The Role of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S.-Japan Alliance in Deterring Chinese Gray Zone Strategy

Maritime Self-Defense Force Sasebo Museum · Cho Min · Seoul National University

Introduction

China and its neighbor states are involved in multiple maritime disputes in both the East and South China Sea (ECS, SCS). These disputes range from territorial sovereignty to legal rights in different maritime zones. In the ECS, China, Japan, and South Korea have overlapping Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) claims while China and Japan are in a stalemate over Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. On the other hand, in the SCS, China, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam are involved in territorial disputes over numerous rocks and islands spread across the region. Furthermore, in the SCS, the U.S. Freedom of Navigation Operations, naval operations intended to preserve freedom of the seas, have also been fomenting much protest from China as it claims the operations ‘undermine Chinese sovereignty.’ The U.S. and Japan both see China’s behaviors in ESCS as coercive and threatening to the established rules-based international order.

Some scholars characterize such Chinese behaviors as gray zone coercion. For this paper, the Asia Maritime Security Initiative’s report on gray zone strategy will serve as a starting point; this paper will draw from the report’s definition and characteristics of gray zone strategy. First, the authors of the report define gray zone coercion as “an effort of series or series of efforts beyond steady-state deterrence and assurance that attempts to achieve one’s security objectives without resort to direct and sizable use of force” (Green, Hicks, Cooper, Schaus and Douglas 2017). For example, the use of proxies, covert military operations, and paramilitary activities each constitutes a gray zone activity. While some scholars use the term ‘hybrid strategy’ and gray zone strategy interchangeably, this definition views gray zone strategy to be broader and more comprehensive than the concept of hybrid strategy since hybrid strategy combines “military tactics across traditional nuclear, conventional, and or unconventional divisions” (Green, Hicks, Cooper, Schaus and Douglas 2017). Gray zone coercion is characterized by asymmetry, ambiguity, and incrementalism.

‘Neither fully war nor fully peace’ is another phrase often used to describe the characteristics of gray zone activities. However, if one considers Clasuwitz’s definition of war that views wars to exists on continuum, it is difficult to define a threshold that separates a war from gray zone conflict (Green, Hicks, Cooper, Schaus and Douglas 2017). Due to this ambiguity, there are varying definitions of gray zone activities. However, despite this difficulty in delineation, most of those varying definitions tend to use ‘conventional war’ as the ceiling. An actor is more likely to employ gray zone strategies under two conditions; when it attempts to alter some element of status quo and when it perceives its opponent as having an advantage at higher levels of escalation. The stability-instability paradox in which the stability at a higher level of conflict incentivizes challenges at a lower level of conflict well explains this tactic; US conventional military dominance encourages competitors to seek more limited changes to the status quo (Green, Hicks, Cooper, Schaus and Douglas 2017).

This paper will discuss the role of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF) in deterring such gray zone strategies, specifically those employed by China. JMSDF operates as Japan’s navy since the end of World War II and the dissolution of Imperial Japanese Navy. As an island country with the sixth largest EEZ in the world and 90% of its trade dependent on seal lanes of communication (SLOCs), maritime stability is critical to Japan’s security and prosperity. Japan’s National Security Strategy from 2013 and the National Defense Program Guidelines from 2018 define three goals for the force; to defend Japan’s territory and surrounding areas, to secure the safety of maritime traffic, and create desirable security environment (JMSDF 2020).

Due to the increasing tensions in the ESCS and the subsequently mounting pressure, the U.S. has been promoting Japan’s assumption of a bigger security role in the region. In harmony with this, until the recent resignation, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) were eager to find policy options to further this movement. Indeed, Japan has been gradually increasing its role in the SCS, which is not its direct domain, by enhancing its defense cooperation and capability-building activities with various Southeast Asian countries including the Philippines, another U.S. treaty ally.

In examining these situations, a few questions emerge. In countering China’s slowly increasing assertiveness in the region, what role can the JMSDF play? What implications does the U.S.-Japan alliance have in the context of such Asian maritime disputes and U.S.-China competition? Probing these questions will not only give suggestions for the future of maritime disputes in Asia but also shed light on what role the U.S. alliances in Asia can affect the rivalry.

between the U.S. and China in an era of low-intensity conflict.

Literature Review

Asian maritime disputes and U.S.-Japan alliance In the context of U.S.-Japan alliance, deterring China’s coercive behaviors means incorporating components of general-extended deterrence. In the specific case of U.S.-Japan alliance, reassurance and burden-sharing are important in understanding the Defense Guideline between the two allies; while the former clearly ensures the U.S. commitment to Japanese defense, the latter reveals that both parties want an expanded Japanese security role in maintain the existing global order by sharing greater responsibilities (Satake 2016). Maintaining a united front among the allies and displaying resolve and commitment, all widely understood components of alliance success, are also drawn from the U.S. alliance experiences in the face of SCS disputes as well (Holmes and Yoshihara 2017).

The role of JMSDF in countering Chinese Coercion In examining the role of JMSDF in the ECS, some argue that Japan’s Coast Guard (JCG) and JMSDF must increase their interoperability and integration since the binary system limits coordination between the civilian agency and military agency and further challenges successfully coping with gray zone operations (Pajon 2017). Meanwhile, some call on drastic changes to the self-defense force to adapt to the rapidly changing security environment and emerging multilateral cooperation in the region (Shimodaira 2014). While different authors have different specific policy recommendations for how the JMSDF could transform so as to counter China’s coercive maritime behaviors, many agree that there is room for change to better address the issues.

China’s activities as gray zone operations. With the exception of some who argue that the term ‘hybrid strategy’ is more appropriate, most scholars use the term ‘gray zone activities’ in describing China’s coercive behavior in the ESCS (Patalano 2018). In most literature discussing the issue, gray zone situation represents neither peacetime nor wartime situation and gray zone strategy constitutes a strategy through which a country tries to achieve its security objectives without direct and sizable use of force (Pajon 2017). In the ECS, both components of time and space in China’s strategy for the region fit the definition of gray-zone; while in terms of time, China is trying to slowly change the status quo as it rises, in terms of space, it is gradually increasing its presence around Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands space. Both are done at a pace slow enough to avoid stepping over Japan’s red line (Saito 2018). Furthermore, China’s behavior in the SCS are also largely looked through the lens of gray zone activities; examples include China’s integration of paramilitary forces comprising.

of fishing and merchant vessels, the seizure of Scarborough Shoal after a standoff with the Philippine Navy, and the massive land reclamation and island-building activities. These gray zone activities that tiptoe around the red line are also quite not enough to provide a casus belli, and as a result, the U.S. has been finding itself with limited options to come to the defense of its treaty allies more aggressively. This, in turn, raises questions about the U.S. security commitment to its Asian allies, a potentially powerful trigger that could gradually alter the established regional order and security architecture (Holmes and Yoshihara 2017).

Gap in the literature While it is generally agreed that China’s activities in ESCS could be understood through the lens of gray zone operations, there is some disconnect between the established literature on U.S.-Japan alliance and China’s gray zone strategies. Contextualizing the former in terms of the latter will enable us to further understand how general-extended deterrence and alliances transpire in a world where a full-blown interstate military conflict is becoming increasingly rare but the tensions between great powers are mounting. Furthermore, by focusing on the role of JMSDF, this paper will add to the current discussion on the direction of the U.S.-Japan alliance and security cooperation as well as Japan’s future security role in the region.

Theoretical Framework

This paper will employ the framework of classical bargaining theory’s means of signaling foreign policy interests. Bargaining theory is often referred to as ‘the workhorse’ theory of war and is one of the most widely used approaches for explaining war initiation, escalation, and termination (Lake 2010). Fearon’s costly signals further explain important aspects of the bargaining theory. Two means of signaling an actor’s foreign policy interests are important for this paper. One is tying hands, which is deterrence by punishment. Militarily, formal alliance treaties or trip-wire forces serve this purpose while diplomatically, public statements that create domestic audience cost that will incur ex post if not followed through are an example. On the other hand, sinking costs is deterrence by denial; taking actions that are costly ex ante. For instance, militarily, increased defense spending, troop mobilization, arms buildup, foreign land troop stationing all constitute cost-sinking. Economically, sanctions on target actors and increase in trade ties with allies serve this purpose (Fearon 1997).

Additionally, Huth’s work on extended deterrence will guide the U.S.-Japan alliance and extended deterrence aspect of this paper. Two variables in measurement of extended deterrence credibility and stability will be taken into consideration here. The first is the value of the.

Protégé state to the Defender state, measured by the existence of a military alliance, Defender to Protégé arms transfer, and level of economic integration. Another is the scale of escalation; the first level, a symbolic show of force or display of military presence (naval visits to ports of protégé, the dispatch of a warship to a coast of protégé, naval reconnaissance off cost of protégé) and the second level, a demonstration of military capabilities (naval exercises or war games held near the coast of the protégé or adversary) will be used (Huth 1991).

Methodology

This paper will employ the qualitative method. It will first collect information relevant to national interest, security strategy, regional strategy and recent military activities from official documents from the respective governments of the U.S. and Japan. These will include defense white papers and strategy report documents. Then, employing deductive reasoning, this paper will examine them through the lens of the previously mentioned theoretical framework, borrowing from bargaining theory, foreign policy interest signaling, and Huth’s work on extended deterrence. The analysis will focus on the role of JMSDF and the U.S.-Japan alliance in deterring Chinese gray zone strategy.

Analysis

China’s Gray Zone Activities in the SECS The U.S. defines China’s campaign of low-level coercion aimed to assert control of disputed spaces as gray zone activities. Such a perception is clear in the quote “China is using a steady progression of small, incremental steps in the “gray zone” between peaceful relations and overt hostilities to secure its aims, while remaining below the threshold of armed conflict.” In this definition, political warfare, disinformation, use of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) networks, and economic leverage are categorized as gray zone coercion (The Department of Defense 2019).

A plethora of specific Chinese activities represent this strategy. For example, in the SCS, the Scarborough Shoal standoff which started in 2012 is a low-level coercion that continues to pressure the comparatively weak Philippines. Through the use of fishing vessels, import bans and fishing bans on the Philippines, China incrementally pushed for its de facto control of the feature. In the present day, Chinese Coast Guard maintains a constant presence in the area. In this instance, China did not engage in a full-scale armed conflict, but still escalated.

low-level tensions and at the end coerced the Philippines out of Scarborough Shoal (Mazarr 2015).

On the other hand, in the ECS, China’s proclamation of air defense identification zone (ADIZ) and frequent scrambling of its fighter jets exemplify China’s gray zone strategy in the region. Like its actions in the SCS, China’s actions surrounding the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands are also intimidation short of full-scale warfare; China has been not only increasing its naval presence around the feature but has also been employing media fusillades and diplomatic protests as well as economic tools of coercion. For instance, in 2010, when the Japan Coast Guard boats and a Chinese fishing boat collided and JCG took the Chinese crew, China put restrictions on the export of rare earth mineral to Japan (Hornung 2020).

These Chinese activities display all three of the previously mentioned characteristics of gray zone strategy; asymmetric capabilities, ambiguous status between clear aggression and low-intensity conflict, and most of all, incrementalism. Especially in the SCS, China has been “salami slicing its way” to achieving its objectives while cautiously and intentionally avoiding high-intensity conflict or military conflict so as to create a “sufficient balancing dynamic to effectively check its activities” (Mazaar 2015).

U.S. Interests and Strategies The National Security Strategy published by the White House clearly lists China as the biggest threat in the region. The document emphasizes that while the U.S. seeks to cooperate with China, it strongly disagrees with China’s use of economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats aiming to engage in low-level coercion and advance its economic and security interests. As some of the American efforts at countering these gray zone activities, this document emphasizes coordination and cooperation with its regional allies. South Korea, followed by Japan and Australia are mentioned in stating that the U.S. welcomes and supports the strong leadership role of its allies. Additionally, this document sets the assurance of freedom of the seas and “peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law” as its priority goal (The White House 2017).

On the other hand, Free and Open Indo Pacific, Advancing a Shared Vision, a document published by the U.S. Department of State, emphasizes the U.S. commitment to upholding the open seas in the region in which all states are “secure in their sovereignty and able to pursue economic growth consistent with international law and principles of fair competition.” This document highlights four values; (1) respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations; (2) peaceful resolution of disputes; (3) free, fair, and reciprocal trade based on open investment.

transparent agreements, and connectivity; and (4) adherence to international law, including freedom of navigation and overflight.

As NSS does, this document also puts a strong emphasis on cooperation collective action with its like-minded allies and partners in managing transnational issues such as piracy and terrorism and protecting the maritime freedom. Japan in specific is mentioned in two ways; one is through the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, which engages the U.S., Australia, and Japan on “matters in such as sustainable infrastructure development, maritime security, and counterterrorism,” while the other is the Quadrilateral Consultation with Australia, India, and Japan. Additionally, the document’s emphasis of its policy overlap with Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept, India’s Act East Policy, Australia’s Indo-Pacific concept, and the ROK’s New Southern Policy, displays the value the U.S. puts on a network of allies and partners (The Department of State 2019).

Finally, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region, published by the U.S. Department of Defense, opens with a message that defines the Indo- Pacific as its priority theater. As the previous document does, this one also highlights “the competition between free and repressive world order visions” as the primary challenge for the U.S. national security. It also specifically points to the PRC and the China Communist Party (CCP) as seeking to “reorder the region to its advantage by leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce other nations.” Furthermore, its detailed mention of China’s pursuit of the previously mentioned A2/AD strategies is noteworthy; the document records that these A2/AD capabilities could be “used to prevent countries from operating in areas near China’s periphery.” In further explaining China’s “use of military presence to exert de facto control over disputed areas,” it specifically touches upon the SCS as well as Senkaku Islands in the ECS. In delineating the security environment, this document specifically uses the term ‘gray zone strategy’ to describe Chinese low-level coercion.

Additionally, this document also emphasizes the U.S. efforts in building a network of partnerships capable of aggression deterrence, stability maintenance and common domains access preservation. Among the various multilateral relationships this document mentions, five includes partnerships between Japan-ROK-U.S., Australia-Japan-U.S., India-Japan-U.S., and the quadrilateral consultations (Quad) between Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. The document reiterates that the U.S. cannot address the newly emerging challenges alone and it must work with like-minded allies and partners (The Department Defense 2019).

Japan’s Interests and Strategies. In August 2016, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

concept, aiming to foster regional stability and prosperity through a free and open Indo-Pacific region. The three pillars of this concept include; (1) promotion and establishment of the rule of law, freedom of navigation, and free trade (2) pursuit of economic prosperity (3) commitment to peace and stability.

The Japanese defense white paper’s section on the Constitution and the Right of Self-Defense as well as the government’s view on Article 9 illustrate the legal changes that prepare Japan to take on a greater military role. With the new legislation in 2014, under the “Three New Conditions,” Japan is permitted to exercise measures of self- defense. The three conditions include: (1) When an armed attack against Japan has occurred, or when an armed attack against a foreign country that is in a close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival and poses a clear danger to fundamentally overturn people’s right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness (2) When there is no appropriate means available to repel the attack and ensure Japan’s survival and protect its people; (3) Use of force to the minimum extent necessary (Japan Ministry of Defense 2020).

On the other hand, Japan’s National Defense Program Guidelines published in 2018 clearly identifies gray-zone situations as a critical threat to Japan’s national security. In delineating the threat China poses on Japan, these Guidelines recognize China’s high-level growth of defense expenditures and lack of transparency in its defense policy and military power and China’s unilateral and coercive attempts to alter the status quo as major issues. In expanding upon these points, the document mentions both the ECS and the SCS; it identifies China’s constant violation of Japanese territorial waters around the Senkaku Islands as a major threat to itself and China’s large-scale land reclamation and militarization of the disputed features in the SCS as a threat to the rules-based international order.

In order to face these challenges and protect Japan’s national interests, these guidelines proclaim that the government will strengthen its own architecture for national defense as well as Japan-U.S. Alliance. A key component of the latter worth mentioning here is Japan’s intention on increasing Japanese and U.S. presence in the Indo-Pacific region; the guidelines state that Japan will conduct various bilateral activities including capacity-building assistance, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief and counter-piracy (Japan Ministry of Defense 2019).

US-Japan Alliance Interests and Strategies. The latest Guidelines for Japan-US Defense Cooperation, published in 2015, has a major difference from its previous version published in 1997; for the first time, the guidelines specify the role of the U.S. military and the SDF in cases of an armed attack against Japanese islands. Although the.

U.S. military’s operations during this occasion are limited “to support and supplement the SDF’ operations,” its significance is in the fact that the United States has made a commitment to defend Japanese offshore islands, which encompasses the disputed Senkaku islands (Japan Ministry of Defense 2015).

On the other hand, the joint statement after the security consultative committee meeting in 2019 affirmed the alignment of the two countries’ regional strategic policies. The statement recognizes the common emerging challenges that threaten the rules-based international order and emphasizes cooperation between partners and allies. In particular, the ministers expressed strong opposition to “unilateral coercive attempts” in the ESCS. This 2019 joint statement also reconfirmed the previously mentioned U.S. commitment to the defense of Japanese offshore islands by stating that Article V of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty applies to the Senkaku Islands. Both sides agreed on the importance of enhancing alliance capabilities and increasing operational readiness and cooperation (Japan Ministry of Defense 2019).

Another noteworthy point in this statement is that the U.S. welcomes Japan’s “proactive steps to strengthen its defensive capabilities, with the Ministers confirming that both nations need to constantly re-evaluate their roles, missions, and capabilities.” The statement also mentioned the two allies’ support for ASEAN centrality and peaceful resolution of conflict in accordance with international law as well as other multilateral cooperation mechanism such as the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue and trilateral joint exercises.

Signaling: Tying Hands and Sinking Cost In signaling their alliance commitment, the U.S. and Japan employ several signals. First, the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and the recent affirmation of the U.S. commitment to defending Senkaku Islands tie hands militarily and diplomatically, respectively. Second, JMSDF’s increase in defense spending and arms buildup as well as the U.S. troops stationed in Japan sink costs. The below figure shows the change in Japan’s military expenditure in the past fifteen years. After the gradual decrease between 2006 and 2012, there has been a steady increase at a higher rate than the initial decrease.

Figure 1 Change in Defense-Related Expenditures (Japan Ministry of

Defense 2021a.

Furthermore, Japan’s buildup of defense capability in fiscal year 2020 shows Japan’s significant investment in its maritime capabilities; the buildup includes but is not limited to the construction of two destroyers, a submarine, and a minesweeping vessel and the partial refurbishment of Destroyer JS IZUMO for takeoff and landing by F-35B (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021a). F-35B, variant of the American F-35 fighter that is capable of short takeoffs and vertical landings are a great fit for JMSDF’s helicopter carriers that resemble an aircraft carries. In 2018, Japan acquired 42 F-35B fighters for carrier duty. Furthermore, in line with the 2018 National Defense Policy Guidelines that presented Japan’s plans to add three more submarines to its 19-boat fleet by 2023, in October 2020, JMSDF launched JS Taigei (Japan Ministry of Defense 2021a). On the other hand, 54,000 military personnel to Japan, in the U.S. Navy’s Seventh Fleet, U.S. Marine Corp’s III Marnie Expeditionary Force, 3 Air Force wings, and smaller U.S. Army and Special Operations units (The Department of Defense 2019).

Some joint naval engagements are worth noting as well. For example, between May 2 and 8, 2019, the first joint sail by U.S., Indian, Japanese, and Philippines navies took place. This four-way naval engagement with six ships sailing through the SCS demonstrated presence and cooperation (Panda 2019). In terms of exercises, among the 60 exercises (1 planned but canceled due to COVID-19) that took place in 2020, nine were in the SCS; (1) Japan-Singapore in June (2) Japan- U.S. in June (3) Japan-U.S. in July (4) Japan-Philippines in July (5) Japan-Australia-U.S. in July (6) Japan-Australia in September (7) Japan- Indonesia in October (8) Japan-U.S. in October (9) Japan-Australia-U.S. in October.1 These broader engagements in regions that do not directly concern Japan’s homeland security illustrate Japan’s plan to assume a larger role in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

The Role of JMSDF However, the gap between the maritime capabilities between the U.S. and Japan is considerable. In considering naval strengths of different countries, the author believes that examining the range of power projection is more important than simply studying the number of assets. Only considering the number of assets does not accurately reflect the actual capabilities. For example, Global Firepower counts that the North Korean Navy possesses 492 assets in total while the U.S. Navy trails this with 490 assets. Meanwhile, the dataset shows that JMSDF’s naval assets totals at 155 (Global Firepower 2021). Hence, to get a more accurate understanding of the actual naval capabilities of the U.S. and Japan, this paper instead studied the Todd and Lindberg classification system that ranks blue-water navies into 4 classes depending on power projection; (1)global-reach power projection 1 “Exercises,” JMSDF, https://www.mod.go.jp/msdf/en/exercises/. 7. The Role of Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and U.S.-Japan Alliance in Deterring Chinese Gray Zone Strategy_해상자위대 사세보 사료관

(2)limited global-reach power projection (3)multi-regional power projection (4)regional power projection (Todd and Lindberg 1996). According to this classification, the U.S. is the only country that qualifies as having global-reach power projection, capable of carrying out multiple and sustained global power projection missions. On the other hand, Japan is included in the fourth rank as it is has limited range power projection beyond EEZ.

Hence, it is more realistic that in striving to increase Japan’s role in the U.S.-Japan security cooperation, neither country expects JMSDF to rapidly develop its power projection capabilities or increase its number of assets. Likewise, it would be unreasonable to expect Japan to suddenly become a security partner that cooperates with the U.S. on its global missions with a comparable level of contribution. Rather, it is more likely that in attempting to increase Japan’s role in the U.S.-Japan alliance and deterring China’s gray zone activities, both parties envision that Japan will gradually increase its naval capabilities and assets and rise through the ranks. Meanwhile, Japan is starting to play a more active role in the region in which many countries are caught in the U.S.- China competition. Such a Japanese role could considerably lighten the load of the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific region. For instance, as previously examined, Japan’s bilateral and naval exercises and trainings have primarily been with countries in the Indo-Pacific, including India, Australia, the Philippines, and the Singapore. In short, while the U.S. and Japan aim to expand Japan’s role in their security cooperation and deterring China’s gray zone activities, because of the limited naval capabilities of JMSDF, JMSDF’s proactive role is mostly limited to the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

Both the U.S. and Japan clearly express their concerns over China’s gray zone coercion, low-intensity conflict and escalation through which China has been trying to advance its national interests by increasing its presence and establishing de facto control of disputed areas. Both parties view such actions as threatening the rules-based international order. Both countries emphasize that cooperation between the two allies is integral to addressing these challenges. In various strategy documents, the U.S. highlights the importance of its cooperation with its partners and allies and strengthening those relationships through developing them into an extended network. Japan’s official documents also show that its alliance and partnership network strategies align with those of the U.S. Furthermore, JSDF is also transforming. For example, it revised its security guidelines and also enacted a law that adds ‘Three New Conditions’ under which Japan is permitted to practice measures of.

self-defense.

These strategies are reflected in the costly signal activities that two countries engage in. The alliance treaty between the two countries and the U.S. statement affirming its commitment to defending Japanese offshore islands signal the U.S. commitment by tying hands. On the other hand, the U.S. military personnel stationed its bases in Japan, the U.S. arms sales to Japan, Japan’s own arms buildup and increased defense spending, and various joint exercises sink cost to signal their foreign policy interests. Most notably, these joint military exercises are becoming a ‘network.’ As the U.S. emphasizes that one country cannot address these 21st century challenges on its own, Japan is starting to engage more proactively, especially in the SCS.

US deterring China’s gray zone coercion, especially in the ESCS which is a sea that does not surround the continental U.S. is a difficult mission. As the logic of extended deterrence dilemma shows, it is not inherently credible that the U.S. would risk D.C. or New York for Paris or Bonn. This might precisely be one of the reasons why China is engaging in gray zone activities in the ESCS; it does not believe that the U.S. has sufficient interest in the region to risk launching a major escalation in the conflict. However, through signaling activities between the U.S. and JSDF and the networking efforts the JSDF puts in in forming a network of like-minded partners, especially with ASEAN countries, the U.S. and JMSDF can play an integral role in deterring China’s gray zone activities in the ESCS.

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