[Global NK Commentary] Kim Jong Un's Strategic Choices Under a Second Trump Administration

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President Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue, emphasizing his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. In a meeting with White House reporters on March 31st, he also stated that he is in "communication" with North Korea, stressing the importance of communication and the necessity of dialogue(
The Chosun Daily 2025). However, the goals and principles of the Trump administration's second term regarding the North Korean nuclear issue are very clear. At the Munich Security Conference, during the first ROK-U.S. foreign ministerial meeting of the second Trump administration, the U.S. Secretary of State pledged cooperation with South Korea on the North Korean nuclear issue and reaffirmed the goal of "complete denuclearization of North Korea." In the ROK-U.S.-Japan foreign ministerial meeting, this goal was stated identically to the ROK-U.S. summit("the complete denuclearization of the DPRK") and formalized in a joint statement (U.S. Department of State 2025). Furthermore, the G-7 foreign ministers' joint statement at the Munich Security Conference stated that "North Korea must abandon all nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea" (Munich Security Conference 2025).

Meanwhile, President Trump has also raised the issue of nuclear disarmament with Russia and China as important for denuclearization (White House 2025a). He considers the reduction of nuclear weapon numbers itself a tremendous achievement and has already proposed nuclear weapon reductions to Russia and China, stating that North Korea, India, Pakistan, and other countries with many nuclear weapons should also be included in the future (White House 2025b).

The problem is the significant gap between President Trump's statements and the second Trump administration's goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea. Moreover, this widening gap has increased concerns about the possibility of a "small deal" between the U.S. and North Korea, excluding South Korea, and the subsequent weakening of U.S. extended deterrence. However, these concerns are likely to be unfounded. Observing the direction of North Korea's strategic choices, there are few opportunities for North Korea to come to the dialogue table with the U.S., and even fewer reasons to do so if the purpose of dialogue is nuclear negotiations. As North Korea demonstrates clarity in its strategic choices in defense and diplomacy against the second Trump administration, we can gauge the direction of the maximum hardline response strategy against the U.S. announced at the plenary meeting at the end of last year.

I. Strengthening Nuclear Combat Readiness and the "Nuclear Shield" Theory Through Qualitative and Quantitative Enhancement

North Korea has emphasized the irreversibility of its nuclear force enhancement policy, proclaiming a total war for fissile material production and a "maximum hardline response strategy against the U.S." Kim Jong Un, during his on-site guidance at a "fissile material production base" and the "Nuclear Weapons Institute," asserted that "continuous strengthening of the nuclear shield is indispensable, and evolving the nuclear response posture without limits is a firm political and military stance, an unwavering noble duty and mission" (KCNA 2025a). Therefore, he dismissed the spokesperson's statements from NATO and the EU, which do not recognize North Korea as a nuclear state, as "absurd sophistry beyond common sense," declaring that their nuclear weapons are not "bargaining chips" but "immutable tools for actual combat" (KCNA 2025b). Through a statement by the Foreign Ministry spokesperson, it was also emphasized that "we will consistently adhere to the new nuclear force enhancement line declared by the head of state," and that "nuclear weapons are peace, sovereignty, and a legitimate means of self-defense granted by the state constitution" (KCNA 2025c).

When the USS Carl Vinson, part of the U.S. Navy's Carrier Strike Group 1, docked in Busan on March 2nd after an approximately eight-month absence, marking its first port call since the launch of the second Trump administration, Kim Yo Jong issued a statement asserting that the escalation of the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea "provides ample justification for the infinite strengthening of our nuclear war deterrence." She emphasized that "if the U.S. continues to break records in displays of military power, we will have no choice but to break records in the exercise of our strategic deterrence."

Therefore, it is necessary to focus on where North Korea is "breaking records" in exercising deterrence under the catchphrase of strengthening nuclear combat readiness and the nuclear shield theory. First, it is pursuing the enhancement of maritime-based nuclear capabilities and posture. Kim Jong Un inspected the construction of a "nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine" (SSBN), emphasizing that North Korea's maritime defense capabilities will be exercised in any waters (KCNA 2025d). Kim Jong Un revealed the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine and its appearance for the first time, presenting the main direction for strengthening naval power during his on-site guidance. He demanded "simultaneous advancement of modernization and operational capability enhancement for surface and underwater vessels" and outlined plans for future vessel acquisition, phased objectives, and the subsequent direction and tasks for the defense industry to achieve them.

On March 20th, the day the first ROK-U.S. combined exercise (FS) of the second Trump administration concluded, Kim Jong Un visited the Nampo Shipyard, a military shipbuilding base, emphasizing that prioritizing the business of dramatically improving the modernization level of the entire shipbuilding industry for naval power enhancement and ensuring full support (KCNA 2025e). North Korea is developing components of its maritime nuclear deterrence to enhance survivability, including the Kim Gun Ok Hero ship capable of launching ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, newly constructed nuclear submarines, the nuclear-armed underwater drone Ha Il, and strategic cruise missile launches in the West Sea.

Second, the enhancement of air and anti-air capabilities. North Korea recently reported on Kim Jong Un's visit to the defense science research units developing and producing new unmanned aerial technology complexes and reconnaissance and electronic warfare research groups, emphasizing the integrated development of surveillance and reconnaissance assets, unmanned system platforms, radar, and electronic warfare technologies, and the application of artificial intelligence (KCNA 2025f). At the armament exhibition in July 2023, a reconnaissance aircraft resembling the Global Hawk was referred to as a "new unmanned strategic reconnaissance aircraft equipped with detection capabilities to track and monitor enemy activities on land and sea," and a modified Ilyushin (IL)-76 transport aircraft, resembling an airborne early warning and control aircraft, was displayed for the first time with a radome. Furthermore, following the public demonstration of a suicide attack drone performance test that destroyed a BMW sedan in November last year, this time the targets were changed to military vehicles such as tanks, armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery, and they were introduced as "suicide attack drones equipped with new artificial intelligence technology," with the first public display of a bomb-dropping drone from a vertical take-off and landing quadcopter.

Meanwhile, during the ROK-U.S. 'Freedom Shield' combined exercise from March 11th to 20th, several Russian military aircraft made an unprecedented eight incursions into South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) (Yonhap News Agency 2025a). Coincidentally, on March 20th, the day Russian military aircraft flew as close as approximately 20 km from the outer edge of South Korean airspace north of Ulleungdo, North Korea conducted a test launch to comprehensively verify the combat performance of its latest anti-air (surface-to-air) missile weapon system, which has entered full-scale production (KCNA 2025e). Kim Jong Un expressed gratitude to the anti-air weapon system research group and the relevant defense industry enterprise, stating, "We have equipped our military with another important defensive weapon system possessing commendable combat performance."

Third, the enhancement of special operations forces capabilities. When North Korea accelerated its nuclear and missile capabilities with the launch of Kwangmyongsong in February 2016, reports emerged that the South Korean military authorities decided to establish a special forces unit dedicated to carrying out "decapitation strikes" against key targets such as enemy leadership, nuclear facilities, missile bases, and WMD-related facilities in case of emergency (Chosun Ilbo 2016). In response, North Korea also retaliated, with Kim Jong Un announcing a visit to a special operations battalion on November 4, 2016, and providing detailed reports on the combat missions of the special operations battalion. By the time the South Korean military reorganized the existing 13th Airborne Special Brigade into the decapitation strike unit, the 13th Special Mission Brigade, and held its inauguration ceremony on December 1, 2017, Kim Jong Un had unusually visited special operations battalions four times by 2017, in addition to directing their combat training.[1]. After that, visits by Kim Jong Un to special operations units were not reported until the lead-up to the Ukraine war in 2024, when reports of visits to special operations units increased again. On-site guidance at important operational training bases in the western region in March 2024, special operations forces training bases in September, and special operations unit training bases in the western region in October were reported.[2]. In April 2025, Kim Jong Un visited the training bases of special operations units and presented key tasks for advancing special operations capabilities, stating that strengthening special operations forces is a major component of the current military construction strategy (KCNA 2025g).

II. Emphasis on Bilateral Strategic Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia Over Trilateral Relations

Observing the period of the first ROK-U.S. Freedom Shield combined exercise and North Korea's subsequent reactions during the second Trump administration, North Korea appeared to focus more on comprehensive diplomacy with Russia than on military responses. After the ROK-U.S. combined exercise 'Freedom Shield' began on March 10th, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Rudenko arrived in Pyongyang on the 14th for vice-ministerial talks and meetings with Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, discussing "bilateral cooperation and a wide range of international and regional issues" (Yonhap News Agency 2025a). A North Korean delegation led by External Economic Affairs Minister Yun Jong Ho departed Pyongyang on March 17th and held a meeting of the co-chairmen of the Intergovernmental Committee for Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation between Russia and North Korea in Moscow. On March 21st, the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources issued a statement explaining that Russia and North Korea held talks within the framework of the 'Intergovernmental Committee for Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation,' discussing cooperation in various economic sectors, including industry, agriculture, transportation infrastructure, education, and culture – areas of traditional interaction and mutual benefit (Yonhap News Agency 2025b). On the same day, Kim Jong Un met with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, who was visiting Pyongyang, received a personal letter from President Putin, and was briefed in detail on the progress of contacts between Russia and the U.S. regarding a ceasefire proposal for Ukraine (Yonhap News Agency 2025c; KCNA 2025d).

III. Implications for "Korean Peninsula Security"

North Korea's maximum hardline response strategy against the U.S. in 2025 has implications for South Korea in two aspects. Firstly, the second Trump administration is showing flexibility towards the Russian position to end the war in Ukraine, strategically utilizing Russia to counter China. North Korea, having actively provided diplomatic and military support to Russia in the Ukraine war, will seek to strengthen the credibility of its nuclear deterrence and overcome vulnerabilities in anti-air and naval capabilities through military cooperation with Russia by solidifying its strategic bilateral relationship with Russia. Given that Secretary Patrushev visited Pyongyang immediately after the conclusion of the ROK-U.S. combined exercise and the ROK-U.S.-Japan trilateral military exercise, it is possible that both North Korea and Russia, recognizing the importance of combined operations through their wartime experiences, will discuss the level and scope of joint North Korea-Russia exercises, potentially developing them into annual events.

Another aspect is the possibility of U.S.-North Korea dialogue and denuclearization negotiations. Given the rapid pace of cooperation in all areas – politics, military, diplomacy, economy, education, science and technology, and culture – between North Korea and Russia, and North Korea's strategic situation and nuclear shield theory, there is no reason for North Korea to engage in denuclearization negotiations from its perspective. A "small deal" is only possible when North Korea has something to gain from the U.S., but it is far more beneficial for North Korea to solidify its bilateral relationship with Russia, which tolerates North Korea's nuclear weapons and bypasses sanctions, rather than negotiating denuclearization in exchange for improved U.S.-North Korea relations.

Ultimately, our response must focus on policy development to ensure that North Korea's policy toward Russia does not yield strategic benefits for Korean Peninsula security. For North Korea's strengthening of its nuclear combat readiness, we must enhance ROK-U.S. extended deterrence and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. To counter the strengthening of the comprehensive strategic alliance between North Korea and Russia, we must reduce Russia's strategic value to North Korea through ROK-U.S. cooperation and the development of strategic relations between South Korea and Russia.

References

<KCNA>. 2025a. "Report on the Expanded Meeting of the Secretariat of the 8th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea." January 29.

___. 2025b. "Is it that painful to acknowledge reality?" February 8.

___. 2025c. "Statement by the Spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." February 18.

___. 2025d. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un conducted on-site guidance at the Onpo Workers' Sanatorium under construction." March 8.

___. 2025e. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un conducted on-site guidance at the Nampo Shipyard." March 21.

___. 2025f. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un met with Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Sergey Shoigu." March 22.

___. 2025g. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un conducted on-site guidance of defense science research projects." March 27.

___. 2025h. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un visited the training base of the Korean People's Army Special Operations Forces and directed comprehensive training." April 5.

<Yonhap News Agency>. 2025a. "ROK-U.S. Combined Exercise 'Freedom Shield' Concludes... North Korea Relatively Quiet (Comprehensive)." March 20. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250320046551504.

___. 2025b. "ROK-U.S. Marines Conduct 25-1 KMEP Combined Infantry and Combined Arms Exercise." March 21. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20250321020900013.

___. 2025c. "Russia Prepares for Kim Jong Un's Visit This Year... Foreign Minister to Visit Pyongyang (Comprehensive 3rd Report)." March 27. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250327146553009?section=nk/news/diplomacy.

<Chosun Ilbo>. 2016. "[Exclusive] Military to Establish Special Forces for 'Decapitation Strike' Against North Korean Leadership." May 28. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/28/2016052800235.html.

https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250327146553009?section=nk/news/diplomacy

The Chosun Daily. 2025. "North Korea's Latest Provocations Raise Tensions." April 2. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/04/02/CP4E4E5NUBH55NBAFE4S2MMO4I/.

[1] Refer to KCNA, 2016.11.4., 2016.12.11., 2017.4.23., 2017.8.26.

[2] Refer to KCNA, 2024.3.7., 2024.3.16., 2024.9.13., 2024.10.4.

■ Lee Ho-ryeong_Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Responsible for and Edited by:Kim Chaerin, EAI Research Assistant

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | crkim@eai.or.kr