[EAI Commentary] US-China Summit: Seeking Cooperation and Compromise Under the Banner of 'Mutual Respect'

[Editor's Note]

The first summit between the leaders of the US and China, representing the world's two strongest powers, was held from April 6-7 at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida. The meeting took place while the Trump administration's foreign policy and security apparatus was not yet fully in place. Both sides appeared to focus on exploring opportunities for cooperation and compromise between the US and China, rather than on achieving tangible outcomes. Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, which is of utmost concern to South Korea, both sides seemed to agree on the gravity of the matter and the necessity of mutual cooperation, but they did not appear to significantly narrow their differences on solutions. In this context, the authors argue that South Korea must manage the situation to prevent the competition between the two countries from escalating into a 'power struggle' surrounding the Korean Peninsula, and to this end, it is necessary to clearly articulate that a 'Korean Peninsula coexisting peacefully after denuclearization' is what South Korea desires.

The first summit between U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping was held at the Mar-a-Lago resort in Palm Beach, Florida. During the two-day summit, the leaders of the two countries met officially three times, including a welcome dinner, an expanded summit, and a working lunch. Hailed as a 'summit of the century' and generating significant anticipation prior to its occurrence, the meeting between the two most powerful leaders in the world ultimately served more as a 'probing engagement' to foster an atmosphere for future dialogue and cooperation. Notably, unlike previous occasions, this summit concluded without a joint press conference or the issuance of a joint statement. The U.S. announced the outcomes of the summit through a brief joint briefing by three key cabinet members, while China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement evaluating the summit as "positive and fruitful."

Despite these positive assessments from both countries, tangible achievements were limited. Firstly, regarding the '100-day Plan' aimed at resolving the significant trade imbalance, no specific details beyond its name have been disclosed. The briefing only mentioned that the U.S.'s goal through the '100-day Plan' is to increase exports to China and reduce the trade deficit, and that further negotiations are still required. Nevertheless, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross described it as "the most significant thing" to emerge from the summit. In contrast, the '100-day Plan' was not mentioned in China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs statement or in briefings by Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

The second point of agreement was the establishment of new dialogue channels between the two countries. The existing U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED), which comprised 'strategy' and 'economy' as its two pillars, will be reorganized into four high-level dialogues: 1) Diplomatic and Security, 2) Comprehensive Economic, 3) Law Enforcement and Cyber Security, and 4) Social and Cultural. Separately, a Comprehensive Dialogue covering all issues will be chaired by the heads of state of both countries. This appears to be a policy aimed at achieving progress on specific issues through efficient dialogue channel management.

Meanwhile, discussions on key issues between the US and China, such as the North Korean nuclear program and THAAD, appear to have focused on reaffirming existing positions and laying the groundwork for mutual respect. Based on the briefings from both sides, there is consensus on the seriousness of the North Korean nuclear issue and the need for cooperation towards denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. However, the U.S. has indicated the possibility of unilateral action if an agreement with China cannot be reached, while China continues to adhere to its existing position of parallel negotiations for denuclearization and a peace treaty.

Discussions were also reportedly held on issues such as the South China Sea, cyber terrorism, exchange rates, and human rights, though specific details remain undisclosed. Therefore, evaluating this summit based solely on publicly available information has limitations, and it is necessary to examine the outcomes within a broader context, considering the circumstances before and after the meeting.

U.S. Strategy: Communicating Policy Priorities and Establishing Consultation Processes

Given the short, two-day schedule, it would have been difficult for the US and Chinese leaders to discuss numerous bilateral issues. Since taking office, President Trump has not had sufficient time to dedicate to developing a China strategy due to various domestic and international challenges. Furthermore, the lack of sufficient regional experts on Asia in the working-level staff, with only cabinet-level appointments finalized, likely influenced the nature of this summit. President Trump's focus appears to have been on clearly and definitively communicating the U.S. position on urgent and critical issues to China, conveying policy priorities, and establishing future consultation processes with China.

With his 100th day in office approaching, President Trump is fully focused on achieving the policy outcomes he promised during his campaign. To secure his position, President Trump must demonstrate success in reducing the U.S. trade deficit, establishing the framework for fair trade, and protecting the interests of American manufacturing workers. At the US-China summit, economy, particularly bilateral trade, was the most critical issue. Secretary Ross emphasized that the '100-day Plan' signifies that resolving the U.S. trade deficit with China is a significant problem, and agreeing to make progress on this within 100 days is an unusual step in terms of trade policy, indicating efforts to achieve tangible results in a short period. The U.S. likely sought China's cooperation in currency adjustment and infrastructure investment, and China, while not making specific commitments, likely endeavored to accommodate U.S. demands in the economic sphere as much as possible. The response to questions about currency manipulation also suggests that there is still room for maneuver as the currency report has not yet been finalized, hinting at the possibility of a mutually beneficial U.S.-China economic relationship moving forward. President Trump's decision to visit China within the year suggests he will evaluate the outcomes of the '100-day Plan' and engage in full-fledged economic negotiations with China once the Asian policy team is fully established.

A critical and urgent issue is the North Korean nuclear problem. Prior to the US-China summit, President Trump stated in an interview with the Financial Times that the North Korean nuclear issue is extremely urgent and that the U.S. would take unilateral action if China did not cooperate.

The Trump administration has premised its policy on the assumption that North Korea will develop an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of striking the U.S. mainland within its four-year term, estimating this timeline to be within the next few years. At the US-China summit, the U.S. focused on clearly and definitively communicating its red lines, the type of cooperation it seeks from China, and the policy tools it can employ independently. The U.S. made it clear that if China does not exert maximum effort towards denuclearization, it will impose maximum economic sanctions on North Korea and activate secondary boycotts against Chinese companies and financial institutions. The possibility of using military means if economic sanctions prove insufficient has been discussed multiple times, and this was likely conveyed indirectly. Options include preemptive strikes on North Korea's nuclear facilities, deployment of strategic weapons in the Korean Peninsula, and redeployment of tactical nuclear weapons. It is known that such measures are included in the comprehensive plan for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, which was reportedly finalized before the summit.

Although there is significant opposition within the U.S. to the use of military force against North Korea due to the risk of a full-scale war on the Korean Peninsula, a strong willingness to conduct military operations must be signaled for military means to be used as leverage in negotiations. During the US-China summit, President Trump ordered airstrikes on Syria and explained this to President Xi Jinping, thereby showcasing U.S. military power on one hand and conveying the credibility of its willingness to use force on the other. While the Syrian airstrikes may not have been directly intended to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, they effectively served to pressure China into participating in sanctions by implying the availability and willingness to use military force.

China likely reiterated its proposal for parallel negotiations on denuclearization and a peace treaty regime for the North Korean nuclear issue. Furthermore, it likely referenced the broader political context surrounding the North Korean nuclear issue and North Korea-U.S. relations. However, President Trump's framing of the North Korean nuclear issue solely as a problem of North Korea's military threat and nuclear weapons development likely made it difficult for China's approach to be accepted. If China's pressure on North Korea leads to a halt in its nuclear development, the U.S. might then consider China's parallel proposal. However, given that the issue has not been resolved over the past four U.S. administrations, as mentioned by Secretary Tillerson, the possibility of implementing the current parallel proposal is slim. Ultimately, China offered no new proposals, and the summit can be seen as one where the U.S. presented its own vision for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, anticipating a new response from China in the future.

China's Strategy: Probing for Space to Expand

Contrary to expectations that North Korean nuclear issues and THAAD would be major agenda items at this summit, no new progress was officially announced regarding these matters. Despite the Trump administration's hardline stance on the North Korean nuclear issue, President Xi Jinping merely reaffirmed China's existing positions on North Korea and THAAD. He reiterated the dual-track approach (parallel pursuit of denuclearization and a peace treaty) and the dual suspension proposal (simultaneous suspension of North Korean nuclear and missile provocations and ROK-U.S. joint military exercises), expressing hope for a breakthrough in resuming dialogue. Foreign Minister Wang Yi's use of the terms 'introduced' and 'proposed' suggests that China maintained its existing stance, which the U.S. did not accept. It was clearly confirmed through this summit that China is also seriously concerned about the security instability caused by North Korea's repeated provocations. However, this shift in China's perception has not yet translated into actual policy changes.

These circumstances are also evident in China's actions immediately following the summit. While the U.S. is pressuring North Korea by moving strategic assets such as the USS Carl Vinson to the Korean Peninsula, China has dispatched its Special Representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs, Wu Dawei, to South Korea to manage the situation by discussing the North Korean nuclear issue and THAAD in parallel, attempting to prevent further escalation. An unusual phenomenon is occurring where, despite the post-summit declaration of 'achievements,' various situations are unfolding anew. While both countries recognized the risks of North Korean provocations during the summit, they also reaffirmed their differing approaches to response. Consequently, both nations are engaged in an unseen power struggle, pursuing their respective methods to deter North Korean provocations after the summit. As a result, China now faces a significant challenge in maintaining its existing 'North Korea management' approach in the face of the Trump administration's unexpectedly strong stance on North Korea. The fact that President Xi Jinping spoke with President Trump again by phone on the 12th after the summit is unusual and serves as evidence of considerable concern and deliberation regarding the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, China continues to emphasize that the summit was highly fruitful. Foreign Minister Wang Yi published articles on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on April 8th and 9th, detailing the summit's achievements. The achievements China is highlighting are abstract and principled. Firstly, it is stated that mutual understanding and trust between the two heads of state have been enhanced. In particular, it was revealed that President Xi introduced China's governance philosophy and major domestic and foreign policies to President Trump, gaining understanding and consensus on many issues. Secondly, the direction and principles for the development of US-China relations were confirmed. It is stated that the two leaders clearly set the direction for the development of China-U.S. relations and established plans. President Xi Jinping particularly emphasized the symbolic significance of the summit as a 'new start' in a 'new era' for US-China relations. The calligraphy piece gifted to President Trump, featuring a quote from Lao Tzu, was also 'A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step' (千里之行始於足下). This suggests that President Xi Jinping framed the summit as the first step and an opportunity for exploration in the long journey ahead for China and the U.S.

From China's perspective, there are reasons why this summit must be considered a success with 'positive and fruitful achievements,' as explained by Foreign Minister Wang Yi. This can be inferred from Wang Yi's assessment that "President Xi Jinping's visit to the United States was his first overseas trip after the closing of the Two Sessions (National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference), and it was a significant diplomatic activity held before the 19th Party Congress in the fall, thus creating a stable and favorable external environment in preparation for the Party Congress."

To ensure the stable launch of the second Xi Jinping administration, this was an important diplomatic event to solidify President Xi Jinping's political standing both domestically and internationally. Therefore, it is likely that contentious issues that could potentially lead to the failure of the summit were deliberately avoided as agenda items. In other words, for contentious issues like the North Korean nuclear program and THAAD, which are difficult to achieve clear outcomes on in a first summit, a compromise of 'each stating their own position' (각설) was likely chosen.

Despite President Trump's consistent and harsh criticism of China regarding trade imbalances since his campaign, and even his attacks on the 'One China' principle, China has refrained from direct retaliation against the Trump administration. China appears to have made a strategic judgment that it is more rational to proceed with its rise by avoiding escalation of conflict with the U.S. in response to the Trump administration's initial hardline stance, until domestic and international uncertainties are resolved. This tentative approach to managing the situation was also evident at the summit. The fact that the terms 'new model great power relations' and 'community of shared future,' which Xi Jinping has consistently advocated in dialogues with the U.S., were uncharacteristically downplayed at this summit is also related to this cautious approach.

President Xi Jinping also prepared his own logic and 'gifts' to deflect the U.S. offensive regarding trade imbalances. For instance, President Xi Jinping emphasized that bilateral trade benefits both nations' citizens, highlighting the economic interdependence between the two countries. He also stressed that China is undergoing domestic structural adjustments, such as supply-side reforms, expanding domestic demand, and increasing the proportion of the service sector, to reduce the weight of foreign trade in the national economy. Concurrently, he mentioned cooperation in energy and infrastructure construction and proposed U.S. participation in the Belt and Road Initiative.

It is interesting that the Trump administration evaluated China's 'gift,' namely cooperation in resolving trade imbalances, as a major achievement of the summit, while China considered the reorganization of bilateral high-level dialogue channels into four areas as the most noteworthy achievement. President Xi Jinping actively expressed interest in establishing dialogue channels between the two countries at this summit. His emphasis on dialogue and trust-building between the militaries of both nations, particularly noting that military relations are a key component of the US-China strategic relationship, is also noteworthy. President Xi Jinping appears to be wary of U.S. military actions and recognizes the need to actively manage potential unintended conflicts between the two countries.

South Korea's Strategy: Emphasizing Peaceful Coexistence After Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

China finds itself in a dilemma, needing to consider both the U.S. request for stronger economic sanctions against North Korea and its own proposal for parallel negotiations. The Trump administration appears to have effectively rejected China's parallel negotiation proposal by stating that there will be no negotiations unless North Korea's attitude changes, predicated on denuclearization. If so, will China simply stand by and watch the U.S. take unilateral action? Or will it join in strengthening sanctions? Amidst intensifying geopolitical competition with the U.S., strengthening sanctions, thereby risking the collapse or weakening of North Korea, would entail significant costs for China. Meanwhile, the U.S., by signaling unilateral action, seems to have emphasized that the costs of refusing cooperation will be higher than the costs of participating in sanctions.

How will China interpret these signals from the U.S.? Witnessing the Syrian airstrikes during the summit, President Xi's distrust and wariness of the Trump administration's uncertainty and unpredictability may have deepened. In any case, China will ultimately seek the option that best aligns with its own geopolitical interests, and in this process, it will sensitively weigh the U.S.'s future options and resolve. However, given that China is currently facing major domestic political events, it is likely to pursue a strategy of parallel pressure and persuasion towards North Korea to prevent the situation from worsening. Even so, fundamental changes to China's existing position are unlikely. The gap between the U.S. and China regarding a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue stems from a fundamental divergence in their understanding of the future strategic landscape of the Korean Peninsula.

Therefore, South Korea needs to manage the situation to prevent the competition between the U.S. and China from devolving into a 'power struggle' surrounding the Korean Peninsula. To this end, it is crucial to articulate that South Korea's desired outcome is not a scenario of North Korean collapse through strong sanctions, but rather peaceful coexistence after denuclearization, thereby making China recognize that a denuclearized Korean Peninsula is also advantageous for China. ■

Author

Lee Dong-ryul_ Director of the EAI Center for Chinese Studies and Professor at Dongduk Women's University. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Peking University's School of International Studies and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Unification and an executive member of the Joint Research Committee of Korean and Chinese Experts. His main research areas include China's foreign relations, ethnic minorities in China, and Chinese nationalism. Recent works include "Changes and Continuities in the Foreign Policy of the Xi Jinping Regime," "China's policy and influence on the North Korea nuclear issue: denuclearization and/or stabilization of the Korean peninsula?" (co-editor) "Speaking of China's Future" (editor), and "China's Territorial Disputes" (co-author).

Chun Jae-sung_ Director of the EAI Center for International Relations and Professor at Seoul National University. He obtained his Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University in the United States and has served as a policy advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Unification. His main research areas include international political theory, history of international relations, ROK-U.S. alliance, and Korean Peninsula studies. His major works and edited volumes include "The Threat of War and Peace on the Korean Peninsula" (co-author), "Is Politics Moral?", and "East Asian International Politics: From History to Theory."

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