[Global NK Commentary] Kim Jong Un’s Strategic Choices Under a Second Trump Administration

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President Trump has repeatedly expressed his willingness to engage in dialogue, emphasizing his personal relationship with Kim Jong Un. In a meeting with White House reporters on March 31st, he also stated that he is in "communication" with North Korea, stressing the importance of communication and the need for dialogue.(The Chosun Daily 2025). However, the goals and principles of the Trump administration's second term regarding the North Korean nuclear issue are very clear. At the Munich Security Conference, during the first ROK-U.S. foreign ministerial meeting of the second Trump administration, the U.S. Secretary of State pledged cooperation with South Korea on the North Korean nuclear issue and reaffirmed the goal of "complete denuclearization of North Korea." At the ROK-U.S.-Japan foreign ministerial meeting, this objective was stated identically to the ROK-U.S. summit statement ("the complete denuclearization of the DPRK") and formalized in a joint statement (U.S. Department of State 2025). Furthermore, the G-7 Foreign Ministers' Joint Statement at the Munich Security Conference stated, "North Korea must abandon all nuclear weapons, existing nuclear programs, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and ballistic missile programs in a complete, verifiable, and irreversible manner in accordance with all UN Security Council resolutions on North Korea" (Munich Security Conference 2025).

Meanwhile, President Trump has also emphasized the importance of nuclear disarmament with Russia and China for denuclearization (White House 2025a). He views the reduction in the number of nuclear weapons itself as a significant achievement and has already proposed arms reductions to Russia and China, stating that North Korea, India, Pakistan, and other countries with large nuclear arsenals should also be included in the future (White House 2025b).

The problem is that the gap between President Trump's statements and the second Trump administration's goal of complete denuclearization of North Korea is too large. Moreover, this widening gap has increased concerns about the possibility of a "small deal" between the U.S. and North Korea, excluding South Korea, and the consequent weakening of U.S. extended deterrence. However, these concerns are likely to be unfounded. Observing the direction of North Korea's strategic choices, it is unlikely that North Korea will find many opportunities to come to the dialogue table with the United States, and even less reason to do so if the purpose of dialogue is nuclear negotiations. As North Korea demonstrates clarity in its strategic choices in defense and diplomacy in response to the second Trump administration, we can gauge the direction of the maximum confrontation strategy with the U.S. announced at the plenary meeting at the end of last year.

I. Strengthening Nuclear Combat Readiness and Enhancing the Nuclear Shield Through Qualitative and Quantitative Improvements

North Korea emphasizes the irreversibility of its nuclear force enhancement policy, declaring a full-scale effort in nuclear material production and a "maximum confrontation strategy with the U.S." Kim Jong Un, during his site inspections of the "nuclear material production base" and the "Nuclear Weapons Research Institute," asserted that "the continuous strengthening of the nuclear shield is indispensable, and evolving the nuclear response posture without limits is a firm political and military stance, an unwavering noble duty and mission" (KCNA 2025a). Therefore, North Korea dismissed the stance of NATO and EU spokespersons, who do not recognize it as a nuclear-weapon state, as "absurd sophistry" and declared that its nuclear weapons are not "bargaining chips" but "immutable tools for combat" (KCNA 2025b). Through a statement by its Foreign Ministry spokesperson, it also emphasized that it will "consistently uphold the new nuclear force enhancement line declared by the head of state" and that "nuclear weapons are peace, sovereignty, and a legitimate means of self-defense granted by the state constitution" (KCNA 2025c).

When the USS Carl Vinson, part of the U.S. Navy's Carrier Strike Group 1, docked in Busan on March 2nd for the first time in approximately eight months and the first time since the launch of the second Trump administration, Kim Yo Jong issued a statement asserting that the escalation of the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea "provides ample justification for the infinite strengthening of our nuclear war deterrence." She emphasized that "if the U.S. continues to break records in displays of military power, we will have no choice but to break records in the exercise of our strategic deterrence".

It is therefore necessary to pay attention to where North Korea is breaking records in exercising deterrence under the catchphrase of strengthening nuclear combat readiness and the nuclear shield theory. First, it is pursuing the enhancement of its sea-based nuclear capabilities and posture. Kim Jong Un inspected the construction of a "nuclear-powered strategic missile submarine" (SSBN) and emphasized that North Korea's maritime defense capabilities will be exercised in any waters (KCNA 2025d). Kim Jong Un publicly revealed for the first time the fact of the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine and its appearance, presenting the main direction for strengthening naval power during his on-site inspection. He demanded "the simultaneous advancement of modernization of surface and underwater vessels and the enhancement of operational capabilities," outlining plans for future vessel acquisition, phased objectives, and the subsequent direction and tasks for defense industry economic activities.

On March 20th, the day the first ROK-U.S. joint exercise (FS) of the second Trump administration concluded, Kim Jong Un visited the Nampo Shipyard, a naval vessel construction base, and emphasized prioritizing the project to dramatically upgrade the modernization level of the entire shipbuilding industry for naval power enhancement and ensuring full support (KCNA 2025e). North Korea is developing components of its sea-based nuclear deterrence to enhance survivability, including the Kim Gun Ok Hero ship capable of launching ballistic and cruise missiles with nuclear warheads, newly constructed nuclear submarines, the nuclear-armed underwater drone "Haeil," and strategic cruise missile launches in the West Sea.

Second, strengthening aviation and anti-aircraft capabilities. North Korea recently reported on Kim Jong Un's visit to the defense science research units developing and producing new unmanned aerial technology conglomerates and reconnaissance and electronic warfare research groups, emphasizing the integrated development of surveillance and reconnaissance assets, unmanned system platforms, radar, and electronic warfare technology, and the application of artificial intelligence (KCNA 2025f). At the armament exhibition in July 2023, a reconnaissance aircraft resembling the Global Hawk was referred to as a "new unmanned strategic reconnaissance aircraft equipped with detection capabilities to track and monitor enemy activities on land and sea," and a modified Ilyushin (IL)-76 transport aircraft, presumably an airborne early warning and control system, with a radome, was displayed for the first time. Following the public demonstration of a kamikaze attack drone performance test in November last year that destroyed a BMW passenger car, the targets have now been shifted to military vehicles such as tanks, armored vehicles, and self-propelled artillery, and they were introduced as "kamikaze attack drones equipped with new artificial intelligence technologies," while attack drones that drop bombs from vertical take-off and landing quadcopters were also unveiled for the first time.

Meanwhile, from March 11th to 20th, during the ROK-U.S. "Freedom Shield" joint exercises, several Russian military aircraft made unauthorized incursions into South Korea's Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) eight times, which is unusual (Yonhap News Agency 2025a). Coincidentally, on March 20th, the day Russian military aircraft flew close to the airspace of the Republic of Korea, approximately 20 km from the northern border of Ulleungdo, North Korea conducted a test launch to comprehensively verify the combat performance of its latest anti-aircraft (surface-to-air) missile weapon system, which has entered full-scale production (KCNA 2025e). Kim Jong Un expressed gratitude to the anti-aircraft weapon system research group and the relevant defense industrial enterprise, stating, "We have equipped our military with another important defensive weapon system possessing commendable combat performance."

Third, strengthening special operations forces capabilities. When North Korea accelerated its nuclear and missile capabilities development by launching the Kwangmyongsong-4 in February 2016, reports emerged that the South Korean military authorities decided to establish special forces tasked with eliminating key targets such as enemy leadership, nuclear facilities, missile bases, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) facilities in case of emergency, a mission known as "decapitation strike" (Chosun Ilbo 2016). In response, North Korea counteracted by reporting in detail on the combat missions of its special operations battalions, with Kim Jong Un announcing his inspection of a special operations battalion on November 4, 2016. Even before the South Korean military reorganized the 13th Airborne Special Forces Brigade into the decapitation unit, the 13th Special Mission Brigade, and held its establishment ceremony on December 1, 2017, Kim Jong Un unusually conducted inspections of combat training for special operations battalions and visited special operations units four times by 2017.[1]After that, reports of Kim Jong Un's visits to special operations units ceased until they increased again in anticipation of participation in the Ukraine war in 2024. Site inspections of important operational training bases in the western region were reported in March 2024, special operations forces training grounds in September, and special operations unit training bases in the western region in October.[2]In April 2025, Kim Jong Un visited the training bases of special operations units and presented key tasks for enhancing special operations capabilities, stating that strengthening special operations forces is a major component of the current military construction strategy (KCNA 2025g).

II. Prioritizing Bilateral Strategic Cooperation Between North Korea and Russia Over Trilateral Relations

Judging from the first ROK-U.S. "Freedom Shield" joint exercise conducted by the second Trump administration and North Korea's subsequent reactions, North Korea appeared to focus more on comprehensive diplomacy with Russia than on military responses. After the ROK-U.S. joint exercise "Freedom Shield" began on March 10th, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Rudenko arrived in Pyongyang on the 14th for vice-ministerial talks and meetings with Foreign Minister Choe Son Hui, discussing "bilateral cooperation and a wide range of international and regional issues" (<Yonhap News Agency> 2025a). A North Korean delegation led by Foreign Trade Minister Yun Jong Ho departed Pyongyang on March 17th and held a meeting of the co-chairmen of the intergovernmental committee for trade, economic, and scientific-technical cooperation in Moscow. The Russian Ministry of Natural Resources stated on March 21st that Russia and North Korea are holding talks within the framework of the "Intergovernmental Committee on Trade, Economic, and Scientific-Technical Cooperation," and that the meeting discussed cooperation in various economic sectors, including industry, agriculture, transport infrastructure, education, and culture – areas of traditional interaction and mutual benefit (<Yonhap News Agency> 2025b). On the same day, Kim Jong Un met with Russian Security Council Secretary Nikolai Patrushev, who was visiting Pyongyang, received a personal letter from President Putin, and was briefed in detail on contacts between Russia and the U.S. regarding a ceasefire in Ukraine (<Yonhap News Agency> 2025c; KCNA 2025d).

III. Implications for "Korean Peninsula Security"

North Korea's maximum confrontation strategy with the U.S. in 2025 has implications for South Korea in two aspects. First, the second Trump administration is showing flexibility towards the Russian position to end the war in Ukraine, strategically utilizing Russia to counter China. Given North Korea's active diplomatic and military support for Russia in the Ukraine war, it will likely seek to strengthen the credibility of its nuclear deterrence and overcome vulnerabilities in anti-aircraft and naval capabilities through military cooperation with Russia, by solidifying its strategic bilateral relationship with Russia. Given that Secretary Patrushev visited Pyongyang immediately after the conclusion of the ROK-U.S. joint exercise and the ROK-U.S.-Japan military exercise, it is possible that both North Korea and Russia, recognizing the importance of joint operations through their wartime experiences, will discuss the level and scope of joint North Korea-Russia exercises, potentially developing them into annual events.

The other aspect is the possibility of U.S.-North Korea dialogue and denuclearization negotiations. Given the rapid pace of cooperation in all areas – politics, military, diplomacy, economy, education, science and technology, and culture – between North Korea and Russia, and considering North Korea's strategic situation and its "nuclear shield" theory, there is no reason for North Korea to engage in denuclearization negotiations from its perspective. A "small deal" is also possible only when North Korea has something to gain from the United States, but it is far more beneficial for North Korea to solidify its bilateral relationship with Russia, which tolerates North Korea's nuclear weapons and bypasses sanctions, rather than negotiating denuclearization in exchange for improved U.S.-North Korea relations.

Ultimately, our response must focus on policy development to ensure that North Korea's policy toward Russia does not yield strategic benefits for Korean Peninsula security. The strengthening of North Korea's nuclear combat readiness should be met with enhanced ROK-U.S. extended deterrence and strengthened ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation. To counter the strengthening of the comprehensive strategic alliance between North Korea and Russia, we must reduce Russia's strategic value in its approach to North Korea through ROK-U.S. coordination and the development of strategic relations between South Korea and Russia. ■

References

<Korean Central News Agency>. 2025a. "Report on the Expanded Meeting of the 8th Central Committee Secretariat of the Workers' Party of Korea, 3rd Session." January 29.

___. 2025b. "Is it that difficult to accept reality?" February 8.

___. 2025c. "Statement by Spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." February 18.

___. 2025d. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided On-Site Guidance at the Onpo Workers' Sanatorium Under Construction." March 8.

___. 2025e. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided On-Site Guidance at the Nampo Shipyard." March 21.

___. 2025f. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Met with Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation." March 22.

___. 2025g. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Provided On-Site Guidance for Defense Science Research Projects." March 27.

___. 2025h. "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Visited the Training Base of the Special Operations Units of the Korean People's Army and Guided Comprehensive Training." April 5.

<Yonhap News Agency>. 2025a. "ROK-U.S. Joint Exercise 'Freedom Shield' Concludes... North Korea Relatively Quiet (Comprehensive)." March 20. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250320046551504.

___. 2025b. "ROK-U.S. Marines Conduct 25-1 KMEP Joint Infantry and Combined Arms Training." March 21. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/PYH20250321020900013.

___. 2025c. "Russia Preparing for Kim Jong Un's Visit This Year... Foreign Minister to Visit Pyongyang (Comprehensive 3rd Report)." March 27. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250327146553009?section=nk/news/diplomacy.

<Chosun Ilbo>. 2016. "[Exclusive] Military to Establish Special Forces for 'Decapitation Strike' Against North Korean Leadership." May 28. https://www.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2016/05/28/2016052800235.html.

https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20250327146553009?section=nk/news/diplomacy

The Chosun Daily. 2025. "North Korea's Latest Provocations Raise Tensions." April 2. https://www.chosun.com/english/north-korea-en/2025/04/02/CP4E4E5NUBH55NBAFE4S2MMO4I/.

[1]See KCNA, 2016.11.4., 2016.12.11., 2017.4.23., 2017.8.26.

[2]See KCNA, 2024.3.7., 2024.3.16., 2024.9.13., 2024.10.4.

■ Lee HoryeongSenior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

■ Ответственные и редакторы:Ким Чхэрин, научный сотрудник EAI

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