[RCEP Policy Briefing] ① China's Perception and Strategy Regarding Trilateral Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and China

Ⅰ. China's Perception and Policy Direction Regarding Trilateral Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and China

1. As Part of China's Diplomacy Toward the US and Neighboring Countries

China's fundamental perception and attitude toward trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China are set as a subordinate strategy that changes in response to its diplomacy toward the US and neighboring countries. First, in the context of China's neighborhood diplomacy, the primary tasks China considers important in pursuing trilateral cooperation are, first, to firmly safeguard national unity, territorial sovereignty, and maritime rights and interests. Second, it aims to maintain stability in East Asia, which can directly affect the stability of China's regime, particularly focusing on preventing security instability such as war, chaos, or abrupt changes in the status quo on the Korean Peninsula. In this regard, China recognizes the necessity of maintaining strategic communication and policy coordination with the US, South Korea, North Korea, and Japan as part of measures to secure stability and enhance crisis management capabilities in its neighboring regions. In particular, China recognizes the need to prevent situations where anti-China sentiments arise in neighboring countries like South Korea and Japan, thereby providing a pretext for the US to strengthen security cooperation led by the US, leading China into a security dilemma. Therefore, as the conflict with the US intensifies, China's motivation to maintain stable relations with South Korea and Japan grows.

Concurrently, China is also attempting to counter the formation of anti-China alliances by presenting more active economic cooperation initiatives to neighboring countries and US allies. In response to the US's de-synchronization and de-risking strategies, China is emphasizing external openness and economic globalization. Indeed, China consistently emphasizes external openness and international cooperation in its major foreign policy agenda presented at the beginning of each year. Notably, China has emphasized trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China, designating it as one of the seven major foreign policy tasks in 2021 and eight in 2022 (Wang Yi 2019; 2020; 2021a; 2021b). China fundamentally bases its approach on economic cooperation and is also active in cooperation in non-traditional security areas such as climate change, public health, and energy security. Therefore, China attaches great importance to the strategic value of trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China as a response to US-led de-Sinicization, de-synchronization, and de-risking, prioritizing economic cooperation and cooperation in non-traditional security areas within this framework (Wang Yinghui 2023).

2. Countering Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and the US

China perceives and criticizes the cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US as essentially a US-led effort to contain China, using the North Korean threat as a pretext (Zhang Chi 2023). China also strongly criticized the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and the US held at Camp David. A commentary in the People's Daily stated, "Calling it a trilateral alliance among Korea, Japan, and the US, this demonstrates the US's intention to build a mini-NATO in Northeast Asia, posing a threat to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and pushing the region into a 'new Cold War'" (Zhong Sheng 2023). In particular, raising the issues of Taiwan and the South China Sea at the trilateral summit was strongly criticized as blatant interference in internal affairs and an intentional attempt to sow discord between China and its neighboring countries.

China's criticism of strengthened cooperation through the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and the US is directly aimed at the US. That is, China sharpens its criticism of US intentions and strategies, viewing them as attempts to pressure and encircle China by drawing in South Korea and Japan, which are adjacent to China. On the other hand, China has relatively refrained from direct attacks on Japan and South Korea. Particularly concerning South Korea, despite the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's efforts to improve relations with Japan, strong domestic opposition persists, and historical and territorial issues inherent in Korea-Japan relations are not easily resolved. Therefore, China holds an expectation that strengthening security cooperation between Korea and Japan, as intended by the US, will not be straightforward.

In summary, China fundamentally perceives and responds to the strengthening of security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US as the establishment of a US-led containment network against China. China views the relationship between Korea and Japan as a relatively weak link in the trilateral framework among Korea, Japan, and the US. Therefore, China's policy direction may involve highlighting various conflict issues inherent in Korea-Japan relations and employing strategies and policies to leverage these to counter the strengthening of cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US. Simultaneously, while weakening cooperation between Korea and Japan, China may pursue expanding bilateral cooperation spaces with Japan and South Korea individually through different approaches.

From China's perspective, the necessity of countering the US through trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China is increasing as the alliance among Korea, Japan, and the US strengthens and China faces potential diplomatic isolation in the Northeast Asian region. China does not hide its intention to utilize trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China as a mechanism to weaken the anti-China alliance among Korea, Japan, and the US. For example, the speech delivered by Politburo member Wang Yi at the International Forum on Trilateral Cooperation Among Korea, Japan, and China, held unusually in Qingdao, China, in 2023, offers insight into China's active engagement in trilateral cooperation. Wang Yi emphasized, "China, Japan, and South Korea, along with other Asian countries, must practice open regionalism, promote inclusive Asian values, cultivate strategic autonomy, maintain regional unity and stability, reject the resurgence of Cold War mentality, and ensure that their destinies are firmly in their own hands without being threatened by hegemony" (Wang Yi 2023).

In essence, although Wang Yi did not directly name the US in his speech, he clearly revealed the perception that the US-led cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US is essentially for containing China, while urging South Korea and Japan to adopt a prudent and autonomous stance. China seeks to promote trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China to counter the strengthening of cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US, while simultaneously conveying a message of concern to South Korea and Japan.

3. Seeking Balance with North Korea-China-Russia Alignment

China remains reserved about pursuing an alignment with North Korea, China, and Russia to counter the security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US. While North Korea is actively pursuing stronger ties with China and Russia, China is relatively passive. China is negative about the 'new Cold War' theory advocated by North Korea and has clearly stated its opposition to the new Cold War led by the US. Unlike North Korea, China has also refrained from explicitly supporting Russia regarding the war in Ukraine and has not responded to Russia's requests for military assistance. China is wary of escalating conflicts with the US and European countries due to the situation in Ukraine. Although it lacks realism, China aims to maintain its position as a mediator by advocating for a peaceful and early resolution of the conflict and presenting mediation proposals.

China recognizes North Korea's strategic value amidst escalating confrontation with the US, but simultaneously harbors concerns about security instability originating from North Korea, its neighbor. North Korea frequently causes instability along China's border through nuclear crises, missile provocations, and economic difficulties. The persistent emphasis by China on 'strategic communication' with North Korea also stems from an intention to manage security instability caused by North Korea. North Korea seeks to foster alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia through its continuous provocations. However, China does not wish for the confrontation with the US to expand further due to issues related to North Korea. The US also does not wish for its strategic burden to increase due to North Korea's continuous provocations. However, China is wary of North Korea's excessive closeness with Russia. China faces a dilemma where it must, to some extent, accommodate North Korea's demands to check the deepening relationship between North Korea and Russia.

Recently, China has expressed support for North Korea by abstaining on the extension of the UN Security Council's expert panel term on North Korean sanctions, cooperating with Russia. Furthermore, with the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between China, Russia, and North Korea, exchanges and cooperation on a bilateral level have become more frequent, leading to an assessment that the alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia is strengthening. Due to the complex dilemma it currently faces, China also needs diplomatic approaches toward the US, Europe, Japan, and South Korea to secure diplomatic balance alongside its participation in North Korea-China-Russia cooperation, and its participation in the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China appears to have been decided in this context.

In conclusion, China is not yet utilizing the alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia to counter or respond to the cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US. Rather, it is concerned that the alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, actively promoted by North Korea, or North Korea's continuous provocations could provide a pretext for strengthening security cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US. Therefore, China prefers methods that prevent South Korea and Japan from fully participating in US-led containment efforts against China through trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China, rather than pursuing alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia.

Ⅱ. China's Strategy and Objectives at the 9th Trilateral Summit Among Korea, Japan, and China

China's focus at the 9th trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China can be summarized in three key objectives. First, China aimed to indirectly convey a message countering the US's pressure and offensive against China through the trilateral summit with South Korea and Japan, key US allies. Premier Li Qiang, while refraining from direct confrontation with the differing views of President Yoon Suk-yeol and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, sought to manage relations through principled statements. For instance, Premier Li stated, 'The three countries should properly handle sensitive issues and conflicts of opinion, and respect each other's core interests and major concerns.' He described South Korea as a 'good neighbor with mutual trust and a partner achieving mutual success,' and proposed to Japan 'managing differences appropriately to build a constructive and stable relationship.'

Conversely, Premier Li Qiang clearly articulated arguments effectively targeting the US. For example, he advocated for 'opposing bloc politics and group confrontation' and 'maintaining stability in Northeast Asia through the practice of true multilateralism,' thereby clearly expressing opposition to US pressure on China through alliances and mini-lateral cooperation. Furthermore, in the summit with South Korea, he emphasized 'opposition to the excessive politicization and securitization of economic and trade issues and the safeguarding of global industrial and supply chain stability,' effectively presenting arguments to counter US-led controls on China in advanced technology and trade.

However, despite China's attempts, it is realistically difficult for the current governments of South Korea and Japan to deviate from US-led controls on advanced technology and trade against China. On the contrary, if China overtly attempts to use trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China to counter cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US, it could create difficulties in maintaining trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China.

Second, China sought to elicit a positive response from South Korea and Japan regarding the Taiwan issue. Ahead of the trilateral summit, the Lai Ching-te administration, with strong pro-independence leanings, took office in Taiwan on May 20, making China sensitive about the Taiwan issue. From China's perspective, the Taiwan issue is a chronic problem that is practically impossible to resolve definitively. Ultimately, the realistic option for China is to prevent Taiwan's independence while continuously upholding the 'One China' principle in the international community. China sought to reaffirm the 'One China' principle at the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China, the first international meeting after the inauguration of the Lai Ching-te administration in Taiwan. According to statements from China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China ultimately obtained a response from South Korea regarding 'adherence to the One China principle' and elicited a response from Japan regarding 'adherence to the position on the Taiwan issue established in the 1972 Japan-China Joint Communiqué' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024b, c). After the Korea-China summit, there was controversy over the difference in wording between 'adherence to the One China principle' and 'respect,' demonstrating China's strong commitment to insisting on this phrasing.

However, although China achieved its intended outcome regarding the Taiwan issue at this summit, the Taiwan issue is largely a dependent variable influenced by US-China relations. Therefore, if tensions in the Taiwan Strait escalate due to deepening conflict in US-China relations, a situation may arise where it becomes difficult for South Korea and Japan, as US allies, to maintain only the principled stance favored by China on the Taiwan issue.

Third, China sought to minimize discussions on the North Korean nuclear issue and missile provocations, mindful of North Korea. After discussions at this summit, an agreement on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula could not be reached. Instead, a compromise was reached stating that 'peace, stability, and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia are common interests and common responsibilities' and that 'positive efforts will continue for the political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue.' While the agreed content is principled, the phrase 'political resolution of the Korean Peninsula issue' is consistently used by China, indicating that China's opinion was significantly reflected. China maintained a cautious stance on discussions regarding the North Korean nuclear issue during its participation in the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China, largely out of consideration for North Korea and to manage relations with it. Nevertheless, it ultimately failed to prevent North Korea's surprise provocation of launching a spy satellite and the resulting tension on the Korean Peninsula. In essence, China participated in trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China to counter cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US, but paradoxically faced a dilemma where this led to provoking North Korea's provocations, which in turn provided a pretext for strengthening cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US.

Ⅲ. Implications and Challenges of the 9th Trilateral Summit Among Korea, Japan, and China

Korea, Japan, and China have accumulated 25 years of cooperative history and have consistently affirmed their willingness to cooperate through eight previous summit meetings. However, specific cooperative agendas or areas have not been established, and no distinct, substantial cooperative outcomes have been achieved. The 9th trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China, resumed after a long hiatus of 4 years and 5 months, also struggles to find concrete agreements or cooperative achievements that symbolize the consolidation of trilateral cooperation. Notably, despite all three countries facing common diplomatic and security challenges such as the waves of US-China competition and instability on the Korean Peninsula caused by North Korea, the trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China reveals its limitations by failing to narrow the gap in their positions and strategies on diplomatic and security issues.

The joint declaration agreed upon at this summit covers various areas including people-to-people exchanges, climate change response, economy and trade, health and aging, science and technology, and disaster relief and safety. However, it is concentrated in economic and non-traditional security fields, and whether the agreed-upon content will progress to actual cooperation remains a challenge (Office of the President 2024). In terms of Korea-China relations, it has created an opportunity for the resumption of cooperation and exchanges in areas such as trade, culture, and tourism, which had been stagnant since the THAAD conflict, thus laying the groundwork for relationship recovery. On the other hand, the issues and agenda points that each of the three countries considered important did not reach agreement, resulting in a compromise where their respective claims were juxtaposed. Specifically, China reiterated its stance on regional peace and stability, South Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and Japan on the issue of abductees.

Therefore, the significance of this summit lies in the very fact that the three countries, with their inherent differences and conflicts, resumed negotiations to seek cooperation after a long period of absence. In practice, all three countries exercised restraint regarding conflicts and disagreements at this meeting, creating the most amicable atmosphere possible to lay the foundation for improving relations and securing momentum for cooperation.

However, behind the cautious approach of the three countries lies the uncertainty of the US presidential election. All three countries participated in this summit with different strategic calculations, preparing for potential changes in US policy, shifts in US-China relations, and fluidity in the East Asian situation following the US election. In essence, once the uncertainty is resolved in any direction after the US presidential election, trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China is likely to be influenced and undergo changes. In conclusion, due to the fragile foundation of cooperation itself, trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China is structurally limited and will inevitably be influenced by changes in US-China relations.

In particular, China is actively pursuing trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China as a means to counter the strengthening of cooperation among Korea, Japan, and the US and to respond to US-led encirclement and pressure against China. However, this Chinese strategy is being tested by North Korea. On the day of the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China, North Korea preemptively announced its plan to launch a spy satellite and carried out the launch after the summit concluded. Furthermore, North Korea immediately and vehemently denounced the discussion of North Korean denuclearization at the summit as a 'direct challenge to sovereignty and a blatant interference in internal affairs.'

North Korea's provocations and harsh reactions appear to be aimed not only at South Korea, which hosted the trilateral summit and raised the issue of North Korean denuclearization, but also at China. North Korea and China have designated this year as the 'Year of Friendship' marking the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations and are engaging in high-level exchanges and cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China 2024a). However, North Korea has expressed strong vigilance and dissatisfaction that China is passively approaching the active pursuit of alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, while simultaneously seeking to improve relations with South Korea through the trilateral summit among Korea, Japan, and China. China, considering the numerous domestic and international challenges, harbors significant concerns about security instability originating from North Korea and is making efforts to manage it. For example, despite the concerns and strong opposition expressed by the leaders of South Korea and Japan regarding North Korea's nuclear program and spy satellite launch plan, Premier Li Qiang reiterated the existing principled stance of 'urging relevant parties to exercise restraint and prevent the escalation of the situation,' emphasizing stability maintenance.

Both the Cheonan incident in 2010 and the THAAD conflict in 2016, which were major events that led to the deterioration of Korea-China relations, were triggered by North Korean provocations. It cannot be ruled out that North Korea may engage in further, more aggressive provocations in the future to undermine the improvement of North Korea-China relations and to promote alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia. In such a scenario, China may face a dilemma in maintaining a balance among trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China, alignment among North Korea, China, and Russia, and inter-Korean relations on the Korean Peninsula. In conclusion, the North Korean variable could also become a factor influencing the continuation of trilateral cooperation among Korea, Japan, and China. ■

References

Office of the President. 2024. "Joint Declaration of the 9th Trilateral Summit Among Korea, Japan, and China." May 27. https://www.president.go.kr/newsroom/press/kwl3PqxA(Accessed: May 28, 2024)

Wang Yi. 2019. "Wang Yi Discusses China's Six Major Diplomatic Tasks for 2020." December 13. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/xghd_673097/201912/t20191213_7587005.shtml(Accessed: September 22, 2022)

______. 2020. "Wang Yi Discusses China's Seven Major Diplomatic Tasks for 2021." December 11. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjdt_674879/gjldrhd_674881/202012/t20201211_7732944.shtml(Accessed: May 22, 2023)

______. 2021a. "State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi's Interview with Xinhua News Agency and China Media Group on the International Situation and China's Diplomacy in 2021." December 30. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/202112/t20211230_10477288.shtml(Accessed: September 22, 2022)

______. 2021b. "China's Diplomacy in 2021: Upholding a Global Perspective, Acting for the Nation and the People - Speech at the Symposium on the International Situation and China's Diplomacy in 2021." December 20. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/202112/t20211220_10471837.shtml(Accessed: September 22, 2022)

______. 2023. "Grasping the Right Direction, Jointly Revitalizing Asia - Wang Yi's Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 2023 International Forum on Trilateral Cooperation Among China, Japan, and South Korea." July 3. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202307/t20230703_11107030.shtml(Accessed: May 28, 2024)

Wang Yinghui. 2023. "US Alliance Strategy: Development, Adjustment, and Dilemmas." *Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Studies*, Issue 4.

Zhang Chi. 2023. "The Core Objective of Trilateral Cooperation Among the US, Japan, and South Korea Has Shifted: From Responding to the 'North Korean Nuclear Threat' to 'Containing China'." *Northeast Asian Forum*, Issue 3.

Zhong Sheng. 2023. "Building a 'Mini-NATO' Style Trilateral Alliance Harms Peace and Stability in the Asia-Pacific." *People's Daily*, August 29, p. 017.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2024a. "Full Text of Zhao Leji's Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the 'Year of China-North Korea Friendship'." April 12. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202404/t20240412_11281105.shtml(Accessed: May 28, 2024)

______. 2024b. "Li Qiang Meets with South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol." May 26. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240526_11311724.shtml (Accessed May 28, 2024)

______. 2024c. “Li Qiang Meets with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio.” May 27. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/zyxw/202405/t20240527_11311818.shtml (Accessed May 28, 2024)

■ Lee Dong-ryul_Director of EAI China Studies Center, Professor of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women’s University.

■ Responsible Editor: Park Han-soo_EAI Research Fellow

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