[EAI Commentary] The Trump Administration's North Korea Policy: Pressure on China and the Realization of Credible Intimidation

[Editor's Note]

Following the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis to South Korea last month, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently visited China, Japan, and South Korea. During these visits, the Trump administration's North Korea policy has gradually begun to take shape. Professor Park Won-gon of Handong University analyzes that the Trump administration's North Korea policy aims to achieve denuclearization by strengthening pressure on China and North Korea, rather than through dialogue. These pressure measures include military actions. Professor Park argues that the exclusion of military options, despite the low probability of their actual use, is intended to pressure North Korea by maintaining strategic ambiguity. In other words, the unpredictable possibility of extreme choices by the Trump administration can serve as a psychological burden for North Korea.

The Trump administration's North Korea policy is beginning to take shape. During his campaign, Trump presented various approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue. He expressed a range of views, from direct dialogue with Kim Jong-un, known as the 'hamburger summit,' to a hardline response against North Korea. Notably, in April 2016, Trump caused tension in South Korea with his blunt remark, "If North Korea starts a war with South Korea and Japan, then, you know, it's a disaster... good luck. You're on your own."

However, just 13 days after taking office, Trump sent Secretary of Defense James Norman Mattis on his first overseas trip as a cabinet member, choosing South Korea as the destination. Upon his arrival in South Korea on February 2, 2017, Secretary Mattis stated, "I was instructed to make it clear that President Trump prioritizes the alliance between South Korea and the United States." He also mentioned that the Trump administration considers the North Korean nuclear issue a top priority in its security policy. This resolved the core doubts that had persisted for nearly a year regarding Trump's North Korea policy and alliance policy with South Korea. It was confirmed that the Trump administration had no intention of abandoning North Korea's nuclear weapons while simultaneously withdrawing the nuclear umbrella for South Korea, effectively dismantling the alliance. On March 17, 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Wayne Tillerson, during his visit to South Korea, made more specific remarks regarding North Korea policy. First, he characterized the Obama administration's policy of 'strategic patience' as a failure and declared that the administration was "exploring a new category of diplomatic, security, and economic measures" for its North Korea policy. He also stated that all options, including military action, would be considered, albeit on a principled level. Furthermore, targeting China, which emphasizes dialogue, he asserted that dialogue based solely on a freeze of nuclear activities was premature, emphasized the 'role of China,' and questioned China's oil supply to North Korea. Trump's remarks in Washington have also become increasingly hawkish. In his characteristic repetitive use of adjectives, President Trump stated, "North Korea's nuclear and missile threat is a very, very high priority" (February 12, 2017), "North Korea is a big, big problem" (February 13, 2017), and "Kim Jong-un is acting very, very badly" (March 19, 2017), expanding the target of criticism from North Korea to its supreme leader.

Synthesizing the situation thus far, the Trump administration's North Korea policy is culminating in the pursuit of North Korean denuclearization through intensified pressure on China, coupled with pressure on North Korea including military strikes, which consequently lowers the possibility of direct dialogue with North Korea. The Trump administration holds a negative stance on China's proposed 'dual suspension' (雙中斷), which would exchange a halt in North Korean nuclear and missile tests for a suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, and on the 'dual-track parallel approach' (雙軌竝行), which would pursue North Korean denuclearization and a Korean Peninsula peace treaty simultaneously. On March 15, during a meeting with National Security Advisor Kim Kwan-jin, U.S. National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster stated that China's proposal could not be accepted. Furthermore, when Secretary of State Tillerson visited China on March 18, he reportedly urged China to strengthen sanctions against North Korea rather than engage in dialogue. While on the plane to China, Tillerson also remarked, "China has the ability to influence the North Korean regime to reconsider its provocations, but it has not used it sufficiently."

Trump is subtly provoking China's strategic interests. He has created tension in China by questioning the 'One China' policy, although it was eventually withdrawn, and in his first week in office, his White House spokesperson twice denied China's claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea. While the extent to which the Trump administration will challenge China's strategic interests and exert pressure remains to be seen, it is becoming relatively clear that U.S.-China relations will remain in a state of conflict for the time being. Notably, the United States is currently on the offensive, while China is on the defensive. For China, it will be difficult to deal with the Trump administration, which, unlike previous U.S. administrations, disregards international norms and operates with unpredictable, extreme policies. Therefore, China is likely to prioritize protecting areas vital to its interests, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. In such a scenario, China might show willingness to compromise with the U.S. on other agendas and regions. The North Korean nuclear issue will be situated at a certain point of compromise and conflict between the U.S. and China in this process. If China compromises with the U.S. by partially abandoning its strategic interest in North Korea, akin to 'lips and teeth' (脣亡齒寒), the Trump administration's policy of achieving North Korean denuclearization through pressure on China will gain momentum. The variable on the U.S. side is whether, in the process of conflict and compromise with China, the U.S. will exert sufficient pressure on China for North Korean denuclearization, even at the cost of sacrificing other interests. Given the weakening domestic support base, strained relations with European countries including NATO, and ongoing situations in Syria and Iran's nuclear program, it remains uncertain how much assets the Trump administration will leverage from a 'America First' perspective to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

However, if the Trump administration desires, it possesses means to pressure China. Firstly, the U.S. can significantly expand measures similar to the imposition of a record $1.192 billion fine on the Chinese company ZTE (中興), the largest ever for a foreign company, and ultimately implement a full secondary boycott. Additionally, the U.S. can take military actions such as deploying additional THAAD batteries to the Korean Peninsula, regularizing large-scale ROK-U.S.-Japan maritime exercises in the West Sea, permanently rotating strategic weapons including tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, deploying offensive weapon systems to the Pyeongtaek base which is strategically positioned to target China, and increasing U.S. carrier strike group patrols in the South China Sea. These measures are military options that the Trump administration, advocating 'peace through strength,' could consider, and if implemented, the pressure on China would be substantial. China will be forced to weigh its policy between the withdrawal of such U.S. actions and the denuclearization of North Korea through strong pressure, such as suspending oil supplies.

Another approach the Trump administration is considering for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is pressure on North Korea, including military strikes. The possibility of the Trump administration using military means against North Korea has been consistently mentioned by the government and Congress since the administration's inception. On February 8, Secretary Tillerson stated, "We will develop an approach to North Korea that includes the use of military force," and during his visit to South Korea in March, he reaffirmed that military action was not entirely excluded from U.S. considerations. On March 18, Devin Nunes, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, argued in an interview with Fox News, "As North Korea gets closer to developing the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon, we must be in a posture to act preemptively."

However, the possibility of a U.S. military attack on North Korea is highly limited. Currently, preemption and prevention strikes are proposed as military actions. A preemptive strike involves attacking first when there are imminent signs of an enemy attack. In North Korea's case, it would be a preemptive strike at the moment North Korea attempts to attack South Korea with a nuclear missile. While it is a natural choice under self-defense if clear signs are confirmed, it is very difficult to detect or identify in real situations, and securing sufficient time for a strike is also challenging. The 'Pukguksong-2' solid-fuel missile launched by North Korea on February 11, unlike liquid-fuel missiles that require 1 hour and 30 minutes, takes less than 10 minutes for fuel injection. Arithmetically, it is nearly impossible to detect and identify whether a North Korean missile is a nuclear-armed missile targeting South Korea, decide to strike, and destroy it within 10 minutes. The difficulty of preemptive strikes is also the reason why the establishment of a ballistic missile defense system, including THAAD, is necessary.

A preventive strike, which involves attacking facilities or weapons that pose a threat even without imminent signs of an enemy attack, is even more difficult to implement. The purpose of a preventive strike is to preemptively eliminate the source of threat posed by an adversary. However, North Korea already possesses a substantial number of nuclear weapons, and in addition to the Yongbyon reactor, it operates multiple secret uranium enrichment facilities. Furthermore, missile bases are scattered, including those in Tongchang-ri, and it possesses over 100 mobile missile launchers. To achieve the goal of a preventive strike to neutralize North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, the targets are too numerous, and prior information about the targets is insufficient. Moreover, the likelihood of the Trump administration, which emphasizes cost-benefit analysis, actually choosing preemptive or preventive strikes is even more limited than under previous administrations. This is because if a full-scale war erupts, the U.S. would be involved, incurring enormous costs. Trump emphasizes 'peace through strength' and advocates for building a strong military, but he maintains a cautious stance on the use of military force, except in situations where the U.S. homeland is directly attacked. Notably, Trump has criticized the George W. Bush administration's Iraq War and views pursuing regime change in other countries as a foolish policy, thus making it unlikely for him to adopt military measures that assume the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula.

Nevertheless, the continued mention of military means by the Trump administration serves as a form of signaling to North Korea. It is intended to pressure North Korea, which continues its nuclear and missile development, by posing a 'credible threat.' For a threat to be credible, there must be a demonstration of capability and willingness to use it. Trump's statement on Twitter that it "won't happen" without specifying clear methods and means to halt North Korea's nuclear and ICBM development can be interpreted as a strategy to pressure North Korea by maintaining strategic ambiguity that does not exclude military means. Trump has emphasized the importance of operating foreign policy based on unpredictability, both during his campaign and after becoming president. Trump himself has cited unpredictability as one of his greatest strengths, stating multiple times that "surprise brings victory" and "it is very important not to reveal your hand."

In conclusion, the Trump administration's North Korea policy is being formulated in a direction that seeks to resolve the issue by applying credible threats to North Korea while maximally pressuring China. Coercion and threats are prioritized, while the possibility of dialogue and compromise is deferred. When President Trump, who previously utilized the 'shock and awe' strategy in his real estate business to pressure opponents, immediately expressed it upon taking office through actions like withdrawing from the TPP, announcing the construction of a wall on the Mexican border, and banning Muslim immigration, the world was astonished. The U.S., a symbol of liberal democracy and the architect of international norms and principles that aimed to make the world predictable, implemented extreme policies based on uncertainty, a strategy typically chosen by states like Kim Jong-un's North Korea. However, paradoxically, the North Korean nuclear issue, which has remained unresolved for over 20 years, might find its answer in a 'shock and awe' strategy that deviates from existing frameworks and thinking. This is because, to make Kim Jong-un's North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons, which everyone assumes it will never give up, the Trump administration's policies, which disregard norms and principles and cross boundaries, might prove effective. However, the security dilemma that could be exacerbated by misperceptions of preemptive strikes and confusion between defense and offense must be managed. Furthermore, for these Trump administration policies to be effective, the prerequisite that the U.S. must incur the costs and efforts, even risking intensified conflict with China, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue must be met.

Author

Park Won-gon_ Professor of International Relations, Department of International Studies and Linguistics, Handong University. Advisor to the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Unification. Holds a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University. His main research areas include Northeast Asian international relations, security studies, diplomatic history, North Korean studies, and the ROK-U.S. alliance. His major works include "Evaluation of the Obama Administration's Foreign and Security Strategy and Prospects for the New Administration's Foreign Policy" (2016) (co-authored), "A Study on the Theory of Just War: A Comparison with Pacifism and Realism" (2016), "Changes in and Prospects for the East Asian Security Order: A South Korean Perspective" (2016), "A Theoretical Review and Critical Analysis of South Korea’s Proactive Deterrence Strategy" (2015), and "Future Vision for the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Focusing on Command Structure Reform" (2014).