[EAI Commentary No. 33] The Seoul-Washington-Tokyo Summit in The Hague: Adjusting U.S. Global Strategy and South Korea's Choices

Jeon Jae-sung is a professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University and currently serves as the Director of the Center for Asian Security Studies at the East Asia Institute (EAI). He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University.

The 3rd Nuclear Security Summit was held in The Hague, Netherlands. With the participation of heads of state from 53 countries and representatives from four international organizations, including the United Nations, the summit adopted the Hague Communiqué, reaffirming the commitment to continuously develop national efforts and international cooperation for nuclear material security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism, as established in the previous Washington and Seoul summits. However, the noble cause of nuclear security has, in fact, significantly diminished in importance, and world leaders were preoccupied with discussing regional issues. It felt as though the primary role of the Nuclear Security Summit had shifted to providing a venue for discussing various issues, given the large number of leaders gathered. Notably, President Obama used the summit as an opportunity to hold consecutive meetings with the European Union and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and even visited Saudi Arabia to discuss Middle Eastern affairs. It was a week that starkly illustrated the United States' situation, requiring comprehensive solutions for issues in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

As South Korea hosted the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit two years prior, follow-up measures for enhancing nuclear security would naturally attract attention. However, what truly captured the attention of the South Korean public was the 45-minute summit between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. The meeting's agenda was confined to trilateral cooperation for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Given the insufficient time for in-depth discussion, it merely reaffirmed the principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue that had been shared among the three countries. In reality, the true purpose of the summit was to find a breakthrough for improving the strained relations between South Korea and Japan. For the United States, in particular, it was imperative to lay the foundation for trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan before President Obama's visit to South Korea and Japan in April.

The U.S. effort to improve South Korea-Japan relations is essential for the success of its Asia Pivot strategy. The current international political landscape makes the U.S. situation even more urgent. While the U.S. convened world leaders in Washington four years ago for the Nuclear Security Summit to discuss global issues such as nuclear disarmament and nuclear security/terrorism prevention, it now appears to be prioritizing the resolution of emerging regional issues, with nuclear security taking a backseat.

The U.S. Put to the Test: Ukraine, the Middle East, and East Asia

The most prominent topic during this Nuclear Security Summit was undoubtedly the situation in Ukraine. The leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) issued the Hague Declaration on March 24th and convened the Group of Eight (G8) meeting in The Hague, excluding Russia, which was originally scheduled to be held in Sochi, Russia.

The U.S. and European countries declared Russia's annexation of Crimea a serious threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and a violation of international law, and agreed to jointly impose economic sanctions on Russia. They pledged to accelerate economic support for Ukraine and criticized Russia's actions for violating the Budapest Memorandum. Military support for Eastern European countries such as Georgia and Moldova was also strengthened. Leaders gathered to discuss post-modern issues of nuclear security and terrorism prevention found themselves engrossed in modern, traditional balance-of-power policies to prevent Russia's geopolitical expansion. Although there appeared to be no significant disagreements between the U.S. and European countries on the surface, the reality is more complex. While European countries criticize Russia's annexation of Crimea and participate in U.S.-led economic sanctions, they find it difficult to antagonize Russia. The European Union has adopted a cautious stance, characterizing economic sanctions on Russia not as punishment but as encouragement to correct Russia's behavior. European nations, heavily reliant on Russian natural gas for energy security, face significant burdens in reducing economic ties with Russia due to the lack of alternative energy sources. The prospect of European geopolitics escalating into a military confrontation between NATO and Russia, with Ukraine becoming a battleground, and Europe being divided into a pro-European Ukraine and a Russian-annexed Crimea, is also unacceptable. The underlying sentiment among European nations is to avoid a situation where Russia's subsequent actions in Ukraine accelerate, leading to a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.

The question remains whether the U.S. possesses the resources to continue eliciting cooperation from Europe. While the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions on Russia, it is a fact that beyond visa freezes, asset freezes, and suspension of G8 membership, there are few practical options available. A military confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia is virtually impossible. European countries, more dependent on Russia than the U.S., also perceive the U.S.'s hardline policy toward Russia as being U.S.-centric. In a meeting between the U.S. and the EU in The Hague, President Obama emphasized the need for Europe to reduce its reliance on Russian natural gas and diversify its imports. He also alluded to U.S. shale gas as an alternative energy source, expressing strong support for Europe. Although the limitations of the U.S. government's involvement in the energy market, which is primarily driven by corporations, were made clear, the U.S. did strive to highlight the incentives it could offer to Europe.

Few believe that Russia will reverse its annexation of Crimea. The simultaneous games unfolding in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia are tests of the U.S.'s will and capacity, as it seeks to readjust its global strategy to recover its leadership or navigate its decline. The critical questions are whether the U.S. possesses the diplomatic acumen to engage in geopolitical adjustments with other regional powers at a regional leadership level in the post-hegemonic unipolar era, whether it can maintain a U.S.-led world order while supporting its existing allies and strategic partners, and how earnestly it will address issues in Europe and the Middle East, despite its stated Asia Pivot strategy.

The situation in the Middle East also presents a challenge for the U.S. Having failed to demonstrate leadership in sanctioning the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons, the U.S. appears to be losing influence in Middle Eastern politics. Relations with traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia have soured since the Arab Spring, and even Israeli support is becoming fluid. The Iran nuclear negotiations, cautiously pursued with the help of European countries, could either significantly benefit or harm U.S. Middle East policy depending on future developments. As in Europe, the U.S. is continuously being evaluated on its willingness and capacity to exert leadership in Middle Eastern geopolitics. As the situation becomes more challenging, what the U.S. absolutely needs are its allies and strategic partners. In The Hague and Riyadh, President Obama consistently appealed for the support of allies. Given that the U.S. is compelled to pursue a strategy of retrenchment for the time being, it is difficult for it to regain hegemonic influence without the assistance of the 28 EU member states, the 28 NATO member states, and its Middle Eastern strategic partners. The trilateral summit between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan in The Hague is also within this context. If South Korea and Japan, which should be the two pillars of the Asia Pivot strategy, do not cooperate with each other, the U.S. Asia strategy will struggle to succeed. In the same vein as the significant setback for the U.S. when conflicts among EU or NATO member states prevent them from speaking with one voice on the Ukraine crisis, the South Korea-Japan conflict is also linked to the U.S.'s Asia strategy and, by extension, its global strategy.

The core of the U.S. Asia Pivot strategy is its strategy toward China. It is crucial for the U.S. to cooperate closely with China to restore its economic strength and address global issues such as climate change and cybersecurity. During the U.S.-China summit in The Hague, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to continue strategic cooperation within the framework of a new model of major power relations. The issue, however, is the ongoing geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. As China's power grows, it seeks to expand its influence over countries within the strategic space surrounding China, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea. China's preemptive actions to expand its influence into surrounding regions, as seen in the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incident late last year, have caused consternation among relevant countries. The U.S. faces a significant dilemma: whether it can demonstrate firm resolve and capability against China when China, like Russia in the Crimea incident, takes preemptive action followed by subsequent measures to solidify its fait accompli. In fact, the U.S. response to the ADIZ incident was disappointing from Japan's perspective. In a situation where the U.S. fails to demonstrate firm resolve, it is difficult for neighboring countries with high economic dependence on China to cooperate with the U.S. at the risk of Chinese economic retaliation. The economic dependence of East Asian countries on China is at a level that is difficult to directly compare with the energy dependence of European countries on Russia. In this context, the U.S. must manage its conflicts with China through strategic cooperation while also cooperating with East Asian countries, including South Korea and Japan, to adopt a common front against China.

U.S. Dilemmas and South Korea's East Asia Strategy

The U.S. effort to mediate South Korea-Japan relations also stems from the broader context of U.S. strategy. It is essential to accurately assess how much practical help the U.S. can provide to South Korea, which must rectify Japan's flawed historical perceptions. As the U.S. needs both South Korea and Japan for its Asia strategy, it will likely be satisfied as long as South Korea-Japan relations are adjusted to a level sufficient for implementing its envisioned strategic framework. While the U.S. may not be entirely devoid of the will to correct Japan's historical perceptions, it will be content if visible actions change, South Korea-Japan relations improve appropriately, and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan resumes. For South Korea, given the critical importance of its alliance with the U.S. for its national security strategy, it cannot continue to develop its cooperation with the U.S. while disregarding the trilateral cooperation desired by the U.S. Ultimately, South Korea must combine two equations: rectifying Japan's historical perceptions while simultaneously utilizing trilateral cooperation for its East Asia strategy. In this process, it is crucial to accurately recognize the extent of the U.S.'s role.

For the future of South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation, a critical task facing the South Korean government is to formulate an East Asia regional strategy. As South Korea stands to lose the most when U.S.-China competition escalates into military confrontation and great power politics determine the fate of the East Asian region, South Korea must establish mechanisms to promote cooperation among great powers and stably guide shifts in the balance of power. When South Korea and the U.S. can reach an agreement on a shared vision for an East Asia regional strategy, particularly regarding a strategy toward China, they can develop a common understanding and policy on Japan's regional role. Furthermore, it is necessary to present the logic and vision that the U.S. Asia Pivot strategy is more likely to succeed when Japan genuinely reflects on its past and reconciles with East Asian countries. In such a scenario, common ground will be established among the U.S. Asia strategy, South Korea's strategy toward Japan, and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for its research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. [EAI Commentary] aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite the source when quoting [EAI Commentary].