The Korea-Central Asia Summit in Seoul: Conditions for Substantiating Cooperation on Critical Minerals and Supply Chains

Executive Summary

The Korea-Central Asia Summit, held in Seoul on September 16, is the culmination of a cooperation framework that began as a ministerial-level channel in the mid-2000s being upgraded to the summit level. However, it has unfolded with a dual structure where substantive negotiations occur not at the main summit but through separate bilateral channels with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. As demonstrated by Kazakhstan’s successive meetings with India, the United States, and the UAE at the BRICS summit just before visiting Seoul, the five Central Asian countries treat South Korea not as an exclusive partner but as one pillar of their diversified diplomacy. While cooperation with Uzbekistan has expanded beyond infrastructure and minerals to include AI, based on their Special Strategic Partnership, the pace of cooperation with other countries, including Kazakhstan, is likely to be slower. Future divergences in implementation should be accepted as natural differentiation rather than a failure of management. The government should manage the multilateral statement and country-specific working channels separately, while companies should focus resources on small-scale pilot projects and refining cooperation in specific minerals like uranium, chromium, and tungsten. Given that Kazakhstan’s strategy to become a Eurasian transshipment hub will be ineffective without resolving infrastructure bottlenecks, it is rational to defer major investment decisions until improvements in logistics connectivity are confirmed.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

The Korea-Central Asia Summit in Seoul: Analysis of the Current Situation

1. Background and Developments

The cooperation framework between South Korea and the five Central Asian countries has operated as a ministerial-level dialogue channel since the mid-2000s. The Uzbek media outlet Gazeta.uz noted that this format has been in place for nearly 20 years [10]. The same article assessed that the recent upgrade to the summit level signifies a “transition from a stage of sectoral coordination to one of strategic decision-making” [10]. This implies that agendas accumulated through working-level ministerial consultations have now become subjects for negotiation between heads of state.

The Kazakh media outlet The Astana Times described the meeting in Seoul on September 16 as the first summit between President Lee Jae-myung and the leaders of the five Central Asian countries [1]. The presidential office reported that President Lee had previously referred to Central Asia as “a region with considerable growth potential” [1]. The agenda was condensed into three main pillars: critical minerals, energy, and resilient supply chains [1].

The intensity of bilateral channels noticeably increased even before the summit. Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev attended the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi, India, on September 12-13 [16], and immediately scheduled a state visit to South Korea [16]. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev also visited South Korea on the occasion of the summit and held a separate bilateral meeting [4]. This shows that the Seoul meeting was designed not merely as an event to confirm multilateral consensus but as a complex diplomatic stage for each country to simultaneously advance its individual bilateral agendas.

2. Current Situation

On September 14 in Seoul, President Tokayev awarded the Dostyk Order (Second Class) to five South Korean figures who have contributed to the development of Korea-Kazakhstan relations [11]. The Astana Times reported that this ceremony was an extension of the bilateral cooperation that is expanding into practical areas such as employment, trade, investment, and technology [11]. The state visit-level protocol is proceeding in parallel with the deepening of working-level cooperation.

The summit with Uzbekistan produced an agreement to broaden cooperation from its traditional focus on transportation and infrastructure to advanced industries and areas that directly benefit the public. President Lee Jae-myung described Uzbekistan as “the only Special Strategic Partner among Central Asian countries” and a “key partner” [4]. A policy to expand the horizon of cooperation beyond infrastructure and minerals to include artificial intelligence was confirmed [4].

Ahead of the Seoul summit, Kazakh media highlighted analyses that Central Asia and the South Caucasus are emerging as new economic growth hubs. Tengrinews reported that the region’s economy has grown 6.3-fold over the past 20 years [7]. Among these countries, Kazakhstan was identified as the largest economy in the region, equipped with natural resources, digital development, a favorable investment environment, and large-scale urban development projects [7]. This assessment, which cited an analysis from the South Korean media outlet Fortune Korea, appears to have been used to shape local public opinion ahead of the Seoul meeting [7].

However, Kazakhstan’s diplomatic schedule is not focused solely on South Korea. Just before his visit to Seoul, President Tokayev held a series of bilateral meetings with India, the United States, the UAE, and Ethiopia at the BRICS summit in New Delhi [12]. In his speech at the BRICS Plus plenary session, he called for deepening practical cooperation with BRICS nations in the fields of trade, logistics, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, and water security [9]. This suggests that Kazakhstan is positioning its cooperation with South Korea not as an exclusive axis but as one component of a diversified network of foreign relations.

3. Key Actors and Positions

Kazakhstan is the most active actor in this framework. By combining his attendance at the BRICS summit with his visit to South Korea into a single diplomatic tour [16], President Tokayev is pursuing a pragmatic multilateral diplomacy that does not distinguish between Western and non-Western blocs. The fact that The Astana Times specified energy, critical minerals, transport connectivity, and global water security as Kazakhstan’s priorities vis-à-vis BRICS [8] shows that the Kazakh government is managing its cooperation agenda with South Korea in parallel with its negotiation cards for other major powers and multilateral organizations. Kazakhstan is also simultaneously pursuing the enhancement of its status as a Eurasian logistics hub. An example is the expanded cooperation on digital customs with the World Customs Organization (WCO), although local experts point out that without supporting infrastructure, the long-term effects may be limited [13].

Uzbekistan has elevated its relationship with South Korea to a “Special Strategic Partnership,” the only one of its kind among Central Asian countries [4]. President Mirziyoyev’s visit combined attendance at the summit with a separate bilateral meeting, revealing his intention to expand cooperation from its focus on infrastructure and minerals to advanced fields like artificial intelligence [4].

The South Korean government, led by President Lee Jae-myung, is focused on transforming 20 years of accumulated working-level cooperation into a summit-level partnership [1][10]. The three agenda items—critical minerals, energy, and supply chains—are directly linked to the industrial policy goal of reducing dependence on China for semiconductor and battery supply chains.

4. Key Issues

First is the parallel multilateral diplomacy strategy of the Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan is pursuing a hedging diplomacy, engaging simultaneously with BRICS and South Korea, as well as with Western and non-Western blocs [12][16]. It is unclear whether cooperation with South Korea holds exclusive priority or is being managed as one among many diversified partnerships.

Second is the issue of the binding nature of cooperation. As seen in the case of the joint declaration on critical minerals by four South American countries [3], such multilateral cooperative bodies often remain at the level of information sharing and joint investment promotion rather than becoming binding, cartel-like mechanisms. The key question is whether the Seoul summit will move beyond a declarative agreement to concrete projects.

Third is the infrastructure bottleneck. Kazakhstan’s vision of becoming a Eurasian logistics hub has its limits if it relies solely on institutional improvements like digital customs clearance. Local experts also believe that the expansion of physical infrastructure must proceed in parallel [13]. For cooperation on critical mineral supply chains to be effective, this logistics bottleneck must be resolved first.

Fourth is the positioning of relations with China and Russia. Central Asia is traditionally within Russia’s sphere of influence and is a key axis of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. The cooperation agenda on critical minerals and AI, which President Tokayev separately emphasized on the BRICS stage [9], has the potential to compete with or overlap with the cooperation framework proposed by South Korea.

II. In-Depth Analysis

The Korea-Central Asia Summit in Seoul: In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The primary driver for this upgrade to the summit level is the diversified diplomacy of the five Central Asian countries. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, these nations have long sought to move away from a structure dominated by Russia. This has resulted in the expansion of multilateral channels that are not subordinate to any single major power. The pattern of Kazakhstan conducting nearly simultaneous summit diplomacy with BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the European Union, the United States, and now South Korea illustrates this approach [8][9][12].

Just before his visit to Seoul, President Tokayev held a series of bilateral meetings with India, the United States, the UAE, and Ethiopia at the BRICS summit in New Delhi [12]. At the BRICS Plus plenary session, he mentioned trade, logistics, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, and water security, defining the forum as a “platform for broad economic ties amid deepening geopolitical fragmentation” [9]. The same individual is attending a summit in Seoul three days later with an agenda of critical minerals, energy, and supply chains. This signifies that Central Asia is pursuing a strategy of building parallel partnerships with multiple major and middle powers rather than betting on any single bloc.

South Korea’s motivation is supply chain risk management. The attempt to mitigate dependence on specific countries for critical minerals is not unique to South Korea. Similar to the case of four South American countries declaring a joint roadmap for strategic minerals in Santiago on August 28 [3], there is a concurrent trend of resource-rich countries elevating their relationships with consumer nations to the summit level to increase their negotiating power. Central Asia, being geographically adjacent to China and Russia yet wary of excessive dependence on them, is perceived by South Korea as a cooperation partner that is relatively free from bloc politics.

2. Structural Context

The key political structure is the non-aligned multilateralism of the five Central Asian countries. These nations have a history of voluntarily establishing the first nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Northern Hemisphere through the Treaty of Semipalatinsk in 2006 [15]. This is an example of a long-standing regional tendency to secure autonomy amidst major powers. The recent expansion of the functions of Kazakhstan’s Security Council to cover cybersecurity, AI, and economic crime [17] is also an extension of this autonomous risk management approach.

In the economic structure, the growth of the Central Asia-South Caucasus region is prominent. Tengrinews reported that the region’s economy has expanded 6.3-fold over the past 20 years [7]. Kazakhstan is solidifying its position as the largest economy in the region, leveraging its natural resources, digital development, investment environment, and large-scale urban development projects [7]. However, this growth does not automatically translate into external negotiating power. In discussions on digital customs reform through cooperation with the World Customs Organization (WCO), experts pointed out that long-term success as a Eurasian trade hub ultimately depends on infrastructure, intra-regional coordination, and changes in the global trade landscape [13]. In other words, a gap exists between growth potential and substantive connectivity.

In the security structure, Central Asia’s position as a buffer zone between Russia, China, the United States, and India remains operative. Since the war in Ukraine, the incentive to reduce economic dependence on Russia has grown, while wariness of China’s expanding Belt and Road Initiative investments also coexists. This dual-wariness structure provides the background for actively attracting third partners like South Korea, India, and the United States. The Moroccan ambassador’s description of Kazakhstan as a “geostrategic hub in the Eurasian region” [14] is in the same context, showing that Central Asia itself is using partner diversification as a pillar of its external messaging.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparative Cases

The Seoul summit is an instance of a ministerial-level dialogue body, accumulated over 20 years, transitioning to the summit level, making its institutionalization path not unusual [10]. Gazeta.uz assessed this as a “transition from a stage of sectoral coordination to one of strategic decision-making” [10]. The pattern of a multilateral consultative body being upgraded from the working level to the summit level is a path repeatedly observed in forums like ASEAN+3 and BRICS Plus.

The joint roadmap for strategic minerals by four South American countries serves as a useful comparison [3]. Both cases share the common feature of resource-rich countries recognizing the limits of their individual negotiating power and seeking to enhance their voice through a multilateral framework. However, the South American case is assessed to have remained a declarative agreement for information sharing and joint investment promotion, rather than a binding, cartel-like mechanism [3]. A parallel structure also emerged where the expansion of Chinese capital into individual projects continued on a separate track from the declaration [3]. Similarly, whether the Korea-Central Asia summit will lead to a binding supply chain reorganization or remain a declarative partnership will be determined in the future implementation phase.

Another reference point is the declaration of a “complete recovery” of South Korea-China relations on the occasion of Wang Yi’s visit to Seoul [6]. In that case, it was pointed out that summit-level and high-level diplomatic events could remain at the level of confirming diplomatic principles rather than leading to substantive policy shifts [6]. For the Korea-Central Asia summit, apart from its symbolism as the first summit-level meeting, the true measure of its substance will be whether cooperation on critical minerals and supply chains leads to concrete contracts and investments.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the intensity of each Central Asian country’s parallel diplomacy. President Tokayev’s schedule of moving directly to Seoul immediately after the BRICS summit in India [16] suggests that Kazakhstan is managing South Korea as one among several partners. The depth of cooperation will depend on whether the terms offered by South Korea have a competitive advantage over those from rival partners like India, the United States, China, and Russia.

The second variable is the individual pace of progress in bilateral channels. Uzbekistan is already the only Central Asian country to have its relationship elevated to a “Special Strategic Partnership” and has agreed to expand cooperation beyond infrastructure and minerals to AI [4]. Kazakhstan is pursuing both the human networks symbolized by the awarding of the Dostyk Order and working-level cooperation in employment, trade, investment, and technology [11]. It is highly likely that the five countries will deepen cooperation at different speeds rather than a uniform pace, and this divergence could constrain the specificity of the summit’s joint statement.

The third variable is the speed at which regional connectivity infrastructure is realized. Kazakhstan’s strategy to become a Eurasian trade hub cannot be completed with digital customs reform alone; it has already been pointed out that it must be supported by actual logistics infrastructure and intra-regional coordination [13]. The extent to which this infrastructure bottleneck is resolved will be crucial for ensuring that cooperation on critical mineral supply chains does not end at the declarative stage.

The fourth variable is the reaction of China and Russia. Central Asia geographically lies within the traditional spheres of influence of these two countries. As long as the deepening of cooperation with South Korea is managed within a scope that does not directly conflict with their existing interests, cooperation on resources and infrastructure can proceed smoothly. However, if a specific project touches upon security sensitivities, the possibility that Central Asian countries will adjust the pace according to their principle of balanced diplomacy cannot be ruled out.