Iranian President's UN Speech and the Risk of Prolonged Blockade of Hormuz
Executive Summary
During the UN General Assembly on September 22-23, President Trump’s threat of "annihilation" and President Pezeshkian’s refusal to surrender demonstrate that the US-Iran standoff has shifted from a negotiation phase to a confrontational phase following the expiration of the Islamabad memorandum. Both sides have framed the issue of navigation rights in the Strait of Hormuz as a prerequisite rather than an ancillary issue to a ceasefire agreement, indicating a high likelihood of renewed deadlock in future negotiations, even if the Omani mediation channel remains intact. Given that Iran's unilateral navigation regime has effectively become the standard route since the outbreak of hostilities, hasty normalization of navigation routes carries risks associated with reliance on an unstable legal status. South Korean companies should not rush to return to normal routes but should gradually reduce their dependence on Iran's navigation regime and concurrently assess alternative logistics routes by both sea and air. The existence of the Omani mediation channel and the handling of navigation rights under the 60-day ceasefire roadmap should be key observation points.
I. Issue Situation Analysis
Iranian President's UN Speech, Hormuz Blockade, and Escalation of US-Iran Tensions
1. Current Situation
On September 23, the leaders of the US and Iran delivered contrasting speeches at the UN General Assembly podium just a day apart. President Trump threatened on September 22 that if negotiations were not concluded quickly, he could "annihilate" Iran, while President Pezeshkian responded on September 23 by stating, "The more we face American pressure and bullying, the greater the resistance of the Iranian people will become." He added, "Threats only unite our people and make us stronger," and stated, "We will either create security together or endure instability together."
The US delegation left the room as President Pezeshkian began his speech. During his address, he held up a photo of the late Supreme Leader Khamenei, who was reportedly assassinated in the early stages of the conflict, labeling the US as a "terrorist". Simultaneously, he rebutted, "We are the victims of terrorism." He characterized his country’s military actions as defensive measures while reiterating that there was no intention to surrender.
However, President Pezeshkian did not close the door on diplomatic solutions in his speech. He asserted that any agreement must include the end of the US blockade preventing Iranian vessels from using the main Gulf shipping routes. His statement that "some can freely use this route to protect their national interests while simultaneously forcing us to face aggression through the same route" was reported by Spanish-language media as well. This indicates that Iran views the issue of navigation rights not as a secondary topic for negotiation but as a prerequisite for any ceasefire agreement.
Amid the exchange of speeches between the US and Iran, it was also confirmed that the first shuttle diplomacy between the two countries has resumed after several months. According to Reuters, a senior Iranian official stated, "While both sides still show significant gaps in ending the war, diplomacy must continue." However, there were no signs of public shifts in positions or concessions from either side during these negotiations.
Meanwhile, a sense of war fatigue is also palpable within Washington. The US Senate narrowly voted down a resolution demanding President Trump to cease military actions, with a vote of 49 to 50. The close vote coincides with rising oil prices becoming a contentious issue ahead of the midterm elections. Simultaneously, the US is reinforcing its control over Hormuz through a "steel wall" blockade operation involving the redeployment of 115 vessels.
2. Positions of Each Side
Iran (Pezeshkian Government): Iran's official position can be summarized as a dual stance of "no surrender, but diplomacy continues." President Pezeshkian has been classified as a moderate pragmatist, but his speech this time prominently featured the language of a hardline stance. This suggests that, following the assassination of the Supreme Leader at the onset of the conflict, a conciliatory attitude has become a politically untenable option within the Iranian leadership. The existing assessment by EAI that navigation rights in Hormuz are not a bargaining chip but an asymmetric leverage directly linked to regime survival has been reaffirmed by this speech.
United States (Trump Administration): President Trump employed extreme rhetoric of "annihilation" during his UN address while simultaneously conveying a dual message positively evaluating the resumed negotiations with Tehran. This is interpreted as a typical maximum pressure tactic that combines military pressure with negotiation incentives. However, the fact that the Senate's resolution on war powers was narrowly defeated indicates that rising oil prices and the political burdens of a prolonged conflict are gradually constraining the Trump administration's discretion.
US Congress: The vote result of 49 to 50 reveals a tight division where neither party holds an overwhelming advantage. The situation of rising oil prices becoming a midterm election issue imposes substantial political costs on the administration's continued military options.
Oman (Mediator): As the only operational mediation channel in the Gulf region, Oman plays a physical role in the resumption of US-Iran shuttle diplomacy. However, the survival of this channel is vulnerable to the military pressure threats from the Trump administration.
3. Key Issues
First, the issue of navigation rights in the Strait of Hormuz has been fixed as a prerequisite for ceasefire negotiations. President Pezeshkian publicly stated at the UN podium that he could not accept any agreement without the end of the blockade.
Second, the dual control structure of the US's "steel wall" blockade operation and Iran's unilateral navigation regime is becoming entrenched. The redeployment of 115 vessels indicates the US's intent to militarily normalize control over the Strait, which directly contradicts Iran's claims of navigation sovereignty.
Third, the threat of 'airport paralysis' reported by Italian media signals that Iran may extend its blockade response measures from the maritime domain to the aviation sector. Whether this threat targeting countries participating in US sanctions will lead to actual implementation remains to be seen in Iran's actions towards third countries.
Fourth, the existence of the Omani mediation channel remains a variable that influences the sustainability of the negotiation-tension cycle itself. If this channel falters, the current dual signaling phase could lead to a more abrupt shift.
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
Iranian President's UN Speech, Hormuz Blockade, and Escalation of US-Iran Tensions
1. Fundamental Cause Analysis
The fundamental cause of this phase is not merely a clash of diplomatic rhetoric but rather the unresolved core issue that the Islamabad memorandum failed to address: who defines the navigation rights in the Strait of Hormuz. President Trump's statement immediately after the expiration of the memorandum, designating the Strait as "US territory," cannot be dismissed as rhetorical exaggeration. This signals a policy intent to treat the freedom of navigation not as a right under international maritime law but as a privilege that the US can grant or revoke at its discretion.
From Iran's perspective, this signal is unacceptable. President Pezeshkian's statement at the UN podium that "some can freely use this route to protect their national interests while simultaneously forcing us to face aggression through the same route" encapsulates this sentiment. Iran is challenging the double standard where the US utilizes the Strait of Hormuz as a conduit for military operations against Iran while simultaneously restricting Iran's access to this route. The navigation issue transcends economic concerns for Iran; it is a matter of security. The movement of US naval vessels and supplies through the Strait is perceived as a potential threat to Iranian territory.
President Trump's threat of "annihilation" and President Pezeshkian's response of "we will not kneel" are surface manifestations of this structural confrontation. The act of President Pezeshkian holding up a photo of the assassinated former Supreme Leader Khamenei during his speech serves as a political message for internal Iranian audiences. The perception within the Tehran leadership that surrender in the face of regime change threats could lead to systemic collapse fundamentally narrows the scope for negotiation.
2. Structural Context
Politically, both sides continue to make statements mindful of their domestic audiences. In the US, the rise in oil prices since the outbreak of hostilities has emerged as a contentious issue for the midterm elections. The Senate's narrow vote against a resolution demanding President Trump to cease military actions, with a result of 49 to 50, reflects the political tensions surrounding this issue within the US. President Trump's hardline rhetoric is not unrelated to the pressure to showcase the achievements of his Iran policy domestically.
On the Iranian side, the unique situation of a leadership vacuum following Khamenei's assassination compels a hardline stance. In the absence or replacement of a Supreme Leader, if the President were to adopt a conciliatory attitude, it would provide grounds for political attacks from hardliners within the regime. President Pezeshkian's statement that "threats only unite our people and make us stronger" serves as both an external message and a domestic rallying cry.
Economically, the volume of goods passing through the Strait has become a basis for negotiating power. This route accounted for about one-fifth of global oil and LNG supplies before the war. The longer the blockade persists, the more Iran is prepared to endure economic pain while attempting to leverage this as "retaliatory capability against countries participating in US sanctions." The threat of airport paralysis reported by Italian media is also in line with this strategy, signaling Iran's intent to diversify its asymmetric leverage.
From a security perspective, the US's "steel wall" blockade operation is a factor that entrenches structural tensions. The scale of operations involving the redeployment of 115 vessels is interpreted as a long-term deployment rather than a temporary measure. This directly clashes with the reality that Iran's unilateral navigation regime has effectively solidified as the standard route. The fact that all vessels navigating since the outbreak of hostilities have utilized the regime established by Iran suggests that a distorted balance has already been established where the US blockade and Iran's alternative navigation order coexist.
3. Current Context
President Trump's designation of the Strait as 'US territory' following the expiration of the memorandum diverges from the past US rhetoric surrounding strategic chokepoints like the Panama Canal or the South China Sea, which framed them as international public goods. Rather, it employs language closer to territorial claims, which is unusual. While existing analyses suggest this rhetoric is more about pressure following the breakdown of negotiations, it cannot be ruled out that the Iranian leadership may take this literally and escalate their response.
The Islamabad memorandum itself also exposed limitations similar to past temporary ceasefire agreements. The optimistic message President Trump publicly declared immediately after signing, urging "ships of the world, turn on your engines," has transitioned into a completely opposite phase within a month following the expiration of the memorandum. This case reaffirms that the more politically significant a ceasefire agreement is, the more it can amplify tensions in subsequent phases if its implementation mechanisms are weak.
4. Key Variables in Issue Development
The first variable is the existence of the Omani mediation channel. President Trump's threats of military action against Oman have previously shaken the credibility of this channel. The continuation of shuttle diplomacy despite strong rhetoric at the UN indicates that the channel has not completely collapsed. However, whether this channel will lead to substantial agreements beyond symbolic levels remains a separate question.
The second variable is the domestic political schedule in the US. With the midterm elections approaching, if oil prices continue to rise, there exists both the possibility of the Trump administration facing pressure to ease the blockade and the incentive to shift towards a hardline response. The narrow margin by which the Senate's war powers resolution was defeated indicates that the support base for this issue within the US is not solid.
The third variable is the legal and practical sustainability of Iran's unilateral navigation regime. Despite the fact that this regime has effectively become the standard route, its weak legal basis remains a potential trigger for abrupt operational halts or re-blockades. The precedent of blacklisting by the Persian Gulf Maritime Organization also suggests that this regime could be converted into a selective pressure tool at any time.
The fourth variable is whether Iran diversifies its retaliatory measures. If attempts to exert pressure through the aviation sector, represented by the threat of airport paralysis, lead to actual actions, the frontlines of the conflict could expand from maritime to aviation, influencing the calculations of countries participating in sanctions. This could lead to a situation where third-country companies, including those from South Korea, must extend their risk management scope beyond maritime transport to include air logistics.
III. Final Recommended Response Measures
Iranian President's UN Speech, Hormuz Blockade, and Escalation of US-Iran Tensions
1. Comprehensive Assessment and Recommended Response Measures
In a situation where President Trump's threats of military action against Oman are shaking the only mediation channel in the Gulf region, this UN speech is more a reaffirmation of hardline stances directed at domestic audiences than a signal for the resumption of negotiations. The fact that the US delegation left the room as President Pezeshkian began his speech symbolically illustrates the diplomatic distance in this phase.
EAI applies the judgment framework presented in previous reports to this phase as well. While maintaining the basic scenario of alternating negotiations and tensions, we should not lower the preparedness level for a pessimistic path leading to the collapse of the Omani mediation channel. President Pezeshkian's assertion that "some can freely use this route to protect their national interests while simultaneously forcing us to face aggression through the same route" indicates that Iran is framing the issue of navigation rights not as an ancillary clause to a ceasefire agreement but as a prerequisite. This suggests that even if discussions on the 60-day roadmap actually commence, there is a high likelihood of renewed deadlock over navigation rights.
The core recommendations for South Korean companies can be summarized in three points. First, do not rush to return to normal routes. Given that Iran's unilateral navigation regime has effectively become the standard route, hasty normalization could lead to reliance on an unstable legal status. Second, gradually reduce dependence on Iran's navigation regime. Third, manage the demands for US sanctions participation and Iran's retaliation threats through a separate response system. The threat of airport paralysis reported by Italian media suggests the possibility of extending maritime blockade responses to the aviation sector, necessitating simultaneous assessments of alternative logistics routes by both sea and air.
2. Short-term/Medium-term/Long-term Action Plans
Short-term (within 1 month): Conduct an urgent assessment of the volume of oil and LNG passing through the Strait of Hormuz and the status of alternative routes. Identify the exposure of national shipping companies and cargo owners utilizing Iran's navigation regime. Track whether the redeployment of 115 vessels participating in the US's "steel wall" blockade operation leads to searches or detentions of vessels actually using Iran's navigation regime. Verify the specifics and feasibility of the airport paralysis threat reported by Italian media and pre-assess alternative routes for national airlines operating in the Middle East.
Medium-term (3-6 months): Establish the existence of the Omani mediation channel as an independent risk indicator and track it on a weekly basis. If the 60-day ceasefire roadmap comes to the negotiation table, focus on how the clauses related to navigation rights are handled as a key observation point. Monitor whether the criteria for blacklisting by the Persian Gulf Maritime Organization are expanded and whether Iran's retaliatory measures against countries participating in US sanctions are actually activated. During this period, aim to reduce dependence on Iran's navigation regime by at least 20-30% by gradually expanding contracts for alternative routes.
Long-term (6 months to 1 year): Regardless of whether US-Iran negotiations conclude successfully or not, track the process of re-establishing the legal navigation status of the Strait of Hormuz as a separate track. Confirm whether there are changes in the official positions of the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and related international organizations, and whether the US's designation of the Strait as "US territory" is formalized in actual policy documents or military operation justifications. Even if a ceasefire agreement is established, prepare for the possibility that Iran's unilateral navigation regime may not be completely abolished but coexist, and maintain a risk assessment system for both navigation routes.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is the operational status of the Omani mediation channel. If circumstances confirming the actual severance of this channel are identified following President Trump's threats of military action against Oman, it should be regarded as a signal for a shift to a pessimistic path in the negotiation-tension scenario.
The second indicator is the intensity of the US's "steel wall" blockade operation. It is necessary to track whether the redeployment of 115 vessels expands into actual physical measures such as searches and seizures or remains limited to surveillance purposes.
The third indicator is the implementation of Iran's declaration of restricted zones. The actual declaration of the restricted zone near Hormuz, as anticipated by the Supreme National Security Council, and whether it leads to specific enforcement measures like the past blacklisting of 45 vessels will be crucial.
The fourth indicator is the execution of the airport paralysis threat reported by Italian media. This serves as an early warning indicator for the escalation of maritime blockade responses into the aviation sector.
The fifth indicator is the actual presentation of the 60-day ceasefire roadmap. It is necessary to confirm whether this roadmap mentioned in the UN speech is brought to the practical negotiation table as a specific document or remains merely rhetorical.
Three trigger points are established. If a complete severance of the Omani channel is confirmed, immediately initiate an urgent reassessment of the volume dependent on Iran's navigation regime. If a military clash occurs between US forces and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, issue temporary route avoidance recommendations to national shipping companies. If the airport paralysis threat leads to actual cyber attacks or physical measures, immediately activate alternative routes for air cargo in the Middle East.
4. Summary Conclusion
President Pezeshkian's UN speech and President Trump's threat of "annihilation" are extensions of the structured confrontation phase following the expiration of the Islamabad memorandum. The US delegation's exit and Iran's insistence on navigation rights as a prerequisite indicate that even if discussions on the 60-day roadmap take place, the likelihood of a swift resolution is low. South Korean companies should not rush to return to normal routes but should gradually reduce their dependence on Iran's navigation regime and maintain a conditional response system that tracks the existence of the Omani mediation channel and the feasibility of the airport paralysis threat.
References
[3] [BBC News] Iran's president tells Trump it will never 'bend the knee'
[8] [Cyprus Mail] Pezeshkian says Iran won’t surrender, after Trump’s annihilation threat
[10] [Daily Sabah] Iran won't surrender to US but seeks diplomacy: Pezeshkian
[13] [Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ)] Iran-Krieg: Huthi feuern Raketen auf Saudiarabien ab
[15] [Al Jazeera] Iran’s Pezeshkian slams ‘terrorist’ US but extols diplomacy in UN speech
[17] [The Hindu] Iranian president says he will not allow Strait of Hormuz to be used as leverage
[18] [Tengri News] “We have not knelt”: Iranian President addresses the UN
[19] [The Wall Street Journal] Iran’s President Says Open to Talks but Won’t Bow to U.S.
[20] [Geo News] Iran's Pezeshkian accuses Trump of 'bullying mentality,' vows no surrender
[21] [Al-Monitor] President tells Trump that Iran will never 'bend at the knee'
[22] [The Star (MY)] Trump says Iran deal nearing, Tehran offers Hormuz reopening
[23] [Le Monde] Iranian president tells UN Tehran will never 'bend at the knee'
[25] [ABC News Australia] Iran's president addresses UN after Trump threatens 'annihilation'
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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