[Global NK Commentary] Denuclearization and Humanization of the North Korean Nuclear Issue

North Korea's nuclear capabilities have rapidly advanced. Following a total of six nuclear tests and the declaration of nuclear force completion in 2017, it has not ceased to enhance its nuclear capabilities in terms of both quality and quantity. North Korea's nuclear buildup is proceeding according to its roadmap since the 8th Party Congress in January 2021. Even as we speak, the Yongbyon nuclear reactor, capable of producing plutonium, is in operation, and centrifuges are spinning somewhere, increasing the stockpile of highly enriched uranium. Various new types of missiles, capable of serving as delivery vehicles for intercontinental ballistic missiles as well as nuclear warheads, are being unveiled.

It is difficult to pinpoint a single intention behind North Korea's continuous strengthening of its nuclear arsenal, but it is a calculated rational choice made from diplomatic, military, and internal perspectives. Diplomatically, it can be viewed as coercive diplomacy aimed at extracting sanctions relief or concessions from the United States. Militarily, it serves to deter and neutralize military threats from the US, South Korea, and others. By developing various missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, North Korea is expanding the spectrum of its nuclear operational strategy, from strategic retaliatory deterrence targeting the US mainland to operational and tactical denial deterrence in the Korean Peninsula and the region.

From an internal regime perspective, the intention to alleviate the security concerns of the North Korean populace through nuclear capabilities, thereby creating conditions for them to focus more on economic activities, is also significant. The greatest fear for the Kim Jong Un regime may not be South Korea or the United States, but a change in consciousness among the North Korean people. The formalization of 'people-centeredness' as the basic political method of socialism in the Party's charter is not unrelated to this. In the Kim Jong Un era, North Korea, while focusing on economic development, finds it inevitable to maintain and strengthen its military power in the face of external security concerns. North Korea is evolving towards 'Byungjin Line 2.0,' based on its nuclear capabilities, to simultaneously achieve economic development and security by resolving security concerns through defense strengthening. Nuclear capabilities are a necessary and sufficient condition for building a strong socialist nation and a prosperous homeland.

Recent actions by North Korea to strengthen its nuclear and military capabilities are intertwined with the political situation in South Korea, leading to a reciprocal military response without compromise. North Korea attributes its nuclear buildup to the United States and South Korea, thereby establishing justification and legitimacy for its military actions and making it clear that it has no intention of backing down. The current South Korean government defines North Korea's nuclear buildup and military actions, such as the development of new weapons, as clear military provocations and is prioritizing military responses, vowing to protect peace through strength based on the ROK-US alliance. The United States also dismisses North Korea's nuclear buildup as a ploy to draw the US into dialogue or gain concessions, and is using it as justification for strengthening ROK-US-Japan military cooperation and revitalizing the UN Command.

This is not to say that a military response to the North Korean nuclear issue is meaningless or unnecessary. However, under a re-globalized international order, it is questionable how effective Western-centric pressure on North Korea will be, based on the strengthening of ROK-US-Japan military cooperation led by the United States. Since the breakdown of North Korea-US talks in Hanoi in 2019, North Korea no longer appears to be expecting concessions from the US, such as North Korea-US dialogue or sanctions relief. In the context of a renewed bipolar Cold War structure, North Korea seems poised to actively utilize its nuclear capabilities to expand its strategic autonomy for independent diplomacy, while showing a leaning towards China and Russia by leveraging the intensifying US-China competition and the situation in Ukraine. Perhaps denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is no longer a feasible, realistic term.

In a situation where military tensions are escalating on the Korean Peninsula and the risk of accidental armed conflict is increasing, the future of the Korean Peninsula is unpredictable. If we insist solely on politically convenient military responses due to a lack of understanding of North Korea's intentions, the Korean Peninsula is likely to fall into a cycle of escalating military tensions, crises, arms races, and security dilemmas. Maintaining peace solely through alliances and strength does not lead to denuclearization; rather, it breeds crises related to the North Korean nuclear issue and could escalate into a nuclear war crisis. We must recognize that both South Korea, with its conventional military power ranked sixth globally and an annual defense budget nearing 60 trillion won, and North Korea, possessing nuclear weapons, have more than enough military power to completely destroy each other. Attempting to evade the risks of the North Korean nuclear issue through military solutions alone cannot be considered a bold response, nor can it achieve denuclearization. We are choosing the easiest and most convenient response without careful consideration, due to a lack of understanding of North Korea and a lack of strategy. The resulting crises and fear will be borne by the public. Before discussing denuclearization, we need proactive and unilateral adjustments and strategic choices to stably manage the risks of the North Korean nuclear issue.

North Korea has made it clear that nuclear weapons no longer hold any exchange equivalence. It has not accepted the parallel pursuit of denuclearization and a peace regime. To resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, an 'exchange' commensurate with mutual levels must occur, rather than 'equivalence' or 'sequencing.' If we aim to eliminate the threat we face from North Korea's nuclear weapons, the threat faced by North Korea must also be eliminated. To eliminate past nuclear threats, such as the warheads and fissile materials North Korea has already produced, there is a dilemma and unreality in having to resolve North Korea's future security concerns. Rather than advocating for unrealistic denuclearization, 'denuclearization of obsolescence'—a situation where nuclear weapons are not used and become unnecessary, based on stable and sustainable peace—is a realistic alternative. To create a situation where North Korea has no reason or need to use its nuclear weapons, we need to seek alternatives that focus on the human dimension beyond national security. This is the 'humanization' of the North Korean nuclear issue.

It is incorrect to definitively state that North Korea will never use nuclear weapons. In September last year, North Korea specified the conditions for preemptive and retaliatory use of nuclear weapons in its new nuclear doctrine. While North Korea assesses the situation and decides whether or not to use nuclear weapons, the question for us is how to prevent North Korea from using them. Furthermore, the North Korean nuclear issue poses risks beyond the mere possibility of military use. The 'humanization' of the North Korean nuclear issue involves an approach that considers not only the military and security implications of North Korea's nuclear buildup on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia, but also human rights, including principles of human, environmental, climatic, economic, social, and cultural well-being. Whether North Korea's nuclear weapons become instruments of desperation or despair depends on our understanding of North Korea's actions and a shift in our perception of the risks they pose to us, not just to North Korea. The window of opportunity for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains open.

■ Kim Dong-yup_Professor of Military Security, Graduate School of North Korean Studies. Director of the Center for North Korean Nuclear Studies at the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Kyungnam University.

■ Editor:Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

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