[Global NK Commentary] Xi Jinping Takes the First Step Towards 'One-Man Rule'!

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The 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (hereinafter referred to as the CPC) has several characteristics compared to previous congresses. The first is the emergence of a new model of power succession, with Xi Jinping being reappointed as General Secretary. There were originally two models of power succession. The first was a phased succession, where key positions were transferred sequentially. At the 16th National Congress of the CPC in 2002, Jiang Zemin transferred the position of General Secretary of the CPC to Hu Jintao and then, two years later, transferred the chairmanship of the Central Military Commission (CMC). The second was a comprehensive succession, where all positions were transferred simultaneously. At the 18th National Congress of the CPC in 2012, Hu Jintao transferred all positions, including the General Secretary of the CPC, to Xi Jinping simultaneously. However, at this 20th National Congress of the CPC, a model of power extension emerged, with Xi Jinping being reappointed to all positions.

Xi Jinping's reappointment breaks the existing norm of replacing the top leader (General Secretary) every ten years. This signifies the emergence of a new phenomenon in Chinese elite politics. First, the increased uncertainty in power succession has heightened the possibility of political instability. The issue of power succession is the Achilles' heel of socialist political systems; without resolving this issue, stability cannot be expected in politics, economy, society, or any other field. The secret to maintaining political stability in China during the reform era was precisely the resolution of this issue through regular power transitions. Now that this norm has been broken, China may be entering a new phase.

Second, the halt in the replacement of top leaders has reduced the likelihood of new policies emerging to address China's current problems. Ten years of rule yield achievements but also create numerous problems. Therefore, newly emerging top leadership focuses on both inheriting achievements and resolving problems. In this way, the CPC has cultivated its ability to adapt to changing circumstances. This is the secret to 'authoritarian resilience.' Now, this advantage is likely to disappear.

Third, once a norm for power succession is broken, it is very difficult to re-establish it. Consequently, the CPC faces the arduous task of establishing new norms for power succession. When and how will power be succeeded? Who will be candidates for power succession, and how will they be selected? What if Xi Jinping insists on maintaining power for another five or ten years? Will the emergence of a 'second Mao Zedong' in the form of Xi Jinping be allowed to continue unchecked? Or will he be forcibly removed? These are by no means easy questions.

The second characteristic of the 20th National Congress of the CPC is that the type of elite politics began to change through this congress. In a word, Chinese elite politics has begun to shift from collective leadership to Xi Jinping's one-man rule. Socialist elite politics can be broadly divided into collective leadership (oligarchy) and one-man rule, determined by three criteria. The first is the source of power (i.e., institutional authority and personal authority) and the degree of power concentration. The second is the power relationship among leaders. The third is the method of power operation. With changes occurring in these three criteria through this congress, Xi Jinping's 'one-man rule' has begun to emerge.

First, Xi Jinping has acquired 'personal authority' in addition to 'institutional authority,' enabling him to wield immense power not merely as General Secretary but as a 'Great Leader.' This began with the 'Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century,' passed at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 19th CPC Central Committee in November 2021. According to this resolution, Xi Jinping is the leader who ushered in the 'New Era' in Chinese history and achieved great accomplishments over the ten years since taking power in 2012. This was possible because the 'Great Leader' Xi Jinping proposed 'Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era' (hereinafter referred to as 'Xi Jinping Thought'). Therefore, the CPC officially established the 'Two Establishes': First, the CPC establishes Xi Jinping's core position in the Party Central Committee and the entire Party. Second, the CPC establishes the guiding status of 'Xi Jinping Thought.' Through these decisions, Xi Jinping has now acquired 'personal authority' as a leader who has achieved great accomplishments, in addition to the 'institutional authority' of General Secretary. This legitimacy to extend his rule by achieving great accomplishments as the leader who pioneered the 'New Era' was also carried forward in the 'Political Report' of the 20th National Congress of the CPC.

Furthermore, by securing 'personal authority,' Xi Jinping has consequently been able to wield immense power. That is, power has become concentrated in Xi Jinping. This was clearly evident in the personnel appointments for the Politburo Standing Committee and the Politburo. Notably, all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee were filled by the 'Xi Jinping faction (習家軍).' In contrast, not a single leader from the rival 'Communist Youth League faction (共靑團派)' was appointed to the Politburo Standing Committee. Among the 24 Politburo members, at least 12 are from the 'Xi Jinping faction,' and the majority of the rest were also promoted by Xi Jinping. This was possible because Xi Jinping completely controlled personnel appointments.

Second, the power relationship between Xi Jinping and other members of the Politburo Standing Committee has also changed. Among the six members of the Politburo Standing Committee excluding Xi Jinping himself, three were his direct subordinates, and the other three were individuals he promoted. Therefore, while the relationship between Xi Jinping and these members may appear formally equal, it can actually be described as a 'leader-subordinate relationship.' This is a complete departure from the past. While it cannot yet be described as a 'lord-vassal relationship' like that between Mao Zedong and other leaders, it is clear that an unequal relationship has emerged.

Third, however, no changes have occurred in the method of power operation, and as a result, Xi Jinping's 'one-man rule' is bound to have limitations. The CPC's Party Constitution and Party laws concerning power operation were not amended at this congress. Therefore, in the future, elite politics must still operate according to the principle of collective leadership, i.e., the combination of collective decision-making and individual responsibility, as stipulated by the Party Constitution and Party laws. For example, important policies and personnel appointments must be collectively decided through deliberation by the Politburo Standing Committee and the Politburo, not by the General Secretary alone, and the leaders must responsibly implement the decided policies according to their roles. Ultimately, because the regulations on the method of power operation have not changed, Xi Jinping's 'one-man rule' is inevitably subject to limitations.

※ This commentary is the Korean translation of "China Under Xi Jinping’s One-Man Rule."

■ Cho Young-nam_ He has been a professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, since 2002. He graduated from the Department of East Asian History at Seoul National University and received his master's and doctoral degrees in Political Science. He served as a visiting researcher at the Center for Modern Chinese Studies, Peking University (1997-98), a visiting scholar in the Department of Political Science, Nankai University (2001-02), and a visiting scholar at the Harvard-Yenching Institute (2006-07). His research achievements include 17 single-authored academic books such as 『China's Governance System 1/2』 (2022) and 『China's Elite Politics』 (2019), and Local People's Congresses in China(2009), as well as numerous academic papers. He has received awards such as the Seoul National University Research Award (2007), the NEAR Foundation Academic Award (2008), and the Korean Political Science Association Academic Award (for writing) (2020).