The U.S. Navy's Concept for Containing Chinese Carriers with Unmanned Swarm Strategy: Implications for ROK-U.S. Security Cooperation

Executive Summary

A Washington defense think tank has proposed a new concept, drawing from Ukraine's success in neutralizing Russia's Black Sea Fleet, that would use unmanned surface vehicle (USV) swarms to place Chinese aircraft carriers in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea under a state of constant threat. This proposal coincides with a period when a prolonged conflict with Iran has created a U.S. carrier gap in the Western Pacific, and Chinese official vessel activity around Taiwan has hit record highs for three consecutive months. However, there are differing views among the military services, as suggested by skepticism within the U.S. Army regarding drone integration, making it likely that a significant amount of time will be needed before this concept is reflected in actual doctrine and budgets. China is already engaging in proactive learning, preparing counter-drone doctrine and casualty treatment protocols, which raises the risk that the public disclosure of this concept could simply give Beijing more time to prepare its response. For South Korea, the immediate priority is not to commit resources but to establish ROK-U.S. consultation channels and intelligence tracking systems to ensure it does not miss the moment if and when a policy shift occurs.

I. Situational Analysis

The U.S. Navy's Concept for Containing Chinese Carriers: A Report on Unmanned Swarm Strategy - Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

A new strategy report targeting the U.S. Navy's approach to China has been released by a Washington defense think tank. Its core idea is to adapt the methods Ukraine used to effectively neutralize Russia's Black Sea Fleet [1]. Without its own naval vessels, Ukraine successfully used only unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) to sink Russian ships or enforce a port blockade. The report argues that the same logic should be applied to the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea [1].

The concept presented in the report is clear: to use USV swarms to make Chinese ports and docked vessels constant targets. The report states, "The core idea is to make the routine operation of aircraft carriers always seem dangerous, whether near Taiwan, in the South China Sea, or beyond the First Island Chain" [1]. This is not an approach of direct fleet-on-fleet confrontation, but rather one that turns the very moments a Chinese carrier is docked or transiting a port into phases of vulnerability.

The timing of this idea is closely linked to the U.S. Navy's force posture challenges. The prolonged conflict with Iran led to the USS Abraham Lincoln being deployed for over 260 consecutive days, while the Yokosuka-based USS George Washington was redeployed to the Middle East, creating a carrier gap in the Western Pacific [6]. During the same period, Chinese official vessel activity around Taiwan reached 118 instances in August, setting a record high for the third consecutive month [6][9]. Internally, the U.S. Navy has faced a series of problems exposed by local media, including a power outage on a destroyer and low morale among carrier crews [7]. Against this backdrop, the logic of securing an asymmetric deterrent with low-cost unmanned systems, instead of building more expensive large warships, is gaining traction.

2. Current Situation

Defense News covered the report under the headline, "US Navy should target carriers in fight with China," emphasizing the need for a conceptual shift within the Navy to actually targeting carriers [1]. This aligns with an internal debate within the U.S. Navy about moving away from its carrier-centric force structure.

The use of unmanned systems has already entered the operational testing phase. In the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility, an unmanned naval vessel was reportedly deployed in a search operation following a helicopter crash near the Strait of Hormuz [12]. Defense News described CENTCOM as a "combat laboratory for unmanned systems," analyzing that operational experience with these systems accumulated in the Middle East is being transferred to the Indo-Pacific theater [12]. In the Air Force, discussions about a successor to the MQ-9 have given rise to a future air combat concept where autonomous drones complete a long-range kill chain [4].

However, skepticism about the pace of drone integration is also palpable within the U.S. Army. The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) recently raised the question, "Is the U.S. Army retreating from drones?" based on a series of policy changes [11]. This suggests that the strategy for unmanned systems is viewed differently across the services. It remains uncertain whether the Navy's concept of targeting carriers will actually be prioritized in budgets and procurement.

The Chinese reaction, based on available information, is limited. However, there are reports that Chinese military analysts are closely watching the U.S. Navy's recent difficulties, such as the destroyer power outage in the South China Sea and low carrier morale [7]. This suggests that China may leverage the U.S. Navy's vulnerabilities in its own force posture debates.

3. Key Actors and Positions

The U.S. Navy is the direct audience for this report. For a naval command that has long adhered to a carrier-centric force structure, the idea of including its own carriers in the logic of targeting is organizationally sensitive. Nevertheless, amid the realistic constraints of a stagnating shipbuilding industry and delays in new vessel construction, low-cost unmanned systems are emerging as an alternative [7].

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is moving to institutionalize gray-zone coercion by regularizing coast guard patrols in the South China Sea and waters east of Taiwan and by expanding military reconnaissance using research vessels [17][14]. This trend directly corresponds to the threat environment envisioned by the U.S. Navy's unmanned swarm deterrence concept—namely, the expansion of China's constant maritime activities. The Global Times has described China's maritime patrols as shifting toward a "more systematic, institutionalized, and long-term framework" rather than being individual exercises [17].

Taiwan is in the process of re-evaluating its defense strategy for its eastern waters. With Chinese coast guard patrols in the waters east of Taiwan becoming regularized since July, Taipei faces the need to reconfigure its Western Pacific strategy [14]. If the U.S. Navy's unmanned swarm concept is operationally deployed, Taiwan will be an actor whose operational environment is directly affected.

Ukraine is the provider of this strategy's prototype. Its experience of constraining the Russian Black Sea Fleet's activities with only USVs, despite lacking its own major naval forces, is cited as the theoretical basis for the report [1]. However, the Black Sea and the Taiwan Strait/South China Sea differ fundamentally in terms of geographic depth and the adversary's anti-air and anti-ship defense systems, which limits the potential for a simple transfer of the strategy.

4. Key Issues

First, it has not been proven whether a USV swarm can actually produce a constant deterrent effect against a carrier-class force. The Black Sea case was successful under the specific conditions of the Russian Navy's air defense gaps and Ukraine's geographical proximity. The port defense posture of the Chinese Navy is qualitatively different from that of Russia's Black Sea Fleet.

Second, this concept conflicts with the U.S. Navy's existing carrier-centric force development trajectory. A strategy that defines carriers themselves as vulnerable assets is likely to lead to debates over procurement budget allocation and fleet structure reform.

Third, while the competition in unmanned systems touches upon the new technological axis of U.S.-China military rivalry, this report itself focuses more on naval operational concepts than on the advanced AI of autonomous weapons [8]. This differs from the trend emphasized by the Chinese side of strengthening the capabilities of its AI-based Strategic Support Force.

Fourth, the recent reality of the carrier gap in the Western Pacific serves as a background factor that enhances the policy persuasiveness of this strategy [6][9]. The limitations of the U.S. Navy's ability to respond to two theaters simultaneously, exposed by the prolonged conflict with Iran, create a structure that lends support to the argument for a low-cost unmanned systems alternative. As long as this problem remains unresolved, discussions on the unmanned swarm concept are likely to continue for the time being.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The U.S. Navy's Concept for Containing Chinese Carriers: A Report on Unmanned Swarm Strategy - In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The fundamental reason for this report's emergence is the gap between the U.S. Navy's force structure and its actual deployable forces. The Navy still maintains a carrier-centric force planning model. However, situations where it is difficult to even maintain a constant deployment of one carrier in the Western Pacific have become recurrent [6]. The prolonged conflict with Iran led to the USS Abraham Lincoln being deployed for over 260 consecutive days, during which the Yokosuka-based USS George Washington was redeployed to the Middle East [6]. This resulted in a carrier gap in the Western Pacific [6][9]. The fact that responding to two theaters simultaneously is structurally difficult has been proven in a real-world scenario.

The United States was not the only one to witness this gap. Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense assessed that China used it as an "opportunity to test the limits of America's ability to respond to two theaters simultaneously" [3][9]. Instead of large-scale counter-drills, China shifted to unpredictable tactics of silence and brief, dismissive commentary [3][9]. Official Chinese vessel activity around Taiwan reached 118 instances in August, setting a record for the third consecutive month [3][6][9]. Amid these developments, the U.S. Navy's internal problem of aging ships was also exposed. A power outage on a destroyer in the South China Sea and low morale among carrier crews were successively reported by local media [7]. Given the difficulty of rapidly increasing the number of expensive large warships, there is a structural reason why the logic of securing an asymmetric deterrent with low-cost unmanned systems is gaining traction.

At the same time, China's material superiority in shipbuilding also supports this logic. Defense News reported that Chinese military analysts are actually welcoming the advent of a "battleship era" for the U.S. Navy [7]. This shows that the perception that the U.S. Navy cannot catch up to China in a traditional numbers game of large warships is shared within Washington. The pressure to shift from a competition of numbers to a concept of asymmetric deterrence is the fundamental driver behind this report's ideas.

2. Structural Context

From a security structure perspective, this report directly targets the core terrain of U.S.-China military competition: the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, and the Western Pacific. The very idea of making carrier operations "constantly dangerous" is a deterrence concept aimed at neutralizing China's carrier power projection capabilities [1]. This is not an approach of direct fleet-on-fleet confrontation but one that defines the phases of port docking and transit as points of vulnerability. The goal is to impose a constant risk burden whenever China attempts to project its carrier strike groups around Taiwan or beyond the First Island Chain [1].

This concept is also directly linked to the maritime security structure of the South China Sea. Since declaring a special maritime operation in June, China has been expanding its patrol areas and rotating flotillas to regularize a constant presence [17]. The state-run Global Times announced this as a shift to a "more systematic, institutionalized, and long-term framework" [17]. The trend of strengthening regular patrols by the Chinese coast guard is also being observed in the waters east of Taiwan [14]. Amid this trend of institutionalizing maritime coercion, the U.S. Navy's unmanned swarm concept is positioned as a countermeasure that affects the entire framework of sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and freedom of navigation.

In the technological context, unmanned systems are already proliferating across the services. The CENTCOM area of responsibility is accumulating so much operational experience that it is being called a "combat laboratory" for unmanned systems [12]. The case of an unmanned naval vessel being deployed for a search mission after a helicopter crash near the Strait of Hormuz is one example [12]. In the Air Force, discussions about a successor to the MQ-9 have given rise to a concept of autonomous drones that combine satellite communication networks and the kill chain [4]. However, this proliferation is not uniform. Within the U.S. Army, questions have been raised about whether it is retreating from drone integration, given a recent series of policy changes [11]. Whether the Navy's concept of targeting carriers will actually secure priority in the defense budget depends on a separate political variable: the competition for resources among the services.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The case explicitly cited as a reference in the report is Ukraine's experience of driving out the Russian Black Sea Fleet from the Black Sea [1]. With virtually no naval vessels of its own, Ukraine used only USVs to sink Russian ships or achieve an effect equivalent to a port blockade. The implication of this precedent is clear: even an actor with a decisive naval inferiority can tie down a much stronger navy in a state of blockade by concentrating low-cost unmanned systems. However, the geographical conditions of the Black Sea and the Taiwan Strait/South China Sea are different. The Black Sea is a relatively enclosed sea, and the Russian Navy relied on a limited number of ports in the Crimean peninsula. In contrast, the Chinese Navy operates in the vast South China Sea and has numerous coastal bases. This geographical difference could act as a variable limiting the effectiveness of a swarm strategy.

China, for its part, is also absorbing the lessons of the war in Ukraine. Chinese military medical personnel have identified a surge in head and neck injuries in conflicts dominated by drones and have announced that they have been preparing specialized hemostatic agents and treatment protocols accordingly [18]. This shows that benchmarking the Ukrainian battlefield is not exclusive to the United States. China is conducting parallel learning in the development of its defensive response systems.

Another relevant case is the pattern of controlling economic chokepoints in the Red Sea and the Strait of Hormuz. Iran's exercise of control over the Strait of Hormuz, which has had global economic repercussions, demonstrates that even without a physical blockade, the imposition of a constant threat to maritime traffic can produce strategic effects [16]. This has a similar logical structure to the unmanned swarm strategy, in that it aims for a deterrent effect through the perception of "constant risk" itself, rather than through actual sinkings.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is whether the U.S. Navy's internal budget and procurement priorities will be adjusted. The key will be the resource allocation competition between the existing path of carrier expansion and the new path of increased investment in unmanned systems. The precedent of the debate over a retreat from drone integration in the Army suggests that similar internal resistance could emerge in the Navy [11].

The second variable is the duration of the carrier force gap in the Western Pacific. Regardless of when the conflict with Iran ends, the trend of a lowering threshold for gray-zone activities in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea is likely to persist for a considerable time [6]. The longer this gap lasts, the stronger the political support for an alternative unmanned systems strategy will become.

The third variable is China's method of response. China is already shifting to a "systematic, institutionalized, and long-term" coercion framework in the South China Sea, including regularizing patrols and rotating flotillas [17]. If the U.S. Navy's unmanned swarm concept enters the operational deployment stage, the effectiveness of the strategy will depend on the speed at which China develops its port defense systems and counter-unmanned system interception capabilities.

The fourth variable is the reliability of AI-based command and control systems. The operation of unmanned swarms will heavily rely on AI-assisted intelligence analysis for target identification and kill chain completion. However, a recent case has already been reported where the U.S. military nearly boarded a Chinese vessel by mistake due to flawed AI-assisted intelligence [15][19]. If this risk of false positives is not resolved, the political risks of the unmanned swarm strategy could actually increase.

From South Korea's perspective, it is necessary to watch whether this strategy materializes, as it will act as one of the preconditions for discussions on ROK-U.S. extended deterrence and a re-evaluation of the regional deterrence posture. A shift in the U.S. Navy's operational concepts could have indirect ripple effects on force deployments near the Korean Peninsula in a contingency or on the ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation framework.