[EAI Commentary] North Korea Policy of the Trump Administration: Pressure on China and the Realization of Credible Intimidation

[Editor's Note]

Following the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis to South Korea last month, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently visited China, Japan, and South Korea. During these visits, the Trump administration's North Korea policy has gradually begun to take shape. Professor Park Won-gon of Handong University analyzes that the Trump administration's North Korea policy is moving towards achieving denuclearization through increased pressure on China and North Korea, rather than dialogue. These pressure measures include military actions. The argument is that even though the possibility of actual military action is low, not ruling it out is a strategy to pressure North Korea by maintaining strategic ambiguity. In other words, the unpredictable possibility of extreme choices by the Trump administration can act as a psychological burden for North Korea.

The Trump administration's North Korea policy is taking shape. During his campaign, Trump presented various approaches to the North Korean nuclear issue. He expressed a range of views, from direct dialogue with Kim Jong-un, known as the 'hamburger summit,' to extremely strong countermeasures against North Korea. Notably, in April 2016, Trump made a blunt remark that made South Korea nervous: "If North Korea starts a war with South Korea and Japan, it will be a terrible situation... Good luck. You guys figure it out."

However, just 13 days after taking office as president, Trump sent Secretary of Defense James Norman Mattis on his first overseas trip as a cabinet member, choosing South Korea as the destination. Upon his visit to South Korea on February 2, 2017, Secretary Mattis's first statement was: "I was instructed to clearly convey that President Trump prioritizes the alliance between South Korea and the United States." He also stated that the Trump administration considers the North Korean nuclear issue a top priority in its security policy. This resolved the core doubts about Trump's North Korea policy and South Korea-U.S. alliance policy that had persisted for nearly a year. It was confirmed that the Trump administration had no intention of abandoning North Korea's nuclear weapons while also withdrawing the nuclear umbrella for South Korea, effectively dismantling the alliance. On March 17, 2017, U.S. Secretary of State Rex Wayne Tillerson, during his visit to South Korea, made more specific remarks regarding North Korea policy. First, he declared the Obama administration's attempted 'strategic patience' a failure and announced that they were "exploring a new category of diplomatic, security, and economic measures" for North Korea policy. He also stated that all options, including military action, would be considered, albeit on a principled level. Furthermore, targeting China, which emphasizes dialogue, he stated that dialogue based solely on a freeze of nuclear activities was premature, emphasized the 'role of China,' and raised concerns about China's oil supply to North Korea. Trump's remarks in Washington have also become increasingly tough. With his characteristic repetitive use of adjectives, President Trump stated, "North Korea's nuclear and missile threat is a very, very high priority" (February 12, 2017), "North Korea is a big, big problem" (February 13, 2017), and "Kim Jong-un is behaving very, very badly" (March 19, 2017), expanding the target of criticism from North Korea to its supreme leader.

Based on the situation thus far, the Trump administration's North Korea policy is culminating in achieving North Korean denuclearization through increased pressure on China and pressure on North Korea, including military strikes, making direct dialogue with North Korea relatively less likely. The Trump administration holds a negative stance on China's proposed 'dual suspension' (雙中斷), which would exchange a halt in North Korean nuclear and missile tests for a suspension of ROK-U.S. joint military exercises, and on 'dual-track parallel progress' (雙軌竝行), which would pursue North Korean denuclearization and a Korean Peninsula peace treaty simultaneously. On March 15, U.S. National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster stated to National Security Advisor Kim Kwan-jin that China's proposal could not be accepted. Furthermore, when Secretary of State Tillerson visited China on March 18, it was reported that he urged China to strengthen sanctions against North Korea rather than engage in dialogue. On the plane to China, Tillerson remarked, "China has the ability to influence the North Korean regime to reconsider its provocations, but it has not used it sufficiently."

Trump is subtly touching upon China's strategic interests. He has created tension in China by questioning the 'One China' policy, although it was eventually withdrawn, and in his first week in office, his White House press secretary twice denied China's claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea. While the extent to which the Trump administration will challenge China's strategic interests and pressure China remains to be seen, it is becoming relatively clear that U.S.-China relations will remain in a state of conflict for the time being. Notably, the United States is currently on the offensive, while China is on the defensive. For China, it will be difficult to deal with the Trump administration, which, unlike previous U.S. administrations, does not respect international norms and operates with unpredictable, extreme policies. Therefore, China is likely to prioritize protecting areas vital to its interests, such as the South China Sea and Taiwan. In that case, it may show willingness to compromise with the U.S. on other agendas and regions. The North Korean nuclear issue will be positioned at a certain point of compromise and conflict between the U.S. and China in this process. If China compromises with the U.S. by partially abandoning its strategic interest in North Korea, akin to 'lips and teeth' (脣亡齒寒), the Trump administration's policy of denuclearization through pressure on China will gain momentum. The variable on the U.S. side is whether, in the process of conflict and compromise with China, the U.S. will sufficiently pressure China for North Korean denuclearization at the cost of sacrificing other interests. Given the increasingly fragile domestic support base, difficult relations with European countries including NATO, and ongoing issues in Syria and Iran's nuclear program, it remains uncertain how much assets the Trump administration will utilize from a 'America First' perspective to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue.

However, if the Trump administration desires, it possesses means to pressure China. Firstly, the U.S. can significantly expand measures similar to the imposition of a $1.192 billion fine on Chinese company ZTE (中興), the largest ever for a foreign company, and ultimately implement a full secondary boycott. Additionally, the U.S. can take military actions such as deploying additional THAAD batteries to the Korean Peninsula, regularizing large-scale ROK-U.S.-Japan maritime exercises in the West Sea, permanently rotating strategic weapons including tactical nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula, deploying offensive weapon systems to the Pyeongtaek base which is strategically positioned to target China, and increasing aircraft carrier group patrols in the South China Sea. These measures are military options that the Trump administration, advocating 'peace through strength,' could consider, and if implemented, the pressure on China would be considerable. China will have to weigh its policy between the withdrawal of such U.S. actions and the denuclearization of North Korea through strong pressure, such as cutting off oil supplies.

Another approach the Trump administration is considering for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is pressure on North Korea, including military strikes. The possibility of the Trump administration using military means against North Korea has been continuously mentioned by the government and Congress since the administration's inception. Secretary Tillerson stated on February 8, "We will develop an approach to North Korea that includes the use of military force," and during his visit to South Korea in March, he reaffirmed that military action was not entirely excluded from U.S. considerations. Devin Nunes, Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, argued in a Fox News interview on March 18, "As North Korea gets closer to developing the capability to deliver a nuclear weapon, we must be in a posture to strike preemptively."

However, the possibility of a U.S. military attack on North Korea is very limited. Currently, preemptive strike and preventive strike are proposed as military actions. A preemptive strike is a first strike when signs of an enemy attack are imminent; in North Korea's case, it would be a strike at the moment it attempts to attack South Korea with a nuclear missile. While it is a natural choice under self-defense if clear signs are confirmed, it is very difficult to detect or identify in actual situations, and securing sufficient time for a strike is also challenging. The 'Pukguksong-2' solid-fuel missile launched by North Korea on February 11, unlike liquid-fuel missiles which take about 1 hour and 30 minutes, has a fueling time of less than 10 minutes. Arithmetically, it is nearly impossible to detect, identify, and decide to destroy a North Korean missile carrying a nuclear warhead aimed at South Korea within 10 minutes. The difficulty of a preemptive strike is also the reason why the establishment of a ballistic missile defense system, including THAAD, is necessary.

A preventive strike, which involves attacking facilities or weapons that pose a threat even when signs of an enemy attack are not imminent, is even more difficult to implement. The purpose of a preventive strike is to eliminate the source of threat posed by an adversary country in advance. However, North Korea already possesses a large number of nuclear weapons, and in addition to the Yongbyon reactor, it operates several secret uranium enrichment facilities. Furthermore, missile bases are scattered, including those in Tongchang-ri, and it possesses over 100 mobile missile launchers. To achieve the goal of a preventive strike to neutralize North Korea's nuclear and missile capabilities, there are too many targets, and insufficient prior information about them. Moreover, the Trump administration, which emphasizes cost-benefit analysis, is even less likely to choose a preemptive or preventive strike than previous administrations. This is because if it escalates into full-scale war, the United States would be involved, incurring enormous costs. Trump emphasizes 'peace through strength' and advocates for building a strong military, but he is cautious about using military force except in situations where the U.S. mainland is directly attacked. In particular, Trump has criticized the George W. Bush administration's Iraq War and views pursuing regime change in other countries as a foolish policy, making it unlikely that he would adopt military measures assuming the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula.

Тем не менее, постоянное упоминание военных средств при администрации Трампа носит характер сигнализирования (signaling) в отношении Северной Кореи. Цель состоит в том, чтобы оказать давление на Северную Корею, продолжающую разработку ядерного оружия и ракет, путем оказания на нее «достоверного запугивания» (credible intimidation). Для того чтобы угроза была достоверной, необходимо продемонстрировать наличие возможностей и воли к их применению. Интерпретировать выражение Трампа «этого не произойдет» (It won't happen) в Твиттере, без раскрытия четких способов и средств для прекращения разработки Северной Кореей ядерного оружия и МБР, можно как стратегию поддержания стратегической неопределенности, не исключающей военные средства, с целью оказания давления на Северную Корею. Трамп подчеркивает важность внешней политики, основанной на непредсказуемости, как во время избирательной кампании, так и после избрания на пост президента. Сам Трамп неоднократно заявлял, что считает свою непредсказуемость одним из своих главных преимуществ, говоря, что «внезапность приносит победу» и «очень важно не раскрывать свои карты». Поэтому, хотя вероятность фактического применения военных средств администрацией Трампа ограничена, она, тем не менее, не откажется от этой карты легко. Ключевым моментом является то, будет ли Северная Корея воспринимать возможность превентивных/предупредительных ударов США как реальность. Если Северная Корея будет обеспокоена непредсказуемостью администрации Трампа и возможностью принятия крайних политических решений, бремя разработки ядерного оружия и ракет значительно возрастет. Однако, если Северная Корея полностью осознает пределы вышеупомянутых превентивных/предупредительных ударов, работа Трампа по сигнализированию в отношении Северной Кореи будет ограничена.

In conclusion, the Trump administration's North Korea policy is being formulated in a direction that resolves the issue by maximally pressuring China while posing a credible threat to North Korea. Coercion and threats are prioritized, and the possibility of dialogue and compromise is deferred. When President Trump, who used the 'shock and awe' strategy to pressure opponents in his past real estate business, expressed it with lightning speed immediately after taking office through actions like withdrawing from the TPP, announcing the construction of a wall on the Mexican border, and banning Muslim immigration, the world was astonished. The United States, a symbol of liberal democracy and the establisher of international norms and principles that make the world predictable, implemented extreme policies based on uncertainty, similar to what a country like Kim Jong-un's North Korea might choose. However, paradoxically, the North Korean nuclear issue, which has remained unresolved for over 20 years, might find its answer in a 'shock and awe' strategy that deviates from existing frameworks and thinking. This is because, to make Kim Jong-un's North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons, which everyone assumes it will never give up, the Trump administration's policies, which disregard norms and principles and cross boundaries, might be effective. However, in this process, the security dilemma that could be exacerbated by misperceptions of preemptive strikes and confusion between defense and offense must be controlled. Furthermore, for these Trump administration policies to be effective, the prerequisite that the U.S. must invest the costs and efforts, even at the risk of escalating conflict with China, to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue must be met.

Author

Park Won-gon_ Professor of International Relations, Department of International Studies and Languages, Handong University. Advisor to the Ministry of National Defense and the Ministry of Unification. Obtained a Ph.D. in Diplomacy from Seoul National University. His main research areas include Northeast Asian international relations, security studies, diplomatic history, North Korean studies, and the ROK-U.S. alliance. His major works include "Evaluation of the Obama Administration's Foreign and Security Strategy and Prospects for the New Administration's Foreign Policy" (2016) (co-authored), "A Study on the Theory of Just War: A Comparison with Pacifism and Realism" (2016), "Changes in and Prospects for the East Asian Security Order: A South Korean Perspective" (2016), "A Theoretical Review and Critical Analysis of South Korea’s Proactive Deterrence Strategy" (2015), and "Future Vision of the ROK-U.S. Alliance: Focusing on Command Structure Reform" (2014).