[EAI Policy Brief No. 32] North Korea's Maze Navigation in 2014: An Hermeneutics of the New Year's Address

Ha Young-sun, Chairman of the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Professor Emeritus at Seoul National University, currently serves as a member of the Presidential National Security Advisory Council. He holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Washington.

Kim Jong-un, the First Chairman of the Workers' Party of Korea, concluded 2013 with the execution of Jang Song-thaek and began the Year of the Horse with a New Year's address. While the North Korean populace was busy studying the address, the North Korean authorities strongly demanded the cessation of the ROK-US military exercises in mid-January and early February, proposing to halt slander and hostile acts and prevent nuclear disaster, thus sparking controversy over a "deceptive peace offensive." Government officials from relevant countries, including South Korea, and North Korea experts at home and abroad are wandering through the maze of North Korea in 2014 amidst subjective confusion between pessimism and optimism. To escape these difficulties and properly grasp Kim Jong-un's blueprint for 2014, as well as to devise desirable countermeasures, it is paramount to read the New Year's address correctly.

North Korea's New Year's address is not a mere propaganda piece. In his 2014 address, Kim Jong-un analyzes the current difficult situation, shaped by past perspectives, and seeks his own solutions within a limited future outlook. Therefore, rather than superficially skimming the address, which was carefully crafted according to guidelines likely established after the purge of Jang Song-thaek, using elementary methods such as content analysis, we must deeply understand the implied meanings by employing the hermeneutic method of "fusion of horizons."

Discourse Structure of North Korea's New Year's Address: 1-1-4-1-1

The first step in understanding the 2014 New Year's address is to interpret its discourse structure. North Korea's New Year's addresses have long maintained a 1-1-4-1-1 structure. The first '1' evaluates the past year, the second '1' presents the New Year's state policy guidelines, the third '4' emphasizes the strengthening of domestic revolutionary capabilities in the four major strongholds of socialist construction—politics and ideology, military, economy, and culture. The fourth '1' outlines the strengthening of South Korean revolutionary capabilities for national reunification, and the final '1' discusses the strengthening of international revolutionary capabilities to combat the anti-North Korea hostile policy of US imperialism. This perspective has overwhelmingly influenced the reality outlook of North Korean political leaders since Chairman Kim Il-sung presented the strengthening of the three revolutionary capabilities as a new political line in February 1964, instead of the military line of the Korean War in the 1950s.

The 2014 New Year's address maintains the 1-1-4-1-1 structure, reflecting the line of strengthening the three revolutionary capabilities. The sustained influence of the discourse structure signifies that there has been no change in the fundamental perspective with which the Kim Jong-un regime views the domestic, Korean Peninsula, and international realities. In other words, North Korea's basic perspective of viewing the world through the lens of enhancing the three revolutionary capabilities has not changed. While North Korea's specific actions in the unfolding inter-Korean situation in 2014 may change according to the stage, the overall framework of its actions is already set due to the limitations of its perspective.

Evaluation of 2013: The Year of the New Byungjin Line

Following the review of the New Year's address discourse structure, it is necessary to examine each item of the 1-1-4-1-1 structure in detail. The evaluation of the past year, corresponding to the first '1', holds significantly greater importance this year due to the Jang Song-thaek incident. There is still considerable confusion regarding how to interpret the Kim Jong-un-centric meaning of the Jang Song-thaek purge. The New Year's address, prepared immediately after the brutal execution of Jang Song-thaek, who was known as the second-in-command of North Korea's political power, best reflects Kim Jong-un's perspective on the Jang Song-thaek incident.

The New Year's address summarizes 2013 by stating, "Last year was a glorious year in which the entire party, the entire army, and all the people upheld the new Byungjin line presented by the Party and waged a general offensive, achieving brilliant victories in the construction of a socialist powerful state and the defense of socialism." The fact that First Chairman Kim Jong-un evaluates 2013 as the year of the new Byungjin line signifies that Kim Jong-un was at the center of the selection and promotion of this "line," and simultaneously implies that this "line" will continue to have a core influence on North Korea in 2014. Furthermore, the Jang Song-thaek incident is addressed at a lower level than the selection and promotion of the Byungjin line, as follows: "Last year, our Party took decisive measures to eliminate sectarian impurities that had existed within the Party during the crucial period of struggle for the construction of a powerful state. By uncovering and purging the anti-Party, anti-revolutionary factionalists at a critical juncture with precise decisions, our Party has further solidified the Party and the revolutionary ranks, and our unified solidarity has been magnified a hundredfold." This explanation suggests that First Chairman Kim Jong-un's purge of anti-Party, anti-revolutionary factions during the promotion of the Byungjin line in 2013 refers to the Jang Song-thaek incident. Kim Jong-un views the purge of Jang Song-thaek not as a difference in opinion on fundamental national strategic lines such as the Byungjin line, but from the perspective of consolidating the political and ideological stronghold, one of the four major strongholds for strengthening domestic revolutionary capabilities. Accurately understanding the significance of the Jang Song-thaek incident is directly linked to peering into the future of the Kim Jong-un regime. Although Jang Song-thaek's death shocked the North Korean populace and the international community, it has not caused significant qualitative changes in the short term to the fundamental perspective of the Kim Jong-un regime or the Byungjin line.

New Year's State Policy Guidelines: The Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea

Let us now explore the meaning of the New Year's state policy guidelines, corresponding to the second '1'. North Korea's maze navigation in 2014 presents three potential entrances: military-first, Byungjin, and reform and opening. Regardless of which entrance is chosen, the New Year's address indicates that North Korea's choice is the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea," as the goal of "Advanced Korea" is not easily visible.

The interpretation of this guideline, which simultaneously includes military-first and prosperity, requires caution. Referring to the second year of the Byungjin line as the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea" signifies, firstly, the intention to preserve the military stronghold of nuclear armament, which was built with all-out efforts during the military-first era, and secondly, the intention to build a strong economic stronghold on the foundation of the political and ideological stronghold, solidified by the purge of Jang Song-thaek, thereby ushering in an era of prosperity. Therefore, the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea" in 2014 substantively encompasses both the economy and nuclear weapons. However, it avoids the direct expression of nuclear armament construction used in the Byungjin line.

The Four Major Strongholds: Economy-Culture-Military-Politics and Ideology

In the third section of the New Year's address, the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea" is discussed, with particular emphasis and the largest allocation of space given to the economic stronghold. Agriculture, construction, and science and technology are highlighted as leading fields for the "torch of innovation." Subsequently, the economic stronghold is detailed with tasks to be carried out in sectors such as metallurgy, chemistry, power, coal, railway transport, light industry, fisheries, and resources. This is followed by the cultural stronghold, including education and sports; the military stronghold, emphasizing the strengthening of the People's Army and national defense industry; and finally, the consolidation of the political and ideological stronghold.

The fourth stronghold theory concludes by stating, "The political and ideological stronghold is the decisive bulwark that determines the victory or defeat in the struggle to defend socialism, and the political and ideological strengthening of the revolutionary ranks is the most important task facing us." Following the purge of Jang Song-thaek, it is stated, "This year, we must consolidate the Party organizationally and ideologically, firmly prepare all members of society as Juche followers of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and further strengthen the unified solidarity of the revolutionary ranks."

Inter-Korean Relations: Three Principles of National Reunification, Struggle for Defense of Security and Peace, Improvement of Relations

The section on inter-Korean relations in the New Year's address, which follows the discussion of domestic capabilities, is viewed by conservatives as a deceptive peace offensive with nothing new, while progressives see a need to explore potential for new changes. To read the New Year's address correctly, it is necessary to shed subjective interpretations of both conservatives and progressives and hermeneutically illuminate the Kim Jong-un regime's perspective.

The discussion of unification issues in the New Year's address consists of three elements. First, it clarifies the basic stance of emphasizing the Three Principles of National Reunification—independence from external forces, peaceful reunification, and great national unity—which have been stressed since the 1970s. "To resolve the issue of national reunification in accordance with the aspirations and demands of our nation, we must reject foreign forces and firmly adhere to the principle of our nation being one. [...] The North and the South must adhere to the principle of independence declared in the Three Principles of National Reunification and the North-South Joint Declaration, firmly stand on the principle of our nation being one, respect the Joint Declarations, and faithfully implement them."

Next, it states, "We must actively struggle to defend the security and peace of the nation," strongly criticizing the ROK-US military exercises and arguing that "if war breaks out on the Korean Peninsula, it will bring about immense nuclear disaster, therefore we must thwart and frustrate the confrontational and war-mongering schemes of internal and external warmongers."

As the final component, the New Year's address addresses the improvement of inter-Korean relations as follows: "We must create an atmosphere for improving North-South relations. It is already heartbreaking enough that our nation is divided and living apart due to foreign forces; it is unacceptable for compatriots to slander and distrust each other, as it will only benefit those who do not desire the reunification of Korea. The time has come to end the utterly useless slander and defamation, and we must no longer do things that hinder reconciliation and unity. [...] We will advance together with anyone who values the nation and desires reunification, regardless of their past, and will continue to actively strive for the improvement of North-South relations."

The "Let us open a path for the improvement of North-South relations with the united strength of our nation" proposal, announced on January 16 by the North Korean National Defense Commission as a significant proposal, concretizes the content of inter-Korean relations in the New Year's address by proposing the cessation of slander, the cessation of military hostile acts, and the prevention of nuclear disaster. This proposal has sparked debate among South and North Korean authorities regarding a "deceptive peace offensive." North Korea emphasizes only the third item among the three items concerning inter-Korean relations proposed in the New Year's address, while South Korea focuses on the first and second items following the third. Therefore, if North Korea's proposal is something new and not a deceptive peace offensive, North Korea must demonstrate a change in its perspective on the existing first and second items. South Korea, rather than simply responding to North Korea's proposal as a deceptive peace offensive, should present a concrete "genuine peace proposal" that can sufficiently clarify whether it is deceptive.

International Relations: Anti-Imperialist Struggle

The international relations section of the 2014 New Year's address clearly demonstrates that it has not moved beyond the past perspective emphasizing the US hostile policy toward North Korea, stating: "Last year, on the international stage, the interference and war schemes of imperialists, which threaten the sovereignty of sovereign states and the right to survival of humanity, continued incessantly. In particular, on the Korean Peninsula, the world's hottest hotspot, the nuclear war schemes of hostile forces aimed at crushing our Republic created an imminent war risk, severely threatening the peace and security of the region and the world." Therefore, it emphasizes, "We will defend the sovereignty and peace of our country and firmly protect the dignity of our nation with powerful self-reliant strength."

Although North Korea avoids directly stating its intention to build nuclear capabilities, it expresses its resolve not to abandon nuclear weapons, its "ultimate sword" for survival, by emphasizing the risk of nuclear war and the need for powerful self-reliant strength. The 2014 New Year's address does not indicate any possibility of North Korea adopting a new security perspective that excludes nuclear weapons. For North Korea, nuclear weapons remain the "ultimate sword" for survival.

Internal Contradictions in the 2014 New Year's Address

Despite the 2014 New Year's address placing the greatest emphasis on strengthening the domestic economic stronghold for the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea," its discussions on inter-Korean relations and international relations remain within traditional past perspectives, revealing internal contradictions. Based on the Three Principles of National Reunification, it is unrealistic for South Korea to accept the proposal to create an atmosphere for improving inter-Korean relations, which is based on a limited North Korean perspective of "independence" and "nation," while simultaneously struggling for the nation's security and peace. Therefore, the New Year's address's policy toward South Korea is bound to contradict North Korea's economic development.

Furthermore, the Kim Jong-un regime's desire to strengthen the domestic economic stronghold while simultaneously showing a limited perspective of resolutely confronting the anti-US imperialist hostile policy with nuclear weapons in international relations in 2014 is unrealistic. Unless the sincerity of denuclearization is internationally recognized, North Korea will have to continue its arduous march of building its economic stronghold without international assistance.

In terms of strengthening domestic capabilities, the purge of Jang Song-thaek makes it unlikely that a force challenging Kim Jong-un will emerge in the political and ideological stronghold in the near future. Furthermore, the development of nuclear weapons and missile capabilities has at least secured the military stronghold. However, even with maximum internal efforts to build the economic stronghold to usher in the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea," it will be difficult to achieve the expected results without proper improvement in inter-Korean relations and international relations. While Kim Jong-un may hope that the 2015 New Year's address will describe 2014 as a "glorious year that ushered in the Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea," the outlook is bleak.

Navigating the Korean Peninsula Maze

지난해 10월 동아시아연구원(East Asia Institute: EAI)은 <Proposal for a New North Korea Policy: Towards the Evolution of the Trust Process> The report emphasizes that North Korea must evolve beyond its self-contradictory current economic-nuclear Byungjin line towards a Byungjin 2.0 line that pursues economic construction and non-nuclear security. It also proposes a complex North Korea strategy encompassing phases of "deterrence-engagement-trust" to support such changes in North Korea and formulate South Korea's new North Korea policy.

The Kim Jong-un regime cautiously presented the "Era of Prosperity of Military-First Korea" as its official state policy guideline for 2014, replacing the economic-nuclear Byungjin line of 2013. However, nuclear weapons have not disappeared from North Korea's perspective. For North Korea to truly usher in an "Era of Prosperity of Advanced Korea," it must demonstrate sincerity in denuclearization and earnestly embark on the path of "peaceful economic construction and improvement of people's livelihoods." A North Korean-style peace development theory is needed.

North Korea's New Year's address must be rewritten. Strengthening domestic capabilities should prioritize economic stronghold construction based on the Byungjin 2.0 line of economic construction and non-nuclear security, while establishing a non-nuclear security system in the military stronghold and reinforcing the political and ideological stronghold to promote Byungjin 2.0. Inter-Korean relations should present a new South Korea policy, not a peace offensive based on the Three Principles of National Reunification. International relations must also overcome the perspective of anti-US struggle as soon as possible and demonstrate a new, evolved perspective of "autonomous coexistence."

South Korea's North Korea policy should focus on supporting North Korea's adoption and implementation of the new Byungjin 2.0 line. In her article "A Journey Towards a New Inter-Korean Relationship" published in Project Syndicate on December 30, 2013, President Park Geun-hye summarized the future direction of North Korea policy as "maintaining strong deterrence," "upgrading the Korean Peninsula Trust Process," and "joint development of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia through North Korea's denuclearization."

To escape the escalating crisis on the Korean Peninsula without worsening it, maintaining and strengthening deterrence against North Korea must be the primary principle of South Korea's North Korea policy. Throughout 2014, North Korea will likely exert all its efforts to strengthen its economic stronghold, but it will be difficult to achieve the expected results without sincerity in improving inter-Korean relations or denuclearization. Therefore, North Korea's only breakthrough lies in the Byungjin 2.0 theory of economy and non-nuclear security. It is difficult for Kim Jong-un to make a decision to change his strategic line based on "upgrading trust" measures such as promoting humanitarian aid to North Korea, arranging reunions for separated families, and resolving the issue of prisoners of war and abductees. A peace and prosperity system for the Korean Peninsula and East Asia that can guarantee North Korea's non-nuclear security is necessary. Promoting this more earnestly to support North Korea's strategic line change, such as the adoption of Byungjin 2.0, should be the second principle of South Korea's North Korea policy. The third principle of South Korea's North Korea policy is international cooperation, closely coordinating with relevant parties, including the United States and China, to establish such a peace and prosperity system. Finally, the fourth principle is to prepare phased trust-building measures corresponding to the developments in the situation to help the Korean Peninsula move from the current crisis phase through a transitional phase into a negotiation phase. ■

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