[EAI Issue Briefing] Ideological Composition of Voters in the 20th Presidential Election and Preferences for Candidates: Generational Divide, Class Betrayal, and Polarization

1. High Election Interest Amidst a Two-Party Competition

Contrary to concerns that voters might become indifferent due to an unprecedented 'dislike' election, respondents showed relatively high average election interest. Among the 1,515 respondents, only 7.8% answered that they were not interested in the election, while approximately 92.1% responded that they were 'somewhat interested' (34.1%) or 'very interested' (58.0%), confirming high interest in the March election through this survey.

[Figure 1] Election Interest by Party Affiliation

However, by age group, the 18-29 age group stands out with a high rate of indifference (21.5%), unlike other age groups (which show uniformly high election interest). By ideological orientation, those who identified as ideologically centrist, along with progressive and conservative voters, also showed relatively high election interest (89.1%). In contrast, by party affiliation, not only those unaffiliated with any party (none/don't know/no response) but also supporters of the Justice Party or other parties showed relatively low election interest, which is noteworthy.

This difference in election interest by party affiliation can also be analyzed as a result of the election's flow into a two-party competition centered around the ruling Democratic Party's 'regime perpetuation' and the main opposition People Power Party's 'regime change' narrative, around which voters are consolidating.

This trend is further confirmed in the survey on voting intention, where the proportion of respondents who answered 'I will definitely vote' was relatively high among the progressive (89.1%) and conservative (88.8%) groups. However, it decreased to 79.5% among centrist voters. Furthermore, by party affiliation, it was lower among supporters of the Justice Party (85.8%) and unaffiliated voters (64.3%) compared to supporters of the People's Party (90.4%), the Democratic Party (90.2%), and the People Power Party (89.4%).

2. Presidential Candidate Support by Voter Age, Ideology, Region, and Class: Clear Generational Divide and "Class-Betraying Votes"?

[Figure 2] Presidential Candidate Supported (Candidate to Vote For)

Although referred to as an election of 'dislikes,' the survey results indicate that the presidential election is clearly unfolding as a two-way race between the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung and the People Power Party's Yoon Suk-yeol. The strong performance of the People's Party's Ahn Cheol-soo, who recorded a double-digit approval rating (12.7%), is noteworthy.

However, when classified by party affiliation, the support for Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol among Democratic Party and People Power Party supporters, respectively, is high at 83.5% and 82.2%. It is noteworthy that the support for Ahn Cheol-soo among People's Party supporters is only 64.8%, with their support for the conservative candidate Yoon Suk-yeol reaching 18.1%. Meanwhile, those who have no candidate to support or chose 'don't know/no response' accounted for only about 11%.

[Figure 3] Supported Presidential Candidate by Respondent's Age Group

As has been revealed through various opinion polls, a clear differentiation in candidate support by age group is observed. While there is overwhelming support for the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung centered around those in their 40s and 50s, strong support for the People Power Party's Yoon Suk-yeol is evident among those aged 60 and over.

Among the MZ generation, categorized as those in their 20s and 30s, Yoon Suk-yeol recorded higher support than Lee Jae-myung. Specifically, in the 18-29 age group, Yoon Suk-yeol led Lee Jae-myung by more than 10 percentage points.

This differentiation in preferred presidential candidates by age group is also confirmed in the survey on 'candidates I will absolutely not vote for,' indicating 'disliked candidates.' In fact, the proportion of respondents in their 40s and 50s who stated they would never vote for Yoon Suk-yeol was high at 54.3% (40s) and 45.6% (50s), respectively. Conversely, the proportion of respondents aged 60 and over who stated they would never vote for Lee Jae-myung was also high at 45.9%.

[Table 1] Supported Presidential Candidate by Gender within the MZ Generation (%)

The relatively high support for Yoon Suk-yeol among the MZ generation is presumed to be related to the conservatism of men in their 20s, often referred to as '20-dae Nam' (men in their 20s). Indeed, when candidate support is broken down by age and gender, women in their 20s show somewhat dispersed preferences (Lee Jae-myung: 21.6%, Yoon Suk-yeol: 13.7%, Sim Sang-jung: 14.2%, Ahn Cheol-soo: 18.2%). However, men in their 20s show very strong support for the People Power Party's Yoon Suk-yeol, with the preference order being Yoon Suk-yeol (49.6%), Lee Jae-myung (16.4%), Sim Sang-jung (1.5%), and Ahn Cheol-soo (14.2%). Combining the support for candidates classifiable as ideologically conservative or center-right, Yoon Suk-yeol and Ahn Cheol-soo, among men in their 20s, confirms the political conservatism of this demographic group.

A similar pattern is observed when classifying voters in their 30s by gender. While the gap in support between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol is not large among women in their 30s (29.7% vs. 28.5%), it widens slightly among men (31.8% vs. 42.4%).

[Figure 4] Favorability of Politicians by Age Group

The generational differences in candidate preference are further confirmed by the candidate favorability survey. On an 11-point scale from 0 (strongly dislike) to 10 (strongly like), the favorability scores for President Moon Jae-in and the main candidates in this presidential election show that high favorability (5 points or more) for President Moon is clearly observed among those in their 40s and 50s. Conversely, favorability for President Moon was lower among the 18-29 age group and those aged 60 and over.

The generational favorability pattern for the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung is similar to that of President Moon Jae-in, who belongs to the same party. However, except for those in their 50s, where President Moon and Lee Jae-myung received the same score (5.1 points), Lee Jae-myung's favorability was lower than President Moon's across all age groups.

Furthermore, high favorability for Yoon Suk-yeol is observed among the elderly (60 and over) (5.5 points), followed by the 18-29 age group and those in their 30s.

Meanwhile, favorability for the People's Party's Ahn Cheol-soo is relatively positive across all age groups, particularly high among the 18-29 age group. He also received high favorability ratings after Yoon Suk-yeol among the elderly (60 and over). Sim Sang-jung, on the other hand, shows low favorability (around 3.5-3.9) across all age groups.

[Figure 5] Supported Presidential Candidate by Respondent's Ideological Orientation

Preferred presidential candidates are also differentiated by voters' ideological orientation. As expected, progressive voters show high preference for the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung, while conservative voters show high support for Yoon Suk-yeol.

Ahn Cheol-soo of the People's Party, who advocates for ideological centrism, shows relatively high support among centrist voters. However, the candidate with the highest preference among centrists is Lee Jae-myung (35.3%), followed by Yoon Suk-yeol with 29.0% support.

However, when the question format is changed to 'candidate I will absolutely not vote for' (negative framing) instead of 'candidate to vote for,' the gap in support (dislike) between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol among centrists slightly narrows (34.4% and 33.9%, respectively).

[Figure 6] Favorability of Politicians by Ideological Orientation

When classified by ideological orientation, high favorability for Lee Jae-myung is particularly evident among voters who identify as ideologically progressive. However, even this high favorability (6.5 points) is lower than the favorability President Moon received from the progressive group (7.3 points), and furthermore, Lee Jae-myung's favorability falls short of President Moon's across all ideological groups.

Yoon Suk-yeol received positive favorability ratings mainly from the conservative group. Ahn Cheol-soo received the most favorable ratings from the centrist group and also received relatively positive evaluations from conservative voters.

[Figure 7] Supported Presidential Candidate by Respondent's Residential Region

Meanwhile, regionalism is confirmed in this presidential election, with differences in candidate support based on the respondent's region of residence. Specifically, in the Seoul Metropolitan Area (Seoul, Incheon, Gyeonggi Province) and the Chungcheong region, the support gap between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol is not significant. However, the gap between the top two candidates in opinion polls is mainly observed in the Honam and Daegu/Gyeongbuk regions. Notably, Lee Jae-myung's high support in the Honam region (61.0%) and the relatively low support for Yoon Suk-yeol and Ahn Cheol-soo (12.2% and 11.9%, respectively) are striking.

In the PK region (Busan, Ulsan, Gyeongnam), Yoon Suk-yeol leads Lee Jae-myung in support, but the gap is not as large as in the TK region. This confirms the weakening of regionalism in the Busan, Ulsan, and Gyeongnam areas, as has been the case in elections since 2016.

[Figure 8] Supported Presidential Candidate by Respondent's Socioeconomic Class

Meanwhile, when voters are classified by household income to examine their preferences for presidential candidates, the phenomenon of 'class-betraying votes,' observed in various past studies, appears to be replicated in this election.

As is well known, People Power Party's Yoon Suk-yeol receives relatively high support from the group with household incomes of 3 million won or less, while Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung consistently receives high support from the group with household incomes of 4 million won or more. Notably, Lee Jae-myung's relatively high support among households with very high incomes (over 6 million won) is striking.

This class-betraying voting tendency is also confirmed in the 'disliked candidate' ('candidate I will absolutely not vote for') survey. The proportion of respondents in the income group of 2 million won or less who stated they would absolutely not vote for Lee Jae-myung was highest at 43.7% (Yoon Suk-yeol received 23.5% in the same group). Conversely, Yoon Suk-yeol showed high dislike rates exceeding 40% among high-income groups, such as those with household incomes of 5-6 million won (43.6%), 6-7 million won (49.7%), and over 7 million won (40.1%).

3. Voter Ideological Landscape and Partisan Polarization: Partisan Sorting, Generational Gender Gap, and Affective Polarization

[Figure 9] Distribution of Party Affiliation and Ideological Orientation

Based on data where respondents were asked to indicate their ideological orientation on a 10-point scale from 0 (very progressive) to 10 (very conservative), as of January 2022, Korean voters still have a higher proportion of centrists (5 points, 40.4%) than progressives (1-4 points, 25%) and conservatives (6-10 points, 33%). As is well known, the proportion of conservative voters slightly exceeds that of progressive voters.

Furthermore, when voters are grouped by party affiliation, a thick distribution of centrists is common across all party groups. Nevertheless, supporters of the Democratic Party and the Justice Party tend to have a thicker distribution of progressives, while supporters of the People Power Party and the People's Party have a thicker distribution of conservatives. In other words, a form of partisan sorting is relatively well-established among Korean voters.

Meanwhile, when respondents were asked to rate the ideological orientation of the main presidential candidates on a scale of 0-10, the order from most progressive to most conservative was Lee Jae-myung (3.1), Sim Sang-jung (3.2), Ahn Cheol-soo (5.5), and Yoon Suk-yeol (7.3). Although the difference is not large, it is interesting that voters perceive the Democratic Party's Lee Jae-myung as a progressive candidate comparable to Sim Sang-jung of the Justice Party.

However, the ideological perception of presidential candidates also varies depending on the respondent's personal political orientation (e.g., party affiliation and self-identified ideology). For example, supporters of the People Power Party perceive Lee Jae-myung as a considerably radical candidate (rated 2.0, lower than Sim Sang-jung's 3.2). Conversely, supporters of the Democratic Party perceive Lee Jae-myung as a relatively moderate progressive (3.8), and supporters of the Justice Party tend to perceive Yoon Suk-yeol as closer to extreme conservatism than other party supporter groups.

[Table 2] Evaluation of Main Candidates' Ideological Orientation by Party Affiliation

Interestingly, the People's Party's Ahn Cheol-soo consistently receives an evaluation of being close to the center across all party supporter groups, which is noteworthy.

Similarly, the perception of the main presidential candidates' ideological orientation differs based on the respondent's personal ideological orientation. For instance, conservative voters perceive Lee Jae-myung as more ideologically radical than other ideological groups, and progressive voters perceive Yoon Suk-yeol as closer to extreme conservatism.

Furthermore, progressive voters perceive the Justice Party's Sim Sang-jung as more moderately progressive (3.6 vs. 3.3 & 2.7) than other ideological groups. Conversely, they perceive Ahn Cheol-soo, who received a centrist evaluation (5.3 points) from other ideological groups (centrist or conservative), as more conservative (6.0).

The conservatism of men in their 20s and the gender gap in ideological orientation within this age group, confirmed by recent opinion polls, are also observed in this survey. As shown in [Figure 11], which presents the average ideological orientation of men and women by age group, the 18-29 age group exhibits characteristics of considerably conservative men, unlike the generally progressive women in this age group (Average for men in their 20s: 5.9, Average for women in their 20s: 4.6).

The average ideological orientation for women (4.9) and men (5.5) in their 30s also appears relatively high compared to other age groups. In contrast, the gender gap in ideological orientation within the 40s age group is smallest, with averages of 4.8 for women and 4.7 for men.

[Figure 10] Generational Gender Gap in Ideological Orientation

[Figure 11] Gap in Candidate Favorability by Ideological Orientation[1]

Meanwhile, examining the difference in favorability between Lee Jae-myung and Yoon Suk-yeol, the top two candidates and presidential nominees of the major parties, based on candidate favorability (0-10 points), provides insight into the emotional evaluation of the presidential candidates by different voter groups. As expected, the favorability gap between the two candidates is smallest on average among centrists (4.6), while the gap in favorability ratings is larger among progressive and conservative groups.

This result reaffirms that to win the election, the two leading candidates must, above all, effectively target the ideologically centrist voters.

[Figure 12] Generational Gap in Presidential Candidate Favorability (Lee Jae-myung - Yoon Suk-yeol)[2]

Examining the gap in candidate favorability ratings by age group shows a tendency for the gap to increase with age. Consequently, the favorability gap between the two candidates is smallest in the 18-29 age group (3.0) and largest in the 60 and over group (6.3).

In other words, as age increases, voter preferences become more stable, while in the 20s and 30s generation, the difference in candidate preference is not significant. This again confirms that securing the votes of the 20s and 30s generation is crucial for competing candidates to win this election.

Al examinar la brecha en la evaluación de la simpatía de los candidatos por partido de apoyo, se observa la mayor brecha (6.4) entre los partidarios de los dos grandes partidos, especialmente el Partido Demócrata, seguido por los partidarios del Partido del Poder Popular (5.9), y luego por los partidarios del Partido de la Justicia, el Partido del Pueblo y otros partidos en orden descendente de brecha.

[Figura 13] Brecha de simpatía hacia los candidatos presidenciales por partido de apoyo (Lee Jae-myung - Yoon Suk-yeol)[3]

4. Evaluación del gobierno de Moon Jae-in y pronóstico de probabilidad de victoria por orientación política

Al pedir que se evaluara el desempeño del gobierno de Moon Jae-in en una escala de 100 puntos, los partidarios del candidato Lee Jae-myung del Partido Demócrata otorgaron la calificación más alta (72.9 puntos), como se esperaba, mientras que los partidarios del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol del Partido del Poder Popular dieron la evaluación más negativa (24.3).

Los partidarios del Partido de la Justicia, de tendencia progresista, mostraron una proporción relativamente alta de evaluaciones positivas del gobierno de Moon Jae-in, después de los partidarios del Partido Demócrata, mientras que las evaluaciones del gobierno de Moon Jae-in por parte de los votantes del Partido del Pueblo, otros partidos y los no afiliados fueron predominantemente negativas, por debajo de los 50 puntos.

[Figura 14] Evaluación de la gestión del gobierno de Moon Jae-in por candidato de apoyo

Al examinar la pregunta sobre la predicción del ganador de las próximas elecciones presidenciales por partido de apoyo de los votantes, se observa que, si bien el patrón general es una alta probabilidad de victoria para el candidato del partido de apoyo, la alta confianza de los partidarios del Partido Demócrata en la victoria es particularmente impresionante.

Sin embargo, en contraste con los partidarios del Partido Demócrata que ven la probabilidad de victoria del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol como bastante baja (5.0%), es notable que la probabilidad de victoria del candidato Lee Jae-myung entre los partidarios del Partido del Poder Popular sea del 14.6%, y que la probabilidad de victoria del candidato Lee Jae-myung sea abrumadoramente alta entre los partidarios de otros partidos y los no afiliados.

Por el contrario, los partidarios del Partido del Pueblo no hacen una gran distinción en la probabilidad de victoria de un tercer candidato, incluido el candidato Ahn Cheol-soo, pero es impresionante que, en ese contexto, reconozcan la mayor probabilidad de victoria del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol del Partido del Poder Popular por encima de los candidatos Lee Jae-myung y Ahn Cheol-soo.

Este patrón se confirma nuevamente al clasificar a los votantes por candidato de apoyo en lugar de por partido de apoyo. Se observa una alta confianza en la victoria electoral en el grupo de votantes que apoyan al candidato Lee Jae-myung, y, de manera interesante, es un punto bastante peculiar que la probabilidad de victoria del candidato Lee Jae-myung sea la más alta en todos los grupos de candidatos, excepto en el grupo de partidarios del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol.

[Figura 15] Percepción de la probabilidad de victoria por partido de apoyo

[Figura 16] Percepción de la probabilidad de victoria por candidato de apoyo

5. Resumen y conclusión

A pesar de las preocupaciones sobre una elección presidencial sin precedentes de "falta de simpatía", la investigación reveló que el interés general de los votantes en esta elección presidencial es considerablemente alto. Sin embargo, dado que el nivel de interés electoral es algo bajo entre los votantes de centro ideológico, no afiliados o partidarios de otros partidos, se puede inferir que la actual campaña presidencial se está desarrollando con los votantes uniéndose en torno a los dos ejes principales de "cambio de gobierno" y "continuidad del gobierno".

Como se ha informado en varias ocasiones, la división generacional en el apoyo a partidos o candidatos preferidos, que se observa en esta encuesta, también se confirma en esta investigación. Mientras que los grupos de edad de 40 y 50 años muestran una alta preferencia por el candidato Lee Jae-myung, se observa un fuerte apoyo al candidato Yoon Suk-yeol entre los votantes mayores de 60 años. De manera particularmente interesante, el candidato Yoon Suk-yeol supera significativamente al candidato Lee Jae-myung entre los votantes de 20 y 30 años, especialmente entre los jóvenes de 20 años. Esta llamada tendencia conservadora de la Generación MZ se explica por la creciente orientación conservadora en las preferencias políticas, especialmente entre los hombres de 20 años.

Las preferencias de los votantes por los candidatos presidenciales en competencia se diferencian según la ideología y la orientación política del encuestado, como se esperaba. En primer lugar, el candidato Lee Jae-myung recibe evaluaciones positivas de los votantes de tendencia progresista, pero su nivel de preferencia es inferior al de la preferencia por el ex presidente Moon Jae-in, quien pertenece al mismo partido. Los candidatos Yoon Suk-yeol y Ahn Cheol-soo reciben principalmente el apoyo de los votantes conservadores.

Al clasificar a los encuestados por nivel de ingresos familiares, se observa un fenómeno de preferencia de "traición de clase" similar al del pasado en esta encuesta. Por ejemplo, mientras que el candidato Lee Jae-myung forma un alto nivel de apoyo entre los hogares de altos ingresos con ingresos familiares de 6 millones de wones o más, el candidato conservador Yoon Suk-yeol recibe un mayor apoyo entre los hogares de bajos ingresos con ingresos familiares inferiores a 3 millones de wones.

En 2022, nuestros votantes todavía tienen una base sólida de votantes de centro ideológico, pero existe una alineación partidista, es decir, una conexión entre la orientación partidista y la preferencia ideológica de los votantes, lo que permite cierta distinción en las preferencias ideológicas según la preferencia partidista individual.

Además, al distinguir las orientaciones ideológicas de los encuestados en función de la generación y el género, se observa una marcada brecha de género en las preferencias ideológicas en el grupo de 18 a 29 años en comparación con otros grupos de edad, y se observa la tendencia conservadora de los llamados "hombres de 20 años". Por el contrario, la brecha de género en las preferencias ideológicas es menor en el grupo de 40 años, que puede considerarse el grupo de edad de apoyo más fuerte para el candidato Lee Jae-myung.

Al examinar los grupos de votantes en torno a la brecha de simpatía hacia los dos candidatos presidenciales principales, el grupo de votantes que apoya al Partido Demócrata de Corea muestra la mayor estabilidad en la preferencia por el candidato Lee Jae-myung. Como se esperaba, la diferencia en la simpatía entre los candidatos Lee Jae-myung y Yoon Suk-yeol es menor en el grupo de otros partidos o no afiliados (ninguno/no sabe/no responde).

Además, al examinar la brecha de simpatía hacia los dos candidatos por grupo de edad, la brecha es menor en el grupo de 18 a 29 años en comparación con otros grupos de edad. Basado en este hecho, se puede confirmar en cierta medida por qué los candidatos en competencia en esta elección presidencial se esfuerzan intensamente por obtener el apoyo de los votantes de 20 y 30 años.

Al examinar la probabilidad de victoria de las próximas elecciones presidenciales por partido de apoyo de los votantes, se observa que, si bien el patrón general es una alta probabilidad de victoria para el candidato del partido de apoyo, la alta confianza de los partidarios del Partido Demócrata en la victoria es particularmente clara.

Finalmente, se observa que los votantes que creen que la política nacional y el bienestar social deben ser la principal tarea de gobierno del próximo gobierno tienden a votar por el candidato Lee Jae-myung, mientras que aquellos que creen que la política internacional y la reforma fiscal deben ser la principal tarea tienden a votar por el candidato Yoon Suk-yeol. Por el contrario, los temas de empleo y crecimiento económico, que tradicionalmente han servido como criterios para distinguir entre votantes progresistas y conservadores y han tenido una influencia significativa en la decisión del candidato de apoyo, no son monopolizados por ninguno de los candidatos, Lee Jae-myung o Yoon Suk-yeol. ■

[1]La brecha de simpatía aquí se refiere a la diferencia (valor absoluto) entre la puntuación de simpatía del candidato Lee Jae-myung (0-10) y la puntuación de simpatía del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol (0-1) para cada encuestado. La puntuación por grupo en el gráfico indica el valor promedio de la brecha de simpatía derivada de esta manera para cada grupo de orientación ideológica.

[2]La brecha de simpatía aquí se refiere a la diferencia (valor absoluto) entre la puntuación de simpatía del candidato Lee Jae-myung (0-10) y la puntuación de simpatía del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol (0-1) para cada encuestado. La puntuación por grupo en el gráfico indica el valor promedio de la brecha de simpatía derivada de esta manera para cada grupo de edad.

[3]La brecha de simpatía aquí se refiere a la diferencia (valor absoluto) entre la puntuación de simpatía del candidato Lee Jae-myung (0-10) y la puntuación de simpatía del candidato Yoon Suk-yeol (0-1) para cada encuestado. La puntuación por grupo en el gráfico indica el valor promedio de la brecha de simpatía derivada de esta manera para cada grupo de partido de apoyo.

■ Autor: Lee Jae-mook_Profesor Asociado del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Hankuk de Estudios Extranjeros, Director de la Oficina de Relaciones Públicas de la Universidad Hankuk de Estudios Extranjeros, y Jefe del Equipo de Investigación de Democracia Global y Seguridad Humana del Departamento de Ciencias Políticas de la Universidad Hankuk de Estudios Extranjeros. Obtuvo un doctorado en Ciencias Políticas en la Universidad de Iowa, EE. UU. Actualmente, se desempeña como Director de Educación de la Asociación Coreana de Ciencias Políticas y Director Administrativo de la Asociación de Partidos Políticos. Sus principales áreas de investigación son el comportamiento político, los procesos políticos y la política estadounidense. Sus obras publicadas recientemente incluyen "Partidos Políticos Coreanos y Democracia Diagnosticados en el Escenario Político" (2018, coautor), "Política Estadounidense y Política Exterior de Asia Oriental" (2017, coautor) y "Política Coreano-Estadounidense: Desafíos y Cambios" (2014, coautor).

■ Editor y Redactor:Jeon Ju-hyun_Investigador de EAI

    Contacto: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 204) | jhjun@eai.or.kr