[New Year Special Commentary Series - EAI Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy] ⑦ Outlook for the Biden Administration's Middle East Policy and Strategies for Korean Diplomacy

Editor's Note

In the final commentary of the "EAI Korean Diplomacy 2021 Outlook and Strategy" series, Kim Kang-seok, a research fellow at the Dankook University Institute for GCC Studies, predicts that the Iran nuclear deal, a key concern for the Biden administration's Middle East policy, will face a challenging path. While the Biden administration advocates for a new agreement within the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Iran insists on the US taking the first step, attributing all issues to the US. The author forecasts that the new US administration will strengthen its policy engagement with Middle Eastern countries, positively assess the Abraham Accords, and simultaneously pursue a policy shift regarding Palestine. In response, Korea is advised to keenly observe the evolving Middle East dynamics, broaden its diplomatic horizons to engage in discussions with the US, and strengthen partnerships with Middle Eastern nations.

Biden Administration's Iran Denuclearization Negotiations: A Foreboding Journey

The primary focus of the Biden administration's Middle East policy is the Iran denuclearization negotiations. The US and Iran relations have reached a nadir due to the Trump administration's withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), additional economic sanctions, and the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force. Although the Biden administration has pledged to pursue nuclear negotiations with Iran, the process of reaching an agreement portends a difficult path ahead.

Firstly, hardline sentiment is gaining traction within Iran ahead of the Biden administration's inauguration. The influence of conservatives has grown within the Iranian parliament, and following the assassination of nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in November 2020, hardline measures related to nuclear activities have been rapidly implemented. On January 4, 2021, Iran announced its decision to increase uranium enrichment levels to 20%, exceeding the 3.67% agreed upon in the 2015 JCPOA. Furthermore, Iran declared that it would expel International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors if US sanctions were not lifted by February 21. Even if this stance is a strategic maneuver to enhance its negotiating leverage with the Biden administration, Iran's hardline attitude indicates that the negotiations will be arduous.

Most importantly, the Biden administration and the Iranian government hold significantly different positions regarding the nuclear issue. The Biden administration insists on the necessity of a new agreement within the framework of the JCPOA. In other words, Washington has indicated plans to engage in comprehensive negotiations by selecting additional agenda items not discussed in the JCPOA, such as missile development, human rights issues, and activities destabilizing the region. Specifically, the US position is that its return to the JCPOA may only be possible if Iran reverses its actions, such as increasing uranium enrichment levels, which violate the JCPOA agreement.

Conversely, Iran attributes all issues to the US and demands that the US take the first step. The Iranian government points to the US's unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and the imposition of additional sanctions, arguing that sanctions relief must precede any other action. Iran maintains a firm stance that additional agenda items mentioned by the Biden administration, such as the missile issue, are absolutely not subject to negotiation. Furthermore, Iran is demanding compensation for damages incurred due to the illegal sanctions imposed by the Trump administration, which it claims violated the JCPOA in pursuit of negotiations. Additionally, Iran questions how any agreement can be guaranteed to remain in effect regardless of the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration is expected to strengthen cooperation with its European allies from a multilateral perspective in its engagement with Iran. By restoring alliances strained during the Trump era, the administration aims to coordinate negotiations with Iran. A significant variable that could negatively impact negotiations is the backlash from US allies such as Saudi Arabia and Israel. The statement from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit held in Saudi Arabia in January 2021 included demands that Iran's destabilizing regional actions, its missile program, and drone activities be addressed alongside the nuclear issue in the negotiation process. From this perspective, Israeli actions against Iran, which the US cannot control, could provoke Iranian hardliners and potentially derail the negotiations.

In addition, the outcome of the Iranian presidential election scheduled for June 2021 warrants close attention. The US-China relationship must also be considered, as China and Iran are forging an unprecedented bond, and China could influence Iran's policy towards the US. However, Iran's need for an exit strategy, exacerbated by prolonged economic sanctions, will be a significant driving force towards reaching an agreement. Nevertheless, given the substantial differences in positions between the two countries and the various potential variables, the negotiations are expected to be challenging.

Restoring Priorities: Iraq and Syria Policy: Key Issues

The Biden administration is expected to intensify its policy engagement on Iraq and Syria, issues that were de-prioritized under the Trump administration. Brett McGurk, appointed as the Middle East Coordinator for the White House National Security Council (NSC), is likely to take the lead on these matters.

In this regard, the first issue to note is whether the strategy of reducing US involvement in Iraq and Syria, pursued by the Trump administration, will be revised to prevent the resurgence of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) and restore US political influence. The Trump administration declared an end to the war on terror following the killing of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi in October 2019. However, the Biden administration is likely to pursue a strategic shift, viewing the potential resurgence of extremist Islamist groups like ISIS as a credible threat. McGurk is a Middle East expert who served under the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations, resigning from his position as Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in December 2018. His resignation was due to President Trump's decision to withdraw US troops from Syria. From this perspective, there are observations that the Biden administration may adopt a more proactive approach to counter extremist Islamist groups and protect US interests.

Second, there is growing curiosity about the Biden administration's strategy for resolving sectarian conflicts and the Kurdish issue in Iraq and Syria. In a 2006 co-authored New York Times op-ed, then-Senator Biden advocated for the necessity of applying federalism, dividing Iraq into Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish autonomous regions, to stabilize the country. While the current situation differs significantly from 2006, his ideas from that time can provide insight into Biden's policy framework. Specifically, the Biden administration may consider strengthening the autonomy of the Kurdish-populated northeastern region of Syria, which is considered a factor in Syria's instability. This would represent a 180-degree shift from the Trump administration's abandonment of the People's Protection Units (YPG), which aided the US in the fight against ISIS. Therefore, it is crucial to closely observe how the Biden administration's policy will unfold.

Third, there is a possibility that Iraq and Syria, as states with incomplete sovereignty, could become arenas for proxy conflicts involving regional powers such as Israel, Iran, and Turkey, as well as competing interests of external powers like the US, Russia, and the EU. For instance, the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC's Quds Force, in Baghdad in January 2020, followed by Iran's missile strikes on US bases in Baghdad, escalated the proxy conflict between the US and Iran. Against this backdrop, attention is focused on how the Biden administration, which advocates for multilateralism and strengthening alliances, will coordinate with competitors like Russia on the international stage to resolve the human security crisis in Syria and initiate diplomatic processes for peacebuilding.

Abraham Accords' Positive Assessment and Palestinian Policy

In September 2020, under the mediation of the Trump administration, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain signed the Abraham Accords, normalizing relations with Israel. The Abraham Accords can be seen as a reflection of the weakening of the Palestinian cause and the changing nature of threats in the contemporary Middle East political order. In other words, many Arab countries today place less importance on the Palestinian issue compared to the past and perceive non-Arab countries like Iran and Turkey as greater threats than Israel.

While the Biden administration views most of the Middle East policies pursued by the Trump administration negatively, it holds a positive view of the Abraham Accords. Therefore, the Biden administration is expected to encourage further normalization of relations between Arab countries and Israel. The most anticipated development is whether relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel will improve. The Biden administration's foreign policy emphasis on human rights and its pursuit of negotiations with Iran could create friction with its ally, Saudi Arabia. From this perspective, Saudi Arabia may leverage its policy towards Israel as a political tool in its dealings with the Biden administration.

Furthermore, the UAE anticipates acquiring advanced strategic assets like the F-35 from the US, spurred by the Abraham Accords. However, the Biden administration is expected to adopt a stricter stance on arms support to Arab allies in the Middle East compared to the Trump administration. This is likely due to concerns that arms transfers to Arab allies could exacerbate humanitarian crises in conflict zones such as Yemen.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018 and recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights in March 2019. Additionally, the Trump administration's "Deal of the Century" was considered a peace plan that excluded Palestine and strongly favored Israel's position. Most significantly, President Trump's pro-Israel stance led to a halt in aid to Palestine. Funding was suspended to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) representative office in Washington was closed.

The Biden administration is expected to take measures to restore credibility with the Palestinian Authority, which was undermined during the Trump era. For example, it may reopen the Palestinian representative office and resume aid to UNRWA. However, the Biden administration also recognizes the strategic importance of Israel and is likely to maintain a cautious approach to avoid undermining the strong US-Israel alliance. Consequently, it is unlikely that bold initiatives to resolve the stalled Israeli-Palestinian issue will be pursued early in the Biden administration's term.

Korean Diplomacy's Strategy

First, Korea needs to expand its diplomatic horizons to discuss Middle Eastern issues with the US, moving beyond the scope of inter-Korean relations and the Korean Peninsula issue. To this end, Korea must continuously track changes in key Middle Eastern agendas of interest to the US and be prepared to engage in consultations with the US when necessary. For example, as seen in the Trump administration's International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), the US has a significant interest in maritime security in the Persian Gulf. Furthermore, US competitors such as China and Russia are also showing signs of engaging in competition to establish security order in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, Korea must carefully consider strategies for contributing to the US-ROK alliance while minimizing conflict with Iran and taking global international relations into account. In this context, considering the situation where Iranian funds are frozen in Korea and the Korean chemical tanker Hankuk Chemi was seized by Iran, it is necessary to contemplate the potential role Korea could play in the negotiations between the US and Iran. Unlike passively responding to US requests, as seen in past instances of US troop deployment requests, Korea must proactively identify Middle Eastern issues where it can play a constructive role and explore additional agenda items.

Second, amidst the rapidly changing regional order in the Middle East, the potential for cooperation between Middle Eastern and Asian countries is increasing, necessitating a meticulous diplomatic strategy to strengthen partnerships between Korea and Middle Eastern nations. Since the Arab Spring in 2011, the political and economic order of the Middle East has undergone rapid transformation over the past decade. With the exception of Tunisia, anti-government movements in most Middle Eastern countries have led to the consolidation of authoritarian political systems. Nations such as Syria, Yemen, and Libya have endured severe civil wars, exacerbating the human security crisis amidst a deepening refugee problem. In particular, the oil-producing Gulf states have sought to diversify their economies away from resource dependency under their future national visions, but their plans have been disrupted by low oil prices and the impact of COVID-19.

Amidst these changes in the Middle East's political landscape, and with the US signaling a continued reluctance for military intervention in the region, Middle Eastern countries are increasingly seeking to reduce their dependence on the West and enhance self-reliance, or pursue increased cooperation with Asia, to navigate future uncertainties. Notably, the oil-producing Gulf states are assessed to be strengthening their "Look East" policy, turning their attention towards Asian countries in preparation for a post-oil era. Within this trend, China views the Middle East as a key region for its Belt and Road Initiative and is actively expanding its presence. Japan is also actively pursuing the establishment of cooperative partnerships with Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, Korea must keenly observe the evolving Middle East dynamics and formulate strategies to enhance cooperation with Middle Eastern countries in various fields. ■

■ Author: Kim Kang-seok_Research Fellow, Institute for GCC Studies, Dankook University. Currently serves as the Chairperson of the Middle East and Africa Studies Division of the Korean Association of International Studies, columnist for the "Middle East Odyssey" column in The Korea Times, visiting professor at the Department of Arabic Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, and director of the Islamic Studies Association of Korea. He holds a Master's degree in Diplomacy from Seoul National University and a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Graduate School of International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He was a Fulbright Visiting Researcher at the UCLA Center for Middle East Studies. His research areas include Middle East international relations, Middle East diplomatic history, and US-Middle East relations. Recent publications include "Incomplete Sovereignty and Political Instability in the Middle East" (2020), "Arms Trade and US Middle East Diplomacy: A Case Study of Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia during the Trump Administration" (2020), "Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman's Pursuit of Regime Security and Policy Changes in Saudi Arabia" (2019), and (2017).

■ Responsible Editor: Seo Jung-hye, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 207) / jhsuh@eai.or.kr

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