[ADRN Issue Briefing] Debates over the China Threat Theory in the 2024 Taiwanese Elections

Election Overview

On January 13, 2024, Taiwan held its presidential and legislative elections. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominated Vice President and party chair Lai Ching-te, while the main opposition Kuomintang (KMT) nominated New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih. The Taiwan People's Party (TPP) nominated party chair Ko Wen-je, former mayor of Taipei. The KMT and TPP initially discussed candidate unification but failed to reach an agreement. Lai Ching-te's victory marked the first time a single party won the presidency three consecutive times since direct presidential elections began in 1996. Lai secured the presidency with 40% of the vote, while Hou and Ko received 34% and 26%, respectively.

While Lai Ching-te and Hou Yu-ih represented Taiwan's traditional major parties, Ko Wen-je campaigned by presenting himself as a new option outside the two-party system, based on popular appeal. Ko's communication style was characterized by direct language, akin to an internet celebrity, pointing out social issues with little concrete alternative proposals. This communication style resonated particularly with younger voters.

In the legislative election held concurrently with the presidential election, the DPP secured 51 out of 113 seats, failing to achieve a majority. The KMT became the largest party in the legislature with 52 seats, while the TPP obtained 8 seats. Consequently, Lai Ching-te's new administration commenced in a minority government situation.

Differences Between the DPP and KMT Regarding Taiwan's Identity and Security Guarantees

The issue of unification versus independence forms Taiwan's most significant political divide. At one end of the political spectrum is the pursuit of Taiwanese independence, the strengthening of Taiwanese identity, and a reduction in economic and trade relations with China. At the opposite end is the pursuit of unification with China, the maintenance of a Greater China identity alongside Taiwan's distinct identity, and the strengthening of economic and trade relations with China. Considering the major parties' stances on independence or unification, the DPP leans towards Taiwanese independence, while the KMT leans towards unification, with the TPP positioned in the middle. However, all three parties can be considered to occupy the center of the spectrum in their preference for maintaining the status quo.

Taiwan has always been situated in a position where it must consider the movements of surrounding powers. The pledges made by each party in past presidential elections were clearly evident in this election as well. Firstly, the DPP assured the United States that even if they remained in power, they would not change the national title of "Republic of China" or its constitution. This implied that they would not pursue Taiwanese independence. This was also an assurance to Beijing, based on the perception that immediately pursuing constitutional amendments would escalate cross-strait tensions and would not benefit the election. Furthermore, the DPP's assurance was aimed at centrist voters within Taiwan. Meanwhile, the KMT assured the United States that if they were in power, Taiwan would maintain close relations with the U.S., stand with the democratic camp, and would not be linked to political negotiations with China, including the issue of unification. The KMT's assurance also aimed to attract centrist voters within Taiwan.

Along with these assurances, the two major parties uphold distinct values. The DPP emphasizes Taiwan's sovereignty and democracy, while the KMT prioritizes the "Republic of China" as a state entity, which is tied to each party's political identity. The KMT stresses a pro-U.S. stance and strengthening defense capabilities, but its inclination to enhance economic ties with China raises concerns among voters favorable to the DPP. Conversely, although the DPP declared it would not pursue changes to the national title or constitution, its past actions over several years aimed at weakening Chinese identity have caused concern among voters favorable to the KMT. These differing objectives serve to mobilize voters, with the core supporters of each party reacting more sensitively to issues of identity and values.

The China Threat and Election Interference

In recent years, China's threat towards Taiwan has escalated, combining political influence with military pressure. China has pressured and enticed several countries to sever official relations with Taiwan diplomatically. Militarily, it has conducted regular flights of military aircraft in the Taiwan Strait and implemented effective blockades through military exercises involving warships and aircraft deployed near Taiwan. Additionally, threatening rhetoric directed at Taiwan has increased. These Chinese threats have provoked backlash from a majority of Taiwanese citizens.

Recently, China has sought to influence Taiwanese elections through both direct and indirect methods. Apart from pressure through official statements, China has disseminated disinformation through various media channels. False news aimed at discrediting political forces critical of China has spread through social media platforms commonly used by Taiwanese netizens. Even after the election, rumors concerning electoral fraud were introduced from external sources. While mainstream media did not readily propagate fake news, it spread widely through social media platforms.

External Chinese actors have also attempted election interference by inviting representatives of Taiwanese local administrative districts and officials from civic groups to China, arranging tours for them (Central Broadcasting Station 2023-12-04). Furthermore, interference occurred through the bribery of Taiwanese journalists to publish false poll results and the illegal transfer of political funds to legislative candidates.

Leveraging the China Threat

In recent years, candidates in Taiwanese elections have elevated the significance of the elections to encompass democracy, sovereignty, and national survival. The escalating threat from China provided an opportunity for the ruling DPP to leverage the China threat narrative. During the election campaign, DPP candidates promoted themselves as guardians of Taiwan's sovereignty, arguing that if their opponents were elected, Taiwan would capitulate to China, democracy would collapse, and Taiwan's sovereignty would be weakened. This also aimed to divert critical public opinion regarding the DPP's domestic policies during its term in power towards the China threat narrative. The DPP's electoral victory was undoubtedly influenced by the China threat and the election strategies that utilized it. However, the DPP's vote share, which was limited to 40%, suggests that the election strategy of leveraging the threat narrative did not strongly resonate with the majority of voters. There are also voters who prefer to reduce the risk of miscalculation and military confrontation through dialogue with China.

Young voters did not support the DPP as strongly in the 2024 presidential election as in previous elections. During this election period, there were no specific events that intensified anti-China sentiment, such as the review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement or the protests against the Hong Kong extradition bill. In the relatively calm period of the months leading up to the election, the incentive for cross-strait relations issues to take center stage diminished. Moreover, as military conflict threatens lives and property and can negatively impact young men subject to conscription, many young voters did not wish for a deterioration of cross-strait relations. This resulted in a significant portion of young voters supporting the TPP rather than the DPP (Wang 2024).

Meanwhile, the KMT framed the election as a choice between war and peace, also leveraging the China threat. The KMT criticized Lai Ching-te's pro-Taiwan independence tendencies and confrontational approach as escalating conflict, arguing that under a DPP administration, the younger generation would be sent to the front lines. In response, Lai Ching-te repeatedly pledged not to pursue changes to the national title or constitution.

The utilization of the China threat by political forces also manifested as interference in government agencies that maintained neutrality for political purposes. The government sought to legitimize its actions by strategically emphasizing the importance of the election. Such situations can undermine a fair competitive environment and erode public trust. For instance, when China launched a satellite passing over Taiwan's airspace just days before the election, Taiwan's Ministry of National Defense issued an air raid alert, announcing that China had conducted a missile test (Central News Agency 2024-01-09). Such disinformation can heighten perceptions of national security threats, thereby consolidating support for the ruling party. Furthermore, government intervention, such as ordering law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute political opponents and citizens for spreading fake news and aiding Chinese infiltration before the election, has become more frequent.

In recent years, Taiwan has enacted the Social Order Maintenance Act to counter fake news and the Anti-Infiltration Act to address Chinese election and political interference. The DPP has exploited the fact that China is involved in cognitive warfare and infiltration. By defining acts of criticizing the government or expressing opinions on government policies as cognitive warfare, it can lead to a reduction in critical discourse (Wu 2023). Additionally, the DPP government directed law enforcement agencies to investigate dozens of local representatives accused of facilitating residents' visits to China, ahead of the election. Several local representatives had used China-subsidized trips as a means to secure voter support (Kung 2019). The Ministry of Justice also intensified investigations into immigrants from China, sparking controversy over targeting specific immigrant groups.

Absence of Differences on Economic Policy

While national defense, security, and sovereignty emerged as the main campaign issues, discussions on other policy issues were limited. Issues concerning sovereignty are largely intertwined with political identity and can effectively mobilize strong support from core constituencies. In contrast, urgent socioeconomic issues such as the potential bankruptcy of the labor pension fund, rapid demographic shifts, global warming, labor shortages, and the financing of energy subsidies did not receive much attention. The three candidates and the media focused on exchanges regarding each other's flaws, such as issues related to real estate ownership.

The three candidates pledged policies to address serious socioeconomic issues, but in-depth discussions and sufficient public attention were not achieved. Furthermore, to avoid harming the interests of specific voter groups, they avoided addressing the root causes of these problems. For example, all three candidates remained silent on raising workers' contributions to prevent deficits in the labor pension fund. Instead, they pledged to continue allocating government budgets to cover the shortfalls.

The industrial, labor, education, housing, and healthcare policies of the three candidates showed no significant differences. Regarding energy issues, the KMT and TPP intend to continue nuclear power generation, while the DPP aims to phase out nuclear power as quickly as possible. These policy differences were less pronounced compared to the candidates' differing stances on cross-strait relations.

Each candidate emphasized close relations with the United States, strengthening Taiwan's military deterrence, and engaging in dialogue with mainland China from a position of equality and dignity. U.S. academia and media predicted that regardless of the election outcome, the relationship between the U.S., China, and Taiwan would not change significantly. All candidates visited the U.S. to meet with researchers at universities and think tanks and to discuss with government officials, seeking to clarify their positions on relations with the U.S.

However, the three parties interpreted "equal and dignified" positions differently. Hou Yu-ih accepted the principle of "One China, Different Interpretations" (一中各表), suggesting that while agreeing to the "One China" principle, the expression could differ as "Republic of China" and "People's Republic of China," opposing Taiwan's independence and warning of the risks of war. Lai Ching-te, like his predecessor President Tsai Ing-wen, views "One China" as equivalent to "One Country, Two Systems" and does not accept it. The KMT criticized Lai's stance as favoring Taiwan independence and provoking military conflict, while Lai criticized the KMT's approach as capitulation to China. Ko Wen-je's position was more ambiguous. Regarding cross-strait economic relations, Lai emphasized that the economy is strongly linked to national security and argued that Taiwan should decouple from its dependence on China and strengthen economic ties with democratic nations. The KMT, on the other hand, favored strengthening economic ties with mainland China. However, Hou Yu-ih's stance showed a relatively greater emphasis on the importance of Taiwan's sovereignty and democratic institutions compared to KMT candidates in previous elections, expressing a degree of distrust towards Beijing.

Conclusion

The main theme of the 2024 Taiwanese elections was the China threat and the strategies employed by each party to leverage it. This is a topic intertwined with concerns about the survival and qualitative decline of democracy. While each candidate pledged to strengthen relations with the U.S., enhance Taiwan's defense capabilities, and maintain the status quo, discussions on the survival of democracy were insufficient. However, monitoring Chinese interference and cooperating with democratic nations remain important tasks. Meanwhile, attempts to politically exploit existential threats raise further concerns about Taiwan's democracy. The new government faces the significant challenge of harmonizing the dual objectives of ensuring national security and protecting democratic principles.

As a divided government, the Lai Ching-te administration must contend with opposition parties holding a majority in the Legislative Yuan. While it may pursue issue-by-issue coalitions with parties in the legislature to form a majority, compromise on policies will be inevitable. Setting aside the fact that three-quarters of all legislators are required for constitutional amendments, it will be difficult for the DPP to push through independence-seeking policies when the KMT and TPP are not favorable to Taiwan's independence. However, for laws concerning socioeconomic issues, there is room for inter-party cooperation, as seen during the DPP's Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-2008). ■

References

Central Broadcasting Station. 2023. “China Invites Neighborhood Representatives, Prosecutors have acquired intelligence and are currently conducting investigations.” [中國招待北市里長涉介選 檢方掌握情資偵辦中] December 4. https://www.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2188599 (Accessed January 28, 2024)

Central News Agency. 2024. “Wrong Translation of National Missile Raid Alert Department of Defense Apologizes.” [國家級警報衛星誤譯成飛彈 國防部致歉] January 9. https://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/202401095003.aspx (Accessed January 28, 2024)

Kung, William. 2019. “Neighborhood Representative: How China Factor Penetrates Taiwan’s Local Communities” [從「雙棲里長」到「里長組黨」，中國因素如何深入台灣選舉基層？] The Reporter. December 13. https://www.twreporter.org/a/2020-election-chief-of-village-party-united-front-china (Accessed January 28, 2024)

Wang, Austin Horng-En. 2024. “2024 Presidential Election: The Two Major Parties that Are Trapped, the Third Option Rises with Concern.” [王宏恩／2024總統大選：走不出去的兩大黨、崛起但有隱憂的第三選擇]. The Reporter. January 14. https://www.twreporter.org/a/2024-election-wang-austin-horng-en-view (Accessed January 28, 2024)

Wu, Chin-en. 2023. “Taiwan’s Civic Space Threatened by Chinese Misinformation and the Government’s Worrisome Legislative Responses.” ADRN Issue Briefing. February 10. http://adrnresearch.org/publications/list.php?idx=294 (Accessed January 28, 2024)

■ Chin-en Wu, Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica.

■ Editor: Park Han-sooEAI Research Fellow

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