Ha Young-sun Column: North Korea's 'New Strategic Line' and the Two Summits: Denuclearization and Regime Security

[Editor's Note]

The '2018 Inter-Korean Summit' is scheduled to be held on April 27th. This marks the first summit in approximately 10 years and 6 months since the 2007 summit. There is significant public interest in whether the North Korean nuclear issue, which has remained unresolved despite numerous attempts, will find a breakthrough at this meeting. The fact that North Korea, which had insisted on 'first peace treaty, then denuclearization,' has agreed to negotiations is interpreted as a result of a shift in its approach to the negotiation process. However, the crucial factor is North Korea's stance on the core concepts of denuclearization and regime security, which are the substance of the North Korean nuclear negotiations. The key will be whether the proposals fall within the scope of agreement for South Korea and the United States, analyzes Ha Young-sun, Director of EAI. Director Ha emphasizes that to achieve North Korea's complete denuclearization, a comprehensive regime security plan based on absolute trust and guaranteeing North Korea's self-defense capabilities, which are more significant than nuclear weapons, must be established.

Marking Kim Jong-un's 2018 New Year's address as a turning point, the task of resolving North Korea's denuclearization has been progressing at a breakneck pace, akin to riding a roller coaster between war and peace. The verbal attacks between North Korea and the U.S. that nearly led to war last year have subsided, and in the new year, North Korea's participation in the Pyeongchang Olympics and the exchange of special envoys between the two Koreas occurred at a much faster pace than anticipated. This was followed by the North Korea-China summit and meetings between U.S. special envoys and Chairman Kim Jong-un, and on April 20th, North Korea announced its 'New Strategic Line.' Now, an inter-Korean summit is scheduled for late April, followed by a North Korea-U.S. summit. To successfully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, which has failed eight times since the Agreed Framework in 1994 until 2017, and to reach the final destination of North Korea's complete denuclearization and a Korean Peninsula peace regime, free from the dizziness of the roller coaster, it is essential to accurately grasp the strategic shift in North Korea's approach to the summits and for all parties involved, including South Korea, the United States, and China, to work together to solve this problem.

To successfully resolve this historic task, unlike in the past, we must move beyond current simplistic optimism and pessimism and analyze the changes and continuity in North Korea's 'New Strategic Line' from a complex perspective. We must clarify the objectives of the summits pursued by North Korea based on the fundamental documents of the parties involved, and then strive to find solutions that can be agreed upon by all relevant parties, including North and South Korea, the U.S. and China, regarding the core tasks of the upcoming summits: North Korea's complete denuclearization and regime security.

North Korea's 'New Strategic Line': Change and Continuity

To accurately assess the strategic changes North Korea is undergoing ahead of the inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits, it is crucial to carefully interpret the two official statements released to date and North Korea's 'New Strategic Line.' Chung Eui-yong, Director of the National Security Office, announced the results of his visit to Pyongyang to the press after meeting with Chairman Kim Jong-un on March 5th. The core of the six-point announcement is in the third point: 'The North side clearly expressed its will for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and stated that if military threats against North Korea are resolved and its regime security is guaranteed, there is no reason for it to possess nuclear weapons.'

Next, during his summit with President Xi Jinping on March 26th, Chairman Kim Jong-un stated, 'It is our unwavering position to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the last wishes of Chairman Kim Il-sung and General Secretary Kim Jong-il.' He added, 'We will transform inter-Korean relations into a relationship of reconciliation and cooperation, hold an inter-Korean summit, and desire dialogue with the United States.' He further remarked, 'If South Korea and the United States respond to our efforts in good faith, create an atmosphere of peace and stability, and take phased and simultaneous measures for peace, the issue of denuclearization of the peninsula can be resolved.'

Synthesizing these two statements, the issue of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula can be resolved if South Korea and the United States take phased and simultaneous measures to guarantee North Korea's regime security. The new element here is the expression 'phased and simultaneous measures.'

In a statement by its Foreign Ministry spokesperson on October 17, 2015, North Korea criticized the 'denuclearization first, then peace treaty' approach demanded by South Korea and the U.S., as well as China's proposal for simultaneous pursuit of denuclearization and a peace treaty (dual track approach), as unrealistic, and emphasized 'peace treaty first, then denuclearization.' However, Chairman Kim Jong-un's statement of 'phased and simultaneous measures' this time differs from North Korea's previous stance. It suggests the parallel pursuit of denuclearization and a peace treaty, similar to China's dual track approach.

However, it is crucial to determine whether North Korea is attempting a strategic shift not only in the 'process' of nuclear negotiations but also in the 'content' of the core concepts of denuclearization and regime security. Firstly, the March 5th press release following the visit to Pyongyang states, 'The North side clearly expressed its will for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.' However, at the North Korea-China summit on March 26th, Chairman Kim Jong-un stated, 'It is our unwavering position to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in accordance with the last wishes of Chairman Kim Il-sung and General Secretary Kim Jong-il.' The key lies in the meaning of 'unwavering position.' The 'last wishes' of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il referred to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, not North Korea's denuclearization. This concept encompasses not only North Korea's denuclearization but also the presence or absence of nuclear assets in South Korea, and furthermore, the presence or absence of strategic nuclear weapons around the Korean Peninsula. Therefore, if North Korea's will for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula refers to the denuclearization of the entire peninsula, it implies the simultaneous denuclearization of both North and South Korea, rather than just North Korea's denuclearization.

President Trump, in a joint press conference following his summit with Prime Minister Abe on April 18th, stated, 'If North Korea achieves complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization (CVID), there is a bright path for North Korea.' President Moon Jae-in reiterated on April 19th during a meeting with media executives, 'North Korea has declared its intention for complete denuclearization.'

At the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea on April 20th, Chairman Kim Jong-un stated, 'We must make the historic victory achieved in the development of the Republic's nuclear force a stepping stone for new development and launch a revolutionary general offensive to achieve new victories on all fronts of building a socialist powerful nation.' He then outlined the 'New Strategic Line' as follows: First, the 'Byungjin' (parallel development) line has reliably achieved the weaponization of nuclear weapons; Second, nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test launches will be suspended; Third, efforts will be made to join international efforts for a complete suspension of nuclear tests; Fourth, nuclear weapons will never be used as long as there is no threat or provocation of nuclear use, and nuclear weapons and technology will not be transferred under any circumstances; Fifth, full concentration will be placed on socialist economic construction; and Sixth, close solidarity and dialogue with neighboring countries and the international community will be actively pursued. The denuclearization aspect of the 'New Strategic Line' does not represent a declaration of complete denuclearization, but rather an incomplete denuclearization where existing nuclear weapons for minimal deterrence are retained, while further nuclear weapon tests and ICBM test launches are halted.

The second core concept, regime security, is more comprehensive, making it more difficult and controversial to assess changes in its meaning. The phrase 'if military threats against North Korea are resolved and its regime security is guaranteed' in the March 5th press release following the visit to Pyongyang raises the question of under what conditions North Korea will recognize its military threats as resolved and its regime security as guaranteed. The regime security proposals put forth by North Korea over the past two decades of nuclear negotiations have been largely consistent, with minor variations. For denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, North Korea has demanded: first, diplomatic relations (normalization of relations with the U.S.); second, economic support (lifting of sanctions and economic aid); and third, military security (conclusion of a peace treaty). In a statement by the government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea on July 6, 2016, North Korea proposed 'Five Principles for Regime Security': first, public disclosure of U.S. nuclear weapons in South Korea; second, removal and verification of all nuclear weapons and bases in South Korea; third, cessation of deployment of U.S. nuclear strike capabilities; fourth, guarantee of non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea and non-threat of nuclear weapons; and fifth, declaration of the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea. In recent working-level contacts between North Korea and the U.S. to prepare for the summit, North Korea has reportedly proposed five security guarantee measures: normalization of relations with the U.S., a peace treaty, and the withdrawal of U.S. nuclear strategic assets from South Korea (instead of simply withdrawing U.S. Forces Korea), cessation of deployment of nuclear strategic assets in joint ROK-U.S. military exercises, and a commitment not to attack with conventional or nuclear weapons. However, the provisions related to nuclear strategic assets are, in substance, another expression for the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea and the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

There is currently a coexistence of optimistic and pessimistic views regarding the assessment of North Korea's strategic changes ahead of the summits. The inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits have become possible due to North Korea's shift in its approach to the denuclearization negotiation process. However, changes in the substance of the negotiations must be evaluated more cautiously. Therefore, the strategic changes in North Korea's approach to denuclearization and regime security must be clearly assessed at the inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits from the perspective of South Korea and the U.S.'s ultimate goal of 'complete denuclearization.' In this process, particular attention should be paid to the stance of the Trump administration, which emphasizes the failures of past North Korean nuclear issue resolution efforts. The U.S. will strongly adhere to its 'denuclearization first, then peace treaty' position unless North Korea's sincerity towards complete denuclearization is sufficiently confirmed, and will not accept 'phased and simultaneous' denuclearization.

North Korea's 'New Strategic Line' and the Summits

Along with a cautious review of North Korea's strategic changes, it is necessary to properly understand North Korea's fundamental stance towards the summits. In his 2018 New Year's address, Chairman Kim Jong-un presented the slogan for the year as 'Achieve victory on all fronts for building a socialist powerful nation amidst a revolutionary offensive.' The fronts referred to here are the domestic front, the inter-Korean front, and the international front. The domestic front is further subdivided into four fronts: military, economic, cultural, and political-ideological.

The New Year's address does not declare the abandonment of the 'nuclear-economy parallel development' line. Instead, it evaluates 2017 as a year of completing nuclear armament and indicates that based on this achievement, the focus in 2018 will be on achieving the other core objective of the parallel development line: enhancing economic power. However, due to the severe difficulties North Korea faces from intensified international economic sanctions and U.S. military pressure over the past year, North Korea will endeavor to alleviate factors hindering its path to becoming a socialist powerful nation, such as economic sanctions and military pressure, on all three fronts in 2018.

However, the revolutionary offensive on the domestic front is facing practical difficulties due to external economic sanctions and military pressure. Therefore, it appears that North Korea intends to utilize the inter-Korean front as a supplementary means to overcome these challenges. Despite the lack of significant progress in inter-Korean relations due to the South Korean government's outdated approach even after the change of administration in 2017, North Korea proposed to 'jointly endeavor to ease military tensions and create a peaceful environment' due to the urgent situation facing the Korean Peninsula. Simultaneously, it argued that the South Korean government 'should respond to our sincere efforts for tension reduction rather than participating in the U.S.'s reckless war provocation schemes that escalate tensions.'

Meanwhile, on the international front, North Korea briefly stated that as a 'responsible nuclear power,' it would use nuclear weapons for minimal deterrence and 'resolutely respond to actions that undermine the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula.' However, since the New Year's address, to improve the situation that hinders the construction of a socialist powerful nation, North Korea has held a North Korea-China summit and is preparing for a North Korea-U.S. summit.

However, North Korea faces a self-contradiction: to overcome the greatest obstacle to building a socialist powerful nation based on the 'nuclear-economy parallel development' line, it must achieve complete denuclearization. To resolve this contradiction, ahead of the summits, North Korea has softened its previous hardline stance of 'peace treaty first, then denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula' in its North Korea-China summit and 'New Strategic Line.' It is signaling its willingness to negotiate by pursuing incomplete denuclearization and a substantive peace treaty in parallel, aiming to gain certain concessions and compensation during a phased and simultaneous negotiation process. Therefore, negotiations for North Korea's complete denuclearization and a peace treaty can commence. However, the Trump administration will not be willing to pay the price for denuclearization in the early stages of negotiations unless North Korea demonstrates sufficient sincerity towards complete denuclearization. Consequently, the South Korean government will face the heavy task of coordinating the conflicting positions of the U.S. and North Korea from the outset of the negotiations.

North Korea's Complete Denuclearization and Regime Security

The core agenda items for the inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits are denuclearization and regime security. For the summits to yield results, first, it is necessary to clarify the similarities and differences in the conditions for denuclearization and regime security as used by South Korea, the U.S., and North Korea, and then reach an agreement on these issues. South Korea's role in this process is crucial. South Korea must act as an interpreter, explaining how differently North Korea and the U.S. have interpreted the meanings of denuclearization and regime security over time, and furthermore, serve as a navigator to find a path towards a new agreement beyond these differing interpretations.

The starting point for discussing complete denuclearization at the summits will be a nuclear freeze. This will be followed by gradual verification measures such as reporting and inspections, but the important point is that everyone must agree that the ultimate goal is North Korea's complete denuclearization. The outcome of the discussions on denuclearization, the first agenda item of the two summits, ultimately depends on whether the U.S. and North Korea can agree on the same meaning of denuclearization. Especially in the current situation where North Korea's nuclear capabilities are far more advanced than during the negotiations for the Agreed Framework in 1994 or the Joint Statement of 2005, the technical and specific discussions on freezing, reporting, inspection, and dismantling will be much more diverse and complex. Unless North Korea makes a sincere strategic decision for complete denuclearization, it will be difficult to accept the special inspections of various facilities that the U.S. will demand. The U.S. will apply stricter standards and more detailed criteria to North Korea, and if North Korea demands corresponding measures from South Korea and the U.S., negotiations will face difficulties.

Even if North Korea and the relevant parties agree in principle to North Korea's complete denuclearization, a much more difficult task remains: ensuring regime security for a completely denuclearized North Korea. At this stage, North Korea will naturally present conditions for reducing military threats and ensuring regime security, and an agreement on these will be necessary. Since the 1994 Agreed Framework, the 'vicious cycle' of denuclearization and corresponding economic, diplomatic, and military regime security has been an intractable puzzle for the past quarter-century. While diplomatic regime security, such as normalization of relations with the U.S., may be realistically achievable, international coordination is needed on when and in what form economic sanctions relief or economic aid will materialize during the denuclearization process. Most importantly, however, is military regime security. If North Korea cannot move beyond conditions for regime security such as the withdrawal of U.S. Forces Korea, the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. military alliance, and control over nuclear strategic assets around the Korean Peninsula, it will be difficult to establish a regime security plan that can be agreed upon by all relevant parties, including North and South Korea, the U.S., and China.

Furthermore, from North Korea's perspective, the exchange of denuclearization for regime security may seem highly unequal. Even if a declaration of the end of the Korean War is made by North and South Korea, and a peace treaty is concluded by the relevant parties including North and South Korea, in the reality of international politics where a supranational judicial order does not function robustly unlike domestic order, North Korea may not easily overcome the fear that a declaration of the end of the war or a peace treaty could become mere scraps of paper with no effect.

To provide North Korea with regime security that is more sincere than nuclear weapons, recognizing this historical reality more acutely than anyone else, a comprehensive regime security plan must be established that guarantees North Korea's self-defense capabilities and embodies absolute trust. To this end, a declaration of the end of the Korean War and arms control measures by North and South Korea must be prepared, and a peace treaty and a multilateral or Asia-Pacific level peace regime, such as the Six-Party Talks, involving North and South Korea, the U.S., and China, must be linked and established.

Complex Resolution of the North Korean Nuclear Issue

What the parties involved must ultimately keep in mind at the inter-Korean and North Korea-U.S. summits is that to successfully resolve the issues of North Korean denuclearization and regime security, it is necessary to simultaneously pursue a comprehensive resolution strategy involving sanctions, deterrence, engagement, and self-reliance (North Korea's own efforts). The North Korean nuclear issue cannot be resolved solely through economic sanctions and military responses, or through economic aid or improved relations alone, as the past quarter-century of nuclear negotiations has historically demonstrated. However, until North Korea ultimately crosses the final hurdle of complete denuclearization, none of the elements—sanctions, deterrence, engagement, or North Korea's self-reliance—can be absent, and all four pillars must collectively support the roof of North Korea's complete denuclearization until the very end.

Sanctions and deterrence have made significant contributions to bringing North Korea to the negotiating table for denuclearization. However, for denuclearization to advance to the next stage, active engagement, which includes ensuring regime security for a completely denuclearized North Korea, is essential, and complex considerations regarding the 'vicious cycle' are necessary. Without trust-building and exchange through engagement reaching a certain level, denuclearization can regress to its pre-negotiation state at any time. However, this alone is insufficient.

To resolve the North Korean nuclear issue peacefully, rather than militarily or revolutionarily, what is ultimately needed, along with sanctions, deterrence, and engagement, is North Korea's 21st-century evolution. Just as North Korea's planned economy inevitably benefits from marketization, and its closed socio-culture is embracing information technology and efficiency, a political evolution capable of successfully pursuing 'nuclear-economy parallel development' is inevitable. Such a change cannot be imposed from the outside; it can only be achieved through North Korea's 21st-century self-reliance efforts. For this to happen, the relevant parties must also evolve together. ■

Author

Ha Young-sun_ Director of EAI, Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University. He holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from the University of Washington and has served as a professor at the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, Director of the Institute for International Affairs at Seoul National University, Director of the Center for American Studies, and President of the Korean Peace Studies Association. His major works include 'Theories of Complex World Politics: Strategy, Principles, and a New Order,' 'A New Era for Korea-Japan Relations and Symbiotic Complex Networks,' 'World Politics in Transition,' and 'The Competition for Architectural Order in the Asia-Pacific by China and the U.S.'

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