The Launch of WAIC/WAICO and South Korea's Absence at the Senior Level: An Analysis of Diplomatic Tightrope-Walking Amid the US-China AI Hegemony Competition

Executive Summary

The July 2026 Shanghai World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC) and the launch of the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) marked a strategic turning point at which China, buoyed by the confidence generated by DeepSeek, shifted the center of gravity in AI technology competition toward norm- and governance-setting; 29 countries, including Russia, Kazakhstan, and Brazil, joined as founding members, reflecting an institutional effort to co-opt the Global South. In this process, despite repeated requests from China for senior-level attendance, South Korea dispatched only working-level officials at the resident-representative and division-director level. This is assessed as a rational risk-management decision arising from the context in which South Korea, since joining Pax Silica—the US-led initiative—as a founding member in December 2025, has been building a position as a strategic supplier within the free-world semiconductor and AI supply chain. The cases of Global South countries such as Kazakhstan and the Republic of the Congo, which approach WAICO not as a vehicle for bloc confrontation but as a pragmatic means of pursuing national interest, carry significant implications for South Korea as well; as the US-China AI competition becomes more structured going forward, the cost of maintaining strategic ambiguity is expected to grow. South Korea should therefore clarify its status as a core hardware supplier—including HBM—within Pax Silica, while simultaneously pursuing an 'institutionalized dual-track engagement' strategy that keeps working-level channels at the director-general level or below permanently open in multilateral platforms such as WAICO, thereby establishing at an early stage an independent standing as a middle-power AI norm broker. To this end, formalizing a coordination mechanism for messaging between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy, and strengthening prior communication channels with the United States, should be pursued in parallel as short-term tasks.

I. Analysis of the Issue Situation

The Launch of WAIC/WAICO and South Korea's Absence at the Senior Level: Diplomatic Tightrope-Walking Between the US and China

1. Background and Development of the Issue

The World Artificial Intelligence Conference (WAIC), held in Shanghai from July 17 to 20, 2026, marked a strategic turning point at which the Chinese government shifted the center of gravity in AI technology competition from technological development toward norm-setting [2]. China's Cyberspace Administration of China (CAC) framed the conference as a "window for observing China's AI development," spotlighting the growth backdrop and ecosystem logic behind AI's rapid penetration into every industry and household [6]. Indeed, China's domestic outlet 36Kr analyzed that the core signal of this year's WAIC lay not in the scale of the exhibition itself but in a shift in the AI narrative's center of gravity—that is, a transition from technology demonstration toward real-world application and commercial value [14]. This is understood to be the result of the Chinese government gaining confidence as low-cost, high-efficiency models epitomized by DeepSeek-R1 drew international attention, with China now leveraging this momentum to more actively shape the global AI governance order [2][11].

Against this backdrop, on July 16, ahead of the conference's opening, China signed the founding agreement for the World AI Cooperation Organization (WAICO) together with 29 countries including Russia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Algeria, Belarus, Cuba, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Venezuela [3][4][7]. Kazakhstan's domestic outlet Astana Times framed this signing—which took place during President Tokayev's visit to China—in the context of Kazakhstan's participation in shaping AI governance and its bid to strengthen its position as a regional AI hub [4]. Mozambican media likewise conveyed the intent of the founding members' joint declaration, describing WAICO's goals as promoting a human-centered approach, encouraging innovation, development, and utilization, bridging the digital divide, expanding access to AI technology, and strengthening international cooperation for safe and ethical AI development [7]. The following day, on the 17th, President Xi Jinping personally presented a new AI order, and around the conference's closing, a chairman's statement, two governance action plans, and a global initiative on trustworthy agent connectivity and interoperability were announced [3]. This wave of institutionalization is interpreted, as noted by US-based IDC, as evidence that AI agent governance has emerged as a core investment agenda rather than a secondary topic of discussion [3].

Meanwhile, separate from this Chinese charm offensive of invitations, South Korea had joined the US-led semiconductor and AI supply chain consultative body 'Pax Silica' as a founding member in December 2025 [1]. This is connected to the context in which South Korea has functioned as a strategic supplier for the US-led free-world alliance within the AI core hardware value chain, including HBM [13].

2. Current Situation

According to a JoongAng Ilbo report, China repeatedly requested senior-level attendance from the South Korean side during WAIC, but the South Korean government only dispatched working-level officials at the resident-representative and division-director level [1]. Given the symbolic weight of the WAICO launch ceremony on the 16th, attended by 29 countries, and the stage on the 17th where President Xi Jinping personally presented a new AI order, this shows that South Korea's level of response was relatively low [1]. JoongAng Ilbo suggested that the background to this decision was likely South Korea's sense of burden in responding to China's request given its status as a founding member of Pax Silica [1].

During the same period, South Korea and the United States moved in the direction of strengthening ties with the US as well, signing a big-tech 'AI alliance' at the policy chief level and announcing roughly 1,400 trillion won in semiconductor cooperation [15]. This strengthening of Korea-US cooperation occurred almost simultaneously with China's WAIC/WAICO invitations, suggesting that the South Korean government intended to strike a balance between the US and China [1][15].

From the Chinese perspective, there is an assessment that the multilateral cooperation body centered on the Global South formed through this WAIC constitutes a substantive counterweight to the US-led Pax Silica regime [2]. However, this assessment coexists with a cautious diagnosis that whether China's strategy will ultimately succeed remains uncertain, given that the technology-absorption capacity of the founding member states and the practical effectiveness of institutionalization have yet to be verified [2]. Indeed, the East Asia Institute (EAI) assessed that "China's strategy, which combines technological capability demonstrated by DeepSeek with a discourse of 'openness, cooperation, and sharing,' is forming a substantive counterweight to the US-led Pax Silica regime, but since the technology-absorption capacity of the founding members and the practical effectiveness of institutionalization have not been verified, the strategic success of this approach remains uncertain" [2].

3. Key Actors and Their Positions/Interests

The Chinese Government has made clear through WAIC and WAICO its intention to expand the axis of AI technology competition from a race in development toward a contest for leadership over norms and governance [2][6]. President Xi Jinping's personal presentation of a new AI order is in line with China's positioning of 2026 as a watershed moment in the transformation of the international order and its establishment of building a multipolar world order as a core diplomatic goal [2]. At the same time, as revealed by cases in which China's own big-tech firms declined contact with a US Congressional delegation, China is simultaneously pursuing a selective and cautious approach in technology diplomacy toward the United States, exhibiting a dual posture of openness and control [10].

WAICO Founding Member States (Global South) decided to participate based on pragmatic motives—participation in shaping their own AI governance, expanding technology access, and bridging the digital divide—as confirmed by the cases of Kazakhstan and Mozambique [4][7]. The Republic of the Congo likewise took a strategic approach, using its participation in WAIC, the Shanghai High-Level Meeting on Global AI Governance, and the Shenzhen Asia-Africa AI Forum as leverage for advancing its digital economy and strengthening national capacity [12].

The United States is rallying allied countries in the semiconductor and AI supply chain through Pax Silica, while concretizing its vision of a free-world compute alliance on the basis of its dominant position, holding approximately 75% of global AI computing capacity [13]. However, as illustrated by the case of Anthropic's blocking of overseas access, within a structure where cooperation and control operate simultaneously, the United States is also exerting technology-control pressure on its allies [13].

The South Korean Government emerges as an actor pursuing careful balance between these two camps. JoongAng Ilbo pointed out that the South Korean government has engaged in tightrope-walking between the US and China, for instance by omitting the term "China"—which appears in the US-side materials—from its own announcement materials [1]. The East Asia Institute (EAI) recommended that South Korea requires a dual strategy of "selective engagement and norm leadership," maintaining its credibility as a founding member of Pax Silica while independently entering the Global South AI governance space that China seeks to preempt [2].

4. Summary of Key Issues

First, a key point of contention is whether South Korea's decision not to send senior-level representatives to WAIC stems from a choice made to preserve trust with the United States as a founding member of Pax Silica, or whether it is based on a substantive judgment regarding the China-led governance order [1][2]. Second, it remains uncertain whether WAICO can actually function as a counterweight to the US-led regime, or whether its institutional effectiveness will be limited by gaps in the technological capabilities of its founding members [2]. Third, an important policy challenge remains as to whether South Korea can actually pursue a 'dual strategy' of simultaneously participating in Pax Silica and entering the Global South AI cooperation space going forward, and how it will manage the costs of strategic ambiguity in this process [2][13].

II. In-Depth Analysis of the Issue

The Launch of WAIC/WAICO and South Korea's Absence at the Senior Level: An In-Depth Analysis

1. Analysis of Root Causes

The root cause of this matter lies in the fact that, as both the United States and China define artificial intelligence not merely as an industrial technology but as a strategic asset directly tied to national survival, a structure has formed in which third countries are effectively compelled to choose sides. As the East Asia Institute (EAI) points out, "artificial intelligence has today established itself as a core foundational technology cutting across military and security affairs, economic growth, and social and cultural norms, becoming a pivotal axis of the reordering of the world order comparable to the textile technology of the Industrial Revolution or nuclear technology during the Cold War" [2]. As this perception has come to be shared in both Washington and Beijing, both sides have moved beyond a race in technological development toward a competition to implant their respective AI norms and standards worldwide.

China's underlying motivation can be traced to the confidence generated by DeepSeek. DeepSeek's success in drawing international attention with a low-cost, high-efficiency model led the Chinese government to conclude that the technology gap had already narrowed considerably, which in turn immediately triggered a shift toward competition over norm-setting [2][11]. The United States, meanwhile, hastened to consolidate its alliances amid a sense of crisis—as warned by US business leaders in Senate hearings that "while the United States currently holds the lead, the gap with the challenger China is not that large"—and the result of this was Pax Silica [2][11]. Given that South Korea's absence at the senior level stemmed from this structure in which both sides are simultaneously exerting pressure, it can be argued that the essence of the matter lies not in South Korea's passivity but in the intensity of the US-China competition itself.

2. Structural Context

Political Structure. China has positioned 2026 as "a period marking a historic watershed in the transformation of the international order, having set the establishment of a multipolar world order and the expansion of its global role as core diplomatic goals" [2]. The launch of WAICO is interpreted, as an extension of this multipolarization strategy, as an institutional effort to co-opt Global South countries such as Russia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Algeria, and Venezuela. Indeed, Kazakhstan joined as a founding member on the occasion of President Tokayev's visit to China, justifying its participation from the perspective of its own national interest as a means of "strengthening its position as a regional AI hub" [4], and the Republic of the Congo likewise sent a delegation to WAIC and high-level AI governance meetings as part of expanding partnerships for its digital economy development [12]. This suggests that Global South countries are approaching WAICO not as a proxy battleground for US-China confrontation, but as a means of pursuing their own pragmatic interests.

South Korea, by contrast, has considerably narrower room for maneuver in this political calculus. South Korea already joined Pax Silica as a founding member in December 2025 [1], and subsequently invested a significant stake in the US-led camp, including by pledging large-scale semiconductor investments through big-tech cooperation with the United States [15]. Under these circumstances, responding to China's request for senior-level attendance carried the risk of being interpreted as more than mere attendance at a diplomatic event—as a signal of shifting the balance between camps. EAI's analysis noted that "South Korea requires a dual strategy of 'selective engagement and norm leadership,' maintaining its credibility as a founding member of Pax Silica while independently entering the Global South AI governance space that China seeks to preempt" [2].

Economic Structure. South Korea's distinctiveness stems from its position within the AI hardware supply chain. An EAI report assesses that, with "the United States holding approximately 75% of global AI computing capacity," South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan "effectively dominate the AI core hardware value chain, including HBM, and thus possess considerable bargaining power as strategic suppliers to the US-led alliance" [13]. While this supply-chain position grants South Korea leverage, it simultaneously acts as a structural pressure compelling compliance with US technology-control policy. Indeed, as illustrated by the case of Anthropic's blocking of overseas access, in a structure where "cooperation and control operate simultaneously," South Korea finds itself in a position requiring sophisticated strategic autonomy rather than a simple choice of camp [13].

Security Structure. China's technology diplomacy has recently shown signs of shifting toward a more selective and cautious direction. According to a report by the South China Morning Post (SCMP), major Chinese technology firms recently declined a fact-finding visit by a US Congressional delegation, a case analyzed as demonstrating that Beijing's AI diplomacy is gradually becoming more selective [10]. This reflects the paradoxical situation in which, even as both the US and China continue AI safety dialogues, the channels that had helped foster mutual understanding are steadily narrowing [10]. This heightening of security tensions serves as a backdrop that reinforces the incentive for middle powers like South Korea to avoid tilting fully toward either side.

3. Historical Precedents and Comparison with Similar Cases

This matter bears comparison with the Cold War-era Non-Aligned Movement and the more recent semiconductor export-control phase. The decisive difference, however, is that today's technology competition unfolds not through explicit bloc division as with military alliances, but through the multilayered and ambiguous form of participation in supply chains, standards, and governance. As EAI's analysis points out, the trend in which China has, in response to the US's semiconductor export controls (EAR) and the expansion of the Entity List, pursued in parallel both indigenous development—such as Huawei's Ascend chips—and the expansion of AI infrastructure exports targeted at the Global South [13], shows that the launch of WAICO is not a sudden event but the natural culmination of a decoupling-response strategy that has been accumulating over a considerable period.

Moreover, the successive participation of Global South countries such as the Republic of the Congo, Mozambique, and Kazakhstan follows a trajectory similar to the pattern in which non-aligned countries during the Cold War pragmatically utilized aid and technology transfers from great powers [4][7][12]. These countries joined WAICO out of pragmatic motives—bridging the digital divide and building their own AI ecosystems—rather than ideological alignment, suggesting that China's strategy places emphasis on providing pragmatic incentives rather than exporting ideology. By contrast, technologically advanced countries like South Korea, already deeply embedded in the US-led supply-chain consultative body, have far more limited room to move between camps, placing them in a fundamentally different dilemma from that of Global South countries.

4. Key Variables in the Development of the Issue

The key variables that will determine the future development of this issue are as follows. First, the actual degree of institutionalization achieved by WAICO. EAI's analysis assesses that "since the technology-absorption capacity of the founding members and the practical effectiveness of institutionalization have not been verified, the strategic success of this approach remains uncertain" [2]; if WAICO moves beyond a merely declarative body and comes to possess substantive standards, funding, and technology-transfer mechanisms, the pressure on middle powers including South Korea to participate will grow considerably.

Second, the intensity of US technology-control policy and the degree of cohesion within Pax Silica. The more South Korea strengthens its ties with the United States through semiconductor cooperation [15], the narrower the room for accessing the alternative platform offered by China will inevitably become.

Third, changes in China's approach to technology diplomacy. The case reported by SCMP of Chinese firms' selective engagement [10] suggests that how China calibrates the balance between openness and control in its future AI diplomacy will have a significant bearing on the trust that participating countries place in it.

Fourth, whether South Korea establishes a clear strategic direction domestically. As EAI recommends, "as the US-China AI competition becomes more structured, the cost of strategic ambiguity rises accordingly, and South Korea must build, at an early stage, an independent standing as a middle-power AI norm broker on the basis of its semiconductor and AI technological capabilities" [2]; whether South Korea can secure independent norm-shaping power beyond mere reactive balancing will be a touchstone for gauging its future bargaining power.