[EAI Issue Briefing] Restoring Democracy in Myanmar: A Reassessment of Resistance and Solidarity Activities

1. Myanmar's Winter: One Year After the Coup

Myanmar has a history of military rule spanning over 70 years since its independence in 1948. While experiencing rapid political reform and liberalization led by the military in 2011, the desire for democratization gradually grew as the National League for Democracy (NLD), led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, took power in the 2015 elections. Following the NLD's resounding victory in the November 2020 general election, Myanmar was anticipating the inauguration of its second civilian government in early 2021. However, the military declared the 2020 general election fraudulent and staged a coup on February 1, 2021. To date, over 1,500 people are reported to have been killed, and more than 8,700 have been arrested or detained. For over a year, Myanmar's democracy has remained in the cold, without seeing the spring.

The people of Myanmar are striving to reclaim their democracy through continuous anti-coup protests and, in the process, to heal past ethnic conflicts. However, as the civil war situation and the COVID-19 crisis persist and become more complex, both the fatigue of the Myanmar people and the attention of the international community have significantly decreased. Nevertheless, the tense tug-of-war between the military's human rights abuses and the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) is not yet over. Internally, the military's violent suppression has spread to the community level, destroying the daily lives and livelihoods of the Myanmar people and forcing an increasing number of Myanmar citizens to migrate elsewhere within the country or to refugee camps in neighboring countries. Meanwhile, the democratic forces have launched the National Unity Government (NUG) and formed the People's Defense Force (PDF). The NUG has established representative offices of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in countries such as the Czech Republic, Australia, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Norway, starting with its representative office in South Korea. Furthermore, it has established the National Unity Consultative Council (NUCC), an alliance of resistance citizens comprising eight armed groups, civil society organizations, and women's groups, to create a platform for various forces within Myanmar to discuss solidarity. Discussions are also underway regarding the drafting of a federal democratic constitution and future general election strategies.

Nations and the international community committed to defending democracy and human rights have condemned the Myanmar military's violent human rights abuses through statements and diplomacy. Civil society actors worldwide have also been exposing the military's atrocities through various channels, including mainstream media and social media. South Korea, in particular, reflecting on its own democratization experience, has been offering empathetic support to the Myanmar people's aspirations for democracy and protecting them from military oppression.

The East Asia Institute (EAI), with the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), has been operating the project "Strengthening Civil Society Organizations in Myanmar" since 2015. As part of this project, on January 27, 2022, EAI hosted a special online seminar commemorating the first anniversary of the Myanmar coup, titled "How to Support the Restoration of Democracy in Myanmar?" This report is based on the presentations and discussions from that seminar, aiming to review the resistance and solidarity efforts for democratization in Myanmar thus far and to propose diagnoses and solutions for the restoration of democracy in the country.

2. The Flip Side of Protracted Military Repression: Turning Crisis into Opportunity

The NUG aims to overthrow the military dictatorship and establish a federal democratic state with the diverse ethnic groups of Myanmar. The fact that the Myanmar people, united by anti-coup protests, are seeking to reduce discord between the Bamar majority and the 135 ethnic minorities based on their experience of solidarity can be considered a silver lining in the Myanmar situation. The dream of national unity began to be more actively discussed by the generation of the 2030s, who experienced the wave of democratization in Myanmar that intensified from 2017, as they actively participated in the CDM. With more opportunities than before to contemplate the meaning of democracy and listen to the concerns of ethnic minorities, the sense of "we must be together" to build a healthy democratic nation has deepened among the Myanmar people. This naturally implies that the NUG is more inclusive than the previous NLD government, fostering an atmosphere conducive to strategizing for the establishment of a federal democracy. It has also led to a willingness to engage in constructive dialogue on various issues, including the Rohingya issue, and has been accompanied by the resolute declarations of civil society activists that "the current situation will only provide an opportunity for the military forces to step down in the future."

While some are engaged in activities supporting the NUG with the expectation that it will serve as Myanmar's sole legitimate government, others argue that greater focus should be placed on supporting the relentless resistance of the CDM, including the PDF, as they are the backbone of Myanmar's democratization movement. Some individuals focus on solidarity with the international community and economic sanctions at the central level, while others concentrate on grassroots civil resistance movements at the community level. Thus, Myanmar's democratization movement is unfolding on multiple levels.

Meanwhile, as the Myanmar crisis drags on, the military's strategies have become more sophisticated. The military has employed a "four-pronged disconnection strategy" to seize control of state affairs. This brutal strategy involves cutting off funds, food, information, and personnel, and instilling fear through the massacre of a significant number of civilians. While this is undoubtedly a tragic situation, it creates an environment that easily attracts the attention of the international community, which seeks to uphold the values of democracy and human rights. If individual countries, grassroots communities, and international organizations conduct proper monitoring, they can gather evidence that will be useful for imposing sanctions or punitive measures against the Myanmar military in the future.

It is also noteworthy that internal divisions have emerged within ASEAN, which has been inactive, using non-interference in internal affairs as a shield. This was evident when ASEAN rejected the invitation of Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing in October. At the UN General Assembly in June, the statement "no more weapons should flow into Myanmar" indicated a strong resolve for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. Although China abstained, its non-opposition provides grounds to challenge the military's legitimacy, one of its vulnerabilities. Furthermore, while many Myanmar citizens have crossed borders into countries like Thailand and India amidst the fierce anti-coup resistance, their activities also offer grounds for anticipation.

3. The Flip Side of Protracted Democratization Movement: The Rise of Grassroots Solidarity

Having participated in the democratization movement for a long time, the people of Myanmar are reorganizing their resistance efforts, which have continued for over a year, by asking themselves questions such as 'How can people facing common problems form organizations and build solidarity to bring about change?' South Korea, as a nation that has undertaken various activities for Myanmar since the day after the coup, including issuing a statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson, is evaluating past calls for human rights respect and measures for the restoration of democracy and preparing anew. Voices of review are already emerging from civil society and international development cooperation organizations at the grassroots level. While they have actively participated in declarative or symbolic solidarity activities, such as statement diplomacy, they are demanding a re-examination of whether they have properly diagnosed economic sanctions and ODA reduction measures related to issues like the gas corporation and POSCO.

The Korean Residents' Movement Solidarity argues that Myanmar's democratization movement is no longer an infant and assesses that the democratization movements in Myanmar and within the Myanmar community in Korea have been ongoing since 2015. They propose four points of solidarity for continuous democratization movements in both communities: (1) encouraging citizens to voluntarily continue grassroots activities amidst difficult circumstances; (2) exploring ways to cut off the military's economic power and funding sources in collaboration with companies such as POSCO and Innogroup; (3) developing an election strategy for the NUG to ensure that the upcoming election declared by Min Aung Hlaing proceeds democratically through proper procedures, ultimately leading to victory for the citizens; and (4) restoring communities that have been disrupted during the resistance through policies such as job creation and education.

To this end, basic support from the international community, including South Korea, is necessary to prevent citizens from abandoning democracy due to livelihood issues. Simultaneously, a strategy must be developed to provide leadership training in democratic values to the youth of Myanmar's ethnic communities, enabling them to proactively participate in the restoration of Myanmar's local communities in the future. This requires a diversification of solidarity efforts, moving away from a government-centric approach, and emphasizing the importance of grassroots-level solidarity.

Meanwhile, the development cooperation sector, observing the cross-border solidarity movements, emphasizes genuine empowerment over technology-focused capacity building and service delivery programs, proposing solidarity programs centered on democracy and human rights. It strongly argues for a departure from the conventional practice of close consultation with the partner government and maintaining distance from politics, which was considered virtuous when the governing entity lacks legitimacy and instead oppresses its citizens, as is the case in Myanmar.

As a first step towards this, the Alliance of International Development Cooperation Communities requests that the South Korean government thoroughly review the Myanmar ODA programs it has announced it will suspend or reconsider. They point out the problem that while concessional loan projects such as the Myanmar power transmission grid construction and integrated electronic information data construction are being maintained, grant-based aid projects closely related to the livelihoods of the Myanmar people, such as agriculture and restoration projects, have been largely sidelined. They urge the operation of ODA programs to strengthen and support Myanmar's civil society, citing the cases of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Sweden, which have executed aid budgets primarily targeting the Myanmar government.

For example, even when implementing rural development projects, it is urged to carefully examine the power structures within the region and to make the changes among community members the driving force for democratic decision-making within small and large civic organizations. This is because programs planned and executed without careful consideration of the social and political culture or governance structure of the society can inadvertently reinforce existing structural inequalities and the privileges of the elite.

4. Myanmar's Spring: The Protagonists Will Be the People of Myanmar

They say the darkest hour is just before the dawn. Ultimately, democracy will be restored in Myanmar. Because democracy in Myanmar will surely be restored, we hope that the discussions between the civil societies of both countries will not be limited to the restoration of democracy in Myanmar.

- "How to Support the Restoration of Democracy in Myanmar?: Special Online Seminar on the First Anniversary of the Myanmar Coup"

From the congratulatory address of Choi Jong-gun, First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs

Myanmar's democracy has been described as "pact democracy," stemming from a compromise between the civilian government and the military. Perhaps due to past experiences, there are concerns that the NUG's goal of a federal democratic state might be based on yet another compromise. However, many also believe that this incident presents an opportunity to end the military's deep-rooted rule in Myanmar's history and embark on the path toward mature democracy.

Looking back at South Korea's own democratization history, it is clear that democratization in Myanmar cannot be achieved in a short period. Myanmar's democratization will not end with the establishment of a federal democratic state; it will demand the reduction of the military's political power, and furthermore, the public discussion of national unity and domestic and international issues. While the desire to support and cheer for Myanmar's spring remains, ultimately, the Myanmar people are the ones who must endure the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. This is precisely why the agency and on-the-ground realities of the parties involved must be given the highest priority when considering support measures for the restoration of democracy in Myanmar. ■

■ Author: Jeon Ju-hyun_EAI Researcher. She is the program manager for "Strengthening Civil Society Organizations in Myanmar" and a practitioner in the governance and democracy research program. She also works as a reporter for Magazine Leadership Korea and as a writer for Brunch. She holds a Master's degree in European Studies from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, a Master's degree in European Area Studies from Seoul National University, and a Bachelor's degree in German Language Education from Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. Her main areas of interest include German and European identity, media literacy and global citizenship education, strategies for operating national cultural centers, film criticism, and Korean literature translation.

■ Responsible Editor: Jeon Ju-hyunEAI Researcher

    Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr