[Global NK Commentary] The Possibility of Conventional Military Conflict on the Korean Peninsula and Crisis Management Measures

The crisis on the Korean Peninsula, despite numerous localized provocations by North Korea, has primarily focused on the threat of nuclear weapons and WMDs due to the advancement of North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, through the first and second nuclear crises. However, the war in Ukraine and Hamas's surprise attack on Israel prompt a reconsideration of the nature of crises on the Korean Peninsula. Russia, which focused on modernizing its strategic weapons, found itself short of conventional artillery shells during the Ukraine war and purchased North Korea's older conventional weapons, indicating it could not find an exit strategy from the quagmire of the Ukraine war. Meanwhile, Israel, despite deploying the Iron Dome, its state-of-the-art rocket interception and defense system since 2011,[1]was helpless against Hamas's surprise attack of approximately 7,000 rockets. Israel aims to achieve its military objectives by deploying ground troops into the Gaza Strip with the goal of completely eliminating (or neutralizing) Hamas, but it is currently unable to find a desirable exit strategy due to the immense civilian casualties.

The situations in Europe and the Middle East are not distant tales of war and armed conflict unrelated to the Korean Peninsula. First, North Korea's potential for a preemptive attack on the South, its tactics, and its weaponry have already been demonstrated through the Ukraine war and the Hamas attack. North Korea is not only providing conventional weapons to Russia during the Ukraine war but also cannot be ruled out from providing new multiple rocket launchers or missiles (Murphy 2023/10/15; Han Doh-hyung 2023/10/25). Furthermore, the rockets used by Hamas in its attack on Israel and its preemptive tactics are directly or indirectly linked to North Korea. Evidence has emerged that Hamas used North Korean weapons, including the North Korean-made F-7 rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG), in its attack on Israel. Moreover, Hamas's preemptive attack tactics are similar to North Korean tactics, raising concerns and interest in the types and possibilities of North Korea's preemptive provocations against the South (Kim et al. 2023/10/19; JoongAng Ilbo 2023/12).

Second, Russia, Hamas, and Iran, which has supplied weapons to Hamas, are all countries with which North Korea has emphasized strategic solidarity in an anti-US front. Hamas's attack on Israel not only creates a favorable strategic environment for Russia but also has the potential to develop into Arab solidarity against Israel and an anti-US front, given the spread of disinformation from Gaza and Israel's counterattack. North Korea may also seek to foster an anti-US alliance extending from Northeast Asia to Europe and the Middle East through tension escalation or armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, as it might misjudge the expansion of an anti-US alliance as an expansion of its own strategic space.

Third, North Korea's abrogation of the September 19 Military Agreement. On November 21, North Korea launched its third military reconnaissance satellite, following failures in its first attempt in May and second in August, despite international opposition. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had issued a final warning on November 20, urging North Korea to cease its satellite launch and stating that necessary measures, including the partial suspension of the September 19 Military Agreement, would be taken in response. However, North Korea launched the Chollima-1 carrying the Malligyong-1 the following day. In response, the Ministry of National Defense suspended only the effect of Article 1, Paragraph 3 (no-fly zone) of the September 19 Military Agreement and resumed surveillance and reconnaissance activities near the Military Demarcation Line (MDL). The next day, North Korea effectively declared its complete abrogation by stating it would "immediately restore all military measures that were suspended in accordance with the agreement" (<KCNA> 2023/11/23). It further stated that it would "deploy more powerful armed forces and new military equipment to the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) area." The day after declaring the complete abrogation of the September 19 Agreement, North Korea began restoring the 11 guard posts (GPs) that had been dismantled in the demilitarized zone in 2018 and is pursuing the remilitarization of the JSA by allowing its personnel to carry pistols. Following the abrogation of the September 19 Agreement, both North and South Korea are rapidly restoring the situation prior to the agreement and strengthening their response postures.

These three characteristics serve as a stark reminder that crises ranging from conventional military conflict to nuclear escalation on the Korean Peninsula could occur at any time due to North Korea's multidimensional attack patterns and preemptive strikes. Since the 8th Party Congress in 2021, North Korea has pursued the "completion of the great cause of nuclear armament" by enhancing its tactical nuclear capabilities, urging the early achievement of five major strategic weapons, and has dramatically advanced the standardization and diversification of warheads, delivery systems, and fuels. Furthermore, considering the new short-range, medium-range, and long-range ballistic and cruise missiles North Korea has test-fired since the 8th Party Congress, its rapid transition from liquid to liquid-ampoule and solid-fuel-based missiles, its artillery-centric policy demonstrated through combined firing drills of long-range artillery, super-large multiple rocket launchers, and new ballistic missiles, and its strengthening of anti-South Korea hostile policies, it can be concluded that North Korea's preemptive strike capabilities have been further enhanced.

However, in response to North Korea's actions, South Korea and the United States have rapidly shifted to proactive defense policies focused on strengthening the implementation of extended deterrence, such as establishing the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG) to enhance nuclear response planning and operations, and revising the Tailored Deterrence Strategy (TDS) for the first time in a decade (Ministry of National Defense 2023). South Korea and the United States are enhancing their capabilities in all areas of planning, operation, exercises, and readiness under the revised TDS. In other words, from deterrence to response against North Korean nuclear attacks, South Korea and the United States are actively seeking to block North Korea's nuclear coercion through the planning, operation, and exercise of Conventional-Nuclear Integration (CNI).

Therefore, following the abrogation of the September 19 Agreement, North Korea will likely further escalate the 'strong against strong' confrontation to test the response posture of South Korea and the United States. In particular, it is highly probable that North Korea will carry out provocations that materialize the costs of abrogating the September 19 inter-Korean military agreement, such as the armament of the demilitarized zone and the destruction of the West Sea Peace Zone. For example, North Korea could conduct provocations under the guise of live-fire exercises during the restoration of GPs in the MDL area and the deployment of new weapons to the front lines, and it is also possible that it may attempt measures to undermine the NLL maritime boundary, such as maritime live-fire exercises in the West Sea NLL area. Furthermore, it could pursue gray-zone provocations such as incursions by drones with ambiguous identification friend or foe (IFF) in the air or underwater torpedo attacks beneath the sea.

Through such provocations, North Korea will seek to increase mutual uncertainty and vulnerability on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, to neutralize North Korea's offensive strategic and tactical intentions and actions, South Korea must first closely monitor the movements of the North Korean military and enhance the authority delegation and readiness posture to enable field commanders to respond immediately, thereby increasing North Korea's vulnerability. Simultaneously, it is necessary to emphasize that South Korea is prepared to discuss measures to reduce uncertainty at any time if North Korea wishes to de-escalate the crisis.

References

Ministry of National Defense. 2023. “Joint Communiqué of the 55th ROK-US Security Consultative Meeting.” November 13. https://www.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20231113098300504

<KCNA>. 2023, “Ministry of National Defense of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.” November 23.

JoongAng Ilbo. 2023. “Hamas Used North Korean-Made Rocket-Propelled Grenade Launchers… South Korean Government Should Impose Sanctions.” Exclusive Interview. Monthly JoongAng. December 8. https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/25213283#home

Han Doh-hyung. 2023. “North Korea Has Been Mass-Producing Weapons for Russia for a Year.” Radio Free Asia. October 25. https://www.rfa.org/korean/in_focus/nk_nuclear_talks/armsproduce-10252023084739.html

Kim et al. 2023. “Evidence shows Hamas militants likely used some North Korean weapons in attack on Israel.” AP News. October 19. https://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-north-korea-weapons-703e33663ea299f920d0d14039adfbb8

Murphy, Matt. 2023. “US Detects Signs of North Korean Military Equipment Support to Russia... ‘1,000 Containers Worth’ (Translated).” BBC News Korea. October 15. https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c2j915x8p3no

[1]The 'Iron Dome,' with an average interception rate of 90%, currently operates with 10 batteries. Each battery has 3-4 launchers, and each launcher can fire up to 20 interceptor missiles. Theoretically, it can launch 600-800 interceptor missiles at once, and with a 90% interception rate, it can intercept 500-700 enemy missiles. Therefore, the interception capacity of the Iron Dome is inevitably limited against surprise saturation attacks of thousands of rockets at once.

■ Contact and Editing: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr