[EAI Issue Brief] 'Dislike China, but Sino-Korean Relations are Important': What is the Direction of South Korea's China Policy?

I. Concerns and Vigilance Regarding China's Rising Coercion

In the 2023 survey, South Koreans' negative perception of China remained very high at 71.9% ([Figure 1]). Notably, the proportion of respondents who answered 'not good' increased to 20.6% compared to 2022 (17.8%) ([Figure 2]). The primary reason for this negative perception, although decreasing by 8.9 percentage points from 2022 (67.9%), was still China's coercive actions, such as the THAAD retaliation, cited by 59% of respondents ([Figure 3]). Despite the THAAD retaliation occurring seven years ago, it continues to strongly influence South Koreans' perceptions. This indicates that China's excessive retaliatory measures against the THAAD deployment were a unique and shocking event that clearly manifested anti-China sentiment among South Koreans. Furthermore, the response that China does not respect South Korea increased by 9.1 percentage points to 47.6% compared to 2022 (38.5%). Conversely, the perception of China as a military threat was the lowest at 8.7%, a decrease of 3.6 percentage points from 2022 (12.3%).

In summary, while South Koreans do not perceive the rising China as a direct military threat, they view it as a country that does not respect South Korea and acts coercively, leading to negative impressions. Tracking public opinion surveys over a long period reveals that South Koreans began to perceive China negatively as its rise accelerated and it began to assert its great power status in the 2000s (Lee Dong-ryul 2023). The THAAD dispute in 2016 served as a catalyst for South Koreans to confirm China's coercive actions as a rising power and further intensify existing negative perceptions.

Negative sentiment towards China among South Koreans is high across all age groups and ideological spectrums. For instance, not only conservatives (75.7%) but also progressives (66.5%) perceive China negatively. South Koreans in their 20s exhibit the highest negative sentiment at 76%, while even the 60+ age group, which shows the lowest negative sentiment, registers 67.8%.[1]In essence, the negative perception of China among South Koreans is underpinned by concerns and vigilance regarding the structural changes brought about by China's rise, making it difficult to improve in the foreseeable future.

[Figure 1] Perception of China (2019-2023)

[Figure 2] Perception of China

[Figure 3] Reasons for Negative Perception of China

II. Sino-Korean Relations: An Important Relationship That Needs Improvement

The proportion of respondents who view Sino-Korean relations as 'bad' increased by 15 percentage points to 52.6% in 2023, up from 37.6% in 2022 ([Figure 4]). However, regarding the future outlook of Sino-Korean relations, the proportion of those who believe relations will improve increased by 9.5 percentage points to 28.3% compared to 2022 (18.8%). Notably, the response that 'Sino-Korean relations are important' was very high at 81.8%, despite negative perceptions of China ([Figure 5]). Although this is a decrease from 2020 (94%), it remains comparably high to the response that 'ROK-US relations are important' (88.9%). Furthermore, Sino-Korean relations are ranked as the second most important foreign relationship for the South Korean government, after ROK-US relations (74.8%), with 48.1% of respondents selecting it ([Figure 6]). This represents an increase of 22 percentage points compared to 2021, surpassing the importance attributed to inter-Korean relations (40.8%) and ROK-Japan relations (17.4%).

This indicates that South Koreans, while disliking China, pragmatically judge that Sino-Korean relations are important and therefore need improvement. The reasons for considering cooperation with China still important can be interpreted from the survey results in two aspects.

First, expectations for economic cooperation with China remain. While China is perceived more as a competitor (57.6%) than a complementary economic partner (24.6%), the response that China offers significant economic opportunities as a vast market increased by 12.7 percentage points to 77.2% in 2023 compared to 2022 (64.5%) ([Figure 7]).

Second, the increase in the perceived importance of Sino-Korean relations appears to be linked to a shift in the perception of the most significant threats facing South Korea. In 2022, the primary threats were ranked as trade and high-tech competition and friction among major powers (60.8%), US-China strategic competition and conflict (54.8%), and North Korea's nuclear and missile threats (44.4%). However, in 2023, North Korea's nuclear and missile threats rose to first place (56.3%), while US-China strategic competition and conflict decreased significantly by 18.5 percentage points to 36.3% ([Figure 8]). The heightened perception of the North Korean threat has led to an 11.5 percentage point increase in the ROK-US alliance strengthening as a top foreign policy priority compared to the previous year, and a 4.5 percentage point increase in strengthening cooperation with China, from 17.8% to 22.3% ([Figure 9]). As North Korean provocations continue, the necessity of China's role is being re-emphasized.

[Figure 4] Current Sino-Korean Relations

[Figure 5] Importance of Sino-Korean Relations

[Figure 6] Most Important Diplomatic Relations for the Government

[Figure 7] Reasons for Positive Perception of China

[Figure 8] The Biggest Threat Facing South Korea

[Figure 9] Government's Top Foreign Policy Priorities

III. Dynamics of the ROK-US Alliance and Sino-Korean Relations

While the perception of China as a military threat is low, respondents are generally positive about deterring China through the ROK-US alliance. For example, 69.3% of respondents agree that the ROK-US alliance guarantees South Korea's security against Chinese aggression or pressure ([Figure 10]). Even among progressives, 60.8% agree. The role of US Forces Korea in responding to China ranks third among the functions of the USFK, at 47.3%, following the defense of South Korea (62.2%) and maintaining peace in the East Asian region (56.6%). Notably, the proportion of respondents advocating for South Korea to remain neutral in the event of US-China conflict has decreased from 77.4% (2020) to 50.3% (2023), while the proportion supporting alignment with the US has increased from 19.4% (2020) to 45.2% (2023) ([Figure 11]).

However, South Korea seeks caution when participating in deterring China through the ROK-US alliance, depending on the issue. For instance, more respondents oppose (56.5%) than support (43.5%) South Korea's involvement in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait ([Figure 12]). Regarding participation in a joint stance against human rights abuses in China's Xinjiang Uyghur region, support (52.4%) is slightly higher than opposition (47.6%), indicating a cautious approach. Conversely, support (60%) is higher than opposition (40%) for joining policies that strongly deter China in advanced technologies such as semiconductors.

In conclusion, although the public does not view China as a direct military threat, they show an inclination to support the US and deter China's challenges in the context of US-China power competition. Simultaneously, they express concern about excessively provoking China on security-sensitive issues like the Taiwan issue, which could exacerbate South Korea's security anxieties or worsen Sino-Korean relations.

[Figure 10] Opinion on the ROK-US Alliance

[Figure 11] South Korea's Stance in US-China Conflict

[Figure 12] Opinion on the ROK-US Alliance and South Korea's Role

IV. Challenges in China Diplomacy: Economy, North Korean Nuclear Issue, and Mutual Perception Improvement

The public opinion indicating a dislike for China but acknowledging its importance and the need for cooperation suggests that South Korea's China diplomacy faces a complex and challenging situation. Nevertheless, public opinion clearly presents the tasks and priorities for China diplomacy. The priorities for China diplomacy are ranked as follows: first, responding to economic sanctions (28%); second, economic and high-tech cooperation with China (23.1%); third, policy coordination for North Korean denuclearization (19.8%); and fourth, improving mutual perceptions between the two nations (18.8%) ([Figure 13]). This confirms that economic cooperation and the North Korean nuclear issue remain important priorities in China diplomacy.

In conclusion, the negative sentiment towards China among South Koreans is heightened by structural factors such as China's rapid rise, intensifying international power competition including US-China conflict, and the geopolitical sensitivities inherent in being neighboring countries. This sentiment risks becoming entrenched and prolonged, potentially extending to future generations. However, despite this high negative sentiment, there is a shared recognition that Sino-Korean relations remain important for economic and geopolitical reasons and thus need to be improved.

In other words, despite the strong negative sentiment towards China, a pragmatic perspective suggests that Sino-Korean relations should be managed in a more stable and cooperative manner than at present for the sake of South Korea's national interests. Given the unavoidable reality of close proximity and the extensive human and material exchanges between South Korea and China, it is necessary to proactively manage bilateral relations to prevent them from falling into a vicious cycle of chronic conflict. Both countries must confront the serious structural challenges they face and exercise restraint from succumbing to the temptation of unproductive emotional confrontation. A multi-layered dialogue channel is urgently needed to find solutions for coexistence while managing conflicts and crises between neighboring South Korea and China. ■

[Figure 13] Issues to Prioritize in China Diplomacy

References

Lee Dong-ryul. 2023. “Changes in Mutual Perceptions between South Korea and China and Implications for ROK-Japan Relations.” EAI Working Paper Series on Future Vision for ROK-Japan Cooperation ⑪. 3-4. https://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/pub/view.asp?intSeq=21822(Accessed: September 27, 2023)

[1]The survey results showed the lowest negative sentiment among teenagers at 64.3%, but respondents aged 18-19 were limited to a sample size of 14, so they were excluded.

■ Lee Dong-ryul_Professor of Chinese Studies at Dongduk Women's University and Director of the EAI China Studies Center. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the School of International Studies at Peking University and has served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy Advisory Committee, and a member of the ROK-China Future Development Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and ethnic minority issues. Recent publications include "A Case Study of ROK-China Diplomatic Negotiations in the 1980s," "The Origins and 21st Century Transition of Geoeconomics (co-authored)," "South Korea's Foreign Relations and Diplomatic History (Modern Volume 3) (co-authored)," "China's Strategy and Role in the Korean Peninsula Denuclearization and Peace Process," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," and "A Geoeconomic Approach to Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Initiative and its Geopolitical Dilemmas."

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Han-soo_EAI Researcher

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