[EAI Special Feature Commentary] Japan and the Korean Peninsula After Abe Shinzo's Re-election (2): Abe's Identity Politics and Korea-Japan Relations

[Editor's Note]

The East Asia Institute (EAI) has published the second commentary in its special feature series, "Japan and the Korean Peninsula After Abe Shinzo's Re-election," which aims to analyze the factors behind Prime Minister Abe's long tenure and forecast the future of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. This commentary was authored by Professor Emeritus Jae-jung Chung of the University of Seoul, and it analyzes Abe's identity politics and Korea-Japan relations. The author predicts that Prime Minister Abe, having succeeded in his re-election, will accelerate his pursuit of two goals: 'renewing Japan's national image as a post-war nation' and 'possessing its own military through constitutional revision.' He further forecasts that this could significantly impact future Korea-Japan relations. The issue lies in the fact that these goals are based on a revisionist view of history, and that they may be further strengthened by Abe's disparaging perception of Korea and the anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese public. Given the fluid geopolitical situation on the Korean Peninsula and the reality that coexistence with Japan must be pursued, the author suggests that the South Korean government should seek a path of common prosperity by adopting a flexible approach, drawing lessons from past exemplary cases such as the 'Kim Dae-jung-Obuchi Joint Declaration.'

Prime Ministerial Re-election

On September 20, 2018, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe secured a third term as president of the Liberal Democratic Party with an overwhelming majority. Barring any extraordinary circumstances, Abe is expected to remain in power until 2021. In this context, his term will largely overlap with that of President Moon Jae-in, making it no exaggeration to say that South Korea's policy toward Japan is essentially a contest with Abe. In his victory speech, Abe proclaimed, 'I will exercise strong leadership for the nation and its people.' This can be seen as a call for awakening to South Korea, which has been immersed in a mood of inter-Korean reconciliation.

Abe is, by his own admission and by consensus, a conservative politician. Post-war Japanese conservative politicians have broadly pursued two main objectives: first, the revision of historical perceptions, and second, self-reliance in security. Revising historical perceptions aims to shed the stigma of being a defeated aggressor nation. Self-reliance in security involves revising the constitution, which is influenced by the United States, to allow for the possession of its own military. During his two terms, spanning over seven years, Abe has been more prominent than any other prime minister in advancing these two objectives. It appears that Abe will use this victory, which he considers a firm endorsement from the public, to more vigorously pursue the revision of historical perceptions and self-reliance in security. Depending on the direction of these pursuits, turbulent waves may also hit Korea-Japan relations. Considering the highly fluid situation on the Korean Peninsula, this is a time that calls for unprecedentedly flexible thinking and astute wisdom.

Historical Revision

During his first term in office, Abe revised the Fundamental Law of Education in 2006, establishing patriotism, respect for territorial sovereignty, and reverence for tradition and culture as key objectives for school education. These objectives were subsequently incorporated into the teaching guidelines for relevant subjects, leading to their inclusion in textbooks. This aligns with Abe's assertion in his own writings about the 'spirit of conservatism,' which emphasizes the need to 'preserve the traditions cultivated and passed down through Japan's long history.'

Abe, who advocates for a Japanese-style nationalism, appointed several politicians with nationalistic views to his second cabinet. On February 7, 2013, shortly after the cabinet's formation, Abe stated in a Lower House Budget Committee meeting, 'It is extremely regrettable that I was unable to visit Yasukuni Shrine during my first cabinet.' On April 23, in the same committee, he remarked, 'The definition of aggression is not established academically or internationally.' Finally, on December 26 of that year, he made a surprise visit to Yasukuni Shrine, thereby putting his historical revisionism into practice.

Abe's revisionist remarks and actions provoked backlash not only from South Korea and China but also from the United States. Major U.S. newspapers criticized him in editorials as embodying 'Japan's unnecessary nationalism' and being 'unable to face history.' A report by the Congressional Research Service stated that 'Abe holds revisionist views that deny Japan's aggression and Asia's suffering.' Specifically regarding the Yasukuni Shrine visit, the U.S. Embassy in Japan issued a statement expressing 'disappointment that Japan has taken an action that worsens relations with its neighbors.' Major U.S. newspapers also published editorials describing it as 'Japan's dangerous nationalism,' 'the Prime Minister has declared separation from pacifism,' and 'the Prime Minister's visit to the war memorial is a provocative act.'

Abe's revisionist remarks and actions not only strained relations with neighboring countries but also raised concerns that they could undermine the U.S.-Japan-South Korea security framework and the U.S. pivot to Asia policy. Indeed, China continued to strengthen its military, and South Korea's Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye administrations adopted a confrontational stance toward Japan, leading to strained relations. U.S. think tanks suggested that 'Japan should prioritize future policies over revising its past' or 'abandon counterproductive historical revisionism.' The U.S. government also intervened to mediate the improvement of relations between South Korea and Japan. Under pressure from the United States, Japan was compelled to show some consideration for South Korea's historical perspective and seek mutual trust.

Abe, who espoused strategic diplomacy on a global scale, sought to allay international concerns about Japan's historical perceptions. In a joint address to both houses of the U.S. Congress on April 29, 2015, Abe stated, 'Since the end of the war, Japan has walked forward with deep remorse for the past war. We must not turn our eyes away from the fact that Japan inflicted tremendous suffering and pain upon the peoples of Asia. On this point, my thoughts are no different from those of past prime ministers.' However, he did not use the word 'apology.' In a speech at the United Nations University on March 17 of the same year, at the Asian-African Conference on April 22, and in his statement on August 14 (the 70th anniversary statement), Abe mentioned 'remorse' and praised Japan's post-war journey of freedom, democracy, human rights, and peace, but he did not mention 'apology,' 'aggression,' or 'colonial rule.' Successive prime ministers since Murayama have generally issued statements that included keywords such as 'remorse,' 'apology,' 'aggression,' and 'colonial rule.' Abe, while only mentioning 'remorse,' claimed to be inheriting the statements of past prime ministers. Although South Korea and China remained skeptical of Abe's historical perceptions, other countries generally welcomed them.

Abe's continuous, subtle dissemination of his historical perceptions to the international community can be seen as a strategy to postpone historical revisionism in order to first achieve self-reliance in security. Therefore, the priority or intensity of these policies can change depending on the circumstances. Korea-Japan relations will also experience significant fluctuations accordingly.

Coincidentally, this year marks the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration in Japan. Notably, the prime ministers commemorating the Meiji Restoration have all hailed from Chōshū, Abe's home province and the birthplace of his predecessors. Terauchi Masatake (first Governor-General of Korea) during the 50th anniversary in 1918, Eisaku Satō (Prime Minister, Abe's maternal granduncle and younger brother of Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, Abe's maternal grandfather) during the 100th anniversary in 1968, and Abe himself during the 150th anniversary in 2018. Abe perceives a resemblance between the late Tokugawa shogunate period and the current international situation. He argues that to overcome national crises, a second Meiji Restoration is necessary through constitutional revision. For Abe, who seeks to revise history, he is seizing the opportunity of his extended tenure and the 150th anniversary of the Meiji Restoration. Japan's public broadcaster NHK is also airing a year-long historical drama featuring Saigō Takamori, the Meiji Restoration's guiding spirit and an advocate of 'conquering Korea.'

Korea-Japan Relations

Currently, Korea-Japan relations appear to be maintaining a state of calm on the surface. After the South Korean government announced on January 9, 2018, that it could not accept the 'Agreement on the Issue of Comfort Women' (December 28, 2015) reached by the Park Geun-hye and Abe administrations, the two sides were briefly in sharp confrontation. However, historical issues entered a lull, overshadowed by urgent issues shaking Northeast Asian security and the international order, such as North Korea's missile launches and nuclear weapons development, inter-Korean summits, and North Korea-U.S. summits. Of course, during this period, there were annual disputes over Japan's claims to Dokdo and its descriptions in history textbooks, but these did not significantly impact overall Korea-Japan relations.

South Korea's adoption of a 'two-track diplomacy' toward Japan as a last resort has played a role in the lukewarm situation surrounding historical issues between the two countries. The core of this strategy is to address historical issues based on principles while pursuing cooperation on other current issues at a practical and working level. This includes resuming shuttle diplomacy to restore summit talks and closely coordinating with the United States and Japan on North Korea's nuclear development and missile provocations.

While South Korea's 'two-track diplomacy' is a sound strategy, its stable and sustained maintenance requires the Japanese government to also engage in the 'two tracks.' A train needs two wheels to run. However, the Japanese government has indicated little intention to adopt the 'two-track' approach. Instead, it has revealed intentions to link historical issues with other current affairs. Abe, in particular, urges the South Korean government to firmly implement the 'Agreement on the Issue of Comfort Women' and maintains a negative stance on discussions regarding currency swap agreements.

Abe fundamentally distrusts South Korea. His perception of South Korea is as follows: South Korea does not share fundamental values such as freedom and the rule of law with Japan. South Korea repeatedly raises compensation issues that have been legally settled. South Korea demands resolution of historical issues by shifting its objectives. South Korea does not reliably uphold agreements between nations. Reconciliation requires the cooperation of the other party, but South Korea's stance is too rigid. South Korea is overly deferential to China while being excessively stiff toward Japan. Japan has no need to place importance on South Korea, except concerning the North Korean issue.

Abe's disparagement or disregard for South Korea is significantly bolstered by anti-Korean sentiment among the Japanese public. The Japanese public perceives South Korea as follows: They are tired of South Korea's persistent demands for apologies and remorse from Japan. Observing South Korea's favorable attitude towards communist China and North Korea, and its adversarial stance towards democratic nations like the United States and Japan, suggests that South Korea pursues a different system and ideology than Japan. South Korea's views on the threats from North Korea and China, and the role of the United States and China, differ greatly from Japan's, and it is far more passive than Japan in security cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. South Korea, which unconditionally hates Japan, is untrustworthy and undesirable to visit.

Abe's disparaging view of South Korea and the Japanese public's anti-Korean sentiment have interacted, spreading and deepening. South Korea may feel indignant and retaliate, viewing this as a case of the "thief blaming the owner of the house." However, the reality facing the South Korean government is that it must pursue coexistence with such a Japan. With Prime Minister Abe expected to remain in power for another three years, the Moon Jae-in administration will have no choice but to deal with the Abe administration until its term ends. Furthermore, numerous potential landmines lie between South Korea and Japan. For instance, the Supreme Court of South Korea is nearing a decision on lawsuits filed by former forced laborers against companies like Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Depending on the ruling, the very foundation of the 1965 Treaty on Basic Relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea could be called into question. The issue of 'comfort women' could also reignite. If Japan's historical issues are intertwined with these, it is not inconceivable that Korea-Japan relations could deteriorate to an extreme and lead to a breakdown.

How, then, can South Korea and Japan overcome the potential difficulties they may face? I would recommend employing the wisdom of 'knowing oneself and the enemy' (知彼知己) and 'putting oneself in the other's shoes' (易地思之). South Korea and Japan need to accurately understand how the other perceives and responds to them. This includes Japan's disparaging views and anti-Korean sentiment, and South Korea's sense of victimhood and resentment towards Japan. By understanding each other well, they can find ways to resolve their grievances.

Furthermore, South Korea and Japan must accurately understand how historical issues have been handled over the past 70 years, what has been achieved, and what challenges remain. Although South Korea and Japan have fiercely debated and conflicted over historical issues, they have achieved considerable progress through compromise, cooperation, and competition. As a result, they have built nations that uphold liberal democracy, market economy, human rights, equality, and peace. A proper understanding of this history, viewed as 'achievements' rather than 'vestiges of the past,' can provide significant wisdom for problem-solving.

This year marks the 20th anniversary of the 'New Korea-Japan Partnership Joint Declaration,' announced on October 8, 1998, by President Kim Dae-jung and Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. Despite significant differences in historical perception, particularly regarding the understanding and evaluation of 'colonial rule,' South Korea and Japan jointly created and promulgated the well-known 'Joint Declaration' below: "Prime Minister Obuchi, reflecting on the relationship between Korea and Japan in this century and humbly accepting the historical fact that Japan, through its colonial rule, inflicted immense damage and suffering upon the Korean people, expressed his deep remorse and heartfelt apology for this. President Kim Dae-jung, taking Prime Minister Obuchi's expression of historical perception seriously and appreciating it, expressed his view that it is the call of the times for both countries to strive to overcome the unfortunate history of the past and develop a future-oriented relationship based on reconciliation, good neighborliness, and cooperation."

This 'Joint Declaration' is significant because it marked the first time South Korea and Japan agreed on historical perceptions and formalized this agreement, proclaiming it not only to their respective publics but also to the international community. It is also noteworthy that the historical perception outlined in this 'Joint Declaration' was reflected in the 'Pyongyang Declaration' between Prime Minister Koizumi and Chairman Kim Jong-il on September 17, 2002.

Looking back, even when South Korea and Japan established diplomatic relations on June 22, 1965, through the Treaty on Basic Relations ('Korea-Japan Agreement'), they clashed head-on regarding the understanding and evaluation of colonial rule, failing to include even the term 'colonial rule,' let alone 'apology and remorse.' Over thirty years later, while Japan's economic growth, democratic development, and improved awareness contributed to the improvement of Japan's historical perceptions, as seen in the 'Joint Declaration,' historical research and dialogue between the two countries also played a significant role. We must also acknowledge the efforts of both governments in persistently negotiating and carefully compromising to accept these endeavors.

Subsequently, Japan's historical perception improved further. On August 10, 2010, Prime Minister Naoto Kan issued the following well-known statement on the occasion of the '100th anniversary of the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty': "This year marks a major turning point in Korea-Japan relations. Exactly 100 years ago, the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty was signed, initiating 36 years of colonial rule. As evidenced by the fierce resistance during the March 1st Movement, the Korean people, against their will, had their nation and culture taken away through colonial rule under political and military circumstances, inflicting deep wounds on their national pride. I intend to approach history with sincerity. With the courage to face historical facts and the humility to acknowledge them, I intend to be forthright in reflecting on our past wrongdoings. Furthermore, it is said that those who inflicted pain tend to forget easily, while those who received it do not. Hereby, I once again express my deep remorse and heartfelt apology for the immense damage and pain caused by this colonial rule."

The 'Kan Statement' represented progress compared to the 'Joint Declaration' in that it acknowledged that 'colonial rule was carried out against the will of the Korean people under political and military circumstances.' This indicates a shift from the logic consistently asserted by the Japanese government until then, namely, that 'colonial rule was legally carried out through the Annexation Treaty.'

Shortly after the 'Kan Statement' was issued, the Democratic Party government was replaced by the Liberal Democratic Party government. Consequently, few people even remember the 'Kan Statement' today. Instead, there is a sense that Abe's historical revisionism is becoming the prevailing trend. However, a prime minister's statement, officially approved by the cabinet, should not be disregarded. It is hoped that Prime Minister Abe, even if reluctantly, will include the 'Kan Statement' among the historical perceptions of past governments that he pledges to inherit.

If South Korea and Japan employ the wisdom of knowing themselves and the enemy, and putting themselves in the other's shoes, they can overcome the turbulent waves of historical issues and forge a future of common prosperity. This is the true desire of the people of both nations and the calling of world history. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who seeks to exercise strong leadership for his nation and people, and President Moon Jae-in, who aims to usher in an era of peace in Northeast Asia beyond inter-Korean reconciliation, are precisely the leaders capable of achieving this feat. ■

■ Author: Jae-jung Chung_ Professor Emeritus, University of Seoul. He graduated from Seoul National University with a degree in History Education and obtained a Master's degree from the University of Tokyo and a Ph.D. in History from Seoul National University. He served as a professor in the Department of Korean History at the University of Seoul and has held positions such as a member of the National History Compilation Committee and Chairman of the Northeast Asian History Foundation. His main research areas include modern Korean history and Korea-Japan relations history. His major works include "10,000 Years of Seoul and Kyoto," "A History of Korea-Japan Relations in the 20th Century (Read Through Themes and Issues)," and "Japanese Imperialism and Korean Railways: 1892-1945."

■ Responsible Editor: Choi Soo-yi, EAI Research Fellow

Inquiries: 02 2277 1683 (ext. 105) I schoi@eai.or.kr

The [EAI Commentary] is a series of commentaries planned to provide a forum for experts from various fields to offer in-depth analyses and policy recommendations on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting. EAI is an independent research institution unaffiliated with any partisan interests. The claims and opinions expressed in reports, journals, and books published by EAI are not attributable to EAI and represent solely the views of the individual author.