EAI Commentary No. 33: The Hague Summit between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan: Adjusting U.S. Global Strategy and South Korea's Choices

Jeon Jae-sung, professor of Political Science and International Relations at Seoul National University, currently serves as the director of the Center for Asian Security Studies at the East Asia Institute. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Northwestern University.

The 3rd Nuclear Security Summit was held in The Hague, Netherlands. In attendance were heads of state from 53 countries and representatives from four international organizations, including the United Nations. They adopted the Hague Communiqué, reaffirming their commitment to continuously advance national efforts and international cooperation to prevent nuclear material theft and nuclear terrorism, as established in the previous Washington and Seoul summits. However, the noble cause of nuclear security had, in fact, significantly diminished in importance, and world leaders appeared preoccupied with discussing regional issues. The Nuclear Security Summit, by bringing together many leaders, seemed to have shifted its primary role to that of a forum for discussing a variety of issues. President Obama, in particular, used the summit as an opportunity to hold successive meetings with entities such as the European Union and NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), and even visited Saudi Arabia to discuss Middle Eastern affairs. It was a week that starkly illustrated the United States' situation, requiring comprehensive solutions for issues in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

As South Korea had hosted the 2nd Nuclear Security Summit two years prior, follow-up measures to enhance nuclear security were of interest. However, what truly captured the attention of South Koreans was the 45-minute summit between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. The discussions were confined to trilateral cooperation for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. Given the extremely limited time for in-depth dialogue, the meeting merely reaffirmed the principles for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue that the three countries had already shared. In reality, the true purpose of the summit was to find a starting point for improving the strained relations between South Korea and Japan. The United States, in particular, felt compelled to hastily lay the groundwork for trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan ahead of President Obama's visit to South Korea and Japan in April.

The United States' efforts to improve South Korea-Japan relations are essential for the success of its Asia Pivot strategy. The current geopolitical landscape makes the U.S. position even more urgent. While four years ago, at the start of the Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. had gathered world leaders in Washington to discuss global issues such as nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear security threats and terrorism, it now appears that nuclear security has taken a backseat as the U.S. grapples with emerging issues in various regions.

The United States Tested: Ukraine, the Middle East, and East Asia

The most prominent topic during this Nuclear Security Summit was undoubtedly the situation in Ukraine. The leaders of the Group of Seven (G7) issued the Hague Declaration on March 24 and decided to hold the Group of Eight (G8) meeting, originally scheduled to take place in Sochi, Russia, in The Hague without Russia's participation.

The United States and European countries characterized Russia's annexation of Crimea as a serious threat to Ukraine's sovereignty and a violation of international law, and declared their intention to jointly impose economic sanctions on Russia. They pledged to accelerate economic support for Ukraine and criticized Russia's actions for violating the Budapest Memorandum. Military support was also promised to Eastern European countries such as Georgia and Moldova. Leaders gathered to discuss post-modern issues of nuclear security and the prevention of nuclear terrorism found themselves engrossed in modern, traditional balance-of-power policies to curb Russia's geopolitical expansion. Although there appeared to be no significant disagreements between the U.S. and European countries on the surface, the reality is more complex. While European countries criticize Russia's annexation of Crimea and participate in U.S.-led economic sanctions, they find it difficult to antagonize Russia. The European Union maintains a cautious stance, viewing the economic sanctions on Russia not as punishment but as encouragement to correct Russia's behavior. European nations, heavily reliant on Russian natural gas for energy security and lacking alternative energy sources, feel considerable burden in reducing economic ties with Russia. It is also unacceptable for Europe's geopolitics to escalate into a military confrontation between NATO and Russia, with Ukraine becoming a theater of conflict, potentially dividing Europe into a pro-European Ukraine and a Russia-annexed Crimea. The underlying desire of European countries is to avoid a situation where Russia's subsequent actions in Ukraine accelerate, leading to a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO.

The question remains whether the United States possesses the resources to continue eliciting cooperation from Europe. While the U.S. has imposed economic sanctions on Russia, it is a fact that beyond measures such as visa bans, asset freezes, and suspension of G8 membership, it has few practical options. A military confrontation with nuclear-armed Russia is virtually impossible to contemplate. European countries, more dependent on Russia than the U.S., also perceive the U.S.'s hardline policy toward Russia as being too U.S.-centric. President Obama, during a meeting between the U.S. and the European Union in The Hague, emphasized the need for Europe to reduce its reliance on Russian natural gas and diversify its imports. He also hinted at active U.S. support for Europe by mentioning U.S. shale gas as an alternative energy source. Although he clarified the limits of the U.S. government's involvement in the energy market, which is primarily driven by corporations, the U.S. clearly endeavored to highlight the incentives it could offer to Europe.

Few believe that Russia will reverse its annexation of Crimea. The current simultaneous games unfolding in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia are tests of the United States' willingness and capacity to adjust its global strategy for recovery or to restore its leadership. The question is whether the U.S. possesses the diplomatic skill to achieve geopolitical adjustments with other regional powers at a regional leadership level in the post-hegemonic unipolar era, whether it can maintain a U.S.-led world order while supporting its existing allies and strategic partners, and how much sincerity it can demonstrate in resolving issues in Europe and the Middle East, despite its stated Asia Pivot strategy. These are the critical tests.

The situation in the Middle East also presents a challenge for the United States. The U.S. has lost influence in Middle Eastern politics, failing to demonstrate leadership in sanctioning the Syrian regime for its use of chemical weapons. Relations with traditional allies such as Saudi Arabia have soured since the Arab Spring, and even Israel's support is fluid. The Iran nuclear negotiations, cautiously pursued with the help of European countries, could either significantly benefit or harm U.S. Middle East policy depending on future developments. As in Europe, the U.S. is continuously being evaluated on its willingness and capacity to exert leadership in Middle Eastern geopolitics. The more difficult the situation becomes, the more indispensable allies and strategic partners are to the U.S. At The Hague and in Riyadh, President Obama consistently appealed for the support of allies. As the U.S. is compelled to pursue a strategy of retrenchment for the time being, it is difficult to regain hegemonic influence without the assistance of the 28 member states of the European Union, the 28 NATO countries, and its strategic partners in the Middle East. The summit between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan in The Hague is also within this context. If South Korea and Japan, which should be the two pillars of the Asia Pivot strategy, do not cooperate, the U.S. Asia strategy will be difficult to succeed. Just as it is a significant setback for the U.S. when conflicts among EU or NATO countries prevent them from speaking with one voice on the Ukraine crisis, the conflict between South Korea and Japan is also connected to the U.S. Asia strategy, and indeed, its global strategy.

The core of the U.S. Asia Pivot strategy is its strategy toward China. It is crucial for the U.S. to cooperate closely with China to restore its economic power and address global issues such as climate change and cybersecurity. During the U.S.-China summit in The Hague, both countries reaffirmed their commitment to continue strategic cooperation within the framework of a new model of great power relations. The issue, however, is the ongoing geopolitical competition between the U.S. and China. As China's power grows, it seeks to expand its influence over countries within its strategic space, including the South China Sea and the East China Sea. China's preemptive actions to expand its influence into surrounding regions, as seen in the Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) incident late last year, have caused consternation among relevant countries. The question for the U.S. is whether it can demonstrate firm resolve and capability against China, should China, like Russia in the Crimea incident, take preemptive action and then follow up with subsequent measures to solidify the fait accompli. In fact, the U.S. response to the ADIZ incident was disappointing from Japan's perspective. In a situation where the U.S. fails to show firm resolve, it is difficult for neighboring countries, which are highly economically dependent on China, to cooperate with the U.S. without risking economic retaliation from China. The economic dependence of East Asian countries on China is at a level that is difficult to directly compare with the energy dependence of European countries on Russia. In this context, the U.S. must manage its strategic cooperation to avoid conflict with China, while simultaneously cooperating with East Asian countries such as South Korea and Japan to adopt a common stance toward China.

U.S. Concerns and South Korea's East Asia Strategy

The U.S. effort to mediate South Korea-Japan relations also stems from the broader context of U.S. strategy. It is essential to accurately assess how much practical help the U.S. can provide to South Korea, which needs to correct Japan's flawed historical perspective. For the U.S., which needs both South Korea and Japan for its Asia strategy, it would be sufficient if South Korea-Japan relations were adjusted to a level necessary for implementing its envisioned strategic picture. While the U.S. may not be entirely devoid of the will to correct Japan's flawed historical perspective, it would be satisfied if outwardly visible actions change, South Korea-Japan relations improve appropriately, and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan resumes. For South Korea, given the importance of its alliance with the U.S. in terms of national security strategy, it cannot continue to develop its bilateral cooperation with the U.S. while disregarding the trilateral cooperation desired by the U.S. Ultimately, South Korea must combine two equations: correcting Japan's historical perspective and utilizing trilateral cooperation for its East Asia strategy. In this process, it must accurately recognize the extent of the U.S. role.

For the future of South Korea-U.S.-Japan cooperation, a crucial task facing the South Korean government is to formulate an East Asia regional strategy. When U.S.-China competition escalates into military confrontation and great power politics determine the fate of the East Asian region, South Korea stands to lose the most. Therefore, South Korea must establish mechanisms to promote cooperation among great powers and stably guide changes in the balance of power. When South Korea and the United States can reach an agreement on a vision for an East Asia regional strategy, particularly a strategy toward China, they can develop a common understanding and policy regarding Japan's regional role. Furthermore, it is necessary to present a logic and vision that suggests the U.S. Asia Pivot strategy is more likely to succeed when Japan genuinely reconciles with East Asian countries through sincere reflection on its past. In such a scenario, common ground will be established among the U.S. Asia strategy, South Korea's strategy toward Japan, and trilateral cooperation among South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. ■

The East Asia Institute (EAI) receives financial support for research on middle power diplomacy from The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. EAI Commentary aims to provide in-depth analysis and practical alternatives through a balanced perspective on major domestic and international issues. Please cite EAI Commentary when quoting.