-range ballistic missile launches, a DMZ landmine explosion, and range-extension tests of 240mm multiple rocket launchers, border risks have transitioned from rhetorical threats to a tangible phase. However, given that Kim Yo-jong has left open the possibility of conditional dialogue through channels with the U.S., this statement is unlikely to be a direct signal blocking the resumption of a U.S.-North Korea summit. North Korea is running its hardline stance toward South Korea and conciliatory signals toward the U.S. on separate tracks; even if it enters a negotiation phase, its intention to exclude South Korea as a partner remains clear. Businesses need to manage physical risks in border areas, hedge the Korean Peninsula risk premium, and prepare for scenarios where South Korea is bypassed in U.S.-North Korea talks, managing these separately across different timelines.
I. Situation Analysis
Escalation of North Korea’s Threats against South Korea: Situation Analysis
1. Intensification of Hostility toward South Korea
At the Ninth Plenary Meeting of the Eighth Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) in December 2023, Kim Jong Un defined inter-Korean relations as "relations between two hostile states, two belligerents at war" [3][5]. In his policy speech at the Supreme People's Assembly in January 2024, he declared that in the event of war, North Korea would "completely occupy, subjugate, and reclaim the Republic of Korea" [3]. In his March 2026 policy speech, he warned that South Korea is "officially recognized as the most hostile state" and vowed to "make them pay a ruthless price" [3][5]. EAI has conceptualized this trend as the "hostile belligerents theory." Its two pillars are the abandonment of unification discourse, the full-scale adoption of a military occupation policy toward South Korea, and the justification of nuclear attacks against the South [3].
The core of this policy shift is that South Korea is no longer treated as a compatriot with whom to pursue unification, but as a separate hostile state. In late July 2025, Kim Yo-jong, vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, declared that North Korea would "not establish relations in any form" with South Korea [5]. At the same time, she exhibited a dual approach by leaving open the possibility of conditional dialogue in her messages to the United States [5]. This indicates that the strategy of separating responses to South Korea and the United States has already taken root.
2. Key Developments
On September 25, Kang Chol-su, director of North Korea’s Enemy Confrontation Research Institute, released a statement through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) targeting USFK Commander Xavier Brunson’s remark about South Korea being the "decisive center of gravity for collective defense" [1][4]. Kang claimed that "the brigandish nature of the United States, which seeks to utilize South Korea as a core base for executing its hegemony strategy and as a mercenary in regional conflicts, is becoming more blatant" [4]. He then warned that "South Korea, which has emerged as the 'decisive center of gravity for collective defense,' will become the decisive target of collective punishment" [1][4]. This effectively turns the logic of integrating South Korea into the U.S. regional strategic framework into a pretext for attack.
This statement is not an isolated incident but coincides with a series of military signals. On September 20, North Korea launched a short-range ballistic missile from the Wonsan area into the East Sea [15]. A second launch followed on the same day, conducting consecutive tests at an interval of about three hours [14]. The missiles, presumed to be of the Hwasong-11 family, flew approximately 450 km [9]. Prior to this, North Korea had warned of "responsive actions" in protest against U.S.-led exercises in the Asia-Pacific region [9][13]. In a separate statement, Kim Yo-jong threatened that North Korea could respond "more offensively" to multinational military exercises and declared that there would "never" be any change in its stance on strengthening its nuclear deterrent [8]. A spokesperson for North Korea’s Ministry of National Defence also warned that ROK-U.S. cooperation on countering WMDs could trigger a nuclear response from North Korea [6]. Range-extension tests for 240mm multiple rocket launchers were also disclosed. North Korea stated that these weapons would be deployed in the southern border area to "inflict continuous anxiety and terror upon the enemy" [12].
Physical tensions in the border area also escalated simultaneously. On September 21, a landmine explosion occurred during an operation to clear a patrol path in the DMZ on the western front, injuring three officers from the ROK Army’s 25th Division, with one requiring an ankle amputation [10][11]. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) explained that the area was a suspected landmine zone laid by the North Korean military [7][11]. The official JCS explanation is that the accident occurred during an operation to prepare conditions ahead of an on-site investigation by the United Nations Command (UNC) [7]. Some opposition politicians raised the possibility of a connection to North Korea’s "borderization" efforts [10]. While the accident itself has not been confirmed as an intentional provocation by North Korea, its timing, coinciding with North Korea’s escalating rhetoric, highlighted the dangers of military activities in the border region.
3. Positions of Key Actors
North Korea’s Enemy Confrontation Research Institute and Ministry of National Defence. Kang Chol-su’s statement carries significant weight as it was officially released through the KCNA under the name of the Enemy Confrontation Research Institute, which is dedicated to psychological warfare against South Korea, rather than as an individual commentary [4]. A separate statement by the spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defence also defined ROK-U.S. cooperation on countering WMDs as "an attempt to trigger nuclear and chemical weapons conflicts" [6]. Both institutions are using South Korea's integration into the ROK-U.S. alliance's regional strategy as a pretext for their attacks.
Kim Yo-jong. In her capacity as vice department director of the WPK Central Committee, she is responsible for delivering separate messages to South Korea and the United States [5][8]. She employs a dual-track approach, leaving room for conditional dialogue with the U.S. while simultaneously warning of a "more offensive" response to multinational exercises [8]. This is read as a signal that North Korea intends to manage U.S.-North Korea and inter-Korean channels separately.
USFK Commander and ROK-U.S. Authorities. Commander Brunson’s remark about the "decisive center of gravity for collective defense" was made at a public academic event, the ROK-U.S. International Security Conference [1][4], and is close to routine rhetoric emphasizing South Korea's role in the Indo-Pacific strategy. However, North Korea reinterpreted this as the "strategic mercenary-ization" of South Korea, turning it into a pretext for threats [4].
ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. The JCS offered a restrained explanation of the DMZ landmine explosion, stating that it occurred during an operation to identify suspected landmine zones laid by the North Korean military [7][11]. It is currently conducting an investigation while avoiding immediate conclusions on whether it was a provocation.
4. Key Issues
The first issue is whether this statement is mere rhetoric or a precursor to changes in military action. Given that the consecutive missile launches, the 240mm rocket range-extension tests, and the warnings regarding WMD responses were concentrated in the same period [9][12][14][6], a pattern of statements running parallel to actual military demonstrations is evident.
The second issue is the practical scope of application of the "two hostile states" theory. Explicitly designating South Korea as the "target of collective punishment" is a novel development in that it directly links the logic of justifying attacks to the language of U.S. alliance strategy, extending the belligerent state discourse accumulated since 2023 [3][4].
The third issue is the sustainability of the strategy of separating South Korea and the United States. In a structure where Kim Yo-jong’s conditional opening for dialogue with the U.S. and military threats from Defense Minister Kim Song-ki’s line occur simultaneously [5][8], a key point of future observation is whether the risk of accidental clashes in the border area is being managed separately, independent of U.S.-North Korea channels.
II. In-Depth Analysis
Structural Background of North Korea’s Threat Statements against South Korea: In-Depth Analysis
1. Root Cause Analysis
The superficial trigger for Kang Chol-su’s statement was USFK Commander Brunson’s remarks. However, viewing this solely as a trigger misses the essence of the issue. What North Korea took issue with was not the remarks themselves, but the logic of South Korea's integration into regional security implied by those remarks [4]. Among Commander Brunson’s remarks, the mention that the security of the Korean Peninsula is "directly linked to the stability of Northeast Asia, the Western Hemisphere, and the entire Pacific region" became a major point of contention [4]. In fact, this remark is close to a reaffirmation of the United States' existing strategic stance of expanding the ROK-U.S. alliance from defending the Korean Peninsula to an Indo-Pacific collective defense framework. The reason North Korea strongly refuted this is that this logic directly clashes with their "two hostile states" theory.
In North Korea’s logical framework, the moment South Korea is recognized as the "decisive center of gravity" of the U.S.-led collective defense system, South Korea is no longer an individual belligerent state but a member of a multilateral security alliance. This undermines the premise of North Korea’s dual strategy of "separating responses to South Korea and the United States" [5]. When Kim Yo-jong declared in her July 2025 message to South Korea that North Korea would "not establish relations in any form" with the South, while leaving open the possibility of conditional dialogue in her message to the U.S. at the same time, her intention was to treat South Korea and the United States as separate negotiation channels [5]. However, Brunson’s remarks recharacterize South Korea as a "mercenary" and a "base" subordinate to the U.S. regional strategy, which, from North Korea’s perspective, serves as material to justify its hardline stance toward South Korea. Kang Chol-su’s reference to "the brigandish nature of the United States, which seeks to utilize South Korea as a core base for executing its hegemony strategy and as a mercenary in regional conflicts," targets this exact point [4].
Therefore, the root cause of this statement is not a simple backlash against a remark. It should be viewed as a byproduct of the clash between two restructuring logics: the U.S. Indo-Pacific collective defense initiative and North Korea’s "two hostile states" theory.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure: Institutionalization of the Hostile Belligerent States Theory
Since the December 2023 Plenary Meeting, North Korea’s shift in its policy toward South Korea has not been a one-off rhetorical move but the result of step-by-step policy declarations [3][5]. In his January 2024 policy speech, Kim Jong Un stated, "In the event of war, the issue of completely occupying, subjugating, and reclaiming the Republic of Korea and incorporating it into the territory of our Republic must be made a basic task of our military strategy" [3]. In his March 2026 policy speech, he warned that South Korea is "officially recognized as the most hostile state" and declared, "We will make them pay a ruthless price without the slightest consideration or hesitation for any action by South Korea that touches our Republic" [3]. Tracing this lineage, the expression "collective punishment" in Kang Chol-su’s statement is not a new threat but rather a repeated confirmation of the existing policy.
The political implication of this policy shift is the virtual abandonment of the discourse on peaceful unification and federal unification [3]. In the past, while maintaining a military confrontation, North Korea formally kept unification-oriented language such as "unification of the fatherland" and "great national unity." As this framework collapsed in the latter half of the Kim Jong Un era, South Korea was redefined not as a partner for unification but as a target for occupation and incorporation [3]. With this political redefinition complete, the threatening statements directed at South Korea are less of a negotiation card and more of an execution phase of an already established policy stance toward the South.
Security Structure: Regionalization of the ROK-U.S. Alliance and North Korea’s Response Dilemma
The expansion of the ROK-U.S. alliance from defending the Korean Peninsula to an Indo-Pacific multilateral security framework exerts a dual pressure on North Korea. On one hand, South Korea’s role as a node in the regional security network strengthens deterrence against North Korea. On the other hand, integration into this structure provides North Korea with material for a new threat narrative. The warning by the spokesperson for North Korea’s Ministry of National Defence that ROK-U.S. cooperation on countering WMDs could trigger a nuclear response [6], and Kim Yo-jong’s statement that North Korea would respond "more offensively" to U.S.-led multinational exercises [8], can be understood in this context. North Korea defines the multilateralization and regionalization of ROK-U.S. security cooperation as an encirclement against itself, creating a cyclical structure that justifies the advancement of its conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Economic Structure: Cumulative Path of the Risk Premium
The current pattern, where military signals in the border area and escalating rhetoric occur simultaneously, should be viewed as a cumulative risk rather than isolated incidents. Within a span of just over ten days, two short-range ballistic missiles were launched from the Wonsan area into the East Sea on September 20 [15][14], range-extension tests for 240mm multiple rocket launchers were conducted [12], and a DMZ landmine explosion injured South Korean soldiers on September 21 [10][11]. Even if these events individually have a limited impact on the North Korea risk premium, when combined with Kang Chol-su’s statement, the comprehensive tension index perceived by the market tends to be greater than the simple arithmetic sum of the individual events. For businesses operating in the border area or investors holding assets related to inter-Korean economic cooperation, these complex signals carry far more weight than one-off provocations.
3. Comparison with the Past
North Korea’s rhetorical technique of taking issue with a specific individual's remarks to expand its threat to the entire counterpart nation is not new. However, the distinguishing feature of this case is that the target of the threat is not a "policy" or "military action," but South Korea's "status" itself within regional security. In the past, North Korea’s threats against South Korea generally targeted specific actions, such as joint ROK-U.S. military exercises or the deployment of particular weapon systems. This statement, however, used the very definition of South Korea as the "center" of the U.S.-led multilateral defense system as a pretext for punishment. This shows that the "two hostile states" theory established since December 2023 has evolved beyond a simple redefinition of relations, moving toward interpreting changes in South Korea's international status itself as a security threat [3].
Kim Yo-jong’s pattern of separating messages to South Korea and the United States also aligns with recurring characteristics of past North Korean diplomacy. The dual signals of a hardline stance toward South Korea and a conciliatory approach toward the United States were also observed around the 2018–2019 Hanoi Summit. At that time, North Korea maintained harsh rhetoric toward the South while keeping a separate negotiation channel open with the United States. However, the current phase rests on fundamentally different premises. During the 2018–2019 period, the discourse of pursuing unification was at least formally alive, and inter-Korean relations were maintained within the framework of a "special relationship." Today, that very framework has been discarded; thus, while this threat statement shares a similar grammar and pressure tactics with the past, it is issued under fundamentally altered political premises.
The pattern of accidental physical clashes, such as the DMZ landmine explosion, overlapping with political statements has also been observed multiple times in the past. However, in the past, such accidental incidents were often handled with relatively low political fallout within the buffer of the "special relationship" of inter-Korean relations. Today, because they occur under the official definition of "relations between two belligerents at war," even the same type of accident can carry a different weight in interpretation [3][5].
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is the United States' policy stance toward North Korea. President Trump’s reduction of the scale of joint ROK-U.S. military exercises last month is interpreted as a move aimed at resuming summit diplomacy with Kim Jong Un [13]. Nevertheless, North Korea has continued its missile tests and weapon upgrades [13][14]. This illustrates a contradictory phase where the potential resumption of U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy and North Korea’s intensifying military pressure occur simultaneously. The timing of Commander Brunson’s remarks, which drew North Korea’s backlash, can be seen as reflecting a policy inconsistency within the United States, where the expansion of the ROK-U.S. alliance's regional role and conciliatory signals toward North Korea coexist.
The second variable is whether North Korea’s strategy of separating South Korea and the United States is practically sustainable. While the backlash against Brunson’s remarks is a statement that treats South Korea as a subordinate element of U.S. regional strategy, it is also directly aimed at the United States. This is because taking issue with the structure in which South Korea is defined as the "decisive center of gravity for collective defense" is ultimately a critique of the U.S. regional strategy. If the dual tracks toward South Korea and the United States begin to overlap within a single issue as they do now, the effectiveness of North Korea’s separate response strategy could be put to the test.
The third variable is the management of accidental incidents in the border area. If the DMZ landmine explosion is ultimately confirmed to have been caused by landmines laid by the North Korean military [11], the issue transitions from a threat at the level of political rhetoric to one involving actual physical damage. Depending on the findings of the South Korean military investigation and the level of subsequent responses, it will be determined whether border tensions will escalate from a rhetorical war of words into a tangible military confrontation.
The fourth variable is the pace of North Korea’s weapon system advancement. The range-extension tests for the 240mm multiple rocket launchers were disclosed as a measure directly targeting the border area [12]. As long as this strengthening of conventional capabilities continues, the military risk in the border area is highly likely to remain structurally elevated, regardless of the level of political rhetoric.
III. Final Recommendations
Comprehensive Recommendations and Action Plan
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommendations
Kang Chol-su’s statement is not a negotiation card directly linked to whether a U.S.-North Korea summit will be held. This statement is a message confined to North Korea's policy toward South Korea [4]. This is supported by the fact that Kim Yo-jong left open the possibility of conditional dialogue in her message to the United States during the same period [5]. North Korea is maintaining its strategy of separating its approach to South Korea and the United States. The target of Kang’s statement is not Commander Brunson’s individual remarks, but the very logic of integrating South Korea into the U.S. Indo-Pacific collective defense system [4]. This logic directly clashes with North Korea’s "two hostile states" theory [3][5]. Therefore, this statement has a greater impact on inter-Korean channels than on U.S.-North Korea channels.
At the same time, the context of when the statement was issued warrants attention. On September 20, two short-range ballistic missiles were launched [14][15]. On September 21, a landmine explosion in the DMZ injured three soldiers [10][11]. Range-extension tests for 240mm multiple rocket launchers were also disclosed [12]. North Korea stated that these weapons would be deployed in the border area to "inflict continuous anxiety and terror upon the enemy" [12]. This series of military signals serves as physical evidence backing the statement's rhetorical threats. Taken in isolation, the statement might be dismissed as mere exaggerated rhetoric. However, as the missile launches, the landmine incident, and the weapon upgrade tests overlapped during the same period, border risks transitioned beyond rhetoric into a tangible phase.
The variable of a U.S.-North Korea summit must be tracked separately. There are reports that President Trump reduced the scale of joint ROK-U.S. military exercises in August, leaving open the possibility of resuming diplomacy with Kim Jong Un [13]. Nevertheless, North Korea continued its weapon demonstrations afterward [13]. This shows that while North Korea has not completely closed its channels with the United States, it is running conciliatory signals toward the U.S. and a hardline stance toward South Korea on separate tracks. It is difficult to view Kang Chol-su’s statement as a direct signal blocking the potential resumption of dialogue between the U.S. and North Korean leaders. However, even if North Korea enters a negotiation phase, its intention to exclude South Korea as a negotiating partner is clear.
Corporate response strategies can be boiled down to three areas. First is practical preparation for physical risks in the border area. Second is financial hedging against the rising Korean Peninsula risk premium. Third is scenario planning for the potential exclusion of South Korea should U.S.-North Korea dialogue resume. Because these three tracks operate on different timelines, they must be managed separately.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plans
Short-Term (1–4 Weeks)
Businesses with logistics or production facilities in the border area must re-examine personnel movement routes near the DMZ. The recent landmine accident occurred in an area suspected of being laid by the North Korean military [10][11]. The possibility that additional similar zones exist, undetected by military authorities, cannot be ruled out. Workplaces in the border region should establish a system to regularly monitor military safety announcements regarding uncleared areas.
The financial and insurance sectors should incorporate this statement and the weapon testing phase into their geopolitical risk premium calculation models. Given that North Korea has declared its intention to deploy 240mm multiple rocket launchers in the border area [12], there is a need to review potential adjustments to insurance premium rates for assets near the border in the short term.
In terms of external communication, there is a need to address market reactions that overinterpret this statement as a signal of the collapse of potential U.S.-North Korea talks. It should be clearly communicated in briefings for investors and partners that the target of the statement is confined to inter-Korean channels.
Medium-Term (1–6 Months)
A monitoring system should be established to periodically cross-reference the schedule of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises with North Korea's patterns of responsive action. North Korea has repeatedly followed a pattern of announcing 'responsive actions' to military exercises in the Asia-Pacific region and then actually launching missiles [9][13][14][15]. This pattern is highly likely to recur in conjunction with future exercise schedules. It is reasonable to designate the two-week period following the public release of exercise schedules as a high-risk window and adjust business schedules accordingly.
Response plans should be prepared for different scenarios regarding the resumption of U.S.-North Korea dialogue. If President Trump's measures to scale back military exercises lead to an actual summit [13], there is a possibility that South Korea could once again be sidelined from the negotiating table. In this scenario, expectations regarding inter-Korean economic cooperation may temporarily build up in the market; however, given the stance of excluding South Korea revealed in the Kang Chol-su statement, such expectations have little basis. For related industries, it is safer to maintain a wait-and-see approach rather than hastily expanding business operations.
Long-Term (6 Months–2 Years)
Under the premise that the 'hostile belligerent states' doctrine has become an institutionalized policy line in the late Kim Jong-un era [3][5], border risks must be reclassified as a structural constant rather than a temporary tension. North Korea has effectively discarded its unification-oriented discourse and redefined South Korea as a target for occupation and incorporation [3]. This is not an issue that can be managed through short-term, event-driven risk management. Mid- to long-term strategies must be established to reflect this structural shift as a constant in border-area investment decisions, reviews of inter-Korean economic cooperation projects, and asset allocation with high exposure to North Korean risk.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the frequency and tone of statements issued under the names of Kim Yo-jong and the spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defence. Kim Yo-jong has stated that North Korea would respond "more offensively" to multinational exercises [8]. The spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defence warned that ROK-U.S. WMD cooperation could trigger a nuclear response [6]. An increase in the frequency of such statements or an escalation in their rhetoric should be interpreted as a heightened probability of short-term military action.
The second indicator is whether missile launches and conventional weapons tests occur in rapid succession. Since September 20, short-range ballistic missile launches and tests of an upgraded 240mm rocket have taken place within a short timeframe [12][14][15]. The recurrence of such consecutive events should be viewed as a signal that the intensity of military activities in the border area has substantially increased.
The third indicator is the occurrence of additional incidents in the DMZ border area. The opposition party raised the possibility that the recent landmine explosion was linked to the North Korean military's 'border demarcation' work [10]. Whether similar incidents occur in sectors other than the western front serves as a key trigger.
The fourth indicator is remarks on the Korean Peninsula by high-ranking U.S. officials and the speed of North Korea's response to them. North Korea's reaction to General Brunson's remarks came within a few days of the remarks being made [1][4]. Comparing the speed and rhetorical intensity of North Korea's future responses to similar U.S. remarks can help gauge the trend of escalating tensions.
The fifth indicator is the source and credibility of reports regarding U.S.-North Korea contacts. President Trump's measures to scale back military exercises were reported in connection with the possibility of resuming diplomacy [13]. Whether these reports lead to official announcements by the U.S. government or remain speculative serves as a benchmark for assessing whether the scenario of South Korea's exclusion is materializing.
4. Summary and Conclusion
Although the Kang Chol-su statement was prompted by General Brunson's remarks, its essence is a refutation of the logic of South Korea's integration into the U.S. collective defense system [4]. Rather than being a variable directly linked to the prospects of a U.S.-North Korea summit, this message is an extension of North Korea's existing hardline stance toward the South—namely, the 'hostile belligerent states' doctrine [3][5]. Since North Korea maintains a dual-track approach of separating its responses to South Korea and the United States [5][8], it is premature to conclude based on this statement alone that the possibility of a U.S.-North Korea summit has been eliminated. However, with missile launches [14][15], landmine incidents [10][11], and weapons upgrade tests [12] overlapping during the same period, physical risks in the border area have substantially increased. Corporate responses should be carried out on three levels: short-term physical safety checks, medium-term monitoring linked to military exercise schedules, and long-term adaptation to structural risks as a constant. It is also necessary to prepare separate scenarios for the possibility that South Korea might once again be excluded from the process of resuming U.S.-North Korea dialogue.
References
[6] [NK News] North Korea warns US-ROK WMD cooperation could trigger nuclear response
[8] [NK News] Kim Yo Jong threatens ‘more offensive’ response to US military drills in Pacific
[12] [NK News] North Korea says 240mm rocket’s range upgraded to instill fear in South Koreans
[14] [South China Morning Post] North Korea fires 2 missiles in 3 hours amid tensions over US drills
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
How can I help you?