[Global NK Commentary] Prospects for Resuming North Korea-U.S. Nuclear Negotiations After the South Korea-U.S. Summit

Editor's Note

Following the South Korea-U.S. summit, discussions and policy coordination between the two countries regarding the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula are becoming visible. In a joint statement, the leaders of South Korea and the U.S. expressed their intention to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic means, based on the fundamental framework of the Panmunjom Declaration and the Singapore Agreement. In response, Jeon Jae-seong, Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies (and Professor at Seoul National University's Department of Political Science and International Relations), examines the conditions for North Korea-U.S. negotiations and the possibility of resuming talks, including building trust between North Korea and the U.S., enhancing and specifying the U.S. policy toward North Korea, and securing China's active cooperation.

With the announcement of the core elements of the Biden administration's North Korea policy review in late April 2021 and the South Korea-U.S. summit on May 21, discussions and policy coordination between the two countries regarding the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula have become visible. The U.S. is stating that it will seek solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue step-by-step at the working level through a pragmatic and phased approach, overcoming the shortcomings of past approaches by the Obama and Trump administrations. The South Korean government has shown its will to maintain the achievements made in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue in 2018. Consequently, in the joint statement by the leaders of South Korea and the U.S., they expressed their intention to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic means, based on the fundamental framework of the Panmunjom Declaration and the Singapore Agreement.

Currently, the full scope of the Biden administration's North Korea policy review is not known, and it is unclear whether there are plans for future announcements. However, observing the diplomatic efforts the U.S. made toward South Korea during this summit, it is evident that the U.S. is pursuing a meticulous approach that involves coolly calculating the interests of both the U.S. and its counterpart and advancing common interests. We can expect the U.S. to make phased and practical efforts to coordinate the interests of both North Korea and the U.S. while accommodating the opinions of its allies and the international community. North Korea has maintained a wait-and-see attitude to grasp the full picture of the Biden administration's strategy toward North Korea. What are the conditions for resuming North Korea-U.S. negotiations in the future, and what is the likelihood of talks resuming?

Conditions for North Korea-U.S. Negotiations and Prospects for Resuming Talks

North Korea clearly stated the conditions for resuming dialogue with the U.S. in a statement by Kim Yo-jong on July 10 of last year. Although these were conditions from the Trump era, they can be referenced as conditions for future dialogue resumption in the absence of any other clear statement of position. Kim Yo-jong stated that since North Korea must deal with the entire U.S., not just President Trump, building trust with the entire U.S. is important, and cited the withdrawal of the U.S.'s hostile policy toward North Korea as a condition for trust-building. She also clarified that the lifting of economic sanctions holds no particular meaning in the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward North Korea. The economic benefits themselves are not important unless the lifting of sanctions signals the content of the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward North Korea. North Korea is observing what considerations the U.S. has and what it can offer to guarantee its regime in exchange for security for security.

This position is connected to the breakdown of the Hanoi summit on February 28, 2019. In a speech at Stanford University on January 31, 2019, then-U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun discussed the preparations for the Hanoi talks. Following the Singapore summit, a relatively consistent channel of dialogue had been established between North Korea and the U.S., and there was cautious optimism about resolving the North Korean nuclear issue due to the international community's attention and support. The U.S. was pursuing the complete, verifiable dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and ultimately all weapons of mass destruction, but was reportedly promised by the North Korean side that it would start with the Yongbyon facility and gradually expand to all plutonium and uranium facilities. North Korea had agreed to a complete declaration of its nuclear program at a certain point before the complete dismantlement of its nuclear weapons, and the U.S. was considering corresponding compensation, he pointed out.

The problem is that, as revealed in Bolton's memoir, Biegun's negotiation proposal was thoroughly ignored within the White House just before the Hanoi summit. Ultimately, the Hanoi summit failed, and it is clear that this must not be repeated for North Korea-U.S. negotiations to resume. North Korea has lost trust in the special representative for North Korea, who could not represent the will of the U.S. President, and has also lost trust in the South Korean government, which had positioned itself as a mediator between North Korea and the U.S. From North Korea's perspective, the conditions for resuming North Korea-U.S. talks will importantly include not only the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward North Korea but also the authority of the special representative for North Korea and the strengthening of South Korea's negotiating power with the U.S. based on close coordination between South Korea and the U.S. Furthermore, for North Korea-U.S. negotiations to resume, there must be a signal of withdrawal of the hostile policy toward North Korea not only from President Biden but from the entire U.S., and the working-level negotiators must not only have the full authorization of the President but also provide appropriate compensation corresponding to the dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons.

At the press conference following the South Korea-U.S. summit, President Biden appointed Ambassador Sung Kim as the special representative for North Korea and demonstrated his full authorization in front of the South Korean delegation. Moreover, unlike the Trump administration, the Biden administration and its executive branch will approach North Korea negotiations with a complete system, making policy divisions among the President, the administration, and Congress unlikely. Ultimately, U.S. policies that can meet the security-for-security conditions between North Korea and the U.S. are important. The coordination between South Korea and the U.S. regarding the North Korean nuclear issue and peace on the Korean Peninsula has also been elevated in preparation for the summit. The Biden administration has repeatedly shown respect for the positions of its allies, particularly South Korea, on solutions to the North Korean nuclear issue, and the South Korean government has also made statements supporting the U.S. policy review. In addition to the North Korean nuclear issue, as South Korea-U.S. partnerships have been strengthened in areas such as regional security in East Asia, economy, technology, and health, we can expect closer relations between South Korea and the U.S. and continued policy coordination toward North Korea in this process.

Meanwhile, from the U.S. perspective, it is difficult to engage in substantive negotiations with North Korea if there is no sincerity shown by North Korea in its efforts toward complete nuclear dismantlement. North Korea has not reached an agreement with the Biden administration on the final state of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, and the U.S. cannot help but confirm the nuclear dismantlement promises made by North Korea during the Trump era. Although the U.S. stated in the joint statement of the South Korea-U.S. summit that it would pursue negotiations based on the Panmunjom Declaration and the Singapore Agreement, it also made clear that it could not hold a summit until North Korea's willingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons is confirmed. For now, there will be a tense tug-of-war between the U.S., which seeks to confirm North Korea's willingness toward complete nuclear dismantlement, and North Korea, which seeks evidence of the withdrawal of the hostile policy toward it.

It is not easy to build trust between North Korea and the U.S. in the short term. A foundation for meaningful dialogue between North Korea and the U.S. must be laid through various trust-building measures over a considerable period. Efforts that both South Korea and the U.S. can make include, first and foremost, close and consistent policy consultations between the two countries. North Korea has expressed serious doubts about the South Korean government's ability to persuade the U.S. since the breakdown in Hanoi. The U.S. is concerned that South Korea may try to persuade North Korea while weakening sanctions against it. When South Korea achieves perfect policy coordination with the U.S., North Korea will trust South Korea's mediation efforts more. Furthermore, the U.S. can also gain trust in South Korea's efforts to improve relations with North Korea and its inter-Korean cooperation projects. The U.S. must be convinced that South Korea's efforts in humanitarian aid or inter-Korean relations improvement projects, which the South Korean government may pursue in the future, can help build trust with North Korea while adhering to the principles of international sanctions against North Korea.

Second, the U.S. policy toward North Korea must have high priority and specificity. It is well-known that the Biden administration's current priorities are overcoming the COVID-19 pandemic, recovering the domestic economy, and particularly restoring the middle class. In foreign policy, there are numerous issues such as China, Russia, the environment, health, Iran, and the Middle East situation. It is true that the North Korean nuclear issue has a lower priority compared to these issues. When the U.S. takes the North Korean nuclear issue seriously and strengthens its will to resolve it, North Korea will also actively engage in negotiations. The Trump administration discussed a bright future for North Korea if it abandoned its nuclear weapons, but it is difficult to persuade North Korea without concrete plans. Special Representative for North Korea Biegun tried to present detailed U.S. support measures for North Korea as much as possible, but it was still insufficient. When the roadmap for lifting economic sanctions, as well as the U.S. plans for North Korea's self-help measures thereafter, are specific, the credibility of regime guarantees for North Korea will increase.

Importance of Separating U.S.-China Strategic Competition from the North Korean Nuclear Issue

China's active cooperation is also an important factor in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. China has not expressed a particular stance on the Biden administration's North Korea policy review. The Biden administration has presented nuclear non-proliferation, along with environmental and health issues, as areas for cooperation with China. China also supports the goal of denuclearization of North Korea from the perspective of a great power adhering to international norms. The issue is whether cooperation between the U.S. and China on the North Korean nuclear issue can be secured amidst the intensifying strategic competition between the U.S. and China. If North Korea-U.S. relations improve during the denuclearization process, and the future direction of North Korea's foreign policy becomes unpredictable, China is likely to approach the North Korean nuclear issue with greater vigilance amidst U.S.-China strategic competition. Furthermore, in the joint statement of the recent South Korea-U.S. summit, the leaders of the two countries included content that effectively checks China in the South China Sea and Taiwan. If China perceives that South Korea is moving the South Korea-U.S. alliance in a direction that checks China, its stance on the North Korean nuclear issue will be unpredictable. Since economic sanctions against North Korea are a key element of the North Korea policies of both South Korea and the U.S., China's decision on whether to maintain sanctions is crucial. It is important for both South Korea and the U.S. to maintain the possibility of separating U.S.-China strategic competition from the North Korean nuclear issue through diplomatic efforts. 

■ Jeon Jae-seong- Director of the EAI Center for National Security Studies, Professor at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as President of the International Political Science Association and as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, the South Korea-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works and edited volumes include "Threats of War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

• Managed and Edited by: Pyo Kwang-min Senior Researcher, EAI
  
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