[Global NK Commentary] Kim Jong Un's Policy Toward Trump

This article has two objectives. First, what is North Korea's basic perception of the Trump administration's North Korea policy direction? Second, from that perspective, how will Kim Jong Un deal with Trump?

I. North Korea's Assessment of and Response to Trump's North Korea Policy

On July 19, 2024, shortly after Trump's acceptance speech for the presidential nomination, North Korea issued a response on July 23 (KCNA 2024). The key points were as follows: First, although Trump emphasizes personal rapport between leaders, the state's foreign policy and personal sentiments must be strictly distinguished. Second, the U.S. proposal for dialogue with North Korea is an extension of confrontation aimed at inducing and crushing the spiritual and psychological breakdown of the North Korean state, and therefore, there is no need for it from the outset. Third, looking at the entire process of U.S.-North Korea dialogue, the U.S. is an untrustworthy country that delays time ambiguously, either by making and not making promises, or by readily breaking promises with each change of administration. Fourth, the U.S. cannot be trusted, as it has pursued an antagonistic policy toward Korea for the past 80 years and is intensely focused on expanding a comprehensive confrontation structure against the North Korean state.

On November 6, 2024, following Trump's election as the 47th President of the United States, North Korea declared a "maximum hardline response strategy toward the U.S. to be vigorously implemented for prospective national interests and security guarantees" at the 11th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in late December (Rodong Sinmun 2024). However, the specific details were not disclosed.

On January 20, 2025, after President Trump's inauguration, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared the 'principle of maximum hardline response toward the U.S.' on three occasions (January 15, January 26, and March 9). As a justification for this principle, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated on March 9 that it was because the Trump administration habitually resorted to displays of military force (MFA DPRK 2025). In late March, North Korea criticized the Trump administration for persistently <inheriting> and worsening the policy of hostility toward Korea, while easily overturning other policies of previous administrations (KCNA 2025).

The specific content of the 'maximum hardline response principle toward the U.S.' can be inferred from North Korea's various statements regarding its perception of the security environment and its response direction from 2024 to March 2025.[1]. During this period, North Korea's perception of the security environment centered on four key points. First, the current and future security environment surrounding North Korea is deteriorating due to the formation of the ROK-U.S. nuclear alliance, the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, and the adventurous military actions by ROK-U.S. forces. Second, in order to proactively control the situation and maintain peace amidst this deteriorating security environment, North Korea must rapidly increase its power to continuously maintain overwhelming superiority in the balance of power. Third, to this end, unlimited strengthening of military power, including nuclear forces, complete readiness for war related to deterrence, defense, and preemptive strikes, and a resolve to fight are necessary. Fourth, mentioning North Korea's nuclear threat itself is proof of hostility toward North Korea. "Complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula" has already become extinct, both theoretically, practically, and physically.

II. Prospects for Kim Jong Un's Policy Toward Trump

The Kim Jong Un-Trump relationship will not be a simple bilateral relationship but will be shaped by geopolitical calculations concerning the major neighboring countries of the two nations. However, due to the Trump administration's unconventional foreign policy, there is a high level of uncertainty in future relations between countries. Here, we simplify the U.S.-North Korea relationship into a bilateral one and conduct a minimal analysis based on North Korea's aforementioned assessment of the security environment.

First, North Korea will interpret Trump's eagerness to start negotiations as an expression of U.S. 'inferiority in power and lack of resolve,' and as evidence that its policy of 'peace through strength by maximizing its power' has been effective. This perception could embolden North Korea to raise its demands and compel it to rigidly impose its position on the U.S. North Korea will stall for time, exploring how much Trump values the appearance of compromise with North Korea, and what additional concessions he can make unilaterally beyond the 2018-19 concessions, such as the suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises. In this regard, North Korea will likely pay close attention to how Putin handles Trump in relation to the resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war.

Second, North Korea may believe that to initiate effective negotiations within a framework structurally favorable to itself, an additional 'display of overwhelming power' toward the U.S. and the accompanying crisis are inevitable. Based on North Korea's experience, effective U.S.-North Korea negotiations have begun when tensions related to the North Korean nuclear issue escalated and the U.S. was compelled to manage the risk of war (nuclear) through negotiations. Only in such situations could North Korea, as a relatively weaker nation, possess sufficient leverage against the superpower U.S. and consequently achieve, at least provisionally, results favorable to itself. Unless a renewed risk of nuclear war emerges between Trump and Kim Jong Un, it will be very difficult for the U.S. and North Korea, with their significant differences in positions and mutual distrust, to enter into a productive negotiating relationship in any form. Of course, provoking a new crisis is a risky move for North Korea as well. However, based on past experiences, Kim Jong Un will likely judge that his probability of winning in a contest of nerves between the U.S. and North Korea is much higher. Conversely, if Trump's domestic and foreign policy failures lead the U.S. into a domestic and foreign quagmire, Trump might consider a diversionary war, and the North Korean nuclear issue could become one of Trump's candidates for such a war.

Third, Kim Jong Un may pursue diplomacy with the U.S. with the actual objective being contact with the U.S. itself, and meetings with Trump, while managing the nuclear issue as a superficial objective. From North Korea's perspective, Trump's eagerness to negotiate, and the various rumors circulating about progress in U.S.-North Korea relations, enhance Kim Jong Un's and North Korea's international and domestic standing, and particularly have a significant effect in creating discord in ROK-U.S. relations. This does not run counter to Trump's interests either. From Trump's perspective, boasting about his 'romantic relationship' with Kim Jong Un can serve to divert attention from the pressing domestic and international challenges facing the U.S., while simultaneously creating tension with China, Russia, Japan, and especially South Korea.

Fourth, the biggest challenge for Kim Jong Un is that the Trump administration, through its 'Interim National Defense Strategy Guidance,' has downplayed the importance of the North Korean issue in U.S. security concerns. This makes it more difficult for North Korea to force effective negotiations on the U.S. within a structurally favorable framework (Washington Post 2025). Even if North Korea creates greater 'crisis noise,' the U.S. is likely to shift the burden of handling this issue to South Korea, Japan, and China. In this situation, for North Korea to bring the U.S. to the negotiating table seriously, it would have to create an even more dangerous crisis.

Fifth, Kim Jong Un will not be interested in agreements that must be honored beyond the Trump administration's term; instead, he will focus on how to maximize one-time tactical gains during Trump's term. Kim Jong Un will fundamentally distrust the U.S., and especially Trump, and conversely, the U.S. and Trump will not trust North Korea and Kim Jong Un. However, a lack of mutual trust does not preclude even (fake) negotiations. In the absence of mutual trust, the parties will opportunistically focus on acquiring one-time tactical benefits rather than long-term agreements.

Sixth, the hopeful expectation that Trump and Kim Jong Un will meet in Vladivostok with Putin's mediation is unrealistic. For this scenario to materialize, Trump must succeed in mediating a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire, thereby separating Russia and China, and transforming Russia into an ally of the United States. In other words, the so-called U.S. 'reverse Kissinger strategy' must succeed. If that happens, Trump and Putin could agree on a strategy to encircle China, and could pursue a strategic plan to include Kim Jong Un in this. However, the probability of this scenario being realized is very low.

III. Conclusion

According to North Korea's public declarations, its current policy objective is to achieve and maintain overwhelming superiority in the balance of power on the Korean Peninsula, and to this end, it is pursuing a policy of (nuclear) power maximization. North Korea appears to have already achieved a certain level of capability in evading South Korea's preemptive strike system (kill chain) and its indigenous missile defense system.

During the Trump administration, North Korea may conduct its seventh nuclear test and more actively pursue experiments to acquire a second-strike capability against the U.S. This foreshadows the possibility of a fourth North Korean nuclear crisis occurring during Trump's term.[2].

With this perception in mind, even after the Trump administration takes office, South Korea, the U.S., and Japan are pursuing policies to reaffirm 'complete denuclearization of North Korea' and strengthen military responses to the North Korean nuclear threat, as they have in the past. Trump's rhetoric and actions, which outwardly appear to actively seek the resumption of summit talks with North Korea, may be considering this strategic environment. However, his rhetoric and actions are misleading at least some important segments of South Korean public opinion and expert opinion into a false optimism. North Korea's strategic pursuits are being aided by Russia and tacitly tolerated by China. Furthermore, the Trump administration's foreign policy may contribute to weakening Western alliances. This international environment is expected to persist for some time, providing strategic opportunities for North Korea. ■

References

Rodong Sinmun. 2024. "Report on the Expanded Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea." December 29.

Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2024. "Whether the Ticking of U.S.-DPRK Confrontation Stops Depends on U.S. Actions." KCNA, July 23.

____. 2025. "The U.S.'s 'Might Makes Right' Theory Will Not Work in the State's Security Sphere." KCNA, March 25.

Information Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 2025. "The Rampant Use of Force by the U.S. Will Lead to a Worsening Security Crisis." Press Release, March 9.

Leng, Russell J. 1993. Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816--1980: Realism versus Reciprocity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Horton, Alex, and Hannah Natanson. 2025. "Secret Pentagon Memo on China, Homeland Has Heritage Fingerprints." Washington Post, March 29.

[1]During the same period, a total of 54 documents, including public statements by Kim Jong Un and Kim Yo Jong, official positions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and KCNA commentaries, were directly reviewed to understand North Korea's perception of the security environment.

[2] The first crisis occurred in 1993-94 over North Korea's plutonium enrichment, the second in 2002 over uranium enrichment, the third in 2016-17 triggered by North Korea's nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile tests, and the fourth crisis would be triggered by North Korea's seventh nuclear test and its test of a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle missile?

■ Park Hyung-jung, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification.

■ Managed and Edited by:Kim Chaerin, EAI Research Assistant

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