[Global NK Commentary] Analysis of the North Korea-Russia Summit Outcomes

The North Korea-Russia summit held at Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome on September 13, 2023, was a significant event that captured global attention. While the absence of a post-summit press conference, joint statement, or agreement makes it difficult to ascertain the specific details, the format and duration of the summit, along with Kim Jong Un's subsequent itinerary in Russia, clearly indicate that this visit differs markedly from his 2019 trip. It is undeniably clear that the North Korea-Russia relationship will become even closer as a result of this summit.

Firstly, the choice of the Vostochny Cosmodrome in Russia's Far East as the summit venue symbolically signifies that future North Korea-Russia relations will move towards cooperation in the space sector. Experts have already pointed out that North Korea is accelerating its space development, particularly its militarization of space. Previously, North Korea pursued space development independently without cooperation from leading space-faring nations, thus facing limitations in realizing its space programs, such as satellite development, with its indigenous technology (Jang Cheol-woon 2023). However, with Russia's cooperation in North Korea's space development, North Korea now has the potential to overcome its technological limitations and realize its space program in a shorter timeframe. This is also expected to significantly contribute to the improvement of North Korea's rocket technology, inevitably increasing the security threats posed by North Korea.

Meanwhile, Kim Jong Un also held a meeting with Russian Defense Minister Shoigu and inspected missile systems such as the Kalibr cruise missile system and Uran anti-ship missile system aboard the Marshal Shaposhnikov frigate (TASS 2023a). This aligns with President Putin's statement that Russia would "discuss all issues, including military-technical cooperation, with North Korea" (BBC 2023). In other words, North Korea and Russia have publicly declared their intention to pursue military-technical cooperation.

In addition, the North Korean delegation reportedly discussed cooperation with the Russian side in agriculture, transport infrastructure, and services. As a follow-up measure, the intergovernmental committees of North Korea and Russia are scheduled to meet in Pyongyang in November to discuss specific plans (TASS 2023b). It is anticipated that the intergovernmental consultations between North Korea and Russia will not remain merely on paper.

Based on these developments alone, North Korea and Russia have moved in the opposite direction of the diplomatic policy pursued by the South Korean government. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between South Korea and Russia in 1990, the South Korean government has sought to prevent closer ties between Russia and North Korea by developing bilateral relations with Russia. Furthermore, it aimed to utilize Russia in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue by emphasizing the security threats posed by North Korea's nuclear development in East Asia. Indeed, Russia participated in the Six-Party Talks and joined in sanctions against North Korea during its nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches. However, future North Korea-Russia relations have entered a phase where these policies are no longer effective.

The rapprochement between North Korea and Russia is undeniably due to the shifts in the international landscape caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. In fact, prior to that, the relationship between North Korea and Russia was not as close as commonly speculated. During the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, the borders between the two countries were almost completely sealed, with minimal trade and people-to-people exchanges. Moreover, as evident from Kim Jong Un's visit to Vladivostok in 2019, Russia did not readily provide what North Korea desired. The only significant instance was Russia's provision of 50,000 tons of wheat to North Korea in 2020 under the guise of humanitarian aid (TASS 2023c).

Then why did Russia abruptly change its stance towards North Korea? The common explanation is that Russia, facing depleted munitions due to the prolonged war, had no choice but to concede to North Korea's various demands in exchange for military supplies. Some speculate that since Russia has temporarily enlisted North Korea's support, it may not honor its promises to North Korea once the demand for weapons decreases after the war ends. Others predict that the grand military-technical support, as publicly presented, will not actually materialize.

However, it is important not to overlook the fact that if the supply of weapons from North Korea was the primary reason, Russia could have pursued arms deals quietly without engaging in such a conspicuous summit in Vostochny. It is well-known that Russia uses Iranian drones, but there was no elaborate diplomatic event between Russia and Iran comparable to this summit. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that this summit carries a meaning or signal that goes beyond a mere arms deal.

Viewing the North Korea-Russia summit not merely within the bilateral relationship but on a broader geopolitical chessboard reveals its hidden implications. The Vostochny summit is naturally linked to the US-South Korea-Japan summit held just a month prior, in August, at Camp David. In essence, the North Korea-Russia summit is Russia's response to the US-South Korea-Japan summit. Russia's message is clear: if US-South Korea-Japan cooperation, targeting Russia and China in East Asia, intensifies and evolves into a (quasi-)military alliance, Russia will take corresponding measures. This means proceeding with assistance for North Korea's space and military development and strengthening North Korea-Russia military cooperation. From Russia's perspective, it had previously maintained distance from North Korea out of respect for bilateral relations with South Korea and international norms such as non-proliferation. However, it is now actively signaling that if South Korea, in particular, actively participates in anti-Russia (and anti-China) alliances, Russia will reconsider its position.

A new Cold War structure, characterized by the sharp confrontation between the US-South Korea-Japan bloc and the North Korea-China-Russia bloc surrounding the Korean Peninsula, is now unfolding before our eyes. We should not feel relieved simply because this was not a trilateral summit among North Korea, China, and Russia. It appears that Russia and China engaged in close consultations prior to the North Korea-Russia summit. Indeed, since August, Russian and Chinese embassies in Seoul and Pyongyang have held continuous meetings to discuss the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, there is no need to assume that China is inwardly displeased with this North Korea-Russia summit due to competition for influence over North Korea. This is not the time to leisurely discuss Sino-Russian competition. Amidst strengthening trilateral cooperation among the US, South Korea, and Japan, China and Russia must solidify their own relations, along with North Korea, to establish a balance of power against the US-South Korea-Japan axis.

In conclusion, the North Korea-Russia summit can be assessed as an event that is causing significant changes not only in the bilateral relationship between North Korea and Russia but also in the East Asian balance of power. The possibility of arms deals and military cooperation between North Korea and Russia has significantly increased, as widely feared, and a tangible North Korea-China-Russia triangle is forming to counter the US-South Korea-Japan bloc. Considering that the structural cause of the outbreak of World War I lay in the confrontation between the Triple Entente of Britain, France, and Russia, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy, it is no exaggeration to say that we are being drawn into a very dangerous world. This is a time when wise diplomacy is desperately needed. 

References

Jang Cheol-woon. 2023. “North Korea's Space Development: The Gap Between Ideals and Reality.” Global NK Zoom & Connect. May 22.https://eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=21927&board=kor_issuebriefing

BBC News Korea. 2023. “Kim Jong Un and Putin Meet for the First Time in Four Years; Russia to 'Help North Korea Develop Satellites’.” September 13.https://www.bbc.com/korean/articles/c03j28nkl1no

TASS. 2023a. “Kim Jong Un, Shoigu Discuss Military Cooperation, International Affairs.” September 17.https://tass.com/world/1675931

TASS. 2023b. “Russia’s Delegation Discusses Agriculture, Transport Issues with Kim Jong Un.” September 17.https://tass.com/world/1676069

TASS. 2023c. “Russia Ready to Offer Food Assistance to North Korea –Russian Ambassador.” September 18.https://tass.com/politics/1676147

■ Kang Yoon-hee, Professor of Eurasian Studies, Kookmin University.

■ Editor:Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Contact: 82-2-2277-1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr