[ADRN Issue Brief] Current Status of Japan's Response to Digital Influence Operations

Introduction

Digital influence operations possess the capability to shape or undermine the perceptions and public opinion of a specific nation. The U.S. National Intelligence Council analyzes that China, Russia, and Iran prioritize digital influence operations over cyberattacks due to their cognitive efficacy (National Intelligence Council 2023). "Digital influence operations" are referred to by various terms, including cognitive warfare and information warfare. This brief will use the term "digital influence operations" as an umbrella term.

This article describes the current status of response strategies employed by key actors in Japan. In Japan, organizations such as the Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, National Public Safety Commission, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) have established response organizations. In contrast, efforts at the private sector level, including fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and academia, have faced limitations such as a lack of human resources and scale. In recent years, there has been a trend toward expanding private sector response strategies with the support of the Japanese government.

Japan's response to digital influence operations faces three challenges. First, there is a severe shortage of knowledge and human resources. Second, response strategies are largely confined to areas such as countering disinformation and strengthening strategic communication. Finally, the issue of cyberattacks that could lead to political polarization in targeted countries remains unresolved. These challenges are common not only in Japan but also in Europe and the United States.

Key Actors in Responding to Digital Influence Operations

The European External Action Service (EEAS) recently identified key actors responding to digital influence operations in its "2nd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats," including government and its subordinate agencies, private companies, fact-checking organizations, think tanks, and universities (EEAS 2024). In Japan, the roles of government and its subordinate agencies are central, while other actors play relatively less active roles.

1. Government and Subordinate Agencies

Japan's Ministry of Defense, the Self-Defense Forces, and security-related agencies are responsible for responding to external threats posed by digital influence operations. The Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications handles domestic threat responses, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in charge of strategic communication at the diplomatic level, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC) coordinates the overall response. This division of responsibilities was stipulated in the National Security Strategy released in 2022, and each agency is formulating detailed response policies accordingly (Cabinet Secretariat 2022). Furthermore, the National Public Safety Commission handles criminal cases, while the Cabinet Secretariat and the Defense Intelligence Headquarters, among others, are responsible for classified matters.

National Security Apparatus: The National Security Strategy explicitly mandates the Ministry of Defense to respond to digital influence operations. Within the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) is exclusively responsible for response operations (DIH n.d.). The DIH is Japan's largest intelligence agency, with over 2,600 personnel (MOD n.d.). According to publicly available data, the DIH focuses on propaganda and countermeasures against disinformation, including strategic communication, and plans to develop an artificial intelligence system to assess the veracity of rapidly increasing information (MOD n.d.).

Meanwhile, within the Self-Defense Forces, the Training-Evaluation Education Research and Development Command (TERCOM) of the Ground Self-Defense Force operates a dedicated organization for developing new cyber warfare systems, but there are few other notable responses (TERCOM 2023). Unlike the U.S. Cyber Command, preemptive responses that attack the origin of operations do not appear to be discussed, and Japan's response to propaganda and disinformation primarily occurs after the information has spread.

Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communicationshas been involved in responding to digital influence operations since 2018, establishing a research group that includes academic experts and platform companies (MIC 2018). Currently, the Advanced Information Systems and Software Division is leading implementation efforts focused on countering disinformation. However, due to the division of authority among ministries, national security considerations are not taken into account, and the focus is on fact-checking and improving information literacy.

Ministry of Foreign Affairsapproaches the issue of digital influence operations from the perspective of strategic communication, aiming to correct misinformation about Japan and disseminate an accurate and positive image abroad. This can be seen as performing the reputation management function of the Japanese government, some of which is outsourced to Israeli reputation management firms (Intelligence Online 2023).

Cabinet Secretariatoversees response bodies such as the National Security Council, the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office, and the National center of Incident readiness and Strategy for Cybersecurity (NISC). The Cybersecurity Center is responsible for overseeing the overall response strategy of the Japanese government, including the response to digital influence operations (Cabinet Secretariat 2022). In Japan, cyberattacks and digital influence operations were treated separately, but in reality, they are often interconnected, and the response organizations are frequently the same. Therefore, the aim is to organize a response system centered around the Cybersecurity Center.

Additionally, the National Police Agency, which handles criminal cases, and public security and foreign affairs departments dealing with intelligence matters are involved in the response.

As mentioned above, the Japanese government's countermeasures primarily focus on detecting and responding to disinformation. However, digital influence operations encompass a broader range than just disinformation, including emotional manipulation, narratives produced in other countries, and disruption of cognitive frameworks (Myre 2020; Meta 2023). Compared to countries like the United States, which employs comprehensive responses involving various actors, the Japanese government's response is specialized in a narrower scope. This can be attributed to the lack of knowledge and human resources. Since 2023, government agencies have been promoting the participation of private companies with relevant expertise. However, the private sector also faces challenges of expertise and resource shortages. If the government intends to delegate tasks such as countering disinformation to private organizations, a system for supervision and evaluation of these organizations must be established.

2. Private Sector

Many cybersecurity, IT, and military-related companies in Europe and the United States have departments dedicated to digital influence operations and regularly publish activity reports. In Japan, with the exception of foreign companies that share reports from their home countries, there are few cybersecurity and IT companies engaged in such activities.

Reputation management firms are private entities involved in digital influence operations, but their actual activities are largely undisclosed. The same applies to government agencies that outsource work to these firms. Based on the typical scope of work for reputation management firms, it is presumed that they respond to disinformation and support strategic communication. Strategic communication involves shaping international relations by disseminating information or signals to strengthen alliances or clarify desired values. As the Japanese government increases its budget and strengthens its systems, demand for private companies is expected to grow, and their business areas will expand.

Japan's two major fact-checking organizations are the Fact-checking Initiative (http://fij.info) and the Japan Fact-check Center (https://www.factcheckcenter.jp/). Compared to other developed countries, the number and activities of fact-checking organizations are limited, and their influence remains restricted. The scalability of fact-checking activities is challenged by an environment where vast amounts of disinformation are easily produced, and the reach of fact-checking results is limited compared to disinformation. This is a challenge faced by fact-checking organizations worldwide. Among think tanks, the Japan Institute of International Affairs (https://www.jiia.or.jp/) and the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (https://www.spf.org) conduct research related to digital influence operations, but their number and scope are limited, and most of their reports are reconstructions of existing literature and survey data.

Academic researchers in various fields such as political science, sociology, and media explore the connections between their respective fields and digital influence operations. Some of them receive support from the Japanese government. Ambitious research projects involving researchers and practitioners from various fields, such as "Recommendations for the Revision of the National Security Strategy" and "Towards Healthy Media Platforms," have been undertaken (ROLES 2022; Toriumi and Yamamoto 2023). The former covered all areas of national security and served as a groundbreaking reference for responding to digital influence operations. The latter, however, had opaque funding sources and raised concerns about the potential for public opinion manipulation.

In summary, Japan's academic community does not cover as broad a range of fields as its European and American counterparts. However, if government financial support increases in the near future, it could foster greater academic activity.

Problems in Japan's Response to Digital Influence Operations

Japan's response to digital influence operations has been sluggish thus far. Although the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications has actively pursued research, the involvement of civil society, academia, fact-checking organizations, and private companies has been limited. In 2023, the Japanese government decided to address this issue with high priority, expanding its budget and organizational structure to enhance the influence of private companies and research institutions. Although the problem of insufficient knowledge and human resources persists, Japan can be considered to be at the starting point of a full-fledged response.

Currently, Japan's response faces three major problems. First, the lack of knowledge and human resources is the most significant obstacle. Second, response measures are largely confined to countering disinformation, improving information literacy, and strengthening strategic communication. A recent report by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace emphasized the importance of developing multifaceted countermeasures, presenting ten measures covering policy, media, and education (Bateman and Jackson 2024).

Finally, similar to Europe and the United States, domestic risk factors are largely overlooked in Japan. Digital influence operations from abroad often exacerbate polarization within the target country, necessitating a linkage between domestic and international responses. For example, the claims of the American conspiracy group QAnon often align with those of Russia or China (Kayali and Scott 2022; Soufan Center 2021; Butler and Martin 2022; Graziosi 2022).

An approach that only addresses external interference fails to grasp the reality of the threat. The number of countries conducting digital influence operations domestically is greater than the number of countries conducting interference in other nations (Martin et al. 2020; Meta 2022; Bradshaw et al. 2020). Domestic operations pose a more serious threat to democracy. Furthermore, foreign interference often exploits the political polarization within the target country, meaning it leverages existing political issues within that nation. If responses to digital influence operations fail to consider the linkage between domestic conditions and foreign intervention, their effectiveness in protecting democracy will be limited. According to the U.S. National Intelligence Council, China, Russia, and Iran are strategically focused on exploiting American domestic polarization (National Intelligence Council 2022). Responses to digital influence operations must be conducted both domestically and internationally.

State involvement in digital influence operations can be categorized into four types (Nyst and Monaco 2018; Ichida 2018; Woolley 2023). Currently, Europe, the United States, and Japan are addressing two of these types. The third and fourth types, where the government incites and supports operations, are particularly difficult to counter, especially when they exploit the polarization of the target country.

Type 1. Government Execution: The government or its subordinate agencies directly carry out the operations.

Type 2. Government Support and Coordination: The government plans the operations, but delegates their execution to external actors.

Type 3. Government Incitement and Support: The government manipulates public opinion by encouraging online users to attack individuals and groups critical of the government, posing the most severe risk.

Type 4. Government Approval and Support: The government creates an environment conducive to criticizing and attacking the targets of operations.

However, the Japanese government has potential strengths in addressing the last type. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party operated an organization called 'T2' dedicated to online public relations activities after losing power to the Democratic Party in 2009 (Koguchi 2016). T2, with the support of IT and public relations firms, engaged in activities similar to corporate reputation management. This fact suggests that the Japanese government has a policy background related to domestic digital influence operations. If efforts are made to inform the public about government activities, stimulate discussion, and increase transparency, the Japanese government can establish a democratic response posture. ■

References

Bateman, Jon, and Dean Jackson. 2024. “Countering Disinformation Effectively: An Evidence-Based Policy Guide.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. January 31. https://carnegieendowment.org/2024/01/31/countering-disinformation-effectively-evidence-based-policy-guide-pub-91476 (Accessed February 8, 2024)

Bradshaw, Samantha, Hannah Bailey, and Philip N. Howard. 2021. “Industrialized Disinformation: 2020 Global Inventory of Organized Social Media Manipulation.” Oxford University Programme on Democracy & Technology. https://demtech.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/posts/industrialized-disinformation/ (Accessed February 8, 2024)

Butler, Josh, and Sarah Martin. 2022. “Australian online anti-vaccine groups switch to Putin praise and Ukraine conspiracies.” The Guardian. March 1. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2022/mar/02/australias-anti-vaccine-groups-switch-focus-to-putin-praise-and-ukraine-conspiracies (Accessed February 8, 2024)

Cabinet Secretariat. 2022. “National Security Strategy of Japan (Provisional Translation)” December 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2024)

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Toriumi, Fujio, and Tatsuhiko Yamamoto. 2023. “KGRI Working Papers No.1 健全な⾔論プラットフォームに向けて ver2.0 (Toward a Healthy Platform for Discussion).” May 2023. https://www.kgri.keio.ac.jp/docs/S0120230529.pdf (Accessed February 8, 2024)

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■ Kazuki IchidaVisiting Researcher, Meiji University Cybersecurity Research Center.

■ Editor: Park Han-sooEAI Research Fellow

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