Solving the Homework Left by the US-North Korea Summit

[Editor's Note]

A historic meeting between the leaders of the United States and North Korea took place on June 12. This was approximately 70 years after the Korean War. While it is clearly the first step toward establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula, many expressed disappointment that the joint statement, contrary to initial expectations, lacked a specific roadmap and timeline for North Korea's complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID). However, Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI), and Chun Jae-sung, Professor at Seoul National University, point out that what is important here is not whether CVID is included in the joint statement, but whether North Korea is prepared to accept CVID as the final destination of negotiations. The authors analyze that it is too early for such discussions and that full-fledged discussions on CVID with North Korea will only be possible after North Korea further evolves its current new strategic line into a reform and opening-up line and elevates North Korea-US relations to the level of US-South Korea relations.

North Korea and the United States, which have maintained hostile relations for the past 70 years since the division of the peninsula and the Korean War, held their first historic summit. The US-North Korea summit in Singapore on June 12, following North Korea's participation in the Pyeongchang Olympics, the visit of a South Korean special envoy to North Korea in early March, and the exchange of special envoys between the US and North Korea, concluded with a short and abstract joint statement agreed upon after twists and turns. The joint statement's core content includes joint efforts to build a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula to establish new US-North Korea relations, and North Korea's commitment to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, reaffirming the Panmunjom Declaration. However, alongside optimistic views that the North Korean nuclear issue will be completely resolved and a peace regime will be established, there are pessimistic views that the agreement lacks specific steps and a timeline for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue and merely confirms preliminary principles for building a peace regime. These opposing views have led to completely divergent interpretations of the success or failure of resolving these two tasks going forward. However, what is most urgently needed is a cautious approach that goes beyond hasty optimism and pessimism to carefully examine and properly address the homework left by the US-North Korea summit.

The Hidden Homework of Complete North Korean Denuclearization

The biggest concern at the US-North Korea summit was whether North Korea would agree to a specific roadmap and timeline for complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID) proposed by the United States. Prior to the summit, two meetings were held between Chairman Kim Jong-un and Secretary of State Pompeo, negotiations between Vice Chairman Kim Yong-chol and Secretary Pompeo, and working-level talks between Ambassador Sung Kim and Vice Foreign Minister Choe Son-hui until just before the summit. Secretary Pompeo indirectly pressured North Korea by repeatedly emphasizing verification (V) as the core of the summit in a press conference the day before the meeting. It is known that the US side, through Secretary Pompeo, made every effort to include the terms verification and irreversibility in the joint statement until the meeting began at 9 AM on June 12. However, they ultimately failed to obtain North Korea's consent, and it is reported that President Trump decided to proceed with the summit in the process. Therefore, the abstractness and uncertainty of the joint statement became entirely President Trump's responsibility, and he had to make significant efforts at the press conference to persuade the public of the summit's success.

The joint statement of the US-North Korea summit failed to secure North Korea's agreement on the United States' original goal of complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID), as well as a specific roadmap for the completion of denuclearization. While there were expectations that the US would declare an end to the war and present concrete measures for North Korea's regime security in return for denuclearization, the leaders of the US and North Korea merely reaffirmed the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27 and presented the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Furthermore, the statement lacks mention of verification and irreversibility for North Korea's denuclearization, and it is expressed as 'denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' rather than North Korea's denuclearization. In that it is a reaffirmation of denuclearization based on the Panmunjom Declaration rather than a new agreement on denuclearization between the US and North Korea, it is possible to assess that there has been no significant progress on denuclearization. Moreover, concrete discussions on regime security for North Korea were not included in the statement.

In his visit to South Korea immediately after the US-North Korea summit, Secretary Pompeo stated that the US's denuclearization goal has not changed and that its commitment to alliance with South Korea is firm. In other words, complete denuclearization is a concept that includes verification and irreversible measures, and joint military exercises will be suspended only during productive and trust-based negotiations. He reiterated that North Korea understands the indispensability of verification and irreversible measures through several meetings and that economic sanctions will not be eased before complete denuclearization. This means that although CVID was not literally expressed in the joint statement, it remains an de facto understanding between the two countries and the basis for future negotiations. Ultimately, the explanation is that the goal is denuclearization encompassing all aspects, including past nuclear materials and facilities, and that verification and irreversible measures will be pursued through negotiations.

However, North Korea is not prepared to accept CVID as the final destination of negotiations, even though it can engage in negotiations with the US for CVID at this stage. On April 20, North Korea declared a new strategic line at the plenary session of the Workers' Party of Korea, focusing on economic construction based on the completion of the nuclear-economic parallel development line. The new strategic line is not a parallel development of nuclear construction and economic construction as in the past, nor is it a line of economic construction without nuclear weapons. Instead, it aims to reduce nuclear capabilities to a minimum deterrent level within the framework of nuclear disarmament while pursuing economic construction to the maximum extent possible. In this stage of easing hostile relations, it is realistically difficult for North Korea to practically accept the verification or irreversible measures demanded by the US. To accept the CVID proposed by the US, North Korea must further evolve its current new strategic line into a genuine reform and opening-up line and elevate US-North Korea relations to the level of US-South Korea relations before it can begin serious discussions on accepting US CVID as the final destination. Therefore, at the inter-Korean and US-North Korea summits, North Korea addressed the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in the context of nuclear disarmament and received a suspension of joint US-South Korea military exercises in return for a promise to abandon future nuclear and missile development. Subsequently, North Korea intends to pursue a North Korean-style complete denuclearization while observing US efforts to establish a peace regime, normalize relations, and ease economic sanctions. North Korea confirms this understanding in its overall assessment of the US-North Korea summit, stating, "We shared the view that it is important to adhere to the principle of phased and simultaneous action in the process of achieving peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula."

Therefore, the realistically viable path for North Korea at this stage is to quickly pursue initial self-verification and irreversible measures as part of confidence-building measures, in order to avoid external verification and irreversible measures demanded by the US as the first step of nuclear disarmament. That is, instead of special inspections led by multiple countries or the US, North Korea pursues a method of self-reporting and self-verification, and voluntarily takes minimal irreversible measures. As the first step of complete regime security in this first-stage confidence-building process, North Korea simultaneously demanded the easing of joint US-South Korea military exercises and international economic sanctions. And no matter how strongly the US pressures North Korea by suggesting the possibility of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation policies, and military alternatives, complete denuclearization is a life-or-death decision for North Korea as long as it considers nuclear weapons as the last guarantee of survival and regime security.

As Secretary Pompeo stated, even if North Korea understands the inevitability of verification and irreversible measures, it can only cautiously accept the external verification and irreversible measures that the US hopes for until the final moment of securing North Korea's security guarantees. Therefore, if confidence-building measures, the first step of nuclear disarmament, proceed in a phased and simultaneous manner between the US and North Korea, North Korea will begin to discuss international reporting, verification, and irreversible measures for nuclear facilities and nuclear materials, excluding nuclear capabilities for minimal deterrence, as the next step. While demonstrating North Korea's sincerity for complete denuclearization, it will also actively demand the establishment of new US-North Korea relations, the settlement of a peace regime, and the lifting of economic sanctions against North Korea, as promised by the US.

The confidence-building measures by North Korea, which will proceed as the first stage of nuclear disarmament, are likely to be pursued unilaterally and rapidly. However, the second stage, denuclearization excluding minimal nuclear deterrence capabilities, will proceed at a noticeably slower pace, intricately intertwined with the establishment of a new US-North Korea relationship for complete regime security, the construction of a peace regime, and the lifting of international economic sanctions and economic assistance for North Korea. Furthermore, the third and final stage, where North Korea completes complete denuclearization that can satisfy the international community, along with external verification and irreversible measures, will require a significant level of trust-building and a new strategic decision. If North Korea's new strategic line adopted on April 20 was a conditional decision to reduce nuclear weapons in a phased and simultaneous manner, taking into account the response of the international community, especially the US, then CVID will require North Korea to adopt a complete reform and opening-up line and make another major decision to adopt a parallel development line of denuclearized economic development.

The Difficulty of Complete Regime Security

The next focus of the US-North Korea summit was how concretely the US would accept North Korea's demand for complete regime security. North Korea's Rodong Sinmun reported in detail that comprehensive and in-depth discussions were held on issues related to the establishment of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula during the summit. Chairman Kim Jong-un argued that many problems arise from deep-seated distrust and hostility between the two countries, and therefore, to achieve peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and realize denuclearization, both countries must promise not to be hostile toward each other with mutual understanding and take legal and institutional measures to guarantee this. He also stated that the establishment of a lasting and robust peace regime on the Korean Peninsula is of significant importance for security guarantees, and that decisive steps must be taken to cease military actions that provoke and antagonize the other party. Meanwhile, President Trump expressed his intention to suspend joint US-South Korea military exercises, which North Korea considers provocative, while good-faith dialogue is ongoing between the US and North Korea, to provide security guarantees to North Korea, and to ease North Korea-related sanctions as dialogue and negotiations progress.

In his press conference immediately after the summit, President Trump stated that Chairman Kim Jong-un had promised complete denuclearization and pledged to dismantle major missile engine test sites, following the Punggye-ri nuclear test site, as part of the moratorium on future nuclear and intercontinental ballistic missile development. At the same time, President Trump referred to these as "war games" and mentioned issues with the deployment of bombers from Guam and dissatisfaction with the cost-sharing of the exercises. He also stated that conducting war games while engaging in comprehensive and complete negotiations with North Korea is inappropriate, thereby explicitly mentioning the suspension of exercises. Regarding security guarantees for North Korea, he mentioned the possibility of follow-up negotiations on a peace treaty and hopes for prompt establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea, but the core issue was the controversy surrounding the US Forces Korea (USFK). President Trump stated that he ultimately hopes for the withdrawal of USFK in principle, but it is not being discussed as part of the current negotiations with North Korea and he hopes it will be discussed at some point in the future. This raises the issue of the cost of USFK presence, which has been consistently raised, making it unclear whether the issue of USFK was discussed as part of the security guarantees at the US-North Korea summit. The US has maintained the position through other channels that USFK is not a subject of discussion related to security guarantees for North Korea.

President Trump particularly emphasizes joint US-South Korea military exercises and the cost of maintaining USFK. However, short-term and cost-oriented calculations in the context of the Korean Peninsula could lead to significant losses in US national interests when viewed from a long-term and comprehensive perspective in the broader geopolitical landscape. If the US in the 21st century is to build a new Asia-Pacific order without retreating into isolationism, it must inevitably lay the crucial military foundation for the regional order. Regardless of how rapidly technological innovations in advanced military science progress in the 21st century, it is self-evident that utilizing the existing network of overseas bases is the most economical in terms of cost. Furthermore, in contrast to the Obama administration's assessment of China as a potential partner, the Trump administration views China as a strategic competitor. In this reality, if the US unilaterally reduces its utilization of allied military bases, China's influence in the Asia-Pacific region, which is rapidly emerging, will automatically increase.

The proposals for an end-of-war declaration or peace treaty for complete regime security for North Korea have long been pursued and accepted as a unification strategy contingent on the withdrawal of USFK. Therefore, mutual efforts to resolve the distrust that has existed between the parties who have maintained hostile relations for a long time are extremely important. In response, North Korea has stated its position: "If the US takes genuine confidence-building measures to improve US-North Korea relations, we can also take further good-faith measures in response in subsequent stages."

Solving the Homework Properly

First, the process of North Korea reaching CVID, the final destination of complete denuclearization, consists of three stages: the first stage of confidence-building measures, which will be pursued rapidly and voluntarily to avoid external verification and irreversible measures; the second stage of complete denuclearization excluding nuclear weapons for minimal deterrence; and the third stage of strategic decision-making for a North Korean-style reform and opening-up line of parallel development of denuclearized economy. Therefore, South Korea and neighboring countries must pursue a jointly evolving North Korea policy that is appropriate for each stage, along with North Korea's self-help efforts. In the first stage, specific and systematic support for North Korea's security and prosperity after denuclearization should be provided, along with a blueprint for self-reliance, but pressure should also be maintained to prevent a return to the past when facing difficulties due to insufficient confidence-building. Related parties, including the US, South Korea, China, and Japan, must establish a strong consensus base for maximum engagement for denuclearization and reasonable pressure until the completion of denuclearization. Entering the second stage, President Trump suggested that economic sanctions against North Korea could be eased from the point when irreversible denuclearization of North Korea progresses, while Secretary Pompeo expressed a cautious stance that sanctions relief is possible only after more complete denuclearization, necessitating a precise and consistent response.

Second, for North Korea's demand for complete regime security to be properly met for complete denuclearization, a significant level of trust-building must precede between the US and North Korea, which have maintained hostile relations for a long time. A peace regime requires political, legal, institutional, and military confidence-building. The US-North Korea summit is the first step in political confidence-building, attempting to resolve conflicts of mutual understanding through dialogue and negotiation instead of military means, and these efforts can ultimately lead to the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea. The core of legal and institutional confidence-building is the end-of-war declaration and peace treaty. In particular, given the historical precedent where North Korea's past proposals for an end-of-war declaration or peace treaty were pursued as a unification strategy contingent on the withdrawal of USFK, mutual efforts to resolve this distrust are extremely important. Furthermore, various forms of support guaranteeing North Korea's international status are necessary. However, in the reality of international politics where military power remains an important policy tool, these efforts may be mere "pieces of paper," making military confidence-building extremely important. As North Korea's denuclearization progresses, the US's promise to eliminate the nuclear threat, along with military confidence-building and arms control between the two Koreas, must proceed simultaneously to drive complete denuclearization. Military confidence-building measures, such as enhancing transparency in military information and prior notification and observation of military exercises between North and South Korea, should be pursued first, followed by measures for arms control, such as the relocation and reduction of offensive weapon systems in North and South Korea. The future role and scale of USFK should be discussed in close consultation between the US and South Korea, considering the outcomes of inter-Korean military talks, as US strategic assets and USFK serve as multifaceted deterrents against North Korea's nuclear and conventional attacks.

Third, for North Korea to consider complete denuclearization as its final destination, new efforts are needed to pursue a North Korean-style reform and opening-up line to overcome the limitations of the new strategic line of April 20. For a North Korean-style reform and opening-up line, which is more suitable for complete denuclearization than Chairman Kim Jong-un's current line, to be pursued as a self-help measure for regime security, North Korea's own self-organization efforts and a jointly evolving North Korea policy from neighboring countries are necessary.

Fourth, the issue of complete denuclearization and complete regime security for North Korea is not merely an issue of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, but simultaneously an issue of a peace regime in the Asia-Pacific region. A nuclear-armed North Korea will significantly increase the risk of nuclear proliferation in the Asia-Pacific order, and the instability of the North Korean regime will have a significant impact on the US and China, who seek to lead the Asia-Pacific order. Therefore, to successfully achieve complete denuclearization of North Korea, a complex effort to simultaneously pursue a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula and a peace regime in the Asia-Pacific is important. International economic support is essential for North Korea's complete denuclearization, and complete regime security for North Korea must be achieved in a complex manner at bilateral levels such as the US, China, and South Korea, multilateral levels such as the Six-Party Talks, and global levels such as the UN.■

Authors

Ha Young-sun_ Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington and is currently a member of the Senior Advisory Council for the Preparatory Committee for the Inter-Korean Summit. He has served as Professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs, Director of the Institute for American Studies, President of the Korean Peace Studies Association, member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council (2008-2016), and Co-Chair of the South-North Joint Research Committee for a New Era in South Korea-Japan Relations (2009-2013). His major works include "Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order," "A New Era in South Korea-Japan Relations and Symbiotic Complex Networks," "World Politics in Transition," and "The US-China Competition for Building the Asia-Pacific Order."

Chun Jae-sung_ Director of the EAI Center for International Relations and Professor at Seoul National University. He earned his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University and has served as a policy advisor for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, international relations history, the US-South Korea alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works include "War Threats and Peace Between North and South Korea" (co-authored), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

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