[New Year Special Commentary Series] ⑤ Indo-Pacific Prospects for 2025 and Korea's Challenges

I. The Indo-Pacific Strategic Environment in 2025

1. The Indo-Pacific Policy of a Second Trump Administration

There is active discussion about whether a second Trump administration, scheduled to launch in January 2025, will inherit the Indo-Pacific (IP) strategy of the previous Biden administration. Some predict that due to Trump's "new isolationism" and "anti-alliance" stance, US engagement and intervention in the IP region will decrease, posing significant challenges to the alliance strengthening and multi-layered mini-lateral security network building strategies that were central to the previous Biden administration's IP strategy. However, if the US manages regional security agendas through mini-lateral security networks, the division of roles among member states becomes clear, and coordinated responses to specific issues become easier. In this process, the US can more easily disseminate its rules and norms to network members and verify their compliance in various ways. The operation of such networks has the effect of reducing "transaction costs" for both the US and its network members. Therefore, it is highly probable that President Trump, a successful entrepreneur, will actively embrace, rather than reject, the establishment of mini-lateral security cooperation networks that can efficiently manage the IP regional security order with low cost and high efficiency.

Indeed, during the first Trump administration, the US published an IP strategy report under the names of the Department of Defense and the Department of State and pursued its IP strategy by enacting various laws. The "Strategic Framework for America's Indo-Pacific Strategy in 2018," which was a classified document, was also declassified just before President Trump's departure from office. Furthermore, the revival of the "Quad" (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue), a security cooperation alliance of the US, Japan, Australia, and India that emerged in 2007 but quickly faltered due to the withdrawal of Australia and Japan, in November 2017 during President Trump's Asia tour, warrants attention. At that time, a director-level official meeting was held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit in the Philippines, and a total of eight Quad meetings were held during the Trump administration. Notably, the first foreign ministerial meeting was held on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2019, and in October 2020, the foreign ministers of the four countries held an in-person meeting despite the COVID-19 pandemic, expanding Quad cooperation.

A second Trump administration is likely to continue strengthening the linkage between US-led IP regional alliances and the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Stephen Biegun, former Deputy Secretary of State during the first Trump administration, has already mentioned the linkage between Quad Plus and NATO. It is also highly probable that a second Trump administration will continue to provide Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to Southeast and Indian Ocean countries under the pretext of maritime security. The previous first Trump administration promoted the "Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)" to enhance the maritime capabilities of Southeast Asian countries, providing approximately $425 million over five years. In 2020, through MSI, a program was launched to provide 34 unmanned aerial vehicles, strengthening the ISR capabilities of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. In November 2020, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien visited the Philippines and provided military supplies worth approximately 20 billion Korean won.

A second Trump administration is highly likely to frame its IP strategy as an independent brand originating from the first Trump administration, rather than as a legacy of the previous Biden administration. The structure would be that the strategy pursued by the first Trump administration, following the Obama administration's "re-balancing strategy," was inherited by the Biden administration, and the second Trump administration will complete it.

2. China's Multilateral Diplomacy Power Consolidation

Although a second Trump administration is expected to continue building a US-led security network through multi-layered mini-lateral security cooperation, which is central to the US IP strategy, the possibility of a recurrence of "benign neglect" in IP regional multilateral cooperation due to its "America First" policy is also being raised. President Trump did not attend the "East Asia Summit" even once during his first term, and he consecutively skipped the ASEAN-US Summit for three years after the first year. Instead, when a National Security Advisor attended as a representative, ASEAN leaders expressed strong displeasure. In contrast, the Biden administration emphasized multilateral meetings related to ASEAN and promoted bilateral relations with key countries in the IP region, such as Indonesia and Vietnam, which are not traditional US security partners, to draw them into the US-led security network.

If "benign neglect" recurs under a second Trump administration, China will seize this opportunity to weaken US influence in the multilateral sphere and expand its strategic space. In this context, the speech delivered by Foreign Minister Wang Yi on December 17, 2024, at the "2024 International Situation and China's Diplomacy" symposium hosted by the China Institute of International Studies, affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is noteworthy. The keywords of the speech were peace, openness, justice, solidarity, and inclusivity. The first two keywords reveal China's intention not to confront the US head-on (peace) and to expand interdependence with regional countries against the US's "de-coupling" and "de-risking" strategies (openness). The remaining three keywords are important regarding China's expansion of influence in the multilateral sphere: emphasizing China's legitimacy in the realm of international norms (justice), strengthening cooperation with the "Global South" (solidarity), and implicitly aiming to emerge as the center of the world stage by seizing the opportunity presented by the US's pursuit of "America First" (inclusivity) (Ha Young-sun 2025). President Xi Jinping also declared in his 2025 New Year's address the construction of a "community of shared future for mankind" through cooperation with the "Global South."

China is criticizing US-led (mini-)multilateralism as "selective multilateralism" and is expanding its influence through its own brand of multilateralism. Representative examples include RIC (Russia, India, China), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), and the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA). Notably, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates have joined BRICS, and on January 6, 2025, Brazil, the current chair of BRICS, announced that Indonesia would officially join BRICS. At the BRICS Foreign Ministers' Meeting in June 2024, Thailand officially expressed its intention to join BRICS, and its accession is expected to be discussed soon. This expansion of BRICS is part of China's move to strengthen BRICS' role as a representative platform for the "Global South."

Furthermore, one of the weaknesses of the US IP strategy is its lack of geopolitical response to China's "Belt and Road Initiative," and China is expected to exploit this further during a second Trump administration. The US has responded to China's Belt and Road Initiative through individual infrastructure investments and bilateral, trilateral, and Quad cooperation with Japan, Australia, and India, but these efforts have been deemed insufficient compared to China's vast capital. If a second Trump administration strengthens its "America First" and protectionist policies, China will further expand its influence in the multilateral sphere by promoting "development" as the core tenet of multilateral cooperation.

3. The Rise of Mini-lateral Alliances Centered on Middle Powers Amidst US-China Leadership Vacuum

If the geopolitical and geo-economic hegemonic competition between the US and China intensifies in the IP region under a second Trump administration, the role of middle powers is expected to become more prominent in 2025. The conventional view was that regional countries had no choice but to follow the leadership of the US and China in establishing and maintaining the security order in the G2 era. However, as the US and China compete for leadership at both the global and regional levels, forcing regional countries to make choices, there is a growing perspective that regional countries must exert a certain level of influence in establishing and maintaining the security order, albeit significantly less than the two major powers (Lee Shin-hwa & Park Jae-jeok 2021).

In times of increasing uncertainty in the international order, it is difficult for middle powers, which are weaker than the US and China, to independently influence the establishment and maintenance of the regional security order. However, by forming "middle power alliances," they can gain some leverage over the US and China. In other words, while mini-lateral alliances of regional middle powers may not have the influence to fundamentally alter the power dynamics between the US and China, they possess "positional power" sufficient to exert some influence on how the US and China operate and maintain their respective networks. If mini-lateral cooperation among regional countries fills the "empty holes" in the camps maintained by the US and China and acts as a connector between the two camps, they will gain recognition from both the US and China. Therefore, amidst the increasing uncertainty in US-China relations due to the emergence of a second Trump administration, the perception is spreading that one of the response systems being established (or that needs to be established) by regional countries is mini-lateral security cooperation led by regional countries.

In this context, if mini-lateral alliances led by key middle powers in the IP region such as South Korea, Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam secure a position within the US-led security network while also gaining autonomy, they can deter the US-led security network from functioning excessively as a tool for US-China confrontation. For example, in 2024, South Korea, Japan, and Australia launched director-level IP dialogues, and the three countries are seeking cooperation in maritime security and development cooperation in Southeast and Pacific regions. If these key middle power mini-lateral cooperation efforts are linked with the indigenous (mini-)lateral cooperation initiatives emerging in the IP region for Mekong River cooperation, anti-piracy, and maritime information sharing, it will lay the foundation for driving multilateral security cooperation that is freer from US-China strategic competition.

Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation among key Southeast Asian countries has recently strengthened, and there is a high possibility that this will lead to mini-lateral security cooperation centered on them. For instance, in 2024, Indonesia and the Philippines agreed on security cooperation and joint patrols, and Vietnam and the Philippines also agreed to strengthen maritime cooperation, including coast guard cooperation. Mini-lateral security cooperation led by Southeast Asian countries is not new. Representative examples include the "Patrol of the Strait of Malacca" established in 2004 by Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia, with Thailand joining in 2008. Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines signed the "Trilateral Cooperative Arrangement" in 2017 and conduct "Trilateral Patrols in the Sulu Sea." However, as the geopolitical and geo-economic competition between the US and China intensifies, mini-lateral cooperation centered on key Southeast Asian countries has been receiving more attention recently. This is because the confrontation between pro-China and pro-US countries within ASEAN makes it difficult to reach a "consensus of ASEAN" on sensitive issues. Key Southeast Asian countries may prefer a mini-lateral approach centered on a few relevant countries in areas where institutional cooperation at the ASEAN level is difficult, rather than adhering to the "ASEAN Way." This is why the recent trend of increased bilateral security cooperation among key Southeast Asian countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Indonesia is likely to drive mini-lateral security cooperation centered on these countries. It remains to be seen whether such a mini-lateral approach will complement or replace the stagnant ASEAN security cooperation.

4. NATO's Approach to the Indo-Pacific and Japan's Enhanced Strategic Position

As geopolitical and geo-economic competition between the US and China intensifies, the approach of some European countries to the IP region is becoming increasingly noticeable. Numerous joint military exercises involving all or some of the Quad countries are being conducted in the South China Sea, East China Sea, and around Japanese territory, with the frequency and intensity of European participation increasing. In this context, Japan is a key country acting as a bridge in the IP region, connecting NATO in Europe with the US-led security network.

Japan has already clearly established itself as a central pillar of the US-led security network, and the "Reciprocal Access Agreements (RAA)" that Japan has signed with other countries in the IP region are a major facilitator. An RAA is an agreement that simplifies entry procedures for the military of the other country visiting Japan. Japan signed RAAs with Australia in January 2022, with the United Kingdom in January 2023, and with the Philippines in July 2024. Japan is also in negotiations to sign a similar agreement with France.

For a country's military to visit another country, complex procedures are required for visas, customs, food and beverage quarantine, and arms import. Furthermore, jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by a country's soldiers on foreign territory is also a point of contention. Rather than negotiating these procedures repeatedly for each exercise, an RAA simplifies and codifies these procedures through negotiation and then applies them continuously. Negotiations for the RAA between Japan and Australia dragged on for over 10 years. A major point of contention was whether Japanese courts could impose the death penalty on Australian soldiers who committed serious crimes on Japanese territory, as Australia has abolished the death penalty while Japan retains it. In addition to the controversy surrounding the death penalty, policy consultations between government agencies in Japan and Australia also faced difficulties. However, after Japan and Australia reached an RAA agreement, it set a precedent, and negotiations for RAAs between Japan and the UK, and between Japan and the Philippines, were not prolonged.

The RAAs that Japan is signing are noteworthy because the number of bilateral and multilateral military exercises in the region is increasing, and the participating forces and equipment are becoming progressively larger in scale. With the signing of RAAs, it has become easier for Australia, the UK, and the Philippines to deploy large military forces to Japan or the seas of Northeast Asia to conduct military exercises with Japan.

Meanwhile, NATO's official stance in the past was that NATO would not be involved in security issues in the IP region, citing that dealing with various traditional and non-traditional security issues within Europe was already a heavy burden. However, as the "China threat" theory grew in Europe, NATO's position also changed. At the G7 Summit held in the UK in June 2021, China was clearly designated as a potential adversary, and there is a clear trend of aligning with the US, with increasing criticism in Europe of China's information warfare, authoritarian rule in Hong Kong, human rights abuses in Xinjiang, and theft of advanced technology. The NATO Summit held in June 2022 adopted the "2022 Strategic Concept," which explicitly addresses the containment of China. Key NATO member states, the UK and France, are activating security cooperation platforms with regional countries, such as the "Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA)" (UK, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, Singapore), the "Australia-UK-US security cooperation (AUKUS)," and the trilateral strategic dialogue between India, Australia, and France. France has deployed nuclear submarines to the IP region, and the UK has been cruising its carrier strike group in the Asian region. Germany has also deployed frigates to the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. On October 7, 2024, amidst escalating tensions with China, the US, Philippines, Japan, Australia, Canada, and France held the "Sama Sama" military exercise (Tagalog for "together") off the coast of Luzon Island in northern Philippines, facing Taiwan. Subsequently, on October 15, Japan, South Korea, Australia, the UK, and France participated in the "KAMANDAG" (Tagalog for "venom") exercise, a US and Philippine Marine Corps training. The invitation of the Indo-Pacific 4 (IP4) countries – South Korea, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand – to the NATO Summit in 2022, 2023, and 2024 indicates the high likelihood of linkage between NATO and US-led IP regional alliances.

5. The Emerging 'S-Quad'

The "Quad" refers to security cooperation among the US, Australia, Japan, and India. It began in 2007 under the initiative of the US and Japan but faltered within a year due to the withdrawal of Australia and India, who were wary of China's negative perception. However, it was revived in November 2017 under the initiative of the US Trump administration and has since established itself as a representative US-led mini-lateral consultative body in the IP region. Recently, the "S-Quad" has emerged. The S-Quad refers to security cooperation among the US, Australia, Japan, and the Philippines, and unlike the existing Quad, it includes the Philippines instead of India. The 'S' stands for 'Security,' indicating that S-Quad cooperation is expanding into traditional security areas to counter China in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

The S-Quad began with the promotion of bilateral security cooperation between the US and the Philippines. In February 2023, the Philippines provided four additional military bases to the US, in addition to the existing five, three of which are located close to Taiwan. This allowed the US to secure a foothold in preparation for a Taiwan contingency, and in response, it resumed maritime patrols with the Philippines after a six-year hiatus. Subsequently, Japan and Australia also joined the military exercises and joint maritime patrols of the US and the Philippines. Bilateral, trilateral, and quadrilateral military exercises and joint maritime patrols are being conducted among the S-Quad countries, and on April 12, 2024, the US, Japan, and the Philippines held their first trilateral summit. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, on July 8, Japan and the Philippines signed an RAA between their two militaries.

The existing Quad is also a security consultative body with a strong focus on China. However, unlike the US, Japan, and Australia, India is hesitant about the Quad being perceived as a mechanism for containing China. Therefore, even though the Quad serves as a means to check China, to avoid repeating the failure of 2007, the four countries have ostensibly minimized the aspect of China containment and have developed the Quad and "Quad Plus" centered on various non-traditional security issues. In contrast, the S-Quad, unlike the Quad, explicitly emphasizes maritime security cooperation against China.

Currently, the four S-Quad countries do not refer to their security cooperation as the S-Quad, and no formal consultative body exists. However, given that maritime security in the waters around the Philippines is directly linked to maritime disputes in the South China Sea and cross-strait disputes between China and Taiwan, it is highly probable that the four countries will formalize and gradually institutionalize the S-Quad. Furthermore, if the US attempts to establish a collective defense system similar to NATO in Europe in the IP region, as some predict or criticize, the S-Quad is likely to become its focal point. The impact of the S-Quad's deployment in the IP region in 2025 on the regional security order must be closely monitored.

II. Direction of Korea's Indo-Pacific Strategy Implementation

Since the announcement of its IP strategy in December 2021, South Korea has focused on supporting Official Development Assistance (ODA) and international development cooperation in the region. However, it has also faced criticism for maintaining a distance from sensitive regional security issues, while expressing principled support for the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes, the rule of law, and freedom of navigation and overflight. Therefore, in 2025, as it enters the third year of implementing its IP strategy, it is time to make tangible contributions to resolving various non-traditional security issues in the region visible. 2025 is the 'maturation and diffusion' stage in the roadmap for implementing Korea's IP strategy, requiring enhanced visibility in the execution of the IP strategy. To this end, considering the strategic environment mentioned above, the following principles and directions are proposed.

First, Korea must strengthen its security standing within the US-led security network by broadly approaching the IP space and enhancing security cooperation with Japan, Australia, and key European countries. When announcing its IP strategy in December 2022, South Korea set the scope of the IP space to include not only India but also eastward from India to the eastern coast of Africa, allowing European countries such as France and the UK to be included as regional countries. This spatial scope, maintained since the first year of IP strategy implementation, needs to be further solidified.

The reason why Korea needs to set a comprehensive IP space is that the strategic competition between the US and China is shifting from competition between China and the US to competition between China and the "West" network. We will be in a strategic environment where we need to consider our appropriate "positioning" between China and the US-led security network, rather than between China and the US, in many issue areas. In this context, Korea's strengthening of activities in the expanded space in the third year of IP strategy implementation, by extending the IP space to eastern Africa, implies that Korea is approaching the geopolitical competition in the IP region as China versus the "West" and intends to promote security cooperation with the "West." As mentioned earlier, Japan is already strengthening security cooperation with European countries such as France and the UK. If Japan's enhanced position in the US-led security network makes it a pivot in Northeast Asia, Korea's relative standing will decrease. Furthermore, if Japan takes the lead in forming regional mini-lateral security cooperation, as in the case of the Quad, our position in regional multilateral security cooperation will also be overshadowed by Japan. Therefore, to enhance our security standing, we must, on the one hand, strengthen cooperation with European countries in the IP region and, on the other hand, increase our security role in the expanded region, such as by strengthening "Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)" in eastern Africa.

Second, Korea must secure its standing in the IP region by actively participating in comprehensive security, particularly maritime security, led by the US-led security network. While continuing its contributions to "maritime capacity building" for regional countries, Korea must actively engage in enhancing "maritime domain awareness" capabilities in the region. For example, the Quad launched the "Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)" at its third summit in 2022 and expressed its intention to actively pursue it at the summit held in September 2024. In a situation where Quad countries, including the US, are actively engaged in enhancing the maritime domain awareness capabilities of key countries in the IP region, Korea must continue its individual contributions to regional countries and, if IPMDA expands to a Quad+ format, increase cooperation and coordination with Quad countries by participating.

On the other hand, it is necessary to establish a clear stance on China's "showdown of forces" in the Taiwan Strait and its "maritime patrols" in the South China Sea to ensure stable maritime traffic routes in the region. In particular, as mentioned earlier, with the US and Japan strengthening S-Quad cooperation with Australia and the Philippines, the extent to which South Korea can align with the US and Japan in maritime security without being affected by domestic political changes in its third year of IP strategy implementation will be a key factor.

Third, Korea's dilemma is that China, its largest trading partner and a crucial player in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, is critical of the strengthening of the US-led security network and the concept of IP space. To overcome this dilemma, Korea must emphasize "openness and inclusivity" with all regional countries, including China, as it has done over the past two years of implementing its IP strategy. In addition, it is necessary to establish principles of adhering to universal norms at the regional level, such as the "rule of law" and "freedom of navigation," and actively responding to non-traditional security issues in the region as a middle power. In the future, Korea is expected to be requested to participate in maritime security cooperation led by Quad countries, including the US, in various issue areas. If these requests align with the principles Korea has established, it should actively participate and, at times, play the role of a "bridge country" to create an atmosphere where China can also participate. At the same time, it must maintain a balance by participating in indigenous security cooperation led by regional countries or security cooperation led by China, provided it aligns with the principles Korea has established.

Fourth, South Korea must express a strong will to promote mini-lateral alliances centered on regional middle powers. While Korea's IP strategy and implementation documents over the past two years have expressed a commitment to mini-lateral cooperation, the examples of execution results and priority projects have mainly focused on US-centric mini-lateral alliances. From a longer-term perspective, to lay the foundation for multilateral security cooperation that is relatively free from US-China strategic competition, security cooperation, both bilateral and mini-lateral, with key IP regional middle powers such as Japan, Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam must be strengthened. In the future, various regional country-led mini-lateral cooperation and informal multilateral cooperation, such as Japan-Vietnam-Philippines, Australia-Indonesia-India, India-Japan-Vietnam, and France-Australia-India, will establish roles in the regional security domain.

It is noteworthy that South Korea and Australia are seeking mini-lateral cooperation with regional countries not only in Northeast Asia but also in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Consideration should be given to pursuing mini-lateral consultations in 2025 involving combinations such as Korea-Australia-ASEAN and Korea-Australia-Pacific Island Countries. South Korea and Australia could jointly pursue development cooperation projects in Southeast Asia and also in the strategically increasingly important South Pacific. Furthermore, just as South Korea and Australia regularly hold "ASEAN Policy Dialogues," they could pursue "Pacific Island Countries Policy Dialogues" in consultation with Australia, a leading country in the South Pacific, and Korea could propose a "South Pacific Solidarity Initiative" similar to the "Korea-ASEAN Solidarity Initiative (KASI)."

Fifth, while Korea is pursuing an IP strategy of "freedom, peace, and prosperity," it is necessary to strengthen rhetoric on prosperity, as much as on freedom and peace. Our image of "prosperity" achieved through rapid economic growth is an asset to our IP strategy. As countries in the "Global South," including those in the South Pacific, are focusing on "nation-building" and "citizen capacity development," it is necessary to utilize "prosperity" as a core concept of our IP strategy rather than "democratization." We are jointly pursuing development cooperation projects in the IP region with countries like Australia and Japan, and we can also jointly pursue development cooperation projects in the strategically increasingly important South Pacific.

Sixth, the security cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan must be expanded into a platform for promoting cooperation in the IP space beyond Northeast Asia. At the trilateral summit held at Camp David in August 2023, the three countries signed the "Camp David Accords," strengthening their mutual security cooperation. Above all, as North Korea continues to advance its nuclear and missile capabilities, it is essential for the three countries to enhance security cooperation. The three countries have established the core framework for security cooperation, including joint information sharing on North Korean missiles and regular trilateral military exercises, and have explored ways to institutionalize trilateral cooperation, agreeing to establish a trilateral cooperation secretariat in 2024. If the South Korea-US-Japan consultative body becomes a mini-lateral platform for addressing security agendas in the Northeast Asian region, efforts should be made to expand its scope in the format of "ROK-US-Japan + Alpha (α)." The three countries have already formed a trilateral "consultative body" discussing information sharing, Artificial Intelligence (AI), and economic security, and launched the "Trilateral Indo-Pacific Dialogue" in January 2024. At the ROK-US-Japan trilateral summit held on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Peru in November 2024, the "Trilateral Maritime Security and Law Enforcement Cooperation Framework" was also launched through a joint statement.

We must declare our intention to strengthen ROK-US-Japan cooperation targeting the IP region and promote "ROK-US-Japan Plus (+)" linkages with countries such as Australia, India, Indonesia, and Vietnam. We can pursue ROK-US-Japan Plus (+) with regional multilateral regional consultative bodies or regional blocs, such as "ROK-US-Japan-ASEAN, ROK-US-Japan-Pacific Island Countries Forum, ROK-US-Japan-Africa Summit, ROK-US-Japan-"Global South."

References

Lee Dong-ryul. 2025. "[New Year Special Commentary Series] ② China's Search for a New Global Role, Strategy Toward the US, and the Korean Peninsula." EAI Commentary. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22679&board=kor_issuebriefing(Accessed: January 7, 2025.)

Lee Shin-hwa & Park Jae-jeok. 2021. "The Liberal International Order in the Indo-Pacific Region Amidst US-China Hegemonic Competition: Challenges and Prospects." *Journal of International Area Studies* 25, no. 2: 219-250.

Ha Young-sun. 2025. "[New Year Special Multimedia Commentary] The Crisis and Opportunity of the Three Great Global Leaderships." EAI Multimedia Commentary. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=22840&board=kor_multimedia(Accessed: January 5, 2025.)

■ Park Jae-jeok_Professor, Graduate School of International Studies and Underwood International College, Yonsei University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) hspark@eai.or.kr