[Global NK Commentary] Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration

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The Washington Declaration and Strengthening Extended Deterrence Capabilities

The adoption of the 'Washington Declaration' during the ROK-U.S. summit in April, coinciding with the 70th anniversary of the ROK-U.S. alliance, appears to have somewhat alleviated the anxiety of the South Korean public regarding North Korea's advancing nuclear capabilities. President Yoon Suk-yeol emphasized 'peace through strength,' stating that peace based on the goodwill of the other party is false, and maintained the stance that the possibility of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons cannot be ruled out. The Washington Declaration can be seen as an enhancement of extended deterrence capabilities reflecting President Yoon's perception and stance. This seems to be based on the recognition that past denuclearization efforts have failed and that North Korea is unlikely to engage in denuclearization talks in the near future.

The agreement at the ROK-U.S. summit to establish a vice-ministerial level 'Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG)' and expand the deployment of U.S. strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula has achieved a 'balance of terror' commensurate with the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities. With the establishment of the NCG and the joint exercise of wartime operational control by South Korea and the United States, the 'ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty' signed on October 1, 1953, can be considered to have been upgraded to a new level.

Through the Washington Declaration, the United States achieved the outcome of suppressing South Korea's intention to develop its own nuclear weapons and maintaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime, while South Korea gained the benefit of enhancing the execution capabilities of extended deterrence to deter North Korea's nuclear threats. However, this does not provide a fundamental solution to prevent the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities beyond a balance of terror.

North Korea justifies its nuclear development by citing the hostile relationship with the United States and frames its nuclear weapons development as a means of 'war deterrence.' The ROK and the U.S. are countering this with a balance of terror strategy, aiming to deter North Korea's use of nuclear weapons through 'extended deterrence.' South Korea has advocated for 'peace through strength,' and the United States has warned that if North Korea uses nuclear weapons, 'the Kim Jong Un regime will face its end.' In response, North Korea has claimed that the 'Washington Declaration' is 'a concentrated product of the extremely hostile policy toward the DPRK' and asserted that 'such dangerous nuclear war provocations will never be tolerated and will certainly come at a high price' (KCNA, April 30, 2023).

The Balance of Terror Between Extended Deterrence and War Deterrence

Although the Korean Peninsula, having achieved a balance of terror with the Washington Declaration, has entered a period of détente, it is difficult to predict when or what kind of unexpected variables may emerge. North Korea, having established a principle of strong response to strong actions, is expected to determine the level of its response based on the actions of the ROK and the U.S. Since the Kim Il Sung era, North Korea has consistently stated that 'rice is socialism.' It argues that as long as its rice bowls are full, it can withstand a protracted war with the U.S. Currently, North Korea is focusing on increasing food production according to the party's strategic directives during the farming season and is refraining from provocations.

If North Korea's pursuit of 'war deterrence through nuclear weapons' and the ROK-U.S. effort to achieve a 'balance of terror through enhanced extended deterrence capabilities' continue on parallel paths, a head-on confrontation between North Korea and the U.S. and a severance of inter-Korean relations will inevitably be prolonged. In the absence of dialogue and contact between North Korea and the U.S., and between the two Koreas, there is a possibility that any incident, whether a deliberate provocation by North Korea or an accidental event, could escalate into a wider conflict.

Since the Biden administration took office, the U.S. has advocated a 'calibrated, practical approach' and waited for North Korea's response. However, North Korea, believing that the U.S. is not interested in resolving 'fundamental issues' such as ending the hostile relationship, has focused on advancing its nuclear capabilities. Despite this situation, the U.S. is concentrating on strengthening extended deterrence without showing any moves to restore dialogue. It is also true that the intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition and the protracted war in Ukraine have relegated the Korean Peninsula issue to a lower priority for the United States.

Inter-Korean relations have also become strained since the Hanoi no-deal summit. Last year, inter-Korean relations completely severed, with not a single instance of personnel or material exchange. The Kaesong North-South Joint Liaison Office was blown up on June 16, 2020, and currently, both military communication lines and inter-Korean communication lines are severed. Inter-Korean relations have become so distant that Vice Department Director Kim Yo Jong stated, 'It is our earnest wish that we could live without being conscious of each other' (KCNA, August 18, 2022).

Since the Hanoi no-deal summit, North Korea has rejected integration into the global capitalist economy and is focusing on self-reliance based on 'North Korea-centric principles,' proclaiming that 'a new era is dawning where the globe revolves around Korea' (Rodong Sinmun, December 21, 2022). North Korea assesses that the current global situation is transitioning into a 'new Cold War system with accelerating multipolar trends' and emphasizes the need to strengthen its national power accordingly (Rodong Sinmun, January 1, 2023).

Seeking a Solution to the North Korean Nuclear Issue Through the 'Bold Initiative'

To put it simply, the reason for the failure to curb the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities is likely that North Korea's will to possess nuclear weapons was stronger than the international community's efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation. Over the past 30 years, nearly every conceivable solution for the North Korean nuclear issue has been proposed. The solutions merely differ in strategic priorities and sequencing of exchanges.

South Korea's and the United States' approaches to North Korea, which have used economic cooperation and humanitarian aid as incentives while deferring 'fundamental issues' such as the transition from the armistice regime to a peace regime, the resolution of the North Korea-U.S. hostile relationship, and normalization of relations, have repeatedly stalled, reacting sensitively to the geopolitical situation. The approach to denuclearization through 'freeze for compensation,' also known as 'security-economy exchange,' which aimed to promote North Korean denuclearization by postponing negotiations on a peace regime, has failed due to North Korea's advancement of nuclear development.

North Korea's nuclear threat is a geopolitical risk for South Korea and the root cause of the constraint on its foreign policy autonomy. South Korea's emergence as a 'global pivotal state' is likely due to its advantageous utilization and leveraging of geopolitics. In the Cold War geopolitical structure, the U.S. led and North Korea acted as a spur; in the post-Cold War geopolitics, it achieved high growth by deepening labor division with China. However, from now on, the factors that have driven our development will act as challenges in the new geopolitical landscape.

With the full-scale intensification of U.S.-China strategic competition and the advancement of North Korea's nuclear capabilities, South Korea's policy autonomy is inevitably being constrained. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration, at a time of great transition in the reorganization of the world order, is strengthening its 'global cooperative partnership' with the U.S. and aligning itself with the U.S.-led Rules-Based Order (RBO) and the Indo-Pacific strategy. While the restoration of future-oriented ROK-Japan relations through the ROK-Japan summit and the strengthening of the ROK-U.S. alliance through the Washington Declaration have solidified the ROK-U.S.-Japan cooperative relationship based on 'values diplomacy,' relations with China and Russia have entered a phase of adjustment due to factors such as supply chain reorganization. China and Russia have also shown a lukewarm attitude during discussions at the UN Security Council regarding North Korea's long-range missile launches.

As North Korea declares South Korea as an 'obvious enemy' and shifts inter-Korean relations to a 'confrontational relationship,' while also mentioning the possibility of tactical nuclear use, voices within South Korean society calling for independent nuclear development, redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons, or nuclear sharing have not subsided.

The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has proposed 'resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through the Bold Initiative' as a solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. North Korea immediately rejected the Yoon Suk-yeol administration's 'security-economy exchange approach,' which offers economic infrastructure as compensation for denuclearization actions 'if North Korea returns to denuclearization negotiations with sincerity' (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022), perceiving it as a copy of the Lee Myung-bak administration's 'Denuclearization, Openness, 3000' policy (KCNA, August 18, 2022).

However, the South Korean government maintains its position that it will 'create an environment where North Korea voluntarily returns to denuclearization negotiations through a comprehensive approach that deters North Korea's nuclear threat centered on the ROK-U.S. alliance (Deterrence), dissuades nuclear development through sanctions and pressure (Dissuasion), and pursues denuclearization through diplomacy and dialogue (Diplomacy)' (Ministry of Unification, 2023, p. 8).

It will be difficult to find common ground, as North Korea insists on 'coexistence with nuclear weapons' while the South Korean government pursues 'peace and prosperity through denuclearization.' Given past experiences, it will be difficult to pursue denuclearization again with economic aid as an incentive. Ultimately, it will be necessary to establish a denuclearization-peace exchange process that includes issues related to regime security guarantees, which North Korea considers 'fundamental issues' (such as ROK-U.S. combined military exercises, the transition of the Armistice Agreement to a peace treaty, and the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations), and persuade North Korea.

The key to advancing the Bold Initiative lies in resolving the issue of how North Korea, as a nuclear-armed state, and the United States can pursue normalization of relations. Historically, the U.S. has pursued normalization of relations on the premise of North Korean denuclearization. If the U.S. pursues normalization of relations with a nuclear-armed North Korea, it faces the problem of having to acknowledge its nuclear status. If the U.S. acknowledges North Korea's nuclear weapons, it admits the failure of its denuclearization policy and exposes the limitations of its ability to prevent nuclear proliferation. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a sequence for the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations aimed at denuclearization and persuade North Korea. The Yoon Suk-yeol administration has expressed its willingness to provide diplomatic support for the normalization of North Korea-U.S. relations, and Japan is not opposed to normalizing relations with North Korea. Therefore, a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue mediated by the normalization of North Korea-U.S. and North Korea-Japan relations should be actively considered.

In preparation for scenarios where North Korea refuses to engage in denuclearization talks, cooperation between South Korea and the United States must continue to strengthen the three-axis system (Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR) and develop new weapon systems (hypersonic missiles, laser weapons capable of neutralizing nuclear weapons, weapons utilizing AI technology, etc.) that can neutralize North Korea's nuclear capabilities. ■

References

Rodong Sinmun. 2022. “The Great Kim Jong Un’s Korea Will Achieve Endless Victories—Regarding the Glorious Victories of 2022, a Milestone Year in the History of Our Republic: Part 1, A Defining Year in the 70-Plus Year Development Path of Our Nation.” December 21.

________. 2023. “The 6th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Central Committee of the Party.” January 1.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2022. “Bold Initiative.” November 21.

KCNA. 2022. “Do Not Dream a Futile Dream.” August 18.

____________. 2023. “Anatomy of the Dangerous Nuclear War Campaign.” April 30.

Ministry of Unification. 2023. *A Korean Peninsula of Denuclearization, Peace, and Prosperity: The Yoon Suk-yeol Administration's Unification and North Korea Policy*: 8.

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of “Tasks for North Korea Policy After the Washington Declaration.”

■ Koo Bon-hak, President of the Korea Institute for National Unification and Professor Emeritus of North Korean Studies at Dongguk University.

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Ji-soo, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 208) | jspark@eai.or.kr