North Korea's Irreversible Nuclear Status Declaration and ARF's Denuclearization Call Confrontation: Prolongation of Structural Stalemate and South Korea's Strategic Transition Challenges

Executive Summary

North Korea has irreversibly solidified its status as a nuclear state through the constitutional enshrinement of its nuclear status in 2023 and the institutionalization of the leader's command over nuclear forces in 2025. Kim Yo Jong's rejection of the ARF's call for denuclearization serves as an external reaffirmation of this national policy. With the UN Security Council's pressure channel rendered ineffective by Russia's diplomatic shield, the ARF's call for denuclearization is merely a normative expression of intent, clearly limited in its ability to induce behavioral change in North Korea. The baseline scenario (65% probability) is a prolonged 'managed tension' phase, characterized by continuous qualitative advancements in nuclear and missile capabilities while refraining from full-scale provocations, with the possibility of complete denuclearization structurally blocked. South Korea must transition from the existing paradigm centered on resuming denuclearization talks to a 'robust engagement' strategy, focusing on the practical implementation of extended deterrence based on the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG), accelerating the operationalization of the Korean-style three-axis system, and institutionalizing a mechanism to prevent 'Korea passing.' Businesses must establish a medium- to long-term risk management system that assumes the structural persistence of geopolitical risk premiums on the Korean Peninsula, focusing on supply chain diversification and strategic positioning in defense and security sectors.

I. Issue Situation Analysis

North Korea's Refusal to Abandon Nuclear Weapons and the ARF's Denuclearization Call Confrontation

Issue Situation Analysis

1. Background and Progress of the Issue

North Korea's determination to possess nuclear weapons is not a short-term diplomatic tactic but the product of a national policy institutionally completed over decades. The decisive turning point was the collapse of the Hanoi North Korea-US summit in February 2019. Subsequently, in working-level talks in Sweden in October of the same year, North Korea declared that "complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can only be possible when all obstacles that threaten our security and hinder our development are cleanly and undoubtedly removed," effectively raising the preconditions for denuclearization talks to a level unacceptable to the United States [2]. Following this, the 'frontal breakthrough struggle' policy was officially adopted at the 5th Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee in December 2019, and at the 8th Party Congress in 2021, the US was designated as the "monster of war" and the "greatest enemy," institutionalizing a hardline foreign policy stance at the party charter level [8].

This policy was further solidified through constitutional amendments. In 2023, North Korea enshrined its nuclear possession status in the constitution. In March 2025, at the first session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly, the constitutional framework was reorganized to deny the very pursuit of unification by enshrining the leader's command over nuclear forces in the preamble and institutionally establishing the principle of 'two states' on the Korean Peninsula [11]. This has effectively blocked any legal or structural room for denuclearization negotiations and is assessed as a irreversible shift in national policy, going beyond mere rhetorical hardening [2].

Physical advancements in nuclear capabilities have also been concurrent. Even after its sixth nuclear test and the declaration of nuclear force completion in 2017, North Korea continues to operate the Yongbyon reactor and produce highly enriched uranium. It is expanding the spectrum of its nuclear operational strategy, from intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) to short-range missiles capable of carrying tactical nuclear warheads, shifting from strategic retaliation and deterrence to tactical denial and deterrence [5]. SIPRI warned in its 2026 Yearbook that the increasing reliance of nations on nuclear weapons as instruments of state power is reversing decades of reduction efforts, simultaneously increasing the risks of miscalculation and escalation [6].

2. Current Situation

On July 26, 2026, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Ministerial Meeting held in Manila, Philippines, adopted a Chairman's Statement expressing "grave concern" over North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and emphasizing the importance of dialogue for the realization of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The statement urged the full implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions and supported international efforts for denuclearization through peaceful means [12]. This marks the second consecutive year a statement calling for denuclearization has been adopted, reflecting the international community's sustained concern.

North Korea responded immediately and resolutely three days later, on July 27. Kim Yo Jong, sister of Kim Jong Un and Vice Department Director of the Workers' Party of Korea Central Committee, issued an official statement through the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) and the Russian state news agency TASS, declaring North Korea's nuclear possession status as "final and irreversible" and vowing to continue strengthening its nuclear capabilities [14]. She dismissed the ASEAN call for denuclearization as a "stupid and foolish" assertion and characterized the discussion of denuclearization itself as a "foolish dream" [4][10]. The simultaneous release of this statement through both KCNA and TASS is interpreted as an intention to showcase the deepening strategic cooperation between North Korea and Russia to the outside world.

The deepening military cooperation between North Korea and Russia adds another complex dimension to this issue. Ukrainian President Zelensky claimed that Russia is preparing to accept an additional 30,000 North Korean soldiers for deployment on the Ukrainian front, suggesting that North Korea-Russia military cooperation is escalating beyond mere arms trade to a level of substantive military alliance. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov publicly stated in September 2024 that North Korea's denuclearization is an issue "off the negotiating table" for Russia [3], rendering the pressure channel through the UN Security Council effectively defunct [2].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions and Interests

North Korea: Institutional Completion and Strategic Utilization of Nuclear Possession

For North Korea, nuclear possession has become a necessary and sufficient condition for regime survival, transcending its role as a diplomatic bargaining chip. Diplomatically, nuclear weapons serve as a tool for coercive diplomacy to achieve sanctions relief and regime guarantees from the United States, while militarily, they act as a deterrent against the combined forces of South Korea and the US. Internally, they function as a mechanism to alleviate public anxiety about security and create conditions for economic concentration [5]. Kim Yo Jong's role as the messenger for this statement is not merely that of a spokesperson but a reaffirmation of her position as the actual architect and executor of the hardline policy towards South Korea and foreign countries. By enshrining nuclear possession in its constitution and institutionalizing the leader's command over nuclear forces, North Korea has completed structural mechanisms that prevent a return to denuclearization negotiations, regardless of which regime comes to power [11].

Russia: Diplomatic Shield for the Normalization of North Korea's Nuclear Status

Since its invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has shifted to a position of publicly accepting North Korea as a de facto nuclear state. Lavrov's statement about denuclearization being off the table [3] and Russia's defense of North Korea's nuclear status at the ARF demonstrate Russia's self-appointed role as a diplomatic shield, neutralizing North Korea sanctions within the UN Security Council [2]. Russia's interests are clear: needing North Korean artillery shells and soldiers for the Ukrainian front, Russia is building a structurally interdependent relationship by providing diplomatic protection and military technology cooperation in return. The statement's distribution through TASS is a symbolic representation of this symbiotic relationship.

ASEAN and ARF: Limits of Normative Pressure and Strategic Dilemma

Through the ARF, ASEAN has maintained its role as a guardian of international norms by adopting a statement calling for denuclearization for the second consecutive year. However, ASEAN's principle of non-interference and its consensus-based decision-making structure lead to a lack of substantive pressure mechanisms. The Malaysian media outlet The Star reported this incident as North Korea's outright rejection of ASEAN's call for denuclearization, while also suggesting that cautious voices within ASEAN favor maintaining dialogue channels with North Korea rather than completely severing ties [7]. Singapore's Channel News Asia (CNA) also highlighted Kim Yo Jong's remarks as a diplomatic challenge to ASEAN, while conveying concerns about the possibility of North Korea withdrawing from the ARF framework itself [10].

South Korea: At a Crossroads of Paradigm Shift

The Lee Jae-myung administration is seeking to resume inter-Korean dialogue through confidence-building measures, but North Korea is fundamentally blocking any willingness to resume inter-Korean dialogue [2]. South Korea's dilemma lies in the fact that adhering to the existing paradigm of resuming denuclearization talks will inevitably lead to diplomatic stalemate, while abandoning it would necessitate addressing domestic political burdens and readjusting the ROK-US cooperation framework. The EAI East Asia Institute stated, "Kim Yo Jong's declaration of an 'irreversible' nuclear status is an external reaffirmation of the national policy that North Korea has been institutionally completing over several years through constitutional amendments, enshrining the leader's command over nuclear forces, and forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. It goes beyond mere rhetorical hardening to block the very legal and structural space for denuclearization negotiations." [2]

4. Summary of Key Issues

The core issues of this situation can be summarized into four main points.

First, the validity of the denuclearization negotiation paradigmis in question. Given that North Korea has enshrined nuclear possession in its constitution and institutionalized the leader's command over nuclear forces, a fundamental question arises as to whether the existing negotiation framework, based on 'complete denuclearization,' can still be a realistic objective. The fact that North Korea's nuclear capabilities continue to advance, despite the ARF's denuclearization calls being adopted for two consecutive years, deepens doubts about the effectiveness of normative pressure [12][5].

Second, the impact of North Korea-Russia military cooperation on the deterrence structure on the Korean Peninsulais a key issue. In a situation where Russia acts as a diplomatic shield, neutralizing North Korea sanctions within the UN Security Council and effectively normalizing North Korea's nuclear status, the effectiveness of existing multilateral sanctions mechanisms in constraining North Korea's behavior becomes a central question [3][2].

Third, the balance between the credibility of South Korea's extended deterrence and the strengthening of its own deterrence capabilitiesis at issue. As North Korea forward-deploys tactical nuclear weapons and aggressively develops its nuclear use doctrine, the question arises whether extended deterrence based on the ROK-US Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) can provide effective deterrence, and whether the operationalization of the Korean-style three-axis system is proceeding at a sufficient pace [2][15].

Fourth, the limits of ASEAN's strategic autonomy and engagement with North Koreaare a concern. Given that ASEAN lacks substantive pressure mechanisms despite adopting statements calling for denuclearization, there are concerns that a security governance vacuum in the region could deepen if North Korea proceeds to withdraw from or disregard the ARF framework itself [7][10].

II. In-depth Issue Analysis

North Korea's Refusal to Abandon Nuclear Weapons and the ARF's Denuclearization Call Confrontation

In-depth Issue Analysis

1. Analysis of the Fundamental Causes of the Issue

The fundamental reason North Korea dismisses denuclearization as a "foolish dream" and declares the irreversibility of its nuclear status is not merely a matter of diplomatic rhetoric, but a structural outcome where regime survival logic and national identity are inextricably linked with nuclear weapons. North Korea's motivation for nuclear development is a complex interplay of diplomatic, military, and internal regime factors that cannot be simplified into a single cause [5]. Diplomatically, nuclear weapons have served as a tool for coercive diplomacy to obtain sanctions relief or security guarantees from the United States, and militarily, they act as strategic insurance against the military threats from the US and South Korea [5]. However, the most fundamental motivation lies internally. For the Kim Jong Un regime, the greatest fear may not be external military threats but changes in the consciousness of the North Korean populace, and nuclear forces also function as an internal control mechanism to alleviate public security concerns, thereby creating conditions for them to focus on economic activities [5]. This multi-layered motivational structure is the fundamental reason why any external incentives or pressures are unlikely to lead to North Korea's denuclearization.

The collapse of the Hanoi summit was a decisive moment that further solidified this structure. After the failure of the 'big deal' negotiations between the North Korean and US leaders in February 2019, North Korea developed fundamental doubts about the possibility of obtaining regime security guarantees through negotiations. Subsequently, North Korea's raising of preconditions for denuclearization to an unacceptable level for the US in working-level talks in Sweden was a strategic choice to effectively block negotiation possibilities while not completely leaving the negotiating table [2][8]. From this point on, North Korea's nuclear policy began to shift from a bargaining chip to a core element of its national identity, and all subsequent institutional measures were part of the process of legally and structurally completing this transformation.

Furthermore, Russia's strategic support is acting as an external driver that further reinforces North Korea's refusal to denuclearize. Since 2022, Moscow has publicly signaled its de facto acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state, and in September 2024, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov explicitly declared that North Korea's denuclearization is "not on the negotiating table" for Russia [3]. This signifies that the pressure channel through the UN Security Council has lost its effectiveness and has the effect of diluting the need for North Korea to seek international recognition in exchange for denuclearization [2].

2. Structural Context

Political Structure

The most critical structural change at the political level is North Korea's incorporation of nuclear possession into the foundation of its constitutional order. Following the constitutional enshrinement of its nuclear possession status in 2023, the constitutional amendment adopted at the first session of the 15th Supreme People's Assembly in March 2025 fundamentally altered the structure of the Korean Peninsula issue in three aspects [11]. First, by institutionalizing the principle of 'two states' on the Korean Peninsula through the territorial provisions of Article 2, it denied the pursuit of unification itself and defined inter-Korean relations as 'relations between separate states.' Second, by enshrining "establishment of the leader's system of sole leadership" in the preamble of the constitution, it confirmed that Kim Jong Un holds absolute power, directly commanding nuclear forces and not being subject to summons by the Supreme People's Assembly. Third, this amendment is a historically unprecedented shift in that, unlike all previous constitutional amendments which were related to achieving unification in some form, it explicitly carries an anti-unification character [11].

This constitutional structuring means that Kim Yo Jong's recent statement is not merely a diplomatic utterance. "Kim Yo Jong's declaration of an 'irreversible' nuclear status is an external reaffirmation of the national policy that North Korea has been institutionally completing over several years through constitutional amendments, enshrining the leader's command over nuclear forces, and forward deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. It goes beyond mere rhetorical hardening to block the very legal and structural space for denuclearization negotiations." [2] In other words, this declaration serves to officially notify the international community of an already completed institutional structure.

Furthermore, the fact that Kim Yo Jong issued the statement not only through KCNA but also through the Russian state news agency TASS is a noteworthy political signal [14]. This demonstrates North Korea's active utilization of Russia as a diplomatic channel for the international normalization of its nuclear status, while simultaneously serving as a symbolic act of severing ties with the Western-led international normative system.

Economic Structure

Economically, North Korea's nuclear policy is evolving into 'Byungjin Line 2.0.' North Korea pursues a strategy of simultaneously achieving both economic development and security through strengthening national defense, thereby capturing two birds with one stone, with nuclear forces serving as the necessary and sufficient condition for this [5]. The logic is that with nuclear deterrence secured, conventional military spending can be reduced, and economic resources can be concentrated on production. In this structure, denuclearization is not merely about abandoning security assets but is equivalent to dismantling the economic development strategy itself, making it extremely unlikely that any economic incentives would be accepted as compensation for nuclear abandonment.

The deepening of military cooperation between North Korea and Russia adds a new variable to this economic structure. The exchange structure, involving the deployment of North Korean troops to the Ukrainian front and the supply of military technology and energy resources from Russia, fundamentally weakens the effectiveness of the UN sanctions regime. Ukrainian President Zelensky's statement that Russia is preparing to accept an additional 30,000 North Korean soldiers suggests that this military-economic cooperation structure is deepening into a long-term strategic partnership rather than a temporary convenience. This acts as a structural factor that further dilutes the economic pressure effect of sanctions against North Korea.

Security Structure

From a security perspective, North Korea's nuclear strategy is evolving towards expanding its spectrum from strategic retaliatory deterrence to tactical denial deterrence[5]. While showcasing its capability to strike the U.S. mainland with ICBMs, North Korea is pursuing a strategy of making the option of nuclear use a reality in conventional conflict scenarios on the Korean Peninsula by deploying tactical nuclear weapons to its frontline long-range artillery units[15]. This creates a paradoxical security dilemma where North Korea's confidence in nuclear weapons simultaneously increases the possibility of offensive conventional military actions[15].

Kim Jong Un has redefined inter-Korean relations as those between "two warring states" and declared that "we will continue to accelerate preparations for a great incident to suppress the entire territory of the Republic of Korea by mobilizing all physical means and capabilities, including nuclear forces, in case of emergency"[9]. This declaration demonstrates that North Korea's nuclear strategy is combined with offensive war preparations that presuppose actual use beyond deterrence, thereby deepening the fundamental instability of the Korean Peninsula's security structure.

The paralysis of the multilateral pressure mechanism through the UN Security Council is a key variable that further weakens this security structure. With Russia effectively acting as a diplomatic shield, normalizing North Korea's nuclear status in international multilateral forums, the channel for pressure on North Korea through the UN Security Council has become defunct[2]. SIPRI's warning in its 2026 yearbook that the increasing reliance of various countries on nuclear weapons as a tool of state power is reversing decades of disarmament efforts and simultaneously increasing the risks of miscalculation and escalation[6] indicates that the North Korean issue is intertwined with a structural crisis in the global nuclear order, extending beyond the Korean Peninsula.

3. Comparison with Historical Precedents and Similar Cases

To understand North Korea's declaration of irreversible nuclear status in a historical context, a comparison with the cases of India and Pakistan is useful. Both countries, despite strong international opposition and sanctions, proceeded with nuclear tests and effectively acquired de facto nuclear power status. Over time, the international community tacitly adapted to accepting their nuclear status. It is clear that North Korea is aware of these precedents, and there is a strategic calculation that if sufficient time and nuclear capability advancement are achieved, the international community will eventually accept North Korea's nuclear possession as a fait accompli.

However, the North Korean case differs significantly from those of India and Pakistan. India and Pakistan were never signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), thus facing no issues of treaty violation, whereas North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT and developed nuclear weapons in direct violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, while India and Pakistan maintained substantial economic integration with the international community, allowing them to avoid complete isolation, North Korea is pursuing nuclear status in a state of structural isolation, dependent on specific patrons like Russia and China, which differentiates it.

The case of Libya, conversely, is deeply internalized in North Korea's strategic calculations as a cautionary tale. In 2003, the Muammar Gaddafi regime voluntarily abandoned its nuclear program in response to international pressure and economic incentives, but the regime collapsed in 2011 during the Arab Spring due to NATO military intervention. North Korea interprets this case as definitive proof that nuclear abandonment does not guarantee regime security, and it serves as a historical basis that reinforces the North Korean leadership's conviction that it is difficult to accept any external security guarantee in exchange for nuclear disarmament[8].

North Korea's own historical negotiation patterns also provide important precedents. In the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework, the 2005 September 19 Joint Statement, and during the 2018-2019 North Korea-U.S. summits, North Korea consistently repeated a pattern of obtaining concessions through negotiations while simultaneously continuing its nuclear development or violating agreements. This historical pattern shows that North Korea has used negotiations as a tactical means to buy time for nuclear development rather than as a path to nuclear disarmament, and its current declaration of irreversibility signifies a shift in policy that officially closes off even this tactical room for negotiation.

The pattern of ARF's calls for denuclearization and North Korea's immediate rejection also exhibits historical repetition. ARF's calls for denuclearization, adopted for two consecutive years, reaffirm the international community's normative stance but fail to function as a substantive pressure tool to change North Korea's behavior[12]. This demonstrates the structural limitations of multilateral diplomatic forums when dealing with states that have normalized nuclear possession, following a trajectory similar to historical precedents where the international community's response to the nuclear development of the Soviet Union and China during the Cold War ultimately led to deterrence and coexistence management.

4. Key Variables in Issue Development

The first key variable determining the future development of the issue is the speed and scope of deepening North Korea-Russia military cooperation. The scale of North Korean troop deployment to the Ukraine front and the level of military technology transfer from Russia will directly impact the pace of advancement in North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities. Information that Russia is preparing to accept an additional 30,000 North Korean troops suggests that this cooperation is linked to the duration of the Ukraine war, and a prolonged war will act to further enhance North Korea's strategic autonomy. In particular, if the technological support provided by Russia to North Korea involves qualitative leaps in nuclear capabilities, such as nuclear warhead miniaturization or re-entry technology, the impact on the Korean Peninsula's deterrence structure could transform into a threat of a different dimension than quantitative expansion.

The second key variable is the direction of the United States' North Korea strategy. The Korean Peninsula's security structure could change significantly depending on the approach the second Trump administration adopts towards the North Korean nuclear issue. If the U.S. shifts towards pursuing a nuclear freeze agreement on the premise of effectively accepting North Korea's nuclear possession, it could materialize the risk of 'Korea Passing,' which conflicts with South Korea's position of maintaining denuclearization as a policy objective[2]. Conversely, if the U.S. moves towards reaffirming its strong extended deterrence commitment and making the South Korea-U.S. Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) substantive, the stability of the Korean Peninsula's deterrence structure could be relatively maintained.

The third variable is China's strategic choice. While China does not officially support North Korea's nuclear possession, it has, unlike Russia, maintained a position of opposing enhanced UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea. The extent to which China tolerates the deepening of North Korea-Russia military cooperation and how it assesses the impact of North Korea's nuclear capability advancement on the Northeast Asian security structure could lead to a restructuring of the multilateral basis for pressure on North Korea. In particular, if the perception grows that North Korea's nuclear capabilities could also threaten China's strategic interests, China's willingness to exert leverage over North Korea may change.

The fourth variable is the level of economic pressure within North Korea. To sustain its 'Byungjin Line 2.0,' North Korea requires resources that can simultaneously pursue nuclear-missile development and economic progress. Although North Korea-Russia economic-military cooperation alleviates some of these resource constraints, if the internal economic situation deteriorates beyond a critical point, challenges to regime stability could arise. However, considering that the greatest fear for the Kim Jong Un regime is the change in the consciousness of its citizens[5], it is more likely that economic pressure will lead to intensified internal control and external tensions rather than nuclear disarmament.

The fifth variable is the change in perception among Asian countries, including ASEAN, regarding North Korea. Despite ARF adopting calls for denuclearization for two consecutive years, the extent to which Southeast Asian countries perceive the North Korean issue as directly linked to their core security interests varies[12]. If North Korea's nuclear capability advancement and the deepening of North Korea-Russia military cooperation unfold in a way that substantially increases regional security instability, ASEAN countries' willingness to pressure North Korea could be strengthened. Conversely, if ASEAN strengthens its strategy of maintaining distance from both camps amidst U.S.-China strategic competition, the effectiveness of multilateral diplomatic pressure on North Korea will be further weakened.