[EAI Issue Brief] Two Sessions of China in 2024: Strengthening the System, Technological Self-Reliance, Multipolarization

I. Strengthening the System, Promoting Innovation and Self-Reliance in Science and Technology

The core themes running through this year's Two Sessions were 'new quality productive forces' (新質生産力) and 'high-quality development' (高質量發展). In the Government Work Report delivered at the National People's Congress (NPC), the term 'development' was mentioned 137 times, with 'high-quality development,' a concept promoted by President Xi Jinping, mentioned 24 times. High-quality development has been emphasized to such an extent that Xi Jinping mentioned it 65 times in a 2022 speech and approximately double that, 128 times, in 2023 (Bloomberg News 2024/1/5). In particular, the new term 'new quality productive forces' (新質生産力), reportedly introduced by President Xi Jinping in Heilongjiang Province in September 2023, was at the center of discussions throughout the Two Sessions. Judging from Xi Jinping's remarks, 'new quality productive forces' appear to be the result of a determination to lead economic growth by pioneering strategic emerging industries and future industries through scientific and technological innovation.

The NPC Government Work Report set an economic growth target of 5%, higher than external expectations, and clearly expressed its determination to focus on economic growth by presenting goals and directions such as the development of new quality productive forces, high-quality production, and boosting domestic demand. Among the ten major tasks for 2024, the first was to promote the development of emerging industries, future industries, and the digital economy through scientific and technological innovation, and the second was to achieve self-reliance in advanced technologies by fostering talent in science and technology. In short, China has set the highest priority task of achieving high-quality development by strengthening 'new quality productive forces' focused on nurturing emerging industries led by advanced technologies (Li Qiang 2024/3/12). Supporting this, the NPC decided to increase the science and technology budget by 10% to 370.8 billion yuan, a 5-fold increase from the previous year.

Furthermore, this year's Two Sessions repeatedly confirmed the further consolidation of President Xi Jinping's one-man rule by showcasing that President Xi Jinping is effectively leading policies in all areas of the state, including diplomacy, defense, economy, and society. Although the NPC is the supreme organ of power under the Chinese constitution and the largest annual political event, this year's NPC demonstrated a weakening of its status. The press conference held by the Premier after the Two Sessions, which had been a regular event for about 30 years since 1993 and had garnered significant attention from domestic and international media, exceeding the importance of the NPC's work report, was abolished this year. Premier Li Qiang's work report at this year's NPC was not only shorter than previous ones but also contained no remarkable new content beyond emphasizing President Xi Jinping's policy ideology and direction. The amendment to the Organic Law of the State Council, passed at the plenary session of the NPC, clarified that the State Council is also 'under the leadership of the Party,' institutionally reducing the Premier's authority and role. As the second-highest-ranking official and the head of the economy, the Chinese Premier was an important pillar of the so-called Chinese-style collective leadership system, balancing policy decisions. With Li Qiang, who served as Xi Jinping's chief of staff when he was Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province, appointed as Premier, the weakening of the Premier's status and role was virtually predetermined. The weakening of the Premier's role and the integration of Party and government confirmed by this year's Two Sessions are ultimately part of an attempt to further consolidate Xi Jinping's one-man rule. Xi Jinping's continuous concentration of power and attempts to seize policy initiative paradoxically stem from the fragility of the system, and the result carries the potential to cause another problem: the rigidity of the system. The Xi Jinping administration has chosen a long-term plan of growth through technological innovation and self-reliance to secure regime legitimacy and stability.

II. Global Initiative of 'Globalization and Multipolarization' and Diplomacy with the Global South

The key terms in the foreign policy domain of this year's NPC report were 'peaceful and orderly multipolarization of the world and inclusive and balanced economic globalization.' The vision of global multipolarization and economic globalization was emphasized as a new global initiative for setting relations with the world as a major power at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference (中央外事工作会议), held in December 2023 for the first time in five years. At the press conference held by Foreign Minister Wang Yi during the NPC, he explained the global initiative and, by mentioning only relations with Russia and the US in terms of bilateral relations, continued the trend of highlighting the identity of a major power and the corresponding global initiative presented at the previous Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference.

At the press conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented the growth of the Global South as a significant change reflecting progress towards multipolarization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2024/3/7). Wang Yi even argued that the growth of the Global South is the core of changes in the international order and the hope of a century of change, citing the growth of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a specific example. In fact, China has been actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy centered on international multilateral organizations where US influence is relatively weak, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the China-South Asia Cooperation Forum (CSACF).

Foreign Minister Wang Yi also mentioned the importance of developing relations with Europe as a partner for achieving multipolarization. He argued that China and Europe have no fundamental conflicts of interest or geopolitical rivalries, that their common interests far outweigh their differences, and therefore they are not competitors or institutional rivals but partners, emphasizing the need to cooperate based on independence, cooperation, and mutual benefit.

Although China claims that multipolarization and globalization are its global initiatives, a closer look at their specific content reveals that they are, in fact, part of its foreign policy strategy towards the US, without explicitly naming the US. China advocates for multipolarization and economic globalization to seek breakthroughs from US export controls in science and technology, and seeks to expand cooperation with the so-called 'Global South,' particularly emerging and developing countries.

It is also noteworthy that at the NPC, President Xi Jinping attended a plenary session of the People's Liberation Army and Armed Police Force delegations and emphasized capabilities in advanced defense areas such as cyber defense, space, and artificial intelligence (AI), as well as strengthening maritime power. In particular, President Xi issued directives to coordinate preparations for military conflict in the maritime domain, protect maritime rights and interests, develop the maritime economy, and improve maritime management capabilities. In fact, President Xi Jinping identified the construction of a maritime power as an important national agenda early in his tenure in 2012, and the Belt and Road Initiative was also proposed as an extension of this. This could be a move to prepare for the possibility that if Trump is re-elected in the US, China may have new opportunities and spaces for expanding its maritime presence.

III. US Diplomacy: Criticism and Response to Export Controls in Advanced Technology Sectors

Foreign Minister Wang Yi's message regarding US-China relations, reflecting the recent improvement in bilateral relations, was outwardly cautious, refraining from direct and aggressive language. Nevertheless, he expressed dissatisfaction with US policies and actions towards China through four questions. He argued that despite progress in bilateral relations through the San Francisco summit, the US's misperceptions of China continue, and the US fails to demonstrate good faith as a major power by not honoring agreed-upon commitments. He specifically complained that the means to pressure China are constantly evolving, and unilateral sanctions lists are continuously extended, thus denying China its legitimate right to development.

He expressed that the so-called 'five nos' promised by the US at the Bali summit in 2022 and the San Francisco summit in 2023 are not being kept. Specifically, the US is not pursuing a new Cold War, not seeking regime change in China, not pursuing anti-China efforts by strengthening alliances, and not supporting 'Taiwan independence.' Furthermore, the US is not demonstrating through action the agreements not to pursue pressure and containment of China's development or decoupling from China.

China has identified overcoming the US's 'small yard high fence' policy as the most important priority for securing its right to development. However, China realistically has limited means to directly counter US export controls. China has also retaliated with 'resource weaponization' by imposing export controls on resources like gallium and germanium, primarily used in semiconductors. It is also pursuing diplomatic efforts to create indirect criticism of the US and expand its base of cooperation and support by advocating for economic globalization towards emerging and developing countries, the Global South. However, this is insufficient as a fundamental response to US export controls.

Ultimately, China appears to be adopting a strategy of responding with a long-term effort towards self-reliance and self-sufficiency in advanced technology. This is why 'new quality productive forces' and 'high-quality development' were particularly emphasized at this year's NPC. Therefore, in the short to medium term, China is in a situation where it must concentrate its diplomatic efforts on securing time and an environment to focus on technological self-reliance internally, while maximally avoiding direct confrontation and conflict with the US. Diplomacy for securing the right to development is not only a US foreign policy strategy but also an indispensable choice for regime stability. Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded his remarks by stating that US-China relations should enter a stable, healthy, and sustainable development track, sending a message of managing relations with the US stably. However, China still harbors internal doubts that US pressure and offensives against the Chinese system will continue.

Вопрос о Тайване был поднят не в контексте американо-китайских отношений, а в рамках отдельного раунда вопросов и ответов. Это косвенно намекает на то, что это внутреннее дело Китая и вопрос объединения, а также отражает стремление избежать превращения тайваньского вопроса в конфликтную тему между США и Китаем. Министр иностранных дел Ван И вновь подтвердил прежнюю позицию, заявив, что Китай приложит максимум усилий для достижения мирного объединения, а независимость Тайваня абсолютно недопустима. При этом в отчете о работе также предлагаются «пряники», такие как мирное развитие отношений между двумя берегами Тайваньского пролива, углубление интеграционного развития и повышение благосостояния соотечественников по обе стороны пролива. Китай осознает, что реалистичный подход заключается в управлении статус-кво по тайваньскому вопросу, придерживаясь декларативного принципа «одного Китая». Тем не менее, если США и Тайвань попытаются пересечь установленную Китаем «красную линию» принципа «одного Китая», Китай окажется перед дилеммой, не имея другого выбора, кроме как прибегнуть к жесткой реакции.

IV. Managing the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

Foreign Minister Wang Yi also commented on the Korean Peninsula in response to a question from a Korean journalist. The Korean Peninsula was not mentioned in last year's press conference. It was also conspicuously absent from the official statements of the US-China summits in Bali and San Francisco. The Korean Peninsula issue, as well as peripheral diplomacy, was not discussed separately at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in December 2023. As China has begun to emphasize its identity as a major power, put forward its global initiative, and focused its foreign policy on the US, peripheral diplomacy has become a secondary variable in its strategy towards the US and US-China relations. In particular, with the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance and ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, China is increasingly perceiving and approaching the Korean Peninsula and ROK-China relations from the perspective of its strategy towards the US.

The fact that the Korean Peninsula was mentioned again at Wang Yi's press conference this year signifies growing concerns about security instability originating from the Korean Peninsula. Foreign Minister Wang Yi unusually directly mentioned war on the Korean Peninsula, stating, "The world is already chaotic enough; there should not be war and chaos on the Korean Peninsula again." This indicates that China's concerns are growing about the negative impacts of instability on the Korean Peninsula, given its own numerous domestic challenges. The mention of resolving North Korea's legitimate security concerns appears to be an expression of caution regarding not only security instability caused by North Korea but also the ROK-US-Japan security cooperation, which is perceived as targeting China. Furthermore, it seems intended to proactively manage relations with North Korea, considering the possibility of a second Trump administration in the US next year. China experienced an unexpected situation of being 'passed over by China' (China passing) when North Korea-US relations rapidly advanced in 2018.

In his response to the question about the Korean Peninsula, Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not separately mention South Korea or ROK-China relations, and his solution for the Korean Peninsula issue was limited to reiterating existing principled positions. Despite concerns about recent North Korean provocations and escalating tensions on the Korean Peninsula, China's continued adherence to its traditional principled stance essentially signifies its lack of willingness to play an active role on the issue. The Xi Jinping administration, while focusing on diplomacy to secure the right to development, including technological innovation, is approaching the Korean Peninsula and ROK-China relations from the perspective of managing the stability of the surrounding situation. Although China is unlikely to play the role that South Korea expects in resolving North Korea's armed provocations and nuclear issues, it shares a basic consensus with South Korea on stabilizing the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it is necessary to restore strategic communication with China for crisis prevention and management of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

References

중국 외교부. 2024. “中共中央政治局委员、外交部长王毅就中国外交政策和对外关系回答中外记者提问.” 3월 7일. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/2024lh/ (Accessed: 2024.03.13).

Bloomberg News. 2024. “Xi’s Mysterious Economic Sloan Adds to Investor Confusion.” January 5. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-04/xi-s-high-quality-development-for-china-can-mean-anything (Accessed: 2024.03.13).

李强. 2024. “政府工作报告——2024年3月5日在第十四届全国人民代表大会第二次会议上.” 中华人民共和国国务院.” 3월 12일. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202403/content_6939153.htm (Accessed: 2024.03.13).

■ Lee Dong-ryulDirector, EAI China Research Center. Professor, Department of Chinese Language and Literature, Dongduk Women’s University.

■ Editor:Park Ji-soo, EAI 연구원

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