North Korea's Successive Ballistic Missile Launches and the ROK-U.S.-Japan Exercise Phase: A Geopolitical Risk Analysis

Executive Summary

The September 12 ballistic missile launch from the Wonsan area was a repetition of the three-stage "commentary-launch-silence" pattern, which has been ongoing since August in response to the Freedom Edge and Orient Shield exercises. North Korea's primary objective is not to demonstrate military deterrence but to wage a narrative struggle aimed at delegitimizing ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation. A bifurcated structure has become entrenched, operating a channel to Japan under Kim Yo Jong's name and a separate channel to the U.S. and Japan under the names of the Minister of National Defence and the Institute for Military Commentary. State media is simultaneously managing a dual message, remaining silent on the launch while publicly showcasing solidarity with China and Russia, which confirms the regime's priority of separating domestic tension management from its hardline foreign policy. The most likely path is the baseline scenario in which this pattern repeats. As long as trilateral exercises based on the Camp David framework continue to be regularized, it is assessed that similar situations will recur annually. The South Korean government needs a response system that operates on two separate tracks—maintaining a deterrent posture through military channels and refuting North Korea's framing through diplomatic channels—while coordinating message consistency at the level of the presidential National Security Office.

I. Situational Analysis of the Issue

North Korea's Successive Missile Launches and ROK-U.S.-Japan Exercises: A Situational Analysis

1. Background and Developments

The immediate context for this launch was the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral multi-domain combined exercise, 'Freedom Edge,' held from September 7 to 11 [11]. This exercise, institutionalized based on the Camp David agreements, proceeded as scheduled on a separate track from President Trump's directive to scale down Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS) [7]. This indicates that the president's personal channel remarks failed to constrain the Pentagon's policy line or the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation framework [7].

On September 8, two days before the exercise ended, North Korea released a commentary through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) under the name of Kang Won Chol, a commentator on international security affairs [11]. The commentary targeted both Freedom Edge and the U.S.-Japan-Australia combined exercise 'Orient Shield,' which was being conducted concurrently in the Hokkaido area, warning that "the attempts by Japanese neo-militarists to turn the archipelago into an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' will only bring about a tremendous disaster" [11]. By highlighting the temporal overlap of the two exercises, Pyongyang framed Japan's expanding security role as a separate axis of threat [11].

This is an extension of the pattern observed during the two launch phases in August. The day before the August 6 launch from the Wonsan area, a commentary from the KCNA's Institute for Military Commentary was released first, defining U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation as a "trinitarian threat solidifying into a new security crisis" [3][5]. The bifurcated structure, with statements to Japan issued under Kim Yo Jong's name running parallel to statements to the U.S., Japan, and South Korea from the Institute for Military Commentary, has continued this time as well [3][7].

2. Current Situation

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced that it had detected a short-range ballistic missile launched from the Wonsan area at around 5:20 a.m. on September 12 [6]. The missile flew approximately 250 km before landing in the East Sea [4]. Yonhap News Agency raised the possibility that a Hwasong-11 series ballistic missile and a 600mm-class multiple rocket launcher were fired together [4].

On Monday, September 15, North Korea's new Minister of National Defence, Kim Song Gi, issued a statement via KCNA describing the Freedom Edge exercise as "provocative" [8]. He criticized the U.S., South Korea, and Japan for using the pretext of responding to North Korea's "nuclear and missile threats" and warned that Pyongyang would respond with "stronger and more resolute actions" [8]. This rhetoric is merely a repetition of the tone of past statements from the Ministry of National Defence [8].

What is noteworthy is the silence of North Korean state media. As of 9:00 a.m. on September 13, the Korean Central News Agency and Rodong Sinmun had made no mention of the previous day's launch [1]. Yonhap News Agency assessed this as part of a pattern of silence that has continued since early August [1]. This shows that the dual-track message management strategy—carrying out launches while refraining from official propaganda through domestic media—was repeated in September, following the pattern from August.

During the same period, North Korea has also been moving to solidify its foreign relations. On the occasion of the 78th anniversary of the regime's founding on September 9, Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin each sent congratulatory messages expressing their intent to strengthen strategic cooperation [13]. In a speech commemorating the anniversary, Kim Jong Un praised units engaged in "overseas military operations" in the war in Ukraine [14]. South Korea and Japan directly criticized the transfer of ballistic missiles between North Korea and Russia and the issue of troop deployment during a UN Security Council discussion on Ukraine [15].

3. Key Actors and Positions

North Koreais managing both the level of provocation and the attribution of responsibility by decoupling its launches from its commentaries. It employs a dual strategy of issuing external warnings through hardline statements under the Minister of National Defence's name, while managing domestic tensions by having state media remain silent on the actual launches [1][8]. The bifurcation of channels—one for Japan under Kim Yo Jong and another for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea via the Institute for Military Commentary—is interpreted as a strategic move to simultaneously secure leverage for pressuring Japan and preserve room for negotiations with the U.S. in a future diplomatic phase [3][7].

South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staffhas continued its response of focusing on confirming technical facts by promptly disclosing the missile's trajectory and impact point immediately after the launch [6][4]. However, the kind of counter-framing response seen in August—narrative management at the level of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification to explain the legitimacy of trilateral cooperation—has not yet been clearly demonstrated in response to the September launch.

United Statesmaintained its stance of managing escalation during the August phase by using the restrained language of "missile launch" [5]. By proceeding with the September Freedom Edge exercise as scheduled under the institutional framework of the Camp David agreements, the U.S. reaffirmed a structure where conciliatory signals at the presidential level coexist with the Pentagon's working-level policy of continuing the exercises [7].

Japanhas shown a dual approach, expanding security cooperation with the U.S. and Australia through the Orient Shield exercise while simultaneously making an exception to allow the North Korean soccer team to enter the country for the Asian Games [11][12][18]. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kihara, while drawing a line by stating there is "no change" to the principle of banning entry under sanctions against North Korea, acknowledged the exception based on "similar past cases" [12]. This reflects a parallel policy of being a direct target of North Korean criticism in the security domain while keeping sports exchange channels partially open.

China and Russiareaffirmed their strategic alignment on the occasion of the anniversary of the North Korean regime's founding [13]. From mid-August to early September, the Royal New Zealand Navy conducted a mission to monitor the implementation of sanctions against North Korea, watching for illicit activities such as ship-to-ship transfers [10]. North Korea's attempts to diversify its foreign relations are also evident in its efforts to strengthen ties with Nicaragua [17].

4. Key Issues

The first issue is whether North Korea's attempt to redefine ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation as a structural threat, rather than a matter of responding to individual exercises, is sustained in the September phase. The September 8 commentary targeting both Freedom Edge and Orient Shield shows this redefinition effort is expanding to include Japan's growing security role [11].

The second issue is the persistence of state media silence and its implications. It is necessary to examine how this pattern, ongoing since early August [1], strikes a balance between using launches as a bargaining chip in a potential future U.S.-DPRK negotiation phase and managing domestic stability.

The third issue is South Korea's response system. While the JCS's technical response is swift, it is necessary to verify whether the gap in the narrative management system at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification level—a system needed to counter North Korea's framing offensive—that was identified in August is being repeated in September [3][5].

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

North Korea's Successive Ballistic Missile Launches: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

North Korea's recent launch is not an isolated show of force. The root cause lies in the fact that ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral cooperation has entered a phase of institutionalization following the Camp David agreements [7]. This is supported by the fact that the Freedom Edge exercise proceeded as scheduled, irrespective of political signals from the U.S. president's personal channels [7]. From North Korea's perspective, the very fact that the trilateral exercise track survived independently, even during the Trump-initiated phase of scaling down UFS, is central to its threat perception.

North Korea has attempted to define this cooperation not as the sum of individual bilateral relationships but as a new category of threat [3][5]. Evidence for this is the August commentary that labeled U.S.-Japan-ROK cooperation a "trinitarian threat solidifying into a new security crisis" [3][5]. The September commentary went a step further, isolating Japan's expanding security role as a separate axis and warning that "the attempts by Japanese neo-militarists to turn the archipelago into an 'unsinkable aircraft carrier' will only bring about a tremendous disaster" [11]. It seized on the overlapping timing of the Freedom Edge and Orient Shield exercises to designate Japan as a separate threatening actor [11].

Therefore, the primary purpose of the launch is not to demonstrate military deterrence. The priority is a narrative struggle to deny the legitimacy of ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperation, both internally and externally. The missile launch serves as physical evidence to support this narrative.

2. Structural Context

Security Structure. The statement by the new Minister of National Defence, Kim Song Gi, warned of "stronger and more resolute actions," but its content was merely a repetition of past statements from the ministry [8]. This suggests that North Korea's military response is following a standardized script. The scale of the launch—a combination of a 250 km-range short-range ballistic missile and multiple rocket launchers [4]—was also not significantly different from the August launch pattern. Structurally, the message lies not in the intensity of the threat, but in its persistence and repetition.

Message Management Structure. The bifurcated structure, with a channel to Japan under Kim Yo Jong's name operating in parallel with a channel to the U.S., Japan, and South Korea under the names of the Institute for Military Commentary and the Minister of National Defence, has been a fixed pattern since August [3][7]. In addition, a dual structure is confirmed wherein the launch itself is met with silence by KCNA and Rodong Sinmun [1]. This is a strategy of selective disclosure: sending a physical signal externally by conducting the launch, while internally avoiding alarming the public about escalating tensions. This reflects the regime's priority of maintaining stability by managing the domestic spread of military tension amid ongoing economic difficulties.

Foreign Relations Structure. During the same period, North Korea moved to solidify its ties with China and Russia on the 78th anniversary of its founding. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin each sent congratulatory messages expressing their intent to strengthen strategic cooperation [13]. Kim Jong Un publicly praised units engaged in "overseas military operations" in the war in Ukraine [14]. This is a structural balancing strategy to counter ROK-U.S.-Japan pressure by simultaneously strengthening the North Korea-China-Russia axis. South Korea and Japan's direct criticism of North Korea-Russia military cooperation at the UN Security Council [15] can be understood as an extension of this dynamic. However, as seen in Japan's exceptional permission for the North Korean Asian Games delegation to enter the country [12][18], confrontation in the security domain and limited exchanges in sports and humanitarian areas coexist on separate tracks.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

North Korea's practice of conducting launches linked to military exercises is not a new phenomenon. The pattern of framing UFS as a rehearsal for invasion and repeatedly conducting launches before and after the exercise was already confirmed in August [3]. The September case is more of an extension of that repetition to a separate exercise system, namely Freedom Edge.

However, there are points of distinction from past cases. The August launch was a reaction to UFS, a ROK-U.S. bilateral-focused exercise, whereas the September launch occurred during a phase when a ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral multi-domain exercise (Freedom Edge) and a U.S.-Japan-Australia exercise (Orient Shield) were conducted simultaneously [11]. This means North Korea is expanding the targets of its exercise-linked launches from the ROK-U.S. bilateral framework to a broader multilateral structure that includes ROK-U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Japan-Australia. This can be seen as a process in which North Korea is solidifying a perceptual framework that redefines the Northeast Asian security structure not as a sum of individual threats but as a multilateral, network-type threat.

The pattern of state media silence is also historically unusual. In the past, North Korea swiftly reported major launches on the front page of Rodong Sinmun or through KCNA, aiming to simultaneously bolster domestic solidarity and apply external pressure. The silence that has continued since early August [1] suggests a shift: as launches become more frequent, Pyongyang is treating them as routine military activities rather than consuming each event for domestic propaganda purposes.

4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments

The first variable is the continuity of the exercise schedule. Freedom Edge is based on the institutional foundation of the Camp David agreements, giving it a structure that is resilient to political variables [7]. The frequency of North Korea's reactive commentaries and launches is likely to synchronize with the pace at which this exercise becomes an annual and regular event.

The second variable is whether messaging toward Japan continues to be managed separately. As long as the structure of operating a separate channel to Japan under Kim Yo Jong's name is maintained [3][7], the intensity of North Korea's pressure on Japan can be independently adjusted in response to U.S.-Japan bilateral exercises like Orient Shield or Japan's own defense buildup measures.

The third variable is the pace at which North Korea-China-Russia cooperation deepens. The congratulatory messages from Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin on the regime's founding anniversary [13] and the public praise for troops dispatched to Ukraine [14] show that North Korea is moving to strengthen its bloc alignment against pressure from the ROK, U.S., and Japan. The extent to which this trend translates into tangible military and economic support could alter the calculus of constraints on the frequency and intensity of North Korea's launches.

The fourth variable is whether the state media's silence continues. Whether the pattern of silence is maintained or switches back to large-scale reporting on a specific occasion will be an indicator of whether North Korea defines the current phase as routine military activity or is still holding it in reserve as a card for bolstering domestic unity [1].