[North Korea's New Cold War Discourse Series] ② China's Perception and Calculations Regarding North Korea's "New Cold War Theory"

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North Korea, by continuing its ballistic missile launches, is highlighting its geopolitical importance amidst the confrontation between the United States and China by advocating for a "new cold war theory" and a "geopolitical linchpin theory." North Korea also argues for "multipolarization," emphasizing the international order's transition to a multipolar system due to the decline of US hegemony and the rise of China's national power. Through these arguments, North Korea seeks to foster strategic solidarity among North Korea, China, and Russia and to counter the United States. Indeed, North Korea frames the US's offensive against China as a confrontation between imperialism and socialism, advocating for socialist solidarity between North Korea and China.

Amidst intensifying strategic competition between the US and China, and the suspension of dialogue between North Korea and the US, and between the two Koreas, North Korea-China relations are outwardly becoming closer. Cargo train operations between Sinuiju and Dandong resumed in September 2022, and truck passage between Rason and Hunchun reportedly resumed in February 2023. Notably, North Korea unequivocally sides with China on the issue of Taiwan, which has emerged at the forefront of the US-China conflict. For instance, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Pak Myong-ho directly criticized the US, stating, "Recently, the United States has been instigating the independence of Taiwan, an inalienable territory of China, and escalating military tensions."

As China faces difficulties in securing allies amidst global network-building competition with the United States, it places importance on relations with North Korea, referred to as a traditional friendly nation. China also reciprocates by emphasizing its "friendly cooperative relations" with North Korea through congratulatory diplomacy. However, while China agrees with North Korea's advocacy for multipolarization, it remains reserved about the "new cold war theory." China, in fact, criticizes the US's offensive and pressure as "Cold War thinking." The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has argued, "We oppose outdated concepts such as Cold War mentality and zero-sum games, and we do not favor exaggerating geopolitical conflicts and great power competition." China differentiates itself from "Cold War thinking" by proposing so-called "Chinese solutions" befitting the "new era," such as "a new type of international relations" and "a community of shared future for mankind." There are complex strategic calculations behind China's inability to fully endorse North Korea's new cold war theory and its advocacy for strategic solidarity among North Korea, China, and Russia.

First, considering the objective circumstances it realistically faces, the Xi Jinping administration prioritizes regime stability and economic recovery, and diplomacy should be geared towards creating an external environment and conditions conducive to these domestic-first policies. In his report to the 20th Party Congress, General Secretary Xi Jinping enumerated various complex domestic tasks and goals for building a "great modern socialist country," including self-reliance and self-strengthening in cutting-edge technologies, nurturing scientific and technological talent, improving people's livelihoods and welfare, enhancing the ecological environment, and achieving common prosperity. North Korea holds a dual strategic implication for China. While North Korea's strategic value is highlighted amidst escalating confrontation and competition with the United States, China also harbors concerns about security instability originating from its neighbor, North Korea. North Korea frequently causes instability along China's border due to nuclear crises, missile provocations, and economic difficulties. The underlying intention behind China's persistent calls for "strategic communication" with North Korea is to manage security instability stemming from North Korea. In essence, for China, neighboring North Korea is both an object of strategic solidarity and an entity that must be managed stably.

Second, although China and North Korea share a strategic consensus on countering the United States, they also share the commonality of prioritizing their respective relationships with the US. While North Korea fully sides with China in the US-China confrontation, China, unlike North Korea, places relatively less emphasis on the "US factor" in its relations with North Korea. China judges that full-scale power competition with the US is premature and is seeking strategies to circumvent it. China needs to maintain its relationship with North Korea to manage rapid changes in the Korean Peninsula situation, including North Korea's regime crisis, provocations, and improvements in North Korea-US relations. However, China also does not wish to expand its conflict front with the US due to the North Korean (nuclear) issue. Therefore, China is unlikely to provide support to North Korea proactively by violating UN sanctions resolutions as North Korea expects. Furthermore, unless China faces an unavoidable reality of military confrontation with the US, its military and security cooperation with North Korea will remain limited as before.

Third, China's position on Russia's invasion of Ukraine clearly differs from North Korea's. North Korea openly supports Russia regarding the Ukraine situation and criticizes the US. North Korea has made clear its intention to strengthen strategic cooperation with Russia by using the Ukraine situation as a medium. In contrast, China has reserved its stance on providing the level of explicit support Russia expects. China maintains a principled and ambiguous position on resolving the Ukraine crisis, proposing four measures: upholding the UN Charter, considering the legitimate security concerns of the parties involved, resolving the issue through dialogue, and establishing a European security mechanism that can guarantee long-term regional stability.

China has consistently advocated for the important diplomatic principles of defending sovereignty and territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. Particularly in recent times, as China confronts the US by asserting that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair and a matter of sovereignty, the principle of defending territorial sovereignty is paramount. While strategic cooperation with Russia, a friendly nation, is important for China due to intensifying competition with the US, China faces a dilemma where it cannot undermine the core principle of its foreign policy—respect for sovereignty and territory. Despite criticism from the international community, including Europe, China continues economic cooperation with Russia and opposes US-led sanctions against Russia. However, China has not responded to Russia's requests for military assistance. In essence, China seeks to avoid further escalation of confrontation with the US and European countries due to the Ukraine situation.

Fourth, North Korea actively seeks solidarity among North Korea, China, and Russia to find a way out of sanctions and isolation. In this context, North Korea uses the strengthening of South Korea-US-Japan cooperation as a significant pretext for North Korea-China-Russia solidarity. Conversely, China is sensitive to the strengthening of South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation. China is wary of North Korea's repeated provocations becoming a pretext for strengthening South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation and providing opportunities for the deployment of US strategic assets to the Korean Peninsula. Indeed, North Korea's successive ballistic missile launches have led to an increase in positive sentiment towards strengthening South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation in South Korea and Japan. For example, positive responses in South Korea regarding the strengthening of South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation increased from 53.6% (2020) to 64.2% (2021) and 72.4% (2022).[1]In Japan as well, the response that South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation is necessary for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula reached 73.9% in 2022.

Furthermore, in November 2022, a South Korea-US-Japan summit was held in Cambodia, adopting the first-ever joint statement titled the 'Phnom Penh Statement.' The leaders discussed trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the US, and Japan in response to North Korea's nuclear and missile threats, strengthening extended deterrence, and cooperation in economic security. China is concerned that South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation, centered around the US-Japan alliance, will ultimately target China rather than North Korea. China is particularly wary of the possibility that South Korea-US-Japan security cooperation may extend beyond the Korean Peninsula to the Taiwan issue. China is not enthusiastic about explicit North Korea-China-Russia solidarity that could provide a pretext for South Korea-US-Japan cooperation. While China desperately needs to expand its allies, it faces a dilemma of avoiding further deterioration of its international image, increased isolation, and worsened confrontation with the US due to Russia and North Korea.

In conclusion, although North Korea and China outwardly display close ties, complex and divergent strategic calculations lie beneath the surface. While China and North Korea share the strategic motive of countering the US, their specific approaches to utilizing the "US variable" remain disparate. North Korea seeks to find a breakthrough from isolation and economic hardship by exploiting the situation where the US and China are engrossed in power competition. Simultaneously, North Korea seeks opportunities for negotiation with the US. In contrast, China aims to delay full-scale power competition with the US as much as possible and focus on domestic development. Therefore, China does not wish to expand friction with the US due to the North Korean issue and seeks to manage the escalating security instability originating from North Korea.■

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "China's Stance on North Korea's "New-Cold War" Narrative."

[1]East Asia Institute, "[EAIㆍGenron NPO Joint Press Conference] Announcement of the 10th Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey." (September 1, 2022).http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/search_view.asp?intSeq=21398&board=kor_event(Accessed: October 28, 2022).; East Asia Institute, "[EAIㆍGenron NPO Joint Press Conference] Announcement of the 9th Korea-Japan Public Perception Survey." (September 28, 2021).http://www.eai.or.kr/new/ko/etc/data_view.asp?intSeq=20884(Accessed: October 28, 2022).

■ Lee Dong-ryul, Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies. Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies, served as President of the Association for Modern Chinese Studies, and is currently a member of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Policy Advisory Committee. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, Chinese nationalism, and ethnic minority issues. His recent works include "China's Strategy and Role in the Denuclearization and Peace Process on the Korean Peninsula," "Evolution and Current Implications of China's Foreign Policy Discourse Since the 1990s," "A Geoeconomic Approach and Geopolitical Dilemmas of Xi Jinping's 'Maritime Power' Vision," "Deciphering China’s Security Intentions in Northeast Asia: A View from South Korea," and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-authored).

■ Managed and Edited by: Park Jeong-hoo, EAI Research Fellow

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