North Korea’s Serial Ballistic Missile Launches and Protests Against ROK-US-Japan Drills: Situational Analysis and Policy Recommendations
Executive Summary
Between August 6 and September 20, North Korea conducted four ballistic missile launches precisely timed with ROK-US-Japan military exercises. This pattern suggests a pre-designed procedure rather than an impromptu show of force. The dual messaging channels—statements from Kim Yo Jong and the Ministry of National Defence—reveal a narrative strategy aimed at denying the legitimacy of trilateral cooperation. The launches themselves are less a form of negotiating leverage and more a ritualistic reaffirmation of the immutability of its policy to strengthen nuclear deterrence. The fact that the Freedom Edge exercise proceeded as scheduled, irrespective of former President Trump’s directive to scale down Ulchi Freedom Shield (UFS), indicates that the trilateral cooperative framework is resilient to political variables stemming from personal channels. The South Korean government should seize the narrative initiative by exploiting the Korean Central News Agency’s (KCNA) pattern of silence and delayed announcements, preemptively verifying and publicizing launch details. It is also essential to consistently manage message coherence across military, diplomatic, and intelligence channels.
I. Analysis of the Current Situation
North Korea’s Serial Ballistic Missile Launches and the ROK-US-Japan Drills: A Situational Analysis
1. Background and Developments
The recent series of launches was triggered by the schedule of trilateral ROK-US-Japan military exercises that have taken place since August. From August 29 to September 10, a multinational joint maritime exercise involving the United States, Japan, and South Korea was conducted in the waters near Guam [18]. This was followed by the trilateral multi-domain joint exercise 'Freedom Edge' from September 7 to 11 [2]. On September 8, two days before the end of this exercise, North Korea signaled its opposition through a commentary in the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) under the byline of an international security affairs analyst [2].
This pattern has been observable since early August. Before the short-range ballistic missile launch from the Wonsan area on August 6, a KCNA commentary by a military commentator was released, defining US-Japan-ROK cooperation as a “triune threat solidifying into a new security crisis” [4]. Six days later, in the early morning of August 12, another launch from the Wonsan area toward the East Sea followed [4]. On September 12, a coordinated firepower strike drill was conducted, integrating four weapon systems: attack drones, strategic cruise missiles, large-caliber thermobaric multiple rocket launchers, and tactical ballistic missiles [6]. This drill is seen not merely as a show of force but as an exercise with a specific combat doctrine objective: to verify the integrated fire command system [6].
On September 16, a spokesperson for North Korea's Ministry of National Defence raised a separate issue in a statement. The statement took issue with the fact that US and South Korean forces held a Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee meeting on September 10, where they agreed to establish an information-sharing system and commence full-scale joint response exercises [19]. The Ministry of National Defence defined this as “strengthening the combined defense posture premised on the use of military force against the DPRK” [19].
2. Current Situation
On September 17, Kim Yo Jong, Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, released a statement titled “The Routinization of US-led War Drills is a Primary Factor in the Deterioration of the Situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the Region” [10]. The statement singled out the United States for pushing ahead with the multinational joint maritime exercise 'Pacific Vanguard 2026' in the waters near Guam, mobilizing countries like Japan and South Korea [10]. Kim Yo Jong claimed this exercise was a “frenzied military act” aimed at destroying the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region [10]. According to NK News, in this statement, Kim warned of a possible response, describing it as a “responsive action that is proportional or more aggressive,” and declared regarding the policy of strengthening nuclear deterrence that there would be “not the slightest deviation from the course of upgrading the nuclear war deterrence” [7].
On September 20, two days after the statement was released, South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) announced that one short-range ballistic missile had been launched from the Wonsan area into the East Sea around 3:00 PM [1][3]. The missile flew approximately 450 km and is presumed to be from the Hwasong-11 series, one of North Korea's representative SRBMs [1]. About three hours later, the Ministry of National Defense announced it had detected an additional launch of an unidentified projectile [5][8]. If the second projectile is confirmed to be a ballistic missile, it would be an unusual case of consecutive launches just three hours apart [5]. This marks the second set of tests conducted by North Korea in just over a week [8][9].
The response from North Korea's state media has maintained its previous pattern. Since early August, North Korea has repeated a dual announcement structure where its state media remains silent about the missile launches, only to release the results of a 'drill' under a separate byline several days later [6]. Similarly, for the September 12 launch, South Korea's JCS immediately announced the launch on the same day, but North Korean state media only revealed two days later that it had been a 'coordinated firepower strike drill.' This is seen as a continuation of a dual-track message management strategy: maintaining silence about the launches for the domestic audience while publicly flaunting solidarity with China and Russia for the external audience [2].
On September 19, Kim Yo Jong rejected an IAEA resolution and reaffirmed the policy of maintaining nuclear forces, while North Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs also criticized US threats in a separate statement [16]. This context is why the September 20 launch is being read not merely as a protest against military drills but as a signal rejecting the very demand for denuclearization [1].
3. Key Actors and Positions
North Korea's Kim Yo Jong.She leads the issuance of statements that primarily function as a channel directed at Japan, repeatedly framing the ROK-US-Japan drills as the “primary factor in the deterioration of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and in the region” [10]. She is also responsible for repeatedly making it clear that strengthening nuclear deterrence is not a subject for negotiation [7][16].
North Korea's Ministry of National Defence and Military Commentators.Functioning as a channel to the United States and Japan, they address specific military cooperation issues, such as coordination on WMDs and trilateral joint exercises, defining them as measures “premised on the use of military force against the DPRK” [19]. The structure of dual messaging channels—one under Kim Yo Jong's name and the other under the Ministry of National Defence and military commentators—has become entrenched since August [2][4].
South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff.The JCS's role is to immediately release factual details such as the launch point (Wonsan area), flight distance (approx. 450 km), and presumed missile type (Hwasong-11 series) [1]. In contrast to the silence of North Korean state media, a pattern has emerged where the announcements by South Korean military authorities serve as the primary source of information on North Korea's provocations [6].
The United States.The U.S. regularly conducts exercises such as Freedom Edge and Pacific Vanguard 2026 based on the Camp David agreements, continuing their implementation on a separate track from former President Trump's personal directive to scale down UFS [2]. This suggests that conciliatory signals at the summit level do not necessarily constrain the policy lines of the Department of Defense or the trilateral cooperation framework [2].
4. Key Issues
First, there is an assessment that North Korea's launches are less about demonstrating military deterrence and more akin to a narrative struggle aimed at denying the legitimacy of ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation [2]. The basis for this interpretation is the repetition of the three-step 'commentary-launch-silence' pattern since August [2].
Second, coordination on responding to WMDs has emerged as a new axis of conflict. Separate from the protests against existing drills, the Ministry of National Defence has issued a statement defining the very establishment of an information-sharing system as a premise for an invasion [19]. This means that protests against the drill schedule and protests against the institutionalization of military cooperation are proceeding on separate tracks.
Third, the dual-track message management, combining state media silence with external displays of strength, is ongoing [2][6]. The asymmetry of not immediately publicizing the launches while swiftly disseminating statements under the names of Kim Yo Jong and the Ministry of National Defence reveals the regime's priority of separating internal tension management from its hardline external stance.
Fourth, the rejection of the IAEA resolution and the reaffirmation of maintaining nuclear forces are temporally aligned with the recent launches [16]. This raises the question of whether the current phase will extend beyond protesting drills to become a signal rejecting the denuclearization negotiation framework itself [1].
II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue
North Korea's Serial Ballistic Missile Launches: An In-Depth Analysis
1. Analysis of Root Causes
The ostensible trigger for this series of launches is the schedule of ROK-US-Japan military exercises. However, a comparison of the launch timings and the sequence of statements reveals that North Korea's actual goal is less about the military response itself and more about narrative control. In her September 17 statement, Kim Yo Jong defined the United States' actions as “destroying the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region” [10]. This phrasing is a framing device intended to position North Korea's own missile launches as defensive measures.
The logical structure of the statements shows that North Korea is taking issue not with the military substance of the drills, but with their political legitimacy. In a September 16 statement, the Ministry of National Defence spokesperson criticized the ROK and the US for strengthening their combined defense posture on the premise of “someone's <<WMD threat>>” [19]. The key here is not the reality of the threat, but the denial of legitimacy implied by the phrase “someone's.” North Korea is repeatedly stating its refusal to accept being designated as the source of the threat.
In this context, the ballistic missile launches are less a form of negotiating leverage and more a procedure for affirming legitimacy within the regime. Kim Yo Jong's declaration that there would be no change to the policy of strengthening nuclear deterrence “under any circumstances” [7] serves as both a warning to the outside world and a reaffirmation of the policy line for the domestic audience. This means the launches are being used not as a signal to resume negotiations, but as a ritual to demonstrate the immutability of its existing policy.
2. Structural Context
Political Structure: Dual Messaging Channels
North Korea's response system is divided into two channels: one under Kim Yo Jong's name and another under the Ministry of National Defence and military commentators. In her September 17 statement, Kim Yo Jong took issue with the Pacific Vanguard exercise [10], while the Ministry of National Defence, in a separate statement on September 16, singled out the Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee [19]. The structure of these two channels targeting different issues but releasing statements consecutively within the same week is not a coincidence. It is assessed as a deliberate design by the regime to modulate the intensity of its response by tailoring the nuances of its criticism for specific countries and issues.
There is also a consistent pattern in the announcement methods of state media. Since August, the KCNA has repeatedly followed a practice of not immediately publicizing the actual launches, instead selectively announcing only the 'results' of a drill several days later [6]. For the September 12 launch, while South Korea's JCS announced it immediately on the same day, the KCNA remained silent, only to selectively disclose two days later that it had been a 'coordinated firepower strike drill' and publicize its results. This pattern of silence and delayed announcements is a dual-track message management method for managing domestic tensions while maintaining a hardline stance externally.
Security Structure: The Routinization of the Camp David Framework
The trilateral ROK-US-Japan military exercises are no longer temporary measures but have become institutionalized based on the Camp David agreements. The Freedom Edge exercise proceeded as scheduled, irrespective of former President Trump's directive to scale down UFS [2]. This demonstrates that remarks from a president's personal channel could not restrain the policy lines of the Department of Defense or the trilateral cooperation framework [2]. From North Korea's perspective, the routinization of these drills is inevitably perceived as a form of structural pressure that cannot be reversed through negotiations.
North Korea's response is also becoming routinized to match this structure. The timing of the launches on August 6, August 12, September 12, and September 20 aligns precisely with the exercise schedules [4][6]. Given that the three-step 'commentary-launch-silence' pattern has been repeated since August [2], this can be seen not as an impromptu provocation but as a response protocol that has solidified in line with the drill cycle.
Economic Context: Sanctions Evasion and North Korea-Russia Cooperation
The international sanctions regime has failed to fundamentally halt the advancement of North Korea's conventional and asymmetric military capabilities. The enhanced performance of attack drones confirmed during the September 12 coordinated firepower strike drill raises the possibility of North Korea-Russia military-technical cooperation as a contributing factor [6]. However, the KCNA's claims of simultaneous impact and 100% accuracy are self-reported and cannot be independently verified [6], making it difficult to gauge the gap between actual capabilities and propaganda.
3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases
The current pattern is structurally similar to the situation in 2016-2017. At that time, North Korea also conducted a series of short- and medium-range missile launches in sync with the schedule of ROK-US joint exercises, with a tendency to time its announcements with the conclusion of the drills. The difference is that in the current phase, the exercises have expanded from a bilateral ROK-US framework to a trilateral ROK-US-Japan one, and the target of North Korea's criticism has diversified from a single channel (the US) to a dual channel (the US and Japan) [4].
There is also continuity with the 2022-2023 period, which saw intensive launches of the Hwasong-11 series missiles. The missile used in the September 20 launch is also presumed to be from the Hwasong-11 series [1]. This suggests that North Korea is in a phase of repeatedly verifying the readiness of its existing, operationally deployed forces rather than testing new weapon systems. The focus appears to have shifted from new technological leaps to enhancing the operational proficiency and command-and-control automation of its existing capabilities [6].
A notable difference is the announcement method of state media. In the past, launches were often reported extensively immediately afterward, along with news of Kim Jong Un's on-site guidance. In the current phase, silence and delayed announcements have become the norm [6]. This distinguishes the current cases from past ones, as it indicates a stronger practical character—a reaction to the drill cycle—rather than an emphasis on the symbolic nature of the launch itself.
4. Key Variables Shaping Future Developments
The first variable is whether the ROK-US-Japan drills will continue to be held on a regular basis. As long as the schedule of exercises—from Freedom Edge and Orient Shield to Pacific Vanguard—continues, North Korea's 'commentary-launch-silence' pattern is likely to be repeated in sync with the drill cycle [2].
The second variable is the degree of coordination between different policy lines within the U.S. administration. As seen in the case where former President Trump's directive to scale down UFS failed to actually restrain the trilateral exercise framework [2], a gap exists between the president's personal conciliatory signals and the policy lines of the Department of Defense and INDOPACOM. If this gap persists, North Korea is expected to distrust U.S. external signals and increasingly react only to the drills themselves.
The third variable is the pace at which cooperation related to the Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction Committee, an issue raised by North Korea in its September 16 statement, expands [19]. If this cooperation moves beyond establishing an information-sharing system to encompass concrete joint response exercises, North Korea may use it as a separate pretext for further launches or statements.
The fourth variable is the depth of North Korea-Russia military-technical cooperation. If the suspected North Korea-Russia cooperation behind the enhanced drone performance is confirmed [6], a structural shift could occur where North Korea's response measures expand from being centered on ballistic missiles to operating complex, multi-platform systems. This would substantially increase the burden on the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system to counter multiple threats [6].
III. Final Policy Recommendations
North Korea's Serial Ballistic Missile Launches and the ROK-US-Japan Drills: Comprehensive Response Measures
1. Overall Assessment and Recommended Responses
The latest launch does not represent the emergence of a new threat but is the third repetition of a pattern that has become entrenched since August. The timing of the launches—on August 6, August 12, September 12, and now September 20—precisely aligns with the schedule of military exercises [4][6][1]. This regularity suggests that North Korea's response is not an impromptu show of force but a pre-designed procedure.
There are two key assessments. First, North Korea's objective is less about demonstrating military deterrence and more about denying the legitimacy of ROK-US-Japan trilateral cooperation. In her statement, Kim Yo Jong defined the US actions as a “...frenzied military act aimed at destroying the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region” [10]. This phrasing is a framing device to position its own missile launches as defensive measures. Second, the launches are not a signal to resume negotiations but a reaffirmation of the immutability of its policy line. Kim Yo Jong declared that there would be no change to the policy of strengthening nuclear deterrence “under any circumstances” [7]. An approach that interprets the launches as leverage to create an opening for dialogue has a weak basis.
The recommended response should be three-pronged. First, on the military track, the deterrence posture must be maintained without wavering, and the regular nature of the drills should not be exposed as a negotiating card. The case of the Freedom Edge exercise proceeding as scheduled regardless of former President Trump's directive to scale down UFS [2] must be upheld as a signal that trilateral cooperation is not swayed by political variables from personal channels. Second, on the diplomatic track, a system for fact-based rebuttals to North Korea's “triune threat” framing and “destroying the balance of power” narrative should be institutionalized [4][10]. Third, on the intelligence track, the South Korean government should exploit the KCNA's 'silence-delay' announcement pattern [6] by preemptively verifying and publicizing launch details that North Korea does not disclose, thereby seizing the narrative initiative.
2. Short-, Medium-, and Long-Term Action Plan
Short-term (within 1 month)The short-term focus should be on verifying information and ensuring message consistency. If the second projectile on September 20 is confirmed as a ballistic missile, it would mark an unusual case of consecutive launches within a three-hour interval [5]. To counter North Korea's strategy of silence, the Ministry of National Defense should promptly release details on the projectile's type, trajectory, and estimated model, leaving no information vacuum. The presidential National Security Office must coordinate the timing of announcements from the military on its deterrence posture with statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Unification refuting North Korea's framing, thereby preventing conflicting messages between ministries [2]. Furthermore, repeated discrepancies in terminology, such as the U.S. describing a "missile launch" while South Korea and Japan call it a "ballistic missile," could be interpreted as a divergence in the trilateral approach to escalation management and alert levels [4]. Prior coordination among the public affairs channels of the three countries is therefore essential.
Medium-term (3-6 months)The medium-term goal is to establish a response system tailored to North Korea's dual-track messaging structure, which utilizes the Ministry of National Defence and military commentator channels on one hand, and the Kim Yo Jong channel on the other [19][10]. North Korea is segmenting its targets and calibrating the intensity of its condemnations for specific issues, as seen when its Ministry of National Defence issued a statement targeting the ROK-U.S. Counter-WMD Committee [19]. The South Korean government should adopt a similarly differentiated approach. It would be more efficient to designate specific departments to handle military cooperation matters (such as the Counter-WMD Committee and joint exercises) versus issues of political legitimacy (like the trilateral cooperation framework), and to prepare specific counter-arguments for each in advance. Concurrently, the engagement control logic of the Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system must be upgraded to counter combined threats from drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles [6]. The attempt to operate four integrated weapon systems, observed during the September 12 coordinated fire assault drill, should be viewed not as an isolated threat but as part of North Korea's efforts to validate its operational doctrine [6].
Long-term (1 year or more)The long-term strategy involves maintaining the regularity of trilateral exercises under the Camp David framework while institutionalizing North Korea's annual pattern of backlash as a manageable risk. As the "exercise-commentary-launch" cycle is likely to become an entrenched annual event [2], it is crucial to communicate to stakeholders, including businesses and investors, that this pattern represents a predictable risk. Concurrently, as the possibility of North Korea-Russia military-technical cooperation driving the advancement of Pyongyang's drone capabilities cannot be ruled out [6], the intelligence agencies of South Korea, the United States, and Japan must establish a long-term joint assessment framework to monitor the development of North Korea's weapon systems.
3. Monitoring Indicators and Trigger Points
The first indicator is any delay in announcements from state media. The regime's approach to managing domestic tensions can be assessed by whether the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) publicizes drill results within days of a launch or remains completely silent [6]. The second indicator is the sequence of announcements and the division of targets between the Kim Yo Jong channel and the Ministry of National Defence channel. If both channels start targeting the same issue simultaneously, it should be read as a signal that Pyongyang's separate approaches toward Japan and the U.S. are merging [4][19]. The third is the shortening of launch intervals. The recent instance of the interval shrinking from the typical six days to one month down to less than three hours [5] suggests a potential shift in launch patterns; it is crucial to watch for any recurrence of similar short-interval consecutive launches. A fourth trigger point would be any change to the ROK-U.S.-Japan exercise schedule. If statements from former President Trump via his personal channels were to lead to an actual reduction in the scale of drills [2], North Korea's response pattern could also shift, making this a key variable to monitor. The fifth indicator is the frequency of displays of solidarity among North Korea, China, and Russia. An increase in public promotion of trilateral cooperation by state media, separate from its silence on launches, could be interpreted as a turning point, indicating the regime is emphasizing an alternative security axis during a phase of pressuring the United States.
4. Summary and Conclusion
This series of launches represents North Korea's patterned response to the regularized trilateral military exercises involving South Korea, the United States, and Japan. More revealing than the launches themselves is the framing of the official statements that precede them, which offers clearer insight into Pyongyang's actual intentions. The regime's dual-track messaging system, operating through Kim Yo Jong and the Ministry of National Defence, is an intentional design to modulate the intensity of its condemnations by separating targets and issues [10][19]. The South Korean government's response must be refined: it should handle military deterrence and narrative countermeasures separately, while the National Security Office coordinates messaging across ministries to ensure consistency. As this pattern is likely to become an entrenched annual cycle, the focus should shift from ad hoc responses to building a sustainable management framework.
References
[3] [Yonhap] N. Korea fires 1 short-range ballistic missile toward East Sea: S. Korean military
[5] [Geo News] North Korea fires two missiles off east coast in three hours
[7] [NK News] Kim Yo Jong threatens ‘more offensive’ response to US military drills in Pacific
[8] [South China Morning Post] North Korea fires 2 missiles in 3 hours amid tensions over US drills
[11] [NK News] North Korea fires multiple ballistic missiles towards East Sea: ROK military
[12] [Hürriyet Daily News] North Korea fires two projectiles into East Sea: Seoul
[13] [Channel News Asia] North Korea fires unidentified projectile into East Sea: Seoul
[14] [NK News] North Korea warns US-ROK WMD cooperation could trigger nuclear response
[15] [NK News] North Korea launched several missiles and drones in ‘concentrated’ attack drill
[16] [Yonhap] N. Korea rejects IAEA resolution, vows to maintain nuclear force amid U.S. threats
[17] [NK News] North Korea launches suspected ballistic missiles toward East Sea: JCS
[18] [Gulf Daily News] North Korea fires ballistic missile off east coast, Japan says
[20] [El Comercio (PE)] Corea del Norte lanza dos proyectiles hacia el mar de Japón en un mismo día
[22] [NK News] North Korean official rebukes US, defends nukes during international conference
[23] [NK News] Kim Yo Jong slams IAEA critics, says North Korea’s nuclear status is ‘absolute’
[25] [NK News] North Korea’s attack drill, Wonsan Kalma slowdown and Google’s blurry maps
*This text is an AI translation of an original written in Korean. Some translations or nuances may be inaccurate.
This report is an in-depth analysis planned by an EAI researcher, grounded in sophisticated AI-assisted research, and finalized by the EAI researcher.
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