Looking Forward to Another Moon-Kim Meeting

Editor's Note

Since the inauguration of President Biden, expectations for the resumption of inter-Korean dialogue, which has been severed, have been rising. However, despite the U.S.'s willingness to resume dialogue, the reality is that it is still difficult to break the ice due to North Korea's cynical attitude. Professor Shin Sung-ho analyzes that President Moon Jae-in's role is once again important in this situation as a mediator between the U.S. and North Korea, and argues that President Moon Jae-in and Chairman Kim Jong-un must meet again to revive inter-Korean dialogue.

Inter-Korean dialogue has been suspended since the breakdown of the Hanoi Summit between the U.S. and North Korea in February 2019, and this stalemate has continued tediously. The new Biden administration's message to North Korea is positive. While it may not pursue a Trump-style grand bargain, it has stated that it will still pursue dialogue through a calibrated and pragmatic approach. Subsequently, at the South Korea-U.S. summit in May, it was declared that the U.S. would continue its North Korea policy based on the Panmunjom Joint Declaration (April 2018) between the two Koreas, as well as the Singapore Agreement (June 2018) between Trump and Kim Jong-un. President Biden's intention to resume dialogue with North Korea appeared very clear, as he introduced Ambassador Sung Kim, who played a key role in U.S.-North Korea negotiations during the Trump administration, as the new U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy and applauded him during the joint press conference.

U.S. Willingness to Resume Dialogue and North Korea's Cynical Response

However, North Korea's response remains cynical. Chairman Kim Jong-un, who recently acknowledged a severe internal crisis due to COVID-19, emphasized an independent path at the plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea in mid-June, while also instructing to be "prepared for both confrontation and dialogue" in future relations with the U.S. However, Kim Yo-jong, Vice Department Director, immediately dismissed Jake Sullivan's statement (June 20) that he considered Kim Jong-un's remarks as an "interesting signal," calling it "more wishful thinking than interpretation" and pouring cold water on U.S. expectations and hopes (June 22).

Perhaps the shock of Hanoi, which forced Chairman Kim Jong-un, who had traveled thousands of kilometers by train in anticipation of a big deal with President Trump, to return empty-handed, remains a painful trauma for North Korean officials that they do not wish to repeat. Furthermore, suspicions about diplomatic negotiations with the Biden administration, which came to power criticizing Trump's North Korea diplomacy, will be even greater. However, without the withdrawal of various sanctions led by the U.S., the economic construction that Chairman Kim desires is fundamentally impossible. This is why Chairman Kim, who shed tears mentioning the suffering of the people at the military parade last October, will ultimately have no choice but to engage in U.S.-North Korea dialogue.

The problem is that it is difficult for both sides to break the ice for dialogue. Especially from North Korea's perspective, it will be very difficult to have expectations and trust in dialogue with the new Biden administration, which is at the opposite pole from President Trump. In that case, it is also difficult to request mediation from China or Russia, who have further escalated their confrontation with the Biden administration. This is why South Korea must be used once again to communicate with Biden.

The reasons why North Korea should resume dialogue with the current South Korean government are as follows:

First, the Biden administration trusts the South Korean government. In May, President Biden held his second in-person summit with President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, following his meeting with Japan's Prime Minister Suga. Some may dismiss this as merely the second summit after the one with Prime Minister Suga. However, the significant point is that, excluding Japan, South Korea was invited for its second in-person summit after taking office, bypassing all NATO allies, as well as neighboring countries like Canada and Mexico. Furthermore, the South Korea-U.S. summit was evaluated as more meaningful in both format and content compared to the U.S.-Japan summit.

Second, for the Biden administration, the North Korean nuclear issue and U.S.-North Korea talks are not a foreign policy priority. This is in contrast to President Trump, who made summit talks with North Korea the most important agenda item throughout his term. The Biden administration faces the difficult task of concentrating on pressing domestic issues such as COVID-19 response, large-scale economic stimulus, healing sharp racial and social conflicts, and infrastructure investment. This is similar to the desperate situation of the Kim Jong-un regime, which is suffering from a triple crisis of COVID-19, economic crisis due to border closures, and food shortages due to natural disasters. In addition, urgent foreign policy issues are piling up, including the withdrawal from Afghanistan, restoring alliances such as NATO, setting relations with Russia, the recent Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and nuclear negotiations with Iran. Of course, establishing a new relationship with China, including issues of trade, human rights, and climate change, will naturally be the most important foreign policy agenda for Biden's America in the medium to long term. This means that even if North Korea wants it, there are not many incentives for Biden to focus on negotiations with North Korea.

Third, South Korea's international standing confirmed through the recent G7 summit. Even if North Korea proudly claims to have become the world's ninth nuclear power, South Korea has also proven through this meeting that it has entered the ranks of the world's top 10 powers in terms of comprehensive national strength. Although invited as an observer to this meeting, it was evident at the summit that all member states, except Japan, expressed respect and admiration for South Korea's COVID-19 containment efforts, as well as its accumulated economic and technological capabilities. North Korea expects that if it proceeds smoothly with denuclearization negotiations with the U.S., various economic sanctions will be lifted, and it will be able to pursue economic development in earnest. In this process, the Republic of Korea, being geographically, ethnically, and linguistically closest, will continue to play the most crucial role. Before that, South Korea's support and know-how would be the most effective help in containing COVID-19, which North Korea is currently facing the greatest difficulties with.

Fourth, the upcoming South Korean presidential election and President Moon Jae-in's domestic political factors. With the presidential election approaching in May next year, the election fervor is heating up among the ruling party, the opposition party, and various candidates within them. Conversely, this is also interpreted as a period when the lame-duck phenomenon is beginning to manifest for the current administration, with less than a year left in its term. However, what is noteworthy is President Moon Jae-in's current approval rating. In recent opinion polls, President Moon's approval rating has rebounded from a recent decline and is hovering around the 40% range. This is analyzed as an unusually stable performance compared to the approval ratings of past presidents with less than a year left in their term. For example, in contrast, President Roh Moo-hyun, who experienced severe lame-duck phenomena with an approval rating in the low 20s, held the 10.4 Summit with Chairman Kim Jong-il in December 2007, just before the presidential election. In a recent interview with TIME magazine, President Moon Jae-in stated, "There is not much time left for me," but added, "President Biden supports inter-Korean dialogue, reconciliation, and cooperation."

The Role of President Moon Jae-in, Crucial for Resuming U.S.-North Korea Dialogue

President Biden accepted the Trump-Kim Jong-un Singapore Agreement as U.S. policy toward North Korea at the suggestion of President Moon Jae-in. He indicated that he could meet with Chairman Kim Jong-un if denuclearization conditions were met. This is a moment when President Moon Jae-in's role as a mediator can be crucial once again to bridge the dilemma between President Biden, who favors working-level contacts, and North Korea, which prefers top-down negotiations. This is why President Moon Jae-in, who has emerged as President Biden's most trusted partner, and Chairman Kim Jong-un must meet again to revive U.S.-North Korea dialogue. ■

■ Shin Sung-ho - Professor at the Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University. He holds Master's and Ph.D. degrees from the Fletcher School at Tufts University. His main research areas include military security, U.S. foreign policy, and East Asian and Korean Peninsula affairs. His publications include "The North Korean Nuclear Issue and Peace Settlement on the Korean Peninsula" (2008, co-authored) and "Dilemma of South Korea’s Trust Diplomacy and Unification Policy" (2014, International Journal of Korea Unification Studies).

• Management and Editing : Pyo Kwang-min Senior Research Fellow, EAI
  
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