Analysis of the Global South Expansion of WAICO and China's Strategy for Leading AI Governance

Executive Summary

Launched in July 2026 in Shanghai, the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) is evaluated as an institutional outcome of a strategy to establish a multipolar order in response to the US-led Pax Silica system, uniting Global South countries such as those in Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, leveraging China's proven technological confidence through DeepSeek. Founding member countries like Kazakhstan and Oman are utilizing this not as an ideological confrontation but as a means to pursue practical national interests such as regional hub building and knowledge-based economic strategies. Thus, the success or failure of WAICO is contingent not only on China's supply capabilities but also on the technological acceptance capacity of member states and the effectiveness of institutionalization. Future developments may vary across scenarios, including substantial institutionalization (20%), symbolic platform sustainability (55%), or obsolescence, necessitating consideration of the market preemption by Chinese AI companies and the potential bifurcation of global supply chains. South Korea, while maintaining its credibility as a founding member of Pax Silica, requires a dual strategy of 'selective engagement and normative leadership' to independently expand bilateral and trilateral AI cooperation with Global South countries, regardless of WAICO membership. In the short term, it is essential to closely monitor the implementation trends of founding member countries and proactively strengthen cooperation channels with pragmatic states to prevent China from monopolizing the normative vacuum.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

WAICO's Global South Expansion: Building China-led AI Governance - Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

On July 16, 2026, the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) was launched in Shanghai. This coincided with the state visit of Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev to China, where representatives from 29 countries, including Brazil, China, Egypt, Indonesia, Laos, Pakistan, Qatar, Russia, and Kazakhstan, signed the founding agreement[4]. The following day, President Xi Jinping took the stage to present a new AI order, which has been evaluated as a response to the US-led semiconductor and AI supply chain consortium 'Pax Silica'[11].

The launch of WAICO is not a sudden event but rather an extension of China's long-accumulated technological diplomacy strategy. China has already been promoting a global AI governance framework and standard norms with broad consensus based on respect for the policies and practices of various countries, supporting the establishment of a global AI governance body under the UN through the 'AI Global Governance Initiative'[5]. A turning point in this trend was the emergence of DeepSeek-R1, a Chinese startup, in early 2025. Evaluated as a low-cost, high-efficiency model, DeepSeek garnered international attention as an alternative model to US-led AI development, prompting the Chinese government to become more proactive in shaping the global AI governance order[2]. China has positioned 2026 as a historical watershed for changes in the international order, setting the establishment of a multipolar world order and the expansion of its global role as key diplomatic goals[5]. Therefore, the launch of WAICO can be understood as a decision at the level of national strategy.

2. Current Situation

A review of the list of founding member countries of WAICO reveals a significant inclusion of countries from Africa, Latin America, and the former Soviet Union, such as South Africa, Algeria, Belarus, Cuba, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Kenya, and Venezuela[1]. Local media in Mozambique reported that the main goals of this agreement include promoting a human-centered approach, encouraging AI innovation, development, and implementation, expanding international cooperation, creating an open, equitable, and non-discriminatory development environment, addressing the digital divide, enhancing accessibility to AI technologies and services, and strengthening international cooperation to mitigate risks and challenges associated with AI development[1].

Kazakhstan's local media, Astana Times, evaluated WAICO's membership as part of a practical national strategy to strengthen Kazakhstan's position as a regional AI hub, going beyond mere symbolic gestures[4]. Similarly, Oman's local media, Times of Oman, connected its participation in WAICO's founding to a long-term strategy for building a knowledge-based digital economy, interpreting it as an attempt for Oman to position itself as an actor in AI governance at both regional and global levels[7]. Reports from the Republic of Congo indicated that a delegation led by the Minister of Posts, Telecommunications, and Digital Economy participated in a series of Chinese events, including high-level AI governance meetings, the Africa-Asia AI Forum, and the Digital Silk Road Forum, aligning with the Congolese government's vision of leveraging digital transformation as a lever for national development and opportunities for its citizens[9].

Meanwhile, Foreign Policy reported that Xi Jinping stated during his speech at the Shanghai World AI Conference that "we must seize this rare and historic opportunity to promote open-source, openness, cooperation, and sharing," and mentioned that "China is ready to be more open"[13]. This indicates that China is attempting to frame its AI technological prowess within a discourse of 'openness and sharing' to elicit responses from Global South countries.

In this context, South Korea finds itself in a delicate position. Although China requested South Korea's participation in the founding of WAICO, the South Korean government, already a founding member of Pax Silica, decided to refrain from sending high-level officials, considering the overall dynamics of US-China relations and technological cooperation, as reported by a diplomatic source in the JoongAng Ilbo[11].

3. Key Actors and Positions/Interests

Chinais perceived as attempting to shift the focus of technological competition from 'technology development' to 'norm setting' through WAICO. The domestic think tank EAI East Asia Institute analyzed that "the WAIC 2026 and the launch of WAICO formalize a strategic turning point for China, aiming to integrate 29 Global South countries into a China-centered AI governance order, shifting the focus of AI technology competition from development to norm setting"[2]. China's strategy, combining proven technological capabilities with the discourse of 'openness, cooperation, and sharing,' is forming a substantial counterbalance to the US-led Pax Silica system; however, the strategic success remains fluid due to the unverified technological acceptance capacity and institutional effectiveness of founding member countries[2].

Founding member countries of the Global Southshare a commonality in justifying their membership in WAICO within their respective domestic policy contexts. Reports from Mozambique, Kazakhstan, Oman, and the Republic of Congo suggest that these countries approach WAICO from a practical perspective, focusing on their digital economic development, bridging the AI gap, and strengthening their positions as regional hubs, rather than viewing it through the geopolitical lens of integration into China[1][4][7][9]. However, the concern that such practical approaches at the individual country level may ultimately lead to the expansion of China's governance platform is not significantly highlighted in local reports.

The United Statesis responding through its own semiconductor and AI supply chain consortium, Pax Silica, and during a Senate hearing, business leaders such as Sam Altman warned that while the US still holds an advantage, the gap with China is not as large as it once was[2][5]. This indicates a significant level of concern within the US regarding China's pursuit.

South Koreais in a position where it must seek a strategic balance between its identity as a founding member of Pax Silica and the China-led Global South AI governance space that China seeks to preempt. The EAI report suggests that "South Korea requires a dual strategy of 'selective engagement and normative leadership' to maintain its credibility as a founding member of Pax Silica while independently entering the Global South AI governance space that China seeks to preempt"[2].

4. Summary of Key Issues

First, the effectiveness of WAICO is in question. Many founding member countries are developing nations with unverified technological acceptance capacities and institutional foundations, raising uncertainty about whether this organization will function as a substantive norm-forming body or remain a symbolic diplomatic platform[2]. Second, there exists a gap between discourse and substance. It remains to be seen whether the discourse of 'openness, cooperation, and sharing' emphasized by Xi Jinping[13] and the goal of 'human-centered and non-discriminatory development' reported by local media in Mozambique[1] will translate into concrete outcomes such as technology transfer and infrastructure support for member countries. Third, there is the potential for the polarization of the US-China AI competition. The coexistence of two platforms, Pax Silica and WAICO, increases the risk of fragmentation in global AI governance, and the Brookings Institution has held a separate forum to analyze this phenomenon of governance fragmentation[3]. Fourth, there is the strategic dilemma of middle powers. Many middle powers, including South Korea, seek to maintain strategic ambiguity rather than explicitly aligning with one side, but as US-China competition becomes more structured, the costs of this ambiguity may increase[2][11].

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

WAICO's Global South Expansion: Building China-led AI Governance - In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of the Root Causes of the Issue

The fundamental cause of WAICO's launch can be found in the fundamental mismatch between the pace of AI technological development and the existing international governance systems. Today, artificial intelligence has established itself as a core foundational technology that intersects military and security, economic growth, and socio-cultural norms, becoming a focal point for the reconfiguration of the world order, comparable to the textile technology of the industrial revolution or nuclear technology during the Cold War[8]. However, a universal and binding international norm to manage this has yet to be formed. In this normative vacuum, both the US and China are competing to implant their respective technological standards and value systems into the international community, with the stage of competition shifting from technology development itself to norm setting and the establishment of international organizations, which is critical[2].

More structurally, the root cause of this situation lies in China's recovery of technological confidence. The emergence of DeepSeek-R1 in early 2025, recognized as a low-cost, high-efficiency model, empirically demonstrated alternative possibilities to US-led AI development, prompting the Chinese government to become more proactive in shaping the global AI governance order[2][5]. In other words, DeepSeek can be viewed as a political asset that allows China to materialize the discourse of 'openness, cooperation, and sharing' on the international stage.

Another fundamental cause is the structural marginalization faced by Global South countries. As the development, dissemination, and utilization of AI technology are predominantly led by advanced countries such as the US and a few major powers like China, the Global South, which has been relatively marginalized, has consistently raised concerns about the deepening digital divide[8]. Developing countries have lower levels of digital infrastructure and technological innovation compared to developed countries and lack the capacity for digital transformation[8]. Therefore, a multilateral platform that promises access to AI technology and a voice is inherently attractive to them. As reported by local media in Mozambique, WAICO's emphasis on a human-centered approach, addressing the digital divide, and enhancing accessibility to AI technologies and services[1] can be seen as a strategy precisely targeting the structural demands of the Global South.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure: The launch of WAICO can be understood as an institutional outcome of China's long-pursued strategy to build a multipolar world order. China has positioned 2026 as a historical watershed for changes in the international order, setting the establishment of a multipolar world order and the expansion of its global role as key diplomatic goals[5]. This is an extension of the Xi Jinping government's ongoing emphasis on reforming the global governance system[2]. In this context, Xi Jinping's statement during his speech at the Shanghai World AI Conference, urging to "seize this rare and historic opportunity to promote open-source, openness, cooperation, and sharing" and asserting that "China is ready to be more open"[13], can be read not merely as a technological discourse but as a language of international political positioning.

Economic Structure: A look at the participating countries in WAICO reveals a mix of countries aiming to leap to regional AI hubs, such as Kazakhstan and Oman[4][7], and African countries like South Africa, Algeria, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, and Kenya, as well as countries like Belarus, Cuba, and Venezuela that have relatively strained relations with the West[1]. This composition overlaps significantly with the existing economic networks that China has built through the Belt and Road Initiative, suggesting that a similar geopolitical incorporation strategy is also at work in the new domain of AI governance. The case of the Republic of Congo's delegation participating in a series of Chinese events, including WAIC and high-level AI governance meetings, as well as the Africa-Asia AI Forum and the Digital Silk Road Forum[9], shows that WAICO is not an independent event but is integrated into a larger economic structure known as the Digital Silk Road.

Security Structure: From a security perspective, WAICO is interpreted as a counterbalance to the US-led semiconductor and AI supply chain consortium 'Pax Silica'[11]. The case of South Korea, which has participated as a founding member of Pax Silica, feeling burdened by requests for high-level attendance at WAICO, indicates that this structure is already exerting pressure on countries to choose between the two or at least maintain a strategic balance. However, from the perspective of security compulsion, WAICO remains at the level of a cooperative body without the coercive power of military alliances or export control regimes, and in this regard, it can be evaluated more as a competition of norms and standards.

3. Historical Precedents and Similar Case Comparisons

The emergence of WAICO can be understood as an extension of the pattern of 'forming spheres of influence through the establishment of alternative multilateral organizations' that has recurred since the Cold War. Similar to how China established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in response to the Bretton Woods system and created the New Development Bank (NDB) in response to the Western-led development aid system, WAICO also follows the same strategic grammar of building a parallel and alternative platform to the existing US-centered AI governance discussion structure. However, a decisive difference is that the technology of AI itself is still an emerging area where international standards or normative systems have not yet been fully solidified, providing China with a much more advantageous opportunity for preemption than when it challenged the existing financial order.

Another similar case is the North-South dynamics surrounding the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR)' within the UN climate change framework. Just as the Global South has raised its voice for equity and accessibility regarding climate norms led by developed countries, in the AI domain, developing countries have demanded an expansion of their voice amid lower levels of digital infrastructure and technological innovation compared to developed countries[8]. China is strategically leveraging these long-standing grievances of the Global South, positioning itself as a spokesperson for these countries through its own platform, reflecting a transfer of the North-South conflict structure in climate governance to the AI domain.

However, as shown by the case of the UN AI panel, the 134 developing country bloc has already demonstrated its independent negotiating power within the UN AI negotiations[6]. This suggests that WAICO is not a completely new phenomenon but rather an attempt by China to absorb and reconfigure existing movements of solidarity among developing countries into its own led institution. In other words, WAICO is understood as not emerging in a vacuum but as a form combined with a strong sponsor, China, on top of an already fragmented global AI governance landscape[3].

4. Key Variables in the Development of the Issue

First, the actual technological acceptance capacity of founding member countries is a key variable. The implementation gap between countries like Kazakhstan and Oman, which have already established national AI strategies and aim to become regional hubs[4][7], and those that may only participate symbolically will likely determine WAICO's institutional effectiveness in the future. The assessment that "the technological acceptance capacity and institutional effectiveness of founding members have not been verified, leaving the strategic success still fluid"[2] accurately captures this uncertainty.

Second, the overall flow of US-China relations will act as an important variable. As seen in the recent US-China summit, which concluded without meaningful agreements and with both sides announcing their positions[12], the relationship between the two countries oscillates between competition and management, and the confrontation in the AI governance domain may also be strengthened or alleviated in line with this broader trend.

Third, the competitive interaction with the US-led response platform 'Pax Silica' is crucial. The extent to which either side provides substantial technology transfer, investment, and infrastructure support will likely influence the practical choices and loyalties of Global South countries, leading to a competition that goes beyond mere discourse.

Fourth, the strategic choices of middle powers, including South Korea, will act as a variable. If South Korea maintains 'strategic ambiguity' between its identity as a founding member of Pax Silica and selective engagement with the China-led platform, the costs of this ambiguity may increase[2]. This indicates that the actions of middle powers may become a critical litmus test for determining whether the two camps become entrenched.