[EAI Issue Brief] China's 2024 "Two Sessions": Strengthening the System, Technological Self-Reliance, and Multipolarization

I. Strengthening the System, Promoting Innovation and Self-Reliance in Science and Technology

The core themes permeating this year's "Two Sessions" (Lianghui) were "new quality productive forces" (新质生产力) and "high-quality development" (高质量发展). In the Government Work Report delivered at the National People's Congress (NPC), the term "development" was mentioned 137 times, with "high-quality development," a concept promoted by President Xi Jinping, appearing 24 times. High-quality development has been emphasized by President Xi, who mentioned it 65 times in a 2022 speech and approximately double that, 128 times, in 2023 (Bloomberg News 2024/1/5). The new term "new quality productive forces," reportedly introduced by President Xi Jinping in Heilongjiang Province in September 2023, was a central topic of discussion throughout the "Two Sessions." Based on Xi Jinping's remarks, "new quality productive forces" appear to be the result of an intention to lead economic growth through innovation in science and technology, pioneering strategic emerging industries and future industries.

The Government Work Report at the NPC set an economic growth target of 5%, higher than external expectations, and clearly expressed its intention to focus on economic growth by presenting goals and directions such as developing new quality productive forces, high-quality production, and stimulating domestic demand. Among the ten major tasks for 2024, the first was to promote the development of emerging industries, future industries, and the digital economy through scientific and technological innovation, and the second was to achieve self-reliance in cutting-edge technologies by fostering talent in science and technology. In short, China has set the highest priority on achieving high-quality development by strengthening "new quality productive forces" focused on nurturing emerging industries led by cutting-edge technology (Li Qiang 2024/3/12). Supporting this, the NPC decided to increase the science and technology budget by 10% to 370.8 billion yuan, a fivefold increase from the previous year.

Furthermore, this year's "Two Sessions" reaffirmed the consolidation of President Xi Jinping's one-man rule by showcasing his de facto leadership across all areas of state policy, including diplomacy, defense, economy, and society. Although the NPC is China's highest organ of power under the constitution and its largest annual political event, its status appeared to be further weakened this year. The press conference held by the Premier after the "Two Sessions," a regular event since 1993 and one that has garnered significant attention from domestic and international media, exceeding the importance of the Government Work Report, was absent this year. Premier Li Qiang's Government Work Report this year was not only shorter than previous ones but also contained no noteworthy new content beyond emphasizing President Xi Jinping's policy ideology and direction. The amendment to the Organic Law of the State Council, passed at the plenary session of the NPC, clarified that the State Council also operates "under the leadership of the Party," institutionally reducing the Premier's authority and role. As the second-highest-ranking official, the Chinese Premier has historically played a crucial role as the head of the economy and a key pillar of China's collective leadership system, balancing policy decisions. With Li Qiang, who served as Xi Jinping's chief of staff during his tenure as Party Secretary of Zhejiang Province, appointed as Premier, the weakening of the Premier's status and role was virtually predetermined. The weakening of the Premier's role and the integration of Party and government confirmed by this year's "Two Sessions" are ultimately part of an effort to further consolidate Xi Jinping's one-man rule. Xi Jinping's continuous concentration of power and attempts to seize policy initiative paradoxically stem from systemic vulnerabilities, and the result carries the potential to create another problem: systemic rigidity. The Xi Jinping administration has chosen the long-term strategy of growth through technological innovation and self-reliance to secure regime legitimacy and stability.

II. Global Vision of "Globalization and Multipolarization" and Diplomacy with the Global South

The key phrase in the foreign affairs section of this year's NPC report was "peaceful, equitable, and rule-based international order, and inclusive economic globalization." The vision of global multipolarization and economic globalization was emphasized as a new global vision for China's relationship with the world at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference held in December 2023, the first in five years. During the "Two Sessions," Foreign Minister Wang Yi's press conference also explained the global vision, mentioning only relations with Russia and the United States in terms of bilateral relations, continuing the trend of highlighting the identity of a major power and its corresponding global vision presented at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference last year.

At his press conference, Foreign Minister Wang Yi presented the rise of the Global South as a major change reflecting the progress toward multipolarization (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China 2024/3/7). Wang Yi even claimed that the rise of the Global South is the core of changes in the international order and the hope for changes in a century, citing the growth of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) as a specific example. Indeed, China has been actively engaging in multilateral diplomacy centered on international multilateral organizations where U.S. influence is relatively weak, such as BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum (CSACF).

Foreign Minister Wang Yi also mentioned the importance of developing relations with Europe as a partner for achieving multipolarization. He emphasized that China and Europe have no fundamental conflicts of interest or geopolitical rivalries, that their common interests far outweigh their differences, and that they should cooperate based on independence, cooperation, and mutual benefit, stressing that Europe is neither a competitor nor an institutional rival but a partner.

Although China claims that multipolarization and globalization are its global vision, a closer look at the specific content reveals that it is essentially part of its foreign strategy towards the U.S., without explicitly naming the U.S. China advocates for multipolarization and economic globalization to seek breakthroughs from U.S. export controls in science and technology, and aims to expand cooperation with the "Global South," particularly with emerging and developing countries.

Furthermore, it is noteworthy that President Xi Jinping attended a plenary meeting of the People's Liberation Army and the People's Armed Police Force delegation at the "Two Sessions" and emphasized strengthening capabilities in advanced defense sectors such as cyber defense, space, and artificial intelligence (AI), as well as enhancing maritime power. In particular, President Xi instructed that preparations for military conflict in maritime areas, protection of maritime rights and interests, and development of the maritime economy should be coordinated, and maritime management capabilities should be improved. In fact, President Xi Jinping identified the construction of a maritime power as a key national agenda early in his tenure in 2012, and the Belt and Road Initiative was proposed as an extension of this. This could be a move to prepare for the possibility that a second Trump administration in the U.S. might present new opportunities and spaces for China to expand its maritime presence.

III. U.S.-China Diplomacy: Criticism and Search for Responses to Export Controls in Advanced Technology Sectors

Foreign Minister Wang Yi's message regarding U.S.-China relations, reflecting the recent improvement in bilateral relations, was outwardly cautious, refraining from direct and aggressive language. Nevertheless, he expressed dissatisfaction with U.S. policy and actions towards China through four questions. He argued that despite progress in bilateral relations through the San Francisco summit, the U.S.'s misperceptions of China persist, and the U.S. has failed to demonstrate good faith as a major power by not honoring its commitments. He specifically claimed that the means to pressure China are constantly evolving and that unilateral sanctions lists are continuously being extended, asserting that China's legitimate development is not being permitted and expressing dissatisfaction with the alleged suppression of China's right to development.

This refers to the fact that the so-called "five no's" that the U.S. reportedly accepted at the Bali summit in 2022 and the San Francisco summit in 2023 have not been upheld. Specifically, the U.S. is not pursuing a new Cold War, not seeking regime change in China, not pursuing anti-China sentiment by strengthening alliances, and not supporting "Taiwan independence." Furthermore, the U.S. is not demonstrating through its actions the agreements made not to suppress or contain China's development and not to pursue decoupling from China.

China has identified overcoming the U.S.'s "small yard, high fence" policy as the most important priority for securing its right to development. However, China realistically has limited means and methods to directly counter U.S. export controls. China has retaliated by "weaponizing resources," such as imposing export controls on gallium and germanium, which are primarily used in semiconductors. It is also pursuing diplomatic efforts to create indirect criticism of the U.S. and expand its base of cooperation and support by advocating for economic globalization towards emerging and developing countries, the Global South. However, these efforts are insufficient as a fundamental response to U.S. export controls.

Ultimately, China appears to be adopting a strategy of long-term self-reliance and self-strengthening in advanced technology. This is the reason for the unusual emphasis on "new quality productive forces" and "high-quality development" at this year's "Two Sessions." Therefore, China is in a situation where it must focus its diplomatic efforts on securing the time and environment to concentrate on technological self-reliance internally, while maximally avoiding direct conflict and confrontation with the U.S. in the short to medium term. Diplomacy aimed at securing the right to development is not only a U.S. foreign policy strategy but also an indispensable choice for regime stability. Foreign Minister Wang Yi concluded his remarks with a message of stabilizing relations with the U.S., stating that U.S.-China relations should enter a stable, healthy, and sustainable development track. However, China still harbors internal doubts that U.S. pressure and attacks on the Chinese system will continue.

The Taiwan issue was addressed through a separate question-and-answer session, not as part of the U.S.-China diplomacy. This appears to be an attempt to indirectly imply that it is an internal Chinese affair and a matter of reunification, while also avoiding framing the Taiwan issue as a point of contention in U.S.-China conflict. Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China's existing stance that it will pursue peaceful reunification with utmost sincerity and that "Taiwan independence" is an absolute red line that cannot be tolerated. He also presented incentives in the Government Work Report, such as the peaceful development of cross-strait relations, deepening integrated development across the strait, and promoting the welfare of compatriots on both sides. China recognizes that managing the status quo of the Taiwan issue while adhering to the declarative principle of "One China" is a realistic approach. Nevertheless, if the U.S. and Taiwan attempt to cross the "One China" principle red line set by China, Beijing faces a dilemma with no option other than a strong response.

IV. Managing the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

Foreign Minister Wang Yi also commented on the Korean Peninsula in response to a question from a South Korean reporter. The Korean Peninsula was not mentioned in last year's press conference. It was also conspicuously absent from the official statements following the U.S.-China summits in Bali and San Francisco. The Korean Peninsula issue, along with surrounding diplomacy, was not discussed separately at the Central Foreign Affairs Work Conference in December 2023. As China has begun to emphasize its identity as a major power, present its global vision, and focus its foreign policy on the U.S., diplomacy with neighboring countries has become a secondary variable in its U.S. strategy and U.S.-China relations. In particular, with the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance and ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, China increasingly perceives and approaches the Korean Peninsula and ROK-China relations from the perspective of its U.S. strategy.

The fact that the Korean Peninsula was mentioned again at Wang Yi's press conference this year signifies growing concerns about security instability originating from the peninsula. Foreign Minister Wang Yi unusually stated, "The world is already chaotic enough; there should not be further war and chaos on the Korean Peninsula." This indicates that China's concerns are growing about the negative impacts of instability on the Korean Peninsula, given its own numerous domestic challenges. The mention of addressing North Korea's legitimate security concerns appears to be an expression of caution not only regarding security instability caused by North Korea but also regarding the strengthening of ROK-U.S.-Japan security cooperation, which is perceived as targeting China. Furthermore, this may also reflect an intention to proactively manage relations with North Korea, considering the possibility of a second Trump administration in the U.S. next year. China experienced an unexpected situation of being "passed by China" when North Korea-U.S. summit talks rapidly progressed in 2018.

In his response to the question about the Korean Peninsula, Foreign Minister Wang Yi did not separately mention South Korea or ROK-China relations, and his proposed solutions for the Korean Peninsula issue were limited to reiterating existing principled positions. Despite concerns about recent North Korean provocations and escalating tensions on the peninsula, China's continued adherence to its traditional principled stance effectively signifies its lack of willingness to play an active role on the Korean Peninsula issue. The Xi Jinping administration, focusing its diplomacy on securing the right to development through technological innovation, approaches the Korean Peninsula and ROK-China relations from the perspective of managing the stability of the surrounding environment. Although the likelihood of China playing the role South Korea expects in resolving North Korea's armed provocations and nuclear issues is not high, there is a basic consensus with China on stabilizing the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, it is necessary to restore strategic communication with China for crisis prevention and management of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

References

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China. 2024. “Member of the Political Bureau of the CPC Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs Wang Yi answers questions from Chinese and foreign journalists on China's foreign policy and foreign relations.” March 7. https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/ziliao_674904/zt_674979/dnzt_674981/qtzt/2024lh/(Accessed: March 13, 2024).

Bloomberg News. 2024. “Xi’s Mysterious Economic Sloan Adds to Investor Confusion.” January 5. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-01-04/xi-s-high-quality-development-for-china-can-mean-anything(Accessed: March 13, 2024).

Li Qiang. 2024. “Government Work Report – Delivered at the Second Session of the 14th National People's Congress on March 5, 2024.” State Council of the People's Republic of China. March 12. https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202403/content_6939153.htm(Accessed: March 13, 2024).

■ Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University.

■ Managed and Edited by:Park Ji-soo, EAI Researcher

    Inquiries and Editing: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr