Singapore Considers Joining WAICO Amid Risks of a Pax Silica Exit: A Test Case in the U.S.-China AI Rivalry

Executive Summary

Singapore is deferring a decision on an invitation to join the China-led World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) while maintaining its participation in the U.S.-led Pax Silica initiative. A draft letter from the U.S. State Department aims to redefine Pax Silica from a non-binding declaration to an exclusive commitment, thereby discouraging dual membership with WAICO, though its dispatch and timing are yet to be confirmed. Cases such as Kazakhstan's dual membership, Uzbekistan's pursuit of Pax Silica membership after joining WAICO, and Malaysia's adoption of Huawei chips show that Washington's demands for exclusivity are only selectively enforced. This suggests that the diplomatic hedging common to ASEAN countries is reemerging in the new arena of AI technological rivalry. For South Korea, a dual-track response is necessary: maintaining cooperation with the U.S. on security-linked items like advanced semiconductors and foundation models, while refraining from prematurely consolidating procurement sources in the commercial domain. A realistic approach to WAICO would involve minimizing political signals and maintaining only working-level contacts.

I. Analysis of the Current Situation

Singapore Considers Joining China-Led WAICO Amid Risk of Pax Silica Exit: An Analysis of the Current Situation

1. Background and Developments

Last week in Parliament, Singapore’s Minister for Communications and Information Josephine Teo announced that the country had been invited to join the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) [1]. Minister Teo added that the proposal would be considered in the context of Singapore's broader relationship with China and other international AI cooperation initiatives [1]. While this statement appears principled and noncommittal, it is characteristic of Singapore's diplomatic approach: avoiding a direct response and instead framing the decision within the wider context of its foreign relations.

WAICO was launched last July with 29 founding member states [2]. This China-led organization serves as a counter to the Pax Silica initiative, which the U.S. State Department launched last December [3]. Pax Silica aims to reduce dependency on China in AI infrastructure supply chains, including semiconductors, rare earth elements, and data centers [3]. Coordinated by the State Department, it was established in the form of a non-binding declaration [3][6].

Singapore is already a participant in the Pax Silica declaration [7]. It has defined the declaration as non-binding and has framed its involvement from the perspective of mutual economic benefit [7]. This approach differs from that of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Kazakhstan is the only country in the world to have joined both Pax Silica and WAICO [2][4][9]. Uzbekistan, after joining WAICO, is actively pursuing membership in Pax Silica [7]. As Singapore has yet to decide on joining WAICO, it is in a position to observe these existing cases where straddling the U.S. and China has become a reality.

2. Current Situation

A draft State Department letter, reported by Reuters in August, has complicated the situation [3]. The draft emphasizes that signing on to Pax Silica is a commitment, not a membership [2]. It specifies that this commitment cannot be maintained concurrently with "overlapping initiatives that conflict with our expectations" [2]. The Brookings Institution has analyzed that the de facto target of this draft is WAICO [2]. The case of Kazakhstan joining WAICO while being a signatory to Pax Silica had already drawn Washington's attention [2][9].

However, whether and when the letter will be sent remains unconfirmed [3]. This uncertainty gives ASEAN countries, including Singapore, room to adopt a wait-and-see approach. Malaysia's inclination to adopt Huawei chips despite U.S. opposition demonstrates that Washington's demands for exclusivity may be difficult to enforce in practice [3]. A former Indonesian trade minister has assessed that ASEAN is being pulled in different directions by Pax Silica and WAICO [11]. The Business Times reported that Singapore has reaffirmed its stance of keeping its options open to technologies from both the United States and China [16]. Singapore has established national AI missions in four key sectors—advanced manufacturing, financial services, connectivity, and healthcare—and has maintained a focus on the application of AI itself [16].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions

Singaporeis the central actor in this issue. Given its small domestic market and open economy, exclusion from either technological ecosystem would lead to a significant national loss. Minister Teo's statement in Parliament represents a classic hedging strategy, neither immediately rejecting nor accepting the WAICO invitation [1]. Concurrently, by defining Pax Silica as a non-binding declaration, Singapore appears to be preemptively undermining the justification for a potential U.S. backlash if it later decides to join WAICO [7].

The U.S. State Departmentis preparing a draft letter to deter dual membership among Pax Silica participants [3]. The draft's strong language appears to have been triggered by the Kazakhstan case and implies that the front could expand to key ASEAN nations like Singapore [2][9]. However, the fact that the letter's dispatch remains unconfirmed suggests internal disagreement within the State Department regarding the effectiveness and potential side effects of applying such exclusive pressure.

Chinais seeking to build its own bloc through WAICO to counter Pax Silica [6]. Securing 29 founding members has already given it a considerable reach, and the accession of a key ASEAN country like Singapore would greatly enhance WAICO's representativeness and substantive influence.

Kazakhstanas the only country to have joined both initiatives, serves as a reference case for Singapore's decision and the direct backdrop for Washington's cautionary letter [2][4][9]. Experts in Kazakhstan view this dual participation as an experiment challenging the old logic of geopolitical competition [9]. Whether this experiment is thwarted by retaliatory U.S. measures will also affect Singapore's calculations.

ASEAN Member Statesare also individually facing similar dilemmas. Malaysia is leaning toward adopting Huawei chips [3], while Uzbekistan is pursuing Pax Silica membership after having joined WAICO [7]. Thailand is also assessed to be sending mixed signals regarding its stance on AI [14]. The diagnosis that ASEAN as a whole is being pulled between the two great-power initiatives illustrates the structural pressures common to the region [11].

4. Key Issues

The first key issue is whether Washington's letter will actually be sent and, if so, what level of coercive power it will exert [3]. The second is whether a decision by Singapore to join WAICO would lead to tangible disadvantages for its status in Pax Silica, or if it would be tacitly overlooked, as in Kazakhstan's case [2][4]. The third is whether such individual hedging by member states can be coordinated into a collective response at the ASEAN level [11]. If, as the former Indonesian trade minister diagnosed, ASEAN continues to be pulled along without a clear direction, hedging strategies by individual countries will likely remain the dominant regional response for the foreseeable future [11].

II. In-Depth Analysis

Singapore Considers Joining China-Led WAICO Amid Risk of Pax Silica Exit: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root cause of this issue is that both the United States and China have designed their AI infrastructure initiatives with an exclusive membership model. Pax Silica was launched as a non-binding declaration [3][6]. However, the State Department's draft letter attempts to redefine this declaration as "a commitment, not a membership" [2]. The term "commitment" implies a demand for political exclusivity, even if it is not legally binding. The draft letter states that this commitment cannot be maintained alongside "overlapping initiatives that conflict with our expectations" [2]. The de facto target of this language is China's WAICO [2].

WAICO has also moved to build a bloc, securing 29 founding members [2][3]. The Brookings Institution notes that such U.S. pressure ultimately pushes allies into an "unwinnable dilemma" [10]. It argues that while the proliferation of AI models is inherently uncontrollable, Washington is attempting to impose an artificial separation [10].

From Singapore's perspective, there is an additional root cause. Its small domestic market and externally dependent economic structure preclude the option of fully aligning with a single technological bloc. Singapore has defined the Pax Silica declaration as "non-binding" and has framed its participation in terms of "mutual economic benefit" [7]. This indicates a gap between the political significance the United States seeks to attach to the initiative and how Singapore actually perceives it. As long as this gap persists, the potential for conflict will remain a structural feature.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: ASEAN's Tradition of Non-Alignment and Hedging Inertia

Singapore's position should be seen less as an isolated national decision and more as an instance of the hedging inertia that pervades ASEAN. A former Indonesian trade minister diagnosed that ASEAN is being pulled in "different directions" by Pax Silica and WAICO [11]. The challenge for ASEAN is summarized as the need to "build resilience against global geopolitics" [11]. This phrasing itself reaffirms the bloc's principle of not aligning with either the United States or China.

The case of Malaysia clearly illustrates this structure. Despite U.S. opposition, Malaysia is leaning toward adopting Huawei chips [3]. This sets a precedent demonstrating the limited ability of Washington's demands for exclusivity to influence actual policy decisions. The situation with Pacific Island nations is similar. Although Washington pledged $150 million in aid at a regional forum in Palau, experts believe these nations will not frame their foreign policy as a binary choice between the U.S. and China [12]. Instead, they are expected to navigate great-power competition with "strategic flexibility consistent with their long-standing hedging practices" [12]. This suggests a common diplomatic grammar exists among the smaller states of ASEAN and the Pacific.

Economic Structure: The Infrastructure Gap and Asymmetry of Alternatives

On an economic level, the AI infrastructure gap between the U.S. and China forms the material foundation of this competition. The United States operates 5,427 data centers, a figure more than ten times greater than that of any other country [6]. Between 2013 and 2023, private AI investment in the U.S. totaled $335.2 billion, significantly outpacing China [6]. This investment gap is seen as a key driver of the disparity in data center infrastructure [6].

Despite this asymmetry, China's alternatives are not entirely without effect. The release of DeepSeek's R1 early last year gained attention as a low-cost, high-efficiency model, emerging as an alternative to the U.S.-led narrative [6]. The subsequent V4 Pro, which adopted an open-weight model, triggered a debate between Washington and Silicon Valley on how to respond [6]. China's AI strategy is assessed as a dual pursuit of domestic control and external proliferation, aimed at establishing its own standards and seizing leadership in governance [10]. Within this structure, middle powers like Singapore are positioned as actors "preserving the choice between the United States and China" [2]. In short, while the infrastructure gap favors the U.S., China's proliferation strategy leaves it room to maneuver in the competition over standards and governance.

Security Structure: The Gap Between Non-Binding Declaration and Enforcement

In the security dimension, the institutional character of Pax Silica as a non-binding declaration is itself a structural vulnerability [3][6]. Attempting to retroactively impose exclusive obligations on a non-binding declaration is highly likely to provoke a backlash from signatories. The very fact that the State Department letter has not yet been sent illustrates this dilemma [3]. Sending it risks alienating allies, whereas not sending it would mean passively allowing WAICO's expansion. This catch-22 demonstrates that the United States lacks full structural leverage over Southeast and Central Asia.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

The case of Kazakhstan is the most direct precedent for this issue. Kazakhstan is "the only country in the world to have joined both Pax Silica and WAICO" [4][9]. This overlap has "already drawn Washington's attention" [9]. Kazakhstan is striking a balance by treating the two frameworks as "reflecting different approaches to the emerging AI landscape" [9]. Experts assess that this balancing act by Kazakhstan "could challenge the old logic of geopolitical competition" [9]. Since Singapore has not yet made a decision, the Kazakhstan case serves as a reference, indicating the potential intensity and form of pressure Singapore would face if it were to join.

The case of Uzbekistan shows a reverse path. It joined WAICO first and is now pursuing membership in Pax Silica [7]. This suggests that the same dilemma arises regardless of the sequence, as joining the other initiative can become problematic no matter which is chosen first.

A comparison with the Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement is useful but has limitations. The Non-Aligned Movement was centered on non-participation in military alliances and allowed for relatively free exchange in the economic and technological domains. In contrast, the current AI competition uses the economic and technological layers of technical standards, infrastructure, and data governance as the very criteria for creating exclusive blocs, offering less room to maneuver than the Cold War non-alignment model. The hedging of Pacific Island nations [12] and ASEAN's discourse on resilience [11] can be seen as attempts to adapt and apply the traditional grammar of non-alignment within this more constrained environment.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is whether the State Department letter is actually sent and the strength of its wording. If the letter is not sent or is softened with euphemistic language, hedging countries, including Singapore, will gain justification for maintaining their current course. Conversely, if it is sent as an explicit ultimatum, Singapore will be pressured to effectively signal its rejection of the WAICO invitation.

The second variable is whether Malaysia's adoption of Huawei chips leads to a tangible response from the United States [3]. If Washington does not impose visible sanctions or penalties in this case, the very effectiveness of its demands for exclusivity will be called into question, thereby encouraging the straddling strategies of other ASEAN countries.

The third variable is the substantive appeal of WAICO. Key factors will be how much its membership expands beyond the 29 founding states [2][3] and whether the organization provides concrete benefits in terms of technical standards, funding, and infrastructure support. To date, its appeal remains unproven, as its character has been largely declaratory.

The fourth variable is the interests of Singapore's domestic political and industrial sectors. Singapore has established national AI missions in four areas—advanced manufacturing, financial services, connectivity, and healthcare—and has reaffirmed its stance of keeping options open to both U.S. and Chinese technology [16]. If this industrial and policy pragmatism takes precedence over diplomatic pressure, Singapore may lean toward seriously considering the WAICO invitation despite U.S. demands for exclusivity. Conversely, if the importance of its security cooperation with the U.S. weighs more heavily, it is likely to defer joining or limit its participation to a formal level.