[EAI Special Commentary] Japan and the Korean Peninsula After Abe Shinzo's Return to Power (3): The Meaning and Prospects of North Korea-Japan Normalization in Building Peace on the Korean Peninsula

[Editor's Note]

The final commentary in the EAI special series, "Japan and the Korean Peninsula After Abe Shinzo's Return to Power," has been published. This commentary was written by Nam Ki-jeong, Professor at the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies, and analyzes the possibility and significance of North Korea-Japan normalization in the process of building peace on the Korean Peninsula. The author argues that as Japan, which had maintained a hardline stance towards North Korea, shifted its policy after the June 12 North Korea-U.S. summit, and with Prime Minister Abe's re-election confirmed, movements between North Korea and Japan are likely to intensify. In particular, if denuclearization achieves certain results and North Korea-U.S. relations show signs of improvement, Japan will inevitably have to seek alternatives to the Japan-U.S. alliance, and North Korea-Japan normalization could be one such alternative. Furthermore, as can be seen from the recent speeches of President Moon Jae-in and Prime Minister Abe at the UN General Assembly, significant progress appears to have been made between North Korea and Japan, suggesting that the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia will unfold at an even faster pace.

The Korean Peninsula Peace Process and Japan in 2018

Following the Pyeongchang Olympics, Japan acknowledged the ongoing inter-Korean dialogue and the possibility of North Korea-U.S. talks, but considered these as part of preliminary consultations, believing it could coordinate the situation through the United States. Japan viewed North Korea's 'smile diplomacy' as an attempt to divide the North Korea-U.S.-Japan alliance and had consistently been wary of and attempting to check the atmosphere of inter-Korean reconciliation. It downplayed the agreement to hold an inter-Korean summit, stating it was not yet at a stage where it could be evaluated. The Yomiuri Shimbun, in an editorial, urged Japan to take on the important role of "sounding the alarm on hasty negotiations and compromises by the South Korean and U.S. governments and demanding a calm response" (Yomiuri Shimbun, March 10, 2018).

However, on the very day the TPP11 was signed in Chile, just a few hours later, National Security Advisor Chung Eui-yong was officially announcing the holding of a North Korea-U.S. summit at the White House in Washington. This was an event far beyond Japan's expectations and marked a day of shock for Japanese diplomacy since the Nixon Shock of 1971. Abe immediately decided to visit the U.S. on the morning of the 9th, the day the North Korea-U.S. summit was announced. His intention was to intervene in the situation on the Korean Peninsula through the United States and control the pace before the inter-Korean summit was held.

From immediately after the announcement of the North Korea-U.S. summit, Japan showed its intention and attempts to intervene in the situation on the Korean Peninsula through the Japan-U.S. alliance. The editorials of conservative Japanese newspapers such as the Sankei Shimbun, Yomiuri Shimbun, and Nikkei Shimbun, which reported on the White House meeting mentioned above, focused on the need not to disrupt the international sanctions front against North Korea led by the three countries of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan (e.g., Sankei Shimbun, March 21, 2018). In a phone call between Abe and Trump on April 6, Prime Minister Abe emphasized the closeness of Japan-U.S. relations and urged Trump not to misjudge the timing for lifting sanctions against North Korea. A news program on the Japanese public broadcaster NHK, reporting on this, stated that Prime Minister Abe was playing the role of Trump's personal tutor in diplomacy (NHK News Shibuya 5 pm, April 6, 2018).

What is also confirmed through major U.S. think tanks and media reports is that those who have advocated for the Japan-U.S. alliance even after the Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit are becoming the source of pessimism by casting fundamental doubts on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, for the time being, the momentum of inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits will continue, and North Korea's denuclearization will proceed, albeit with twists and turns. However, considering that the denuclearization process is a long-term endeavor, if the pace of denuclearization slows down or if North Korea-U.S. relations consequently cool, the anti-Trump campaigns of Japan-U.S. alliance proponents could become a burden on the peace process pursued by the Moon Jae-in administration. Conversely, if denuclearization achieves certain results and North Korea-U.S. relations show new developments, Japan will have no choice but to seek alternatives to the Japan-U.S. alliance. The search for such alternatives could begin with negotiations for North Korea-Japan normalization.

The Meaning of North Korea-Japan Normalization

What, then, is the meaning of North Korea-Japan normalization in the context of the Korean Peninsula peace process? North Korea-Japan normalization is likely to occur based on the Pyongyang Declaration between North Korea and Japan. The economic assistance promised in the Pyongyang Declaration could serve as an effective guarantee for North Korea's denuclearization, complementing the Libyan model, which North Korea avoids. In other words, it would be a resumption of the approach proposed by the South Korean government in its July 7 Declaration in 1988.

From then until 1992, the Korean Peninsula peace process achieved certain results, including the 1992 Basic Agreement between South and North Korea, the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the joint admission of South and North Korea to the UN. Simultaneously, South Korea normalized relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with China in 1992. However, the North Korea-Japan normalization negotiations, which proceeded during the same period, ended in failure, and North Korea-U.S. normalization negotiations did not even begin. From North Korea's perspective, this situation created an uneven playing field, and the development of nuclear missiles was a means to rectify it. Therefore, normalization of relations between North Korea and the U.S., and between North Korea and Japan, is a natural step that must be taken for North Korea's denuclearization.

Meanwhile, there are reports that North Korea is considering the Vietnam model. For Vietnam to serve as a model for North Korea, it needs to escape economic pressure and diplomatic isolation, as Vietnam did in the early 1980s. However, we must recall that normalization of relations between Japan and North Vietnam occurred as early as September 1973. This happened shortly after the peace agreement between the U.S. and North Vietnam was signed in Paris in January of that year. Furthermore, normalization of relations between China and Japan also preceded that of the U.S. As is well known, the abrupt agreement on normalization of relations between China and Japan following Tanaka's visit to China in July 1972 occurred exactly one year after the Nixon Shock. The U.S. normalized relations with China in January 1979, and with Vietnam in July 1995, twenty years after the end of the Vietnam War. Japan's diplomatic agility and promptness stem not only from its remarkable adaptability but also from the preparedness of its diplomacy to maintain diplomatic alternatives outside the scope of the United States.

Japan's Policy Shift and Its Background

In addition, Japan possesses abundant diplomatic assets at the private and local government levels for engagement with North Korea. In February, there was a movement centered around the Fukuoka prefectural assembly to send a bipartisan delegation of 100 local assembly members to visit North Korea. Those who had been hesitant due to anti-North Korea public opinion may come to the forefront if the 'atmosphere' changes. The sentiment among families of abducted Japanese nationals is also shifting towards direct dialogue with North Korea.

Public opinion has been leading this trend since March. A Nikkei Shimbun survey on April 29 showed that 75% of Japanese people supported an early North Korea-Japan summit, and a survey by the Asahi Shimbun on June 17 showed nearly 67% support. The fact that nearly 70% support was shown in a survey by the Nikkei Shimbun, a moderately conservative newspaper representing the interests of the Japanese business community, is noteworthy.

Amidst this domestic shift, Prime Minister Abe began hinting at the possibility of a summit with North Korea after the Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit. On June 14, while meeting with families of abduction victims and others at the Prime Minister's official residence, Prime Minister Abe referred to the June 12 Singapore North Korea-U.S. summit and stated, "The abduction issue is a Japan-North Korea issue. We must resolve it proactively and with responsibility," expressing his determination to attempt direct dialogue. Foreign Minister Kono also stated on June 14 in Seoul, during a trilateral meeting of foreign ministers of South Korea, the U.S., and Japan, that "Japan is prepared to discuss various pending issues with North Korea, including the abduction issue." On the same day, an official from the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in contact with a North Korean counterpart in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

These movements appear to be coordinated with the United States. It is reported that President Trump strongly recommended Chairman Kim Jong-un to 'also talk with Japan' during the North Korea-U.S. summit on June 12. Chairman Kim Jong-un also showed a changed attitude, stating, 'I will talk with Japan,' and did not maintain the previous stance that the abduction issue was 'already resolved.' A Japanese cabinet official stated in a phone call between the leaders of Japan and the U.S. on the same day that, according to President Trump, Chairman Kim Jong-un showed an open attitude towards dialogue with Japan regarding the abduction issue.

Meanwhile, North Korea is also creating an atmosphere for normalizing relations with Japan. The official website of the Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of the Fatherland of North Korea, 'Uriminzokkiri,' has been publishing a series of articles titled 'Chairman Kim Il-sung and Japanese Figures' this year. Through this series, North Korea emphasizes that the normalization of relations between North Korea and Japan was something Chairman Kim Il-sung desired.

Prospects for North Korea-Japan Normalization

Amidst this, the secret North Korea-Japan meeting reported by The Washington Post in late August is drawing attention (The Washington Post, August 28, 2018). The secret contact between North Korea and Japan reportedly took place on July 15 at a hotel in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. The North Korean representative was Kim Song-hye, Director of the Strategic Research Office of the United Front Department of the Workers' Party of Korea, and the Japanese representative was Shigeru Kitamura, Director of the Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office.

If the meeting in Mongolia in mid-June was between the diplomatic lines of the two countries, then a month later, their intelligence lines attempted contact. Kim Song-hye visited South Korea during the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and visited Washington with Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol of the State Affairs Commission, even taking a commemorative photo with President Trump. Judging by her recent activities, she is considered a close confidante of Chairman Kim Jong-un. Shigeru Kitamura has been the Japanese counterpart since Pompeo was Director of the CIA. It is reported that when Pompeo visited North Korea in May, the North Korean leadership requested someone who could directly connect with Prime Minister Abe and was trustworthy, and Pompeo introduced him.

If Kitamura, who maintains close ties with Pompeo, is indeed involved in the North Korea-Japan negotiations, it should be considered that coordination is taking place behind the scenes between Japan and the U.S. If the South Korean government, as well as the U.S. and China, all desire improved North Korea-Japan relations, it can be inferred that the holding of a North Korea-Japan summit is not far off. Following the confirmation of Abe's third term as LDP president, there is a possibility of significant movements between North Korea and Japan.

A change has already begun to appear in Prime Minister Abe's speech at the UN General Assembly. In stark contrast to his speech last year, which emphasized 'pressure,' Prime Minister Abe expressed his intention to pursue normalization of relations with North Korea. President Moon Jae-in, while conveying the atmosphere of the inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, also relayed Chairman Kim Jong-un's intention to seek improved North Korea-Japan relations 'at an appropriate time.' Prime Minister Abe's speech confirmed that the goal of the North Korea-Japan negotiations is the issue of 'normalization of diplomatic relations,' thereby referring to the normalization of these negotiations. Chairman Kim Jong-un's setting of an 'appropriate time' to pursue improved relations implies that there are pending issues to be resolved before normalization. This can be understood as indicating that he is considering a certain response to the issue of abducted Japanese nationals. Significant progress appears to be emerging between North Korea and Japan. The clock in Northeast Asia has begun to tick even faster as North Korea-Japan relations start to move. ■

■ Written by: Nam Ki-jeong_ Professor at the Seoul National University Institute for Japanese Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Tokyo. He previously served as a professor at the Graduate School of Law, Tohoku University, and an associate professor at Kookmin University's Department of International Studies. His main research areas are Japanese politics and diplomacy, and East Asian international politics. His recent publications include "Lee Yong-hee's Perception of the Cold War: Focusing on Perceptions of the Origins of the Cold War and Division," "The Moon Jae-in Administration's Policy Toward Japan," "The Linkage Mechanism Between Historical Issues and Security in Korea-Japan Relations: Conditions and Tasks for a Two-Track Approach," and "50 Years of Korea-Japan Relations: A Comparative Historical Perspective."

■ Managed and Edited by: Choi Soo-yi, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

[EAI Commentary] is a commentary series planned to provide a forum for experts from various fields to express their opinions and present policy recommendations through in-depth analysis of major domestic and international issues. Please be sure to cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution independent of any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not affiliated with EAI and solely represent the views of the respective authors.